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Tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introductory Note by the Secretariat

At the CCD's informal meeting held on 23 February 1978, the representative of India, speaking as Chairman of the Group of 15 requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of working papers and proposals submitted to the CCD on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The present document incorporates the relevant parts of the working papers and proposals on the subject submitted to the CCD as well as a number of documents of the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session Devoted to Disarmament in accordance with the decision taken by the CCD's Ad Hoc Working Group at its meeting of 22 March 1978.

The contents of the following documents are tabulated in the original wording and in chronological order starting with CCD documents, followed by Preparatory Committee documents:

1. US/USSR: Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, 19 March 1962, ENDC/5
2. Netherlands: Working paper containing some introductory Remarks or Steps Toward a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, 24 February 1970 CCD/276
3. Italy: Working paper on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 19 August 1970, CCD/309
4. Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia: Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 27 August 1970, CCD/313
5. Romania: Steps to be taken with a Disarmament Programme, 13 March 1975, CCD/449
6. USSR: Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Questions of Ending the Arms Race and Disarmament, 15 February 1977, CCD/522

7. Mexico: Working Paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a preliminary Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 23 August 1977, CCD/545

8. Italy: Working Paper on the Question of the Drafting of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 31 January 1978, CCD/548

9. Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Working paper on a draft programme of action, 2 February 1978, CCD/549 and Corr.1

10. Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire: Working document containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation, 16 February 1978, CCD/550 and Corr.1

11. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working Paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 21 February 1978, CCD/552

12. Romania: Working Paper on the Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 21 February 1978, CCD/553

13. Sweden: Working paper on elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations, 21 February 1978, CCD/554

14. Nigeria: Suggestions for inclusion in a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, 24 February 1978, CCD/555

15. Mexico: Working paper on some fundamental principles and norms for inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977, 10 March 1978, CCD/560

16. Mexico: Working paper on an outline of a draft final document of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 10 March 1978, CCD/561 and Add.1.

17. Romania: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on a programme of measures and action (A/AC.187/78).

18. Romania: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on a negotiating machinery for disarmament problems (A/AC.187/79)

19. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/81).

20. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and USSR: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Working paper on basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament (A/AC.187/82).

21. Japan: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper containing a proposal concerning the conventional arms race (A/AC.187/86).

22. USSR: Working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.187/98).

I. INTRODUCTION

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 197
Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on 30 March 1961. Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace. Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly resolution 1378(XIV) of 20 November 1959. Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.	In resolution 1722(XVI) of 20 December 1961 by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the ENDC, it was recommended that the new Disarmament Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee should in its work take into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of the aforementioned principles. Paragraph 8 of the agreed principles stipulates that efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme for general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme. Since then progress has been made first and foremost in the field of collateral measures. But for reasons which are well known the hope that the main task of the Committee could be dealt with without interruption, "as a matter of the utmost urgency" (Res. 1722(XVI)), remained unfulfilled. In the course of its existence the Committee "gradually concentrated more of its efforts on the partial and confidence-building, or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called, than on general and complete disarmament".[*] This trend is discernible in the Provisional Agenda of work of the Committee, adopted in August 1968. Likewise, in its report to the XXIVth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Committee recognizes "the relationship of the various measures already achieved and those currently being considered toward the ultimate goal of	The Italian delegation considers that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should increase its efforts to give effect to resolution 2602 E concerning the question of general and complete disarmament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session. The part of that resolution which seems to us most faithfully to reflect the arguments presented in the United Nations by a large number of countries wishing to give a fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations is to be found in paragraph 4 of the operative part. The instructions given in that paragraph are closely related to the proposals for the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Italy at Geneva at the two preceding sessions of the Conference (see Working Papers ENDC/245 of 21 April 1969 and ENDC/263 of 23 August 1969). With a view to facilitating the opening of a highly desirable discussion on this comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Italian delegation, as members of the Conference are aware, has at the present session taken the initiative of organizing contacts with a number of other interested delegations with the idea of engaging in exchanges of view such as may give rise to a basic plan for possible subsequent discussion by the Conference.	The present Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in compliance with the request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) approved on 16 December 1969, by which the Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. From the contents of this resolution it follows that the General Assembly: 1. Has reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Nations in the attainment of disarmament. 2. Continues to consider, as it did in 1959, that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. 3. Has recommended that the negotiations related to disarmament should be based on the principles incorporated in the Joint Statement submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 20 September 1961, which was welcomed by the General Assembly. 4. Has the conviction that the current negotiations which must be continued and intensified, as well as the ones to be initiated should strive to achieve, in a parallel form, the cessation at an early date of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of additional agreements on specific collateral measures, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 5. Has the conviction that all governments should intensify without delay their concerted efforts towards the achievement of the objectives defined in the previous paragraph, and that the participation of all nuclear weapon powers is indispensable for a full measure of success in these efforts.	(See Chapter VIII)	At the present time, new prerequisites, both political and material, for more resolute progress towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament are now taking shape. In the past, including the years preceding the Second World War and the first post-war decades, such prerequisites did not exist. They do exist now. It is the duty of all States to make the utmost use of them in the interests of international peace and security and in the interest of the peoples. The Soviet Union is prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct negotiations on the most radical disarmament measures, going even so far as general and complete disarmament. It is prepared, in concert with its Warsaw Treaty allies, to take steps for the reciprocal dismantling of counterbalancing military-political groupings of States or, to begin with, of their military organizations. If not all parties are prepared to set about realizing these objectives at once, they should do so gradually, step by step. What is most important is to move on from discussions on ending the arms race to practical action.	In its resolution 2602 E(XXIV) of 16 December 1969 the United Nations General Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and inter alia requested the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations". A number of suggestions and documents were submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during 1970. In its resolution 2661 C(XXV) of 7 December 1970, the General Assembly inter alia expressed "its appreciation of the important and constructive documents and views submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including the working papers on a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the Netherlands on 24 February 1970 and by Italy on 19 August 1970, and the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 1 December 1970". In the same resolution, the General Assembly recommended to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "that it take into account in its further work and its negotiations" the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia (document A/8191) "as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future". In 1974 and 1975 the General Assembly adopted resolutions 3261 A (XXIX) and 3470 (XXX) which, in reviewing the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, urged that new efforts should be made to negotiate effective disarmament measures. At the 1975 session of the CCD Romania submitted a document entitled	

under effective international control".

Mainly as a result of the initiatives of the Romanian delegation (ENDC/PV.400) and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the XXIVth session of the General Assembly declared the seventies as a Disarmament Decade. Disarmament and social and economic development are the main objectives of all mankind for the coming years.

6. Has the conviction that peace, security and the strengthening of confidence in the world are correlated with progress in the field of disarmament and that from this progress particularly important economic and social consequences may derive.

7. Has the conviction that the diversion of enormous resources and energy, human and material, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to an unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries.

8. Has recommended that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress.

In the light of the above it would seem fully justified to state that the request of the General Assembly implies that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but all negotiations and other acts on this matter, whichever the forum and the form in which they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and ensure that the United Nations General Assembly be kept informed on their progress so as to permit it the proper performance of its functions including the constant evaluation of the situation.

In preparing the comprehensive programme, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has endeavoured to adjust itself not only to the last two requisites but also to the basic points that have been outlined at the beginning derived from an analysis of resolution 2602 E (XXIV). It is therefore in the light of those elements that the contents of the comprehensive programme that is now hereby submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration at its twenty-fifth session, should be interpreted.

It seems advisable to point out likewise that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same manner as it has been done in the various forums of the United Nations, that is, a a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the limitation, the reduction, or the elimination of armaments.

ment programme" (CCD/449)]. At the 1976 session Nigeria submitted a working paper on Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade (CCD/510) in which it referred *inter alia* to the adoption of a comprehensive programme as a primary obligation of the CCD during the Disarmament Decade.

On 10 December 1976 the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/68 in which *inter alia* it urged "the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to adopt, during its 1977 session a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade".

The present comprehensive programme of disarmament has been prepared in accordance with that request of the General Assembly.

In the light of the contents of resolutions 2602 E (XXIV) and 31/68 it would seem fully justified to state that the General Assembly's request means that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations conducted and other acts performed in this matter, in whatever place and form they are carried on, and that the programme should include effective procedures to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and to ensure that the United Nations General Assembly is kept informed of their progress so as to be able to perform its functions, including the continuous appraisal of the situation, properly.

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same sense in which it has been used in the various forums of the United Nations: that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, limitation, reduction or elimination of armaments or for the reduction of military forces.

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*/ The UN and Disarmament 1945-65, chapter 6, page 115.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
The States members of the United Nations at the eighth Special Session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States members therefore believe that a serious world-wide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes; to uphold the international rule of law: and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.	Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction on account of the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons man has ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone, at the disposal of only a few States, are sufficient to destroy all life on earth several times over. Yet the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated. This situation not only jeopardizes the peace and security of all States, but acts as a stimulating factor for the persistence of international tensions and conflicts in various regions of the world, aggravates existing differences among nuclear-weapons States, consolidates military alliances and brings ever nearer the threat of a nuclear confrontation for which nuclear-weapons States are in an ever-increasing stage of readiness. Furthermore, the arms race, which is both the cause and result of great Power rivalry, impedes the realization of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, especially those relating to the respect for sovereignty, the refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and adversely affects the right of peoples to freely determine their systems of social and economic development, the struggle of peoples against colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Military expenditures have reached the staggering figure of about $400 billion a year, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to nuclear-weapons States and their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of increasing expenditure spreading to other countries. Vast human, natural scientific, technological and financial resources are thus wasted in the preparation for war, when these resources could be channelled to eradicate hunger, disease and other pressing economic and social problems hampering development in many parts of the world. Disarmament has become the most urgent international objective. However, no real progress has been		The need for a comprehensive programme of disarmament has evolved together with the increasing awareness that disarmament is a matter of universal concern and consequently it requires intensive and well organized efforts by all States. Past experiences in the field of disarmament negotiations have also demonstrated that measures, conceived separately and uncoordinated within a global perspective did not suffice to launch the process of a real disarmament, and had no practical effect on the dynamics of the arms race which continued unhindered and failed to mobilize the world-wide efforts towards disarmament.		In declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade the United Nations General Assembly in the relevant resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 directed the Conference of the "Committee on Disarmament while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations". The time lapse between the adoption of that resolution and today has served to further strengthen the need for such a Comprehensive Programme which is now universally recognized as an essential element in the disarmament process. Negotiations in the CCD itself have been taken up in a rather haphazard manner depending mainly on the convenience of the co-chairmen or their perspective of what is ripe for consideration. Negotiations have also been taken up outside the CCD on issues of interest but with very little coordination with either the CCD or the United Nations. While it is recognized that the multifora approach to disarmament is useful and perhaps inevitable, it is essential to ensure the interrelationship of these efforts and their coordination so as to facilitate periodic review of overall progress.	

ments that have been reached so far relate only to measures of limited restraint, but have not slowed the pace of the arms race, the only genuine disarmament agreement having been the Convention on the Prohibitiion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction. Negotiations for general and complete disarmament have been virtually abandoned for more than a decade.

General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapons States.

I. INTRODUCTION (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98 2 February 1978
It will, we believe, be obvious to anyone with some experience of disarmament negotiations that, in the five months which remain before not only the opening but the closure of the special session, it would be Utopian to think of completing the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that would obtain general approval. It is for that reason that we have put forward the idea of making provision, in the Plan of Action included in the working paper, for a Three-Year Disarmament Plan as a purely transitional measure. Such a plan - as was stated as long ago as 1 September 1977, when the representative of Mexico in the Preparatory Committee explained this point at the 16th meeting of the Committee - would not try to present a more or less exhaustive catalogue of disarmament measures that would be fated, as has happened so often in the past, to remain a scrap of paper. It would include only a selection of such measures, chosen from among the most urgent and meaningful ones, which it is thought may realistically and objectively be considered capable of being transformed into reality during the three-year period from June 1978 to May 1981. In this sense, therefore, the draft Programme of Action is not too ambitious. At the same time, however, in order to stress the transitional nature of this procedure and the fact that it in no way means the abandonment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the draft provides for another procedure which appears best suited for ensuring that, within a period of roughly 2½ years, it will be possible to draft a comprehensive, thoroughly negotiated programme, the implementation of which should lead to the attainment of that goal. The Three-Year Plan also includes provisions that will enable the General Assembly to keep the manner in which the Plan is being implemented under periodic review and to consider and adopt, as a second special session devoted to disarmament that would be held in May-June - or perhaps in May-July 1981 - the comprehensive programme of disarmament which will have been drafted.	(See Chapter VIII)	Governments have not yet applied to the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the resolute and decisive measures which could bring about the reduction and elimination of arms and protect mankind from the danger of a new war. While the treaties and conventions concluded in recent years have made some contribution to creating a climate of understanding, they have not proved capable of curbing the arms race or ensuring the implementation of effective disarmament measures and they do not deal with the basic aspects of the armaments problem, notably nuclear weapons.	Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great. They include the Soviet-United States agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and at limiting strategic arms, as well as the Soviet-French agreement on the prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. They also include such measures for limiting the nuclear arms race as the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and on the non-emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and also the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. An important role in curbing the arms race belongs to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other measures agreed upon in recent years for preventing the spread of such weapons. These steps also include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes. Important proposals for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, for the prohibition of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are on the negotiating table. Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and on further limitation of the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States are currently in progress. A proposal has been submitted calling upon all the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The question of concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is under consideration. Thus, the political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The crucial question now is to translate into practical terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear		Since the end of the Second World War, millions of lives have been lost as a result of military conflicts employing conventional weapons. The international community is witnessing an increase in the arms build-up in many parts of the world, to which the growing international transfer of conventional arms has been one of the major contributors. This trend, if continued, could further intensify the potential for conflicts. It is encouraging that, after a long period of negligence, a great number of countries now feel concern over the conventional arms race and, in particular, the increasing international transfer of conventional arms. As a result, a wide consensus is now emerging in favour of having these issues considered at the special session. These sentiments have been made clear by the statements of many States before the Preparatory Committee and at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, and in their views on the special session submitted to the Secretary-General. A number of private organizations concerned with disarmament have also supported these views.	

developing.

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.	In the relevant resolution the General Assembly endorses the view that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal. Toward that end, the Assembly requests this Committee: 1. to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures; 2. to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects on the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations. In its last report to the General Assembly the Committee expressed its conviction of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. The Netherlands delegation fully shares the opinion that the strategic arms limitation talks, which had a promising beginning, are of the utmost importance. They may create a new and more rational relationship in the strategic balance of the two superpowers. Their successful outcome would certainly facilitate the conclusion of further measures in the field of armaments limitation and ultimately of disarmament. The consideration of a comprehensive programme inevi-	United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378(XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722(XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up-to-date. United Nations General Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: '... to work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ...' (CCD/275). Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The highest priority should be accorded to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament.	The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and economic and social progress are attained.		In a situation in which nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, complete nuclear disarmament becomes the most important measure. The Soviet Union has always favoured the banning of nuclear weapons and their exclusion from the arsenals of States. It worked for this when nuclear weapons had just appeared. At that time the stockpiles of such weapons were not large and it was relatively easier to agree on their prohibition and elimination. Now that nuclear weapons have grown into a huge complex of types and systems of means of destruction, diverse in purpose, capacity and ways of delivering nuclear charges to the target, the problem of eliminating them has become much more difficult. But it can be solved in the present situation as well. The first thing necessary for this purpose is to stop the arms race, that is, to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons. At the same time, or immediately after that, reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons should commence, with the transfer of nuclear materials thus released to peaceful sectors of the economy. The ultimate goal of the reduction should be the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons - strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction of their means of delivery. Naturally, simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, measures should be taken for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and armaments of conventional types, which also pose a considerable threat to the world's peoples. It is evident that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only if all States possessing nuclear weapons take part in it. It is inconceivable that some nuclear Powers should be moving ahead towards eliminating their nuclear weapons while others are stockpiling and perfecting them. Therefore, all nuclear Powers should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as has been already stated by the Soviet side, to sit down at any time at the negotiating table together with all the other nuclear Powers for a comprehensive	The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and the New International Economic Order is attained.	The ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In view of the achievement of this final objective, agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and phased negotiating programme, dealing with all aspects of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

priorities and deadlines. In this connexion reference should be made to the proposal of Sweden (ENDC/PV.397) for "balanced package deals" and of India for a "selective approach" (ENDC/PV.404).

It is, of course, in the nature of things, when there is a whole range of topics, to establish some sort of order of priorities. However, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation such a list can only be of a very tentative character. It should be flexible and may be subject to change - as has already been shown in the past - inasmuch as the political realities of the moment require. One should not overlook that the "partial measures" which have been adopted or are now under discussion, are, in fact, elements of different stages of the proposals for general and complete disarmament.

problem in its full scope and for a joint elaboration of concrete ways of its practical solution. The Soviet Union has no objection to non-nuclear Powers also taking part in such negotiations, since all countries and all the peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
The States members of the United Nations at the eighth Special Session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States members therefore believe that a serious world-wide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes: to uphold the international rule of law: and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.	General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapons States. Progress towards this objective would require the conclusion and implementation of agreements on genuine measures of disarmament according to the Programme of Action on Disarmament, the first priority of which shall be the outlawing of nuclear war, and the elimination of nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind. High priority must also be given to disarmament measures relating to all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Conventional weapons which give cause for grave concern should also be the object of disarmament agreements in the context of general and complete disarmament. The Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting the arms race and starting the process of genuine disarmament leading towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The order of priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be as follows: Nuclear weapons a. Prohibition of the use and as a first step, renunciation of nuclear weapons against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories. b. Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. c. The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their complete elimination constitutes an indispensable step towards avoidance of the danger of nuclear war and the setting in motion of the process of disarmament. d. The immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests is a most important task, and responsibility in this regard rests with the nuclear-weapon States. e. The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes. f. Urgent steps also are: - cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance, - freezing of the qualitative improvement of	The relaxation of international tension and related positive political processes can become truly established if they are accompanied and strengthened by measures of military détente, i.e. by new tangible results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. The principal and ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a firm and long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale. Specific partial measures aimed at limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the road to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a stable peace. Such partial measures should entail the prohibition and destruction of certain types of existing armaments, prevention of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the exclusion of certain spheres or regions of the world from the arms race, the systematic reduction of the military expenditures of States, the limitation of armaments and the achievement of disarmament on a regional basis, as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament. All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to adopt a constructive approach to negotiations and to demonstrate the political will to reach agreements.	The aim of the elaboration of a global programme for disarmament is to set in motion a guideline to chart the negotiations in this field so that the disarmament process could follow a rational course according to established objectives. A comprehensive programme of disarmament should answer the following three basic requirements: a. It should establish a unified concept for the organization of the negotiations in the field of disarmament. b. It should provide a system of disarmament measures, organically subordinated to the ultimate goal which is general and complete disarmament, thus integrating and co-ordinating the negotiations in a world-wide disarmament strategy. The negotiations should be carried on concurrently on several measures so that the efforts so organized could influence and support each other and open the way for further steps. To that end, absolute priority should be given to nuclear armaments given the grave danger they present for humanity and their impact for the acceleration of the arms race in other fields. c. It should be comprehensive, e.g. it should deal with all aspects of the problem of disarmament. Therefore, the programme should provide, along with the measures aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, intermediary steps, such as confidence building, collateral and partial measures. As to its scope, the negotiating programme should stimulate the universal and the regional as well as the bilateral efforts, all of them incorporated in the requisite global planning of the agreed objectives. The arms race carries with it the germ of the disruption of the military balance. A primary purpose of the comprehensive disarmament programme should be, therefore, the planning of the efforts aimed at preserving security and the military balance not through an increase in armaments but through their reduction. Consequently, the programme should aim at crossing the line from		Thus the aim of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will have to be broadened beyond the original perspective of the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV). Such a programme should form a reference point not only for the CCD but for disarmament negotiations conducted in all other fora, so that taken together, these negotiations form a co-ordinated effort that will permit discernible progress in the overall objectives of general and complete disarmament. The ultimate objective of disarmament negotiations is the attainment of general and complete disarmament which will facilitate conditions of peace, security and a new international economic order. To this end a comprehensive programme of disarmament should aim at providing negotiators, at whatever forum, with an orderly, well balanced programme complete with a system of priorities and co-ordination that will ensure discernible and constant progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.	See chapter III

- prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems

The two leading nuclear-weapons States bear a particular responsibility with regard to the realization of the above measures, while the other nuclear-weapons States, as well as militarily significant States should contribute towards the attainment of these objectives.

g. Other measures:

i. Establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of arrangements among States of such regions. Respect by nuclear-weapons States of these zones and the statutes thereof by means of legally binding international instruments that include the obligation to refrain from the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones. The process of establishing such zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

ii. The status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be respected by all States, particularly by nuclear-weapons States and the major maritime users. In addition it would be desirable to create zones of peace in the region of the Mediterranean and wherever feasible.

iii. The formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, pending their final elimination.

Chemical weapons

The complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a treaty on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

Incendiary weapons and other specific conventional weapons with especially inhuman effects

The reaching of agreement on the prohibition or limitation of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons as well as use of specific types of conventional weapons which are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, constitutes an urgent task. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task as provided for in the General Assembly resolution convening the United Nations Conference in 1979.

Other weapons of mass destruction

Conclusion of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Conventional weapons

a. Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons and new systems of such weapons.

to real disarmament measures.

This implies, among others, that the basic factor in the elaboration of the comprehensive disarmament programme is the political will of States.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
	b. The limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons on a global basis should be resolutely pursued in the context of general and complete disarmament. The limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe would constitute a significant step for the attainment of that goal. The States participating in negotiations on such measures in central Europe should therefore exert all efforts for the purpose of concluding, as soon as possible, an agreement on the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in that region. Reduction of armed forces The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfilment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency: a. Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament. b. Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the 35th regular session of the General Assembly in 1980 at the latest.					

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
			The political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The crucial question now is to translate into practical terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, developed and developing.		It is clear beyond question that nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. It is, however, also evident that the goal of general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved without curbing the conventional arms race. The special session should, therefore, take up this question with a view to initiating a comprehensive study as a preliminary step to its final solution within the framework of general and complete disarmament.	

III. PRINCIPLES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme. (Also see Chapters II, IV, VI, VII, VIII)		United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up to date. United Nations General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: '... to work out .... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ...' (CCD/275). Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control . As regards the nature of the programme which the CCD should adopt, the Italian delegation feels that it should be both a programme of work and a commitment: a programme of work with respect to negotiations on the categories of measures being examined and to the suggested studies on international disarmament, and a commitment to open negotiations on a first round of reductions of armed forces and armaments. Finally, as to the form of the programme, we might consider, among other solutions, a joint statement of the Governments members of the CCD or, more simply, the adoption by the CCD of its own programme of work. (See also Chapter II)	1. The measures in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations undertaken in various treaties of disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the UN, and all new elements and possibilities in this area. The programme should be sufficiently realistic to be widely acceptable but at the same time ambitious enough to give thrust to the negotiations on disarmament. 2. Priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This does not mean, however, that progress should not be sought in any field of disarmament. Action should be taken as soon as possible whenever a measure or group of measures is ripe for agreement. The scope of the term "mass destruction weapons" should be studied. 3. The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the USA respectively, or the submission of new proposals. 4. The principle of balance should be kept in mind. It concerns both a numerical decrease of men in arms and types of arms to prefixed levels, and packages of disarmament measures by which an overall balance is achieved which is judged by all parties to be satisfactory in the light of their own security. Particular efforts will have to be undertaken by major powers in order to reduce the gap which exists between them and medium and smaller countries. 5. Verification methods form an indispensable part of disarmament measures. When elaborating such methods it must be recognized that a hundred percent certainty can never be obtained by any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. As a rule, a combination of several methods should be employed, mutually reinforcing one another in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain disarmament measure is being observed by all parties. 6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for			1. The measures provided for in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations assumed in various treaties on disarmament, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and any new factor or possibility arising in this area. 2. The highest priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons. 3. Parallel to the negotiations on partial disarmament measures including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, the problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the USA respectively, or the submission of new proposals. 4. The principle of balanced disarmament should be kept in mind. This principle relates both to a numerical reduction of armed and certain types of weapons determined levels, and to sets of disarmament measures whereby an overall balance is achieved that all parties consider satisfactory from the standpoint of their own security. The militarily important Powers will have to make particular efforts to reduce the disparity between them and other countries. It is understood that the final solution with regard to the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can only be achieved in the context of general and complete disarmament. 5. Methods of verification form an essential part of disarmament measures. In devising such methods it must be recognized that 100 per cent certainty can never be attained with any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. A combination, in which several methods reinforce one another, should as a rule be em-	A global programme for disarmament should be based - inter alia - on the following general considerations and principles: 1. Negotiations on disarmament are essential for peace and have widespread repercussions. Although they may be influenced by international events, they cannot fail to constitute a dynamic and positive factor in the evolution of the political situation as a whole. 2. The great majority of States have expressed their determination to proceed along the twin paths of general and complete disarmament and adoption of specific measures. The two issues are closely linked, and the aim of future negotiations should be to continue harmoniously. 3. As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, disarmament efforts should be granted the active participation and the support of all States and other military significant States, which bear, in the disarmament process, a special responsibility. 4. Through efforts which have been continuing for over a quarter of a century, the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have definitely made some progress in the disarmament field by establishing specific agreements and by adopting an important series of principles which form, so to speak, the "charter" of disarmament: for example, the principles approved on 20 December 1961 and adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI). 5. In order to prevent the disarmament process from creating imbalances or strengthening positions of privilege, it will be necess-

Progress in the former should not however be made dependant on progress in the latter and vice versa.

7. The necessity should be kept in mind of avoiding, when concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations.

8. A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to the benefit of developing countries.

9. In disarmament agreements every effort should be made not to prejudge or prejudice or other unresolved issues in any outside field.

10. Concerted efforts should be made to associate militarily significant States, in particular all nuclear-weapon powers, with the negotiations for disarmament.

11. Regional agreements in conformity with the UN Charter should play an important role for the attainment of the objectives envisaged. Measures in such a context might not only be concerned with disarmament but might also contain elements of a confidence-building nature.

12. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all efforts thereon, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral.

Public opinion should be given adequate information about armament and disarmament, so that it might bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of disarmament efforts.

necessary assurances that a particular disarmament measures is being duly implemented by all parties.

6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for the maintenance of international peace and security. Progress in the former should not, however, be made dependent on progress in the latter, and vice versa.

7. It should be kept in mind that, in concluding disarmament a agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations must be avoided.

8. Efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on the Disarmament Decade, should be intensified in order to promote negotiations relating to disarmament and to ensure that human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. The steady acceleration of the arms race is incompatible with the efforts aimed at establishing the New International Economic Order, as defined in the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. Those efforts entail, more than ever, resolute action by all States to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the impelentation of effective measures of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field.

10. Appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of multilateral organs of negotiations on disarmament in order to secure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

11. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, adopted in that connexion.

urity measures and to carry out the most effective and appropriate verifications.

6. Any programme of negotiations on disarmament should be coherently and globally planned, and should be so conceived as to provide the international community with clear guidelines. The disarmament process will then be able to follow a rational course from its initial or priority stages to its final culmination: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such disarmament should be accompanied by the establisment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenanace of peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

7. To achieve wide acceptance, the comprehensive programme envisaged should attempt to identify priorities and strike a balance among its various components and objectives, seeking its implementation in successive stages but without rigid time-limits.

Specifically, this programme would embody the following elements:
(a) a degree of flexibility in the following timetable set forth;
(b) a balance between the measures to be taken in the various fields of disarmament - thus nuclear disarmament would parallel conventional disarmament - in order to guarantee undiminished security to all States;
(c) an appropriate co-ordination of global and regional disarmament.

8. While pursuing the adoption of a comprehensive disarmament programme, negotiations should be carried out with new impetus and perserverance with the immediate objectives of halting and then reversing the arms race by means of specific measures affecting both nuclear and conventional arsenals.

III. PRINCIPLES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
						12. Public opinion should be supplied with adequate information about armaments and disarmament, so that it may bring its influence to bear to strengthen disarmament efforts.	Such measures should aim to facilitate the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament plan and would constitute an integral part of it. 9. Effective verification methods form an essential part of disarmament measures. A combination of several verification techniques should be applied whenever necessary, including those international means of inspection and control which would appear appropriate to ascertain that agreed disarmament obligations are being fully complied with by all Parties thereto. 10. Measures for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament should not prejudice the inalienable right of all States freely to accede to peaceful applications of scientific and technological discoveries.

III. PRINCIPLES (continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 march 1978
A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.	Disarmament negotiations shall be guided by the following principles: 1. All States have the right and the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear- weapons States have the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race. In this context, significant unilateral initiatives should be urgently undertaken by them in order to promote reciprocal restraint and accelerate the whole process of disarmament. 2. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that no individual State or group of States obtain advantage over others. 3. A mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapons States should be strictly observed. 4. Verification forms an indispensable part of disarmament measures. A single method of verification is rarely sufficient. A combination of methods could be devised, thus providing adequate means of verification of the implementation of disarmament measures. 5. Nuclear-weapons States shall undertake by means of a legally binding international instrument to respect the statutes of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace. 6. A substantial part of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be primarily devoted to social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries. 7. The United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has the primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order to effectively discharge this role, the United Nations shall be kept duly informed of all disarmament steps taken outside its aegis. 8. Measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper the exercise of the rights of all States to develop or to acquire without any discrimination nuclear technology or nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Access to such technology and materials should be subjected to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States.	Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages are the essential prerequisites for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out. The universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat of force must become a law of international life. In order to prevent the continuation of the arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction, and to the development of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes. If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful weapons and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite for further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific and effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament. Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the specific measures provided for in the agreements. The resources released as a result of	(See Chapter II)		a. In formulating the principles that should govern disarmament negotiations it should be borne in mind that disarmament constitutes a vital means to an end. It is an important cornerstone of a new international peace and security order which will combine the worldwide relief from the present nuclear over-kill capacity with an acceptable economic and social condition of living for all peoples. Until genuine disarmament is achieved, it is clear that world economic and social progress cannot run its full course. b. Disarmament is in the basic interest of all States both in its aspect as a sine qua non to international peace and security as a necessary input into the economic and social development of all States particularly the developing countries. Thus negotiations on disarmament should take account of this basic interest of all States; therefore all States should be enabled to participate in the formulation of disarmament instruments. c. In carrying out meaningful disarmament measures, States which have more weapons will have to give up more. Thus a special responsibility devolves on the nuclear weapon States in facilitating disarmament negotiations. All nuclear weapon States therefore should participate in such negotiations. d. Nuclear weapons consitute the gravest threat to mankind. Highest priority should therefore be given to measures leading to nuclear disarmament. e. Development and use of other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited as a matter of urgency. f. The important boost which disarmament will give to development efforts, and the importance to international peace and security of balanced world economic development dictates that efforts at meaningful disarmament negotiations be promoted so as to release vast human and material resources now tied to armament for use to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries. g. Public awareness of the dangers of the armaments race both in its military and economic aspects should be emphasized. Thus adequate and regular information should be released so that public opinion in all countries may bring its influence to bear on disarmament efforts. In keeping with its responsibility for disarmament, the United Nations should launch a new programme for the promotion of disarmament.	All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations. General and complete disarmament under effective international supervision should be the final objective of mankind. Gradual progress towards this end requires the harmonization of partial agreements and authentic measures for disarmament. A progressive reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination should have the highest priority among such measures. The reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction should also be raised to a high priority. The development, production and storage of napalm and other incendiary weapons must be prohibited, and such as exist in the arsenals of all States should be destroyed. The international transfer of conventional weapons should be limited and regulated. International verification constitutes an indispensable part for many disarmament measures. The use of a combination of various methods of verification offers the best guarantee. The adoption of the disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner so as not to endanger the security of any State. The creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace constitutes one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear States must fulfil faithfully the obligations which, in accordance with the definition approved by the General Assembly, they have with regard to the nuclear-free zones and the States which comprise such zones. The reduction of the military budget of the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States would constitute a laudable measure of disarmament. There is a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other. Nevertheless, progress in one of those spheres must not be deemed subordinate to progress in the other and vice versa. The growing arms race and the resultant waste of resources are incompatible with the decision of the United Nations for the establishment of a new international

Since prompt measures should be taken in order to arrest and reverse the arms race, Member States commit themselves to comply with the above-stated principles and faithfully and thoroughly impelement the following Programme of Action.

GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION

a. All States, in particular the nuclear weapons States, are called to contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action;

b. Specific measures of the Programme of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof;

c. These measures shall be implemented in accordance with the above-mentioned priorities, bearing in mind the necessity to conduct, whenever possible, parallel negotiations on several measures with a view to reaching agreement on each of them as soon as possible;

d. Implementation should be in an ageed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade;

e. Implementation of disarmament measures should be facilitated by the speeding up of the process of resolving outstanding problems and disputes which threaten international peace and security. This should include application, where appropriate, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

should be used in a manner which will promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems faced by mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States.

h. The United Nations should be kept informed of all efforts on disarmament whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, so that it may co-ordinate these efforts.

A considerable part of the resources freed by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the economic andsocial development of the developing countries.

It is necessary to have an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear States.

The proliferation of non-nuclear weapons could endanger the security of all States and would make it even more difficult to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international supervision.

Access to nuclear technology for peaceful ends constitutes an inalienable right of all States which is subject only to the relevant provisions incorporated in multilateral instruments for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Conditions should be established for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, for it would help to narrow the gap between the developed and developing countries.

(See also Chapter VII)

III. PRINCIPLES (continued)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
	Although negotiated and adopted separately, all partial measures relating to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons should be made an organic part of the programme for implementing the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. All measures must be implemented subject to suitable control, with the participation both of States which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of States without such weapons. Such control must be strict and effective and must be exercised in such a way as to offer genuine guarantees that the agreements reached and the measures adopted will be effectively applied.		The following fundamental provisions and principles should form the basis of negotiations and decisions on the questions of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. 1. The relaxation of international tensions and the resulting positive political processes can be truly stable if accompanied and buttressed by measures of military détente, i.e. new concrete results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. 2. The principal, ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a stable, long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve the urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale. 3. Specific partial measures for limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the road to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of stable peace. Such partial measures should involve prohibiting and destroying certain types of existing armaments, preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, excluding certain spheres or regions from the arms race, systematically reducing the military expenditures of States, limiting armaments and achieving disarmament on a regional basis as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament. All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to display a constructive approach to negotiations and a political will to reach agreements. 4. Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantage are the essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out. 5. The universal acceptance and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat		The question of the conventional arms race and, in particular, the question of the international transfer of conventional arms, is unquestionably a delicate and difficult matter, since it is closely related to the domestic production of weapons, global as well as regional security and the security of recipient countries, the freezing of mutual arms levels and armed forces or their reduction, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. These and all other relevant aspects should be fully taken into consideration in the comprehensive study in order to secure, above all, the just and impartial treatment of all States. * * * * * * * * * * It is recommended that the following principles be recognized in a declaration on disarmament in order to emphasize the relevance and importance of conventional arms control and disarmament: 1. Most of the world's military expenditures are being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts, parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament, to halt this diversion of resources and to bring about concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. 2. The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world produces a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control. 3. Conventional arms control and disarmament, with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, together with control of the development and production of new systems of sophisticated weapons with increased destructive power and strategic capability - which have blurred the classical distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons - will contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.	One would recall some general observations which, in our opinion, could be taken into consideration in the work that lies ahead. The declaration on disarmament, in our view, would have to include an objective evaluation of the current situation in the disarmament area and take stock of the results already achieved, but, most importantly, it should also contain formulations of fundamental provisions or principles which could form a basis for negotiations and decisions on matters relating to curbing the arms race and to disarmament. The purpose here is, apparently, to make those principles as universal as possible so that they maintain lasting value. They could then play a positive role in elaborating and implementing concrete disarmament measures. In the working papers prepared both by socialist countries and by other members of the Committee, it is proposed to define the general orientation of efforts to halt the arms race as well as specific priority tasks which could be embodied in the programme of action for disarmament. The majority of them are interpreted in an identical way and this is an encouraging sign. It permits the hope that in the final analysis a programme will be drafted which will be a realistic and practical one acceptable to all States. Priorities lacking objectivity and fixing a rigid time-limits for implementing certain specific tasks would hardly contribute to a successful implementation of this programme or assist the ongoing negotiations on complex disarmament issues.

6. In order to prevent a continuing arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction, to the development of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes.

7. If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite of further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament.

8. Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the concrete measures provided for in the agreements.

9. The resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems facing mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation for: a. Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses. b. Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons. c. Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. d. Abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions. e. Discontinuance of military expenditures.	See chapter V	Progress in disarmament is not an isolated matter but is intimately connected with and influenced by problems of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In order to establish the international climate of confidence and good will necessary for progress, specific measures to build up confidence should urgently be agreed upon, including special studies on certain subjects. While progress is being made to build up confidence, the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should engage themselves to negotiate meaningful measures to prevent and limit armament as well as measures of disarmament, taking into account, *inter alia*, the special studies mentioned above. In the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through measures to prevent and limit armament as well as through measures of disarmament, there should be a balance among these categories of measures. In our opinion, the Conference should adopt a programme to guide its work and future negotiations, as recommended by the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution. The programme, in the preparation of which all governments members of the Conference should participate, might include the items indicated in the text prepared by the interested delegations. These items may be summarized as follows: Measures for increasing international confidence The development of the international situation and the improvement of confidence among States will obviously have a direct and favourable effect on the work of the Conference. The Conference should and can, however, contribute to the increase in international confidence by adopting a programme of work defining its undertakings and aims. Studies The Italian delegation believes that, with a view to helping to create favourable conditions for negotiations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might now initiate programmes of studies relating to the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Negotiations might also benefit from a prelimi-	A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation 1. The results achieved so far in the disarmament field and the agreements anticipated for the immediate future consist of partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of the final aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such results consist mainly of the following treaties: a. The 1925 Geneva Protocol. b. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959. c. The partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. d. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967. e. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and its two Additional Protocols of 1967, and f. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Particular attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from these treaties to the review conferences provided for in some of them, and when that is the case, to the adoption of measures intended to complete them. 2. Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement at an early stage of the Disarmament Decade on treaties and conventions whose contents have been for some time under consideration by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international forums should be urgently intensified. These instruments deal mainly with: a. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons. b. The prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. c. The ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests, and d. The establishment of an international régime for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including an international ser-		Prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests An important issue, on the solution of which the cessation of the arms race largely depends, is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. This problem should be tackled without waiting for the outcome of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament. The prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons will put an end to their qualitative improvement and prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground tests have only partially solved this problem. Furthermore, two nuclear Powers out of five have not acceded to the Moscow Treaty, and one of them China, still continues to carry out nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere. The time has now come to bring the task of stopping nuclear-weapon tests to a conclusion. Conditions are quite ripe for that, in particular as a result of the signing between the USSR and the United States of a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, establishing such a procedure for carrying out peaceful explosions as will preclude their use for perfecting nuclear weapons. As is known, in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, that is, a treaty prohibiting the conduct of nuclear test explosions in all environments and by all States. The draft of such a treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations at that time, and a year has already passed since the General Assembly declared itself in favour of holding concrete negotiations to reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, owing to the negative stand taken by some nuclear Powers, such negotiations have not started. It is necessary to begin them promptly. It is a known fact that the question of stopping underground nuclear tests was complicated by certain States which artificially exaggerated the problem of supervision. It was persistently alleged, in particular, that it was impossible without on-site inspections to tell natural seismic phenomena (earthquakes) from similar phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and that therefore, it was impossible to verify whether States were complying with their obligations with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Most experts never accepted that view,	A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation The results achieved so far in the disarmament field constitute partial or collateral measures which facilitate the pursuit of the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and form part of it. Those results consist mainly of the following multilateral instruments at present in force: a. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925 (Geneva Protocol). b. The Antarctic Treaty, 1959. c. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963. d. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967. e. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its two Additional Protocols, 1967. f. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968. g. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1972. h. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1975. Special attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from those treaties, to the review conferences provided for in some of them and, where applicable,	The following main elements should be included in a comprehensive programme for action in the disarmament field: A. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. B. Conventional weapons. C. Other measures. A.1. Nuclear Weapons, including non-proliferation a. Conclusion, as a measure of the highest priority of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) To this effect ongoing tripartite consultations between the USA, USSR and the UK should be speeded up in order to make it possible for the CCD to achieve at an early date a widely acceptable treaty. All nuclear weapon States should be urged to join in these negotiations as soon as possible. b. Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems It is necessary for the nuclear Powers to halt and then reverse the arms race. To this end vigorous efforts should be made to expedite the SALT negotiations. Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat of the very survival of mankind. c. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes d. Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime Universal adherence to the NPT should be actively encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives. Parallel efforts

sary clarification of certain important aspects of that question.

In connexion with the above programmes, the Conference might in particular examine the following points in depth:

a. Relationship between nuclear disarmament and the beginning of reductions in conventional means of warfare.

b. Determination of the geographical areas within which the first reductions in conventional means of warfare would take place. In other words, the Conference should address itself to the question whether the first "round" of reductions affecting armed forces and conventional armaments should be global in scope and apply to all States without distinction or whether it should initially apply only to some States. In the latter case, it would be necessary to study the criteria to be used for determining the States to which this first "round" of reductions would apply. Such States might be the principal world military Powers, or they might be States determined on the basis of a criterion that provides for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in a particular regional context. Before negotiations began, it would be necessary to clarify this important question of principle, for it is on the answer to this question that the political dimensions of the problem will depend. The nature of the negotiations would vary in more than one respect depending on whether those reductions to be negotiated applied to more or less numerous States and whether those reductions would be partial or global. (It should be noted, by the way, that the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided that the first phase of the reductions would be applicable only to some of the States parties to the treaty.)

c. Elaboration of technical criteria necessary for the implementation of reductions (categories of armaments to be reduced, levels, initial declarations, unit of measurement to be used in reductions, extent of reductions, creation of a disarmament organization, verifications, etc.)

d. Relationship between armament reductions and controls.

the IAEA, for such explosions.

B. Other measures of disarmament

1. Prevention and limitation of armaments

The possibilities of giving effect as soon as possible to the measures specified below should be the object of persistent scrutiny and negotiations.

a. Nuclear weapons

i. A moratorium or cessation of testing and deploying new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

ii. The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses.

iii. A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

iv. The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon free zones.

v. A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of or the threat to use nuclear weapons.

b. Conventional armaments and armed forces

i. Convening of regional disarmament conferences at the initiative of the States of the region.

ii. The establishment of freezes or ceilings on the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces.

iii. Restrictions on the creation of foreign military bases and the stationing of troops and military equipment in foreign territories.

iv. Further prohibitions of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

2. Reduction of all armaments, armed forces and military expenditures

At the appropriate stage in the disarmament negotiations ways and means of carrying out the following measures should be thoroughly explored and actively negotiated

a. The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties.

the international exchange of seismic data were sufficient to verify compliance with a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. With the development of technology for detecting and identifying seismic phenomena, this view now enjoys practically unanimous support among scientists. However, even now some States suggest providing for the possibility of on-site inspection of actual circumstances if there is doubt as to compliance with obligations to stop underground nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable understanding on this basis.

Consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

It is quite clear that the threat of nuclear war would immeasurably increase if other States which at present do not possess nuclear weapons were to become involved in the process of developing and stockpiling such weapons. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences that would be brought about by the development of a situation in which the arsenals of parties in conflict in one region or another included nuclear weapons as well.

Hence the effective prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is essential. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which about 100 States have become parties, has achieved a great deal in this regard. The obligation to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a rule of international law.

It must, however, be taken into account that not all nuclear Powers have yet become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some non-nuclear States which are capable, in view of their industrial and technological level, of developing nuclear weapons of their own are also refusing to become

designed to supplement them.

Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement before the end of the Disarmament Decade on the treaties, conventions and proposals which have been under consideration for some time by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international organs should be urgently intensified. This work has included consideration of:

a. A complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

b. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

c. Further measures in the field of disarmament, in particular those aimed at achieving important qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear-weapon systems with a view to eliminating such systems from the arsenals of States.

d. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Other disarmament measures

Measures for whose implementation the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States is essential */

a. Nuclear weapons

i. A moratorium upon or the cessation of the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

ii. A ban on flight testing of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

iii. The cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the assignment of existing stocks to civilian uses.

iv. A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

v. A solution to the problem concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons or of the threat to use such weapons.

weapons States with the view of honouring their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States - as provided by article IV - the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

e. Nuclear-weapons-free zones

Nuclear-weapons-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation régime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions exist, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area.

A.2. Other weapons of mass destruction

a. Early conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is a most urgent feature. The two major military powers should engage in decisive efforts in view of finalizing their announced joint initiative. Simultaneously the CCD should materialize through concrete steps its commitment to the total elimination of chemical warfare agents.

b. Efforts should be made by the CCD to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, stockpiling and use of radioactive material weapons ("radiological weapons") as defined in the resolution dated August 1948 of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments.

c. Efforts should be made to avoid the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific

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*/ See footnote to section II, paragraph 3, above.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 13 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
		Measures to prevent and limit armament This concerns mainly the "collateral" measures to which the Conference has devoted most of its efforts since the start of the discussions concerning the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament of 1962. Negotiations on these collateral measures were moreover envisaged in paragraph 8 of the USSR-United States Joint Statement of 1961. In spite of the fact that the procedure of negotiating collateral measures has caused certain imbalances which are not insignificant, it has had positive results, as is shown by the conclusion of some important international agreements. These collateral measures have, in addition, made another positive contribution: that of reviving hope for the resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the Italian delegation feels that the Conference should make a maximum effort to pursue negotiations on measures designed to prevent and limit armament. Among such measures, and apart from those which are now the subject of active negotiations (denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and prohibition of chemical and biological weapons), the most important and most urgent are the following: cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, the Conference, in adopting its programme of work, should expressly confirm the fact that it is giving priority to negotiations relating to these two measures so necessary to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Disarmament measures The Italian delegation would like to reaffirm that the *raison d'être* of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to negotiate disarmament measures, as soon as possible. They could obviously be facilitated by the creation of an international climate of increased confidence and by the completion of the studies referred to above. Although it would be difficult to fix a precise time-limit for the start of these negotiations, we	b. Gradual reductions in nuclear and conventioanl armaments and armed forces. c. Gradual withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories. d. Reduction in military expenditures. 3. Elimination of armaments In accordance with the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should be the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for international peace-keeping.		parties to it. It is important, therefore, to make the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons genuinely universal. The Soviet Union supports all the decisions adopted in this respect by the United Nations. In the interests of consolidating the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it is also necessary to take actions of another kind. It is well known that in the process of their operation nuclear power plants produce and accumulate as a "by-product" a fissionable material - plutonium - which can be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. With the development of international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology possibilities of this kind will increase, including those of the States which have not assumed obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the States which supply nuclear materials, equipment and technology bear special responsibility in this connexion. Strict safeguards are needed to prevent international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons. This is not a question of commerce but a question of policy, a question of international security. The Soviet Union is also firmly in favour of perfecting in every possible way the system of supervision over nuclear installations and materials that is exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is ready to co-operate with all interested States to this end. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons Following the conclusion of the convention banning bacteriological weapons, the task of completely prohibiting and eliminating another dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction - chemical weapons - has become especially pressing. The use of such weapons as far back as the years of the First World War caused grave suffering and mass deaths. Since that time, however, chemical warfare technology has made great strides. New types of	vi. The complete prohibition of all techniques of environmental modification for military or any other hostile purposes. vii. The prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction. b. Conventional armaments and armed forces i. Further prohibitions of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of the subsoil thereof for military purposes. ii. The setting of ceilings for the level and types of conventional armaments and for the numerical strength of armed forces. iii. The elimination of foreign military bases and the creation of zones of peace. iv. The limitation and regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons. v. The reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council and of any other State with comparable military expenditures. Measures for which the political will of the States directly concerned may be sufficient a. Nuclear weapons The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. b. Conventional armaments and armed forces i. The convening, on the initiative of the States of the region, of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments. ii. The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties on the initiative of the States concerned. iii. The reduction of military expenditures. Elimination of armaments In accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should consist of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international con-	principles. The CCD should keep this question under review and consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific weapon which may be identified. B. Conventional Weapons a. Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be negotiated in parallel with nuclear disarmament progress as a part of a balanced comprehensive programme. New approaches for sucessful developments in this field should be sought, when appropriate, on a regional basis. b. Restraints on the transfer of conventional arms should proceed simultaneously with the limitation of arms and armed forces levels. In this respect, the establishment, on the basis of Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a Commission divided into regional subcommissions in which the main arms suppliers of each region would participate, should be envisaged, in view of keeping conventional armaments at the lowest possible level. To facilitate the setting up of the above-mentioned regional subsidiary organs with the consent of the parties concerned, the establishment of committees or separate parallel group in which the purchasing countries would participate might prove advisable. c. States should seek agreement, on the basis of consensus, on the prohibition or limitation of use of certain specific conventional weapons. C. Other Measures a. Conduct of pilot studies by a group of States on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, for the purpose of devising and testing jointly and effective international

useful if a specific commitment on the subject were assumed now. This would have the important result of reassuring public opinion, which is demanding more effective action by the CCD on disarmament. Such a commitment would be an incentive to Governments to take the necessary decisions, an incentive that would be strengthened if the commitment were assumed collectively by the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the competent body for disarmament negotiations.

Accordingly, at the time it adopts its own programme, the CCD should - in the opinion of the Italian delegation - give expression to the commitment of its States members to open negotiations on a first "round" of reductions of armed forces and armaments. This would better ensure a balance among the various categories: preventive, limitative and effective measures of disarmament.

General and complete disarmament

General and complete disarmament is the final goal of all CCD negotiations, and that has recently been confirmed by General Assembly resolution 2602 E. Consequently, a re-examination of general and complete disarmament plans by the CCD, as suggested by some delegations, should reflect the will of the States members of the CCD to pursue that objective. So far as the Italian delegation is concerned, it believes that it will be necessary for the CCD to bear in mind past experience so as to be able to resume the discussion on new bases. With that in view, and taking as its point of departure the USSR-United States General Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, the CCD might adopt a more articulated directive for the elaboration of a "programme" in line with that joint statement. A single treaty could hardly govern the implementation of the process of disarmament in all its phases. The "programme" should therefore serve as an overall agreement whose purpose would be to lay down in broad outline the approach to general and complete disarmament: it might envisage the conclusion of a series of treaties or agreements relating to the various phases of effective implementation of disarmament. This

with still more agonizing death have been developed. Radical improvements have also been made in the means of delivery of chemical weapons which can now be used not only in combat areas, that is, against the armed forces of the other side, but also against the civilian population in vital centres of States.

The Soviet Union, together with many other countries, has long proposed that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical means of warfare. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacteriological weapons. However, the negotiations on this subject, which have already been going on for several years, still fail to offer prospects of such a comprehensive solution. A question that arises in this connexion concerns the possibility of starting with agreement on the prohibition and elimination of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to seek such a solution as well. A substantial contribution to this end could be the implementation of the Soviet-United States accord on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.

Supervision of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons should be based on national means. In this respect there exists a positive precedent in the convention banning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States.

There is not, and there cannot be, any reason for delay and the question of banning chemical weapons. What is needed is a demonstration of the political will and desire to reach generally acceptable agreement.

Prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

Scientific and technological progress poses the pressing problem of preventing the emergence of new types

tion and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the levels required for the maintenance of internal order and international peace.*/

military expenditure with the object of reducing military budgets. Reduction of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development of mankind.

b. Publication by all States of more information about their armed forces and in particular about any kind of expenditure devoted to military purposes and a mechanism should be established under the United Nations auspices to collect such information.

c. Publication by the United Nations of all available data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data.

d. Preparatory studies on the conversion of the armaments industries of the principal developed countries should be initiated with the aim of providing alternative lines of production, while maintaining the employment rate at a constant level.

e. A United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development should be initiated as soon as possible after the Special Session.

f. The CCD should proceed, in consultation with the States party to the Sea-bed Treaty, to the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Parallel efforts should be made for the Outer Space in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Treaty.

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*/ In this matter more than others, the revision and updating of the draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962 are essential.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
		would avoid the rigidity inherent in a single treaty and the difficulty of discussing problems which are not ready for negotiation. At the same time, it would maintain the concept of a prior commitment with respect to the evolution of the whole process, in its successive phases.			and systems of weapons of mass destruction. New types of weapons may appear even in the foreseeable future and may become commensurate in destructive capability with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, or even surpass them. At present there are no limitations whatsoever on the use of science for such purposes. This means that the most unexpected developments, whose consequences cannot be foreseen, may occur at any time. The danger is great, and it is necessary to find means to avert it. It was precisely these considerations that guided the Soviet Union when it proposed in 1975 the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. As is known, negotiations in this matter are already under way, which is a positive factor. In the course of the negotiations it has become desirable to specify the object of the prohibition that is, define new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union is ready to propose an approach which would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action - according to the method of use and the targets to be attacked or the nature of their impact. Some examples are ray weapons capable of affecting blood and intracellular plasma, infrasound weapons designed to damage internal organs and affect human behaviour, or genetic weapons whose use would affect the mechanism of heredity. If we take into account the fact that the forward march of science never stops, it is not difficult to realize that possibilities for the development of even more dangerous types of weapons may emerge in the future. New systems of weapons of mass destruction should not be developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons which are based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics can be made even more dangerous by introducing new technical		g. Specific measures to establish an international climate of confidence (CBM).

means. In this context, aerospace systems of nuclear weapons using transport space ships as a basis may serve as an example.

The question of the prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important and timely one; it embraces an essential aspect of the whole problem of disarmament and prevention of war. Negotiations on this question should be given top priority.

Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

Nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction unquestionably pose the greatest threat to mankind. But can anyone forget how many millions of human lives have been lost as a result of the use of so-called conventional armaments? Even in the period since the Second World War the destructive power of these weapons has increased manyfold. A modern tank is a weapon many times more deadly than a tank of the 1940s. The same is true of artillery, small arms and, of course, aircraft.

The military conflicts which have taken place in various parts of the world in recent years have shown the tragic consequences for people of the use of new models of conventional weapons and the vast destruction of material values which they cause.

Thus, past experience confronts States with the task of taking practical measures to reduce the number of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional armaments as well as armed forces equipped with those weapons. Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has repeatedly made concrete proposals in this regard. It has cited specific figures for ceilings on the strength of the armed forces of major States and has expressed willingness to conduct negotiations on the matter both within the framework of a programme of general complete disarmament and as a separate measure covering major States. These proposals have not been accepted. Even now, however, the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Given a desire for this on the part of all States possessing powerful armed forces, such negotiations could lead to positive results and to constructive agreements.

Similarly, the Soviet Union considers it desirable that new

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
					efforts should be made at the international level to bring about the elimination of all military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territory. The United Nations has, in many of its forums, expressed itself in very definite terms in favour of a solution to this problem both on a global scale and in relation to individual continents. However, no progress has been made in this regard - a fact which cannot but cause concern. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to co-operate actively and constructively in solving this problem. Zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions In recent years, States in various parts of the world have been ever more insistent in raising the question of carrying out regional measures of military détente and have particularly stressed that Powers which do not belong to a given region should not build up their armed forces or establish military bases there. Thus, the coastal States of the Indian Ocean are expressing concern at the fact that some States which are geographically very remote from the region are expanding their military bases there and increasing their military presence. Regarding such actions as a threat to their independence and security, these countries are putting forward the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union regards this proposal with understanding. Obviously, the key question here is to ensure that there are no for foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, that bases which have been established there are dismantled and that no new bases are established. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it never has and does not now intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean. In resolving the question of foreign military bases along these lines, the Soviet Union would be prepared to join with other Powers in seeking ways to reduce on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and in the region direc-		

of this kind must take fully into account the generally recognized rules of international law regarding freedom of navigation on the high seas and the need for commercial stops at the ports of coastal States as well as for research. This question is of great importance to the Soviet Union, since virtually the only sea route navigable all the year round which links the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

The coastal States of the Indian Ocean are in favour of holding an international conference to discuss practical measures for transforming the region into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to consider the question of its attitude towards the convening of such a conference in the light of the considerations set out above.

The Mediterranean is another region where military tensions, particularly in connexion with the Middle East conflict, have at times reached dangerous proportions. With a view to reducing these tensions, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States some time ago that an agreement should be reached on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of Soviet and United States ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. This proposal still holds good, and it is in the interests of all States whose security in one way or another depends on the situation in the Mediterranean to work for its implementation.

The problem of military détente has great immediacy for the Middle East. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of halting the arms race in the Middle East within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

In various parts of the world, interested States are putting forward proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones. That reflects their desire for effective limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for a lessening of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals. It is prepared to co-operate in their implementation, having regard, of course, to what is possible in any given region where it is proposed to establish a denuclearized zone. It is important that such

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/552, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
					zones should actually be free of nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements should contain no loop-holes and should be fully consistent with the generally recognized rules of international law. Reduction of military budgets One promising approach to halting the arms race and to disarmament is the reduction of the military budgets of States. The resources thus released could be utilized for the economic and social progress of peoples and for accelerating the rate of economic growth, ensuring employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating disease and building new schools and universities. The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals for reducing military budgets and has, by its actions, set an example in that regard. Several years ago, it proposed that agreement should be reached on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was approved by the United Nations General Assembly, but so far it has not been implemented because of opposition by those States which are stubbornly pursuing a policy of increasing military expenditure. The Soviet Union is prepared to take a flexible position regarding the specific figure with which a reduction of military budgets would begin. A figure greater or smaller than 10 per cent could be agreed upon as a first step for 1977. What is important, however, is that this question should as soon as possible become the subject of businesslike negotiations between the States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States can and must give way to the practice of systematically reducing that expenditure.		

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
(See Chapter V)	(See Chapter II)	In accordance with the above purposes and principles, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Agreement must be reached on the simultaneous cessation of the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to any such weapons - whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or projectiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to make a start on the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons, and move towards their complete, total destruction. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interest of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind. Such measures can be bilateral and multilateral. Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This urgent measure, for the implementation of which all the necessary prerequisites exist, including the solution of the problem of effective verification of compliance, will make it possible to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the development of new types of such weapons. Consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be made more effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the national economies of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and destruction of stocks of such weapons. The elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction is long overdue. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacterio-	Negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament Negotiations on this item should be resumed and carried on without interruption concurrently with the negotiations on any collateral or partial measures, with the participation of all States, in all phases of the drafting of the clauses of the Treaty. They will provide the necessary impact on all other negotiations by constantly focusing the attention on the global framework to which all such parallel efforts are confined. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament a. solemn undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon; b. solemn undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States at any time and under any circumstances; c. prohibition of the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States; total prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; d. withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States; e. cessation of the development and testing of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (including the comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons) f. cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, conversion of existing materials to peaceful purposes and transfer of a quota of such materials to be used by all States in the framework of a broad international cooperation; g. setting up of nuclear weapon-free zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the world accompanied by effective guarantees by Nuclear Weapon States to observe their status; h. reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery; i. complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. During the negotiations on these	It is suggested that the following points, among others, be included in the programme of action (points A-E). A. Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament The General Assembly 1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982; 2. Further decides that a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. B. Nuclear disarmament The General Assembly 1. (Appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/78); 2. Considers as a general guide-line for further action that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular, the two leading nuclear-weapon States, carry the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament; 3. Concludes that negotiations should urgently be undertaken concerning measures outlined below aiming at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States: a. freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems; b. cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance; c. cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes; d. balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems; e. prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems;	Nuclear disarmament: utmost priority should be given to the cessation of the nuclear race through: a. Urgent conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. b. A ban on the further development and testing of means of delivery of nuclear weapons. c. Measures to achieve significant qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems and the ultimate elimination of such weapons. d. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions and complete prohibition of the introduction of such weapons into areas where they now do not exist. e. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and submission of all nuclear programmes of all countries to IAEA safeguards. f. Promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries. g. Encouragement of universal adherence to the NPT. h. Complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction a. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, whether based on new scientific principles or on existing principles. b. Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. c. Prohibition of the use of all chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. Collateral measures of disarmament Bearing in mind the link between disarmament and development, effective measures must be taken to progressively free resources now being devoted to armaments for economic and social development particularly in the developing countries. To this end, a. Urgent measures for the reduction of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States and other States with comparable military budgets and earmarking the savings for economic and social de-	(See Chapter III)

there cannot be, any reason for delay on the question of banning chemical weapons. What is needed is a demonstration of the political will and desire to reach generally-acceptable agreement.

Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem is very urgently needed as a means of curbing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the destruction of human beings.

Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is an important measure of regional military détente; it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area, and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce the number of aircraft, artillery pieces, tanks and other modern types of conventional weapons, as well as the armed forces equipped with such weapons. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be eliminated; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.

Reduction of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and to provide assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of specific, businesslike negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.

peaceful uses of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without any discrimination.

Prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction

a. prohibition of the research and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

b. prohibition of the use, cessation of the production and destruction of the existing stockpiles and outlawing of all weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological or any other type);

c. complete prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes.

Collateral measures of disarmament and military disengagement

a. freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets starting with the budgets of the major, heavily armed Powers; setting up of a programme for progressive reduction of military budgets;

b. withdrawal within their national frontiers of foreign troops, their armaments and other combat equipment and demobilization of the withdrawn troops;

c. dismantling of military bases on foreign territories.

Confidence-building measures

a. discontinuance of military manoeuvres, particularly those of multinational nature, near the frontiers or on the territory of other States; prohibition of concentration of troops as well as of demonstrations of force directed against other States; conclusion of international agreements in this field starting in Europe;

b. prevention of military attacks due to accidents, miscalculation or communication failure; conclusion of international agreements in this field;

c. measures to reduce military activities on the ground, in the air and on the sea and oceans; complete prohibition of the use of the seabed and ocean floor and of the subsoil thereof for military purposes;

d. undertaking by all States to ban all forms of war propaganda and hatred among nations;

e. dissolution of military blocs.

continue with the highest priority its work in the field of nuclear disarmament;

5. Underlines the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;

6. Expects substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

C. Disarmament and development

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the results of which to be reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action atthe second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Decides that the expert study should have the following terms of reference (to be inserted at the special session on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution)

D. Particularly inhuman weapons

The General Assembly

Recommends that the 1979 United Nations Conference on Specific Conventional Weapons should seek agreement on the prohibition and restriction of use of certain conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, such as those the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by x-ray, incendiaries, land-mines and booby-traps, certain small calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons.

E. Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General to organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations

ing countries.

b. Annual United Nations sponsored programme to promote public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, its effect on international peace and security, its economic and social consequences and its effect on the attainment of a new international economic order.

Conventional weapons and armed forces

a. Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons.

b. Gradual reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and defence of territorial integrity.

General and complete disarmament

The elaboration of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament should be continued pari pasu other measures outlined above, with the participation of all States.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
		Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. A major contribution could be made to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof complied strictly with their obligation; if the number of parties to this Treaty was increased and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out as soon as possible.	Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and their gradual elimination This objective should be conceived as the final stage of the goal of general and complete disarmament. a. gradual reduction of conventional armaments and national armed forces; conclusion of international agreements to ensure the effective implementation of all measures adopted in this respect; b. quantitative and qualitative ceilings of national armed forces and military equipment.	on a standardized reporting instrument by the group of experts on the reduction of military budgets (A/32/194) with the participation of States representing different geographical regions and, preferably, different military budgeting and accounting systems; 2. Further requests the Secretary-General to apoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyze the results of the pilot test, to further refine the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument; 3. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.		

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/76, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
(Also see Chapter V)	The United Nations must increase its involvement in disarmament problems substantially by exercising direct powers with regard to the negotiation and formulation of disarmament measures and the supervision of their implementation. To this end, the General Assembly has laid down that disarmament negotiations carried on under the auspices of the United Nations are to be based on a programme of measures and action comprising the following elements in order of priority: A. The negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Such negotiations should be carried on without interruption in a forum especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. B. with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament: - A solemn undertaking by all States not to use nuclear weapons; - Prohibition of the emplacement of new nuclear weapons in the territory of other States; - The withdrawal of nuclear armaments from the territory of other States; - Cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and of the means of delivering them; - Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; peaceful use of existing materials and the transfer of a quota of such materials for use by all States within the framework of broad international co-operation; - The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of peace and co-operation in different regions of the world; - The reduction and total destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them; - Total prohibition of nuclear weapons; - Guaranteed unlimited rights and opportunities for all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without discrimination; guaranteed expansion of research in this area with a view to applying the achievements of nuclear science for the development of all countries. C. with regard to the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction: - Prohibition of research, planning and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; - Prohibition of the use, cessation of the production, elimination of military arsenals and the outlawing of all existing or planned		(Also see Chapter III points 1-6)	Guided by the purposes and principles set forth in the Declaration on Disarmament, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is essential to halt the nuclear arms race, ie. to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, and developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons; to begin reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and subsequently to proceed with their complete elimination. The limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of conventional weapons, which also pose a major threat to peoples, should be carried out parallel with nuclear disarmament. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interests of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind. Such measures can be bilateral and multilateral. Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This urgent measure, for the implementation of which all the necessary prerequisites exist, including the solution of the problem of effective verification of compliance, will make it possible to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the development of new types of such weapons. Consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be made more effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the national economies of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction is long overdue. Measures to ban the most dangerous types of chemical weapons can be taken as the initial step towards a radical resolution of the entire problem. Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem is very urgently needed as a means of curbing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of destroying human beings.		In the year of its sixtieth anniversary, the Soviet State issued an appeal for agreement on the simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons, whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to begin gradually reducing their accumulated stocks of weapons, moving ahead to the point where they had been completely liquidated. This proposal was reflected in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. We expect this specific proposal to be taken into account in the drafting of the final documents. We are convinced that the question of nuclear disarmament occupies a prominent place in the drafts being prepared. In drafting the documents for the session, the Preparatory Committee cannot lose sight of such a crucial problem as prevention of the threat of nuclear war. The importance of practical steps in this regard hardly needs any detailed clarification. At the Soviet Union's initiative, this subject was discussed in connexion with the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. In the discussions during that session many delegations spoke in favour of continuing the consideration of the item in the Preparatory Committee. An important step forward was recently taken in the critical and urgent issue of halting nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union, as one of the participants in the current tripartite talks at Geneva, expressed its readiness to agree that a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be declared together with a ban for a limited period on all nuclear weapon tests. This proposal, in effect, opens the way to the speedy elaboration of a treaty imposing a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests. Unfortunately, in recent months, we have witnessed developments which may lead to the start of a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race, and here I have in mind the plans to develop and deploy neutron nuclear weapons. It appears to us that the documents which we shall prepare should impress upon States the need to avert this danger. It may be recalled that on 24 December, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

bacteriological, biological or of any other type);

- Total prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

B. with regard to the adoption of colateral measures:

- A freeze on and gradual reduction of military budgets in accordance with a definite programme. To start with, the military budgets of all States should be reduced by at least 10 per cent and half of the resources thus saved should be transferred unconditionally, to a United Nations development fund to be set up to support development efforts, particularly in countries with a national income of less than $200 per capita. By the end of a decade, that reduction should be in the order of 75-80 per cent of the original level of military budgets, and armed forces and armaments should have been reduced by the same proportion;
- The withdrawal behind national frontiers of foreign troops, their armamanets and other combat equipment, and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn;
- The dismantling of military bases situated in foreign territories;
- The gradual reduction of troops and armaments in the service of national armies by means of international agreements guaranteeing strict fulfilment of the undertaking entered into. To be effective, such reductions must not be of a token nature and, in a first stage, troops and armaments must be reduced by at least 10 to 15 per cent and by even more in large countries with powerful armies;
- An undertaking not to carry out military manoeuvres, particularly those of a multinational nature, near the frontiers or within the territories of other States or to concentrate troops or make shows of strength against other States;
- The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;
- Measures to reduce military activity effectively on the ground, in the air and on the seas and oceans;
- The dissolution of military blocs.

Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is an important measure of regional military détente; it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce aircraft, artillery, tank forces and other modern types of conventional weapons as well as armed forces equipped with them. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be dismantled; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.

Reduction of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and for assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of concrete, businesslike negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.

Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. It would be a major contribution to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof strictly complied with their obligations, if the number of parties to this Treaty was enlarged and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out at an early date.

Soviet, proposed on behalf of the USSR, to the Western States to agree on a mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb in order to rid the world of this new, inhuman weapon of mass murder.

V. MEASURES, STEPS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
(See Chapter VIII)	Although it is understood that there is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands delegation is nevertheless of the opinion that early preparatory work for a close international co-operation in the seismological field should continue to receive high priority in this context. Without prejudice to the eventual shaping of a verification system in a comprehensive test ban treaty, methods of seismological detection and identification will in any case constitute a fundamental element of such a system. Therefore, the Netherlands delegation attaches great importance to the implementation and follow up of the General Assembly resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data. It remains of the opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee (CCD/PV.432). The Netherlands delegation shares the view of the Italian delegation as expressed in documents ENDC/245 and ENDC/263 that pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. During this session of the Committee the curtain on the Disarmament Decade could be raised by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Measures of non-armament and arms limitation certainly contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, which may pave the way to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament. But apart from being an aid to "confidence-building", such measures have, of course, also an intrinsic merit of their own. They should not be limited to the nuclear field. Much time of this Committee will certainly be devoted to the conclusion of new agreements regarding chemical and biological warfare. Within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should also be made to reduce and eliminate conventional arms races. In this respect attention should be paid to the increasing build-up of arsenals and to the international trade in conventional armaments. Finally, with regard to the third category, it would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures can only start fruitfully, when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence building	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	The Twelfth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party held at Bucharest in November 1974, having examined the present world situation and established guidelines for the world policy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, took the view that the following measures should be adopted within a disarmament programme: 1. Steps should be taken to freeze and gradually reduce military budgets and to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 2. Every State possessing nuclear weapons must solemnly bind itself to halt the production of new weapons and begin to destroy existing weapons under appropriate agreements. This is the only way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and effectively warding off the danger of a devastating thermonuclear war. 3. Nuclear-free zones must be established, foreign military bases dismantled, the size of national armed forces gradually reduced, and troops stationed in the territory of other States withdrawn. 4. The reduction of troops, armaments and military expenditure must not be purely symbolic. At first they should be reduced by at least 10-15 per cent and in the heavily-armed countries by more. 5. Confidence and co-operation must be developed among States to create the conditions necessary for the suppression of antagonistic military blocs. All bellicose propaganda must be firmly ended. 6. The negotiations for general disarmament and, most important, for nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of practical measures to bring this about, must be conducted on a thoroughly democratic basis with the participation of all the States concerned. To this end it is essential to improve the work of the Disarmament Committee at Geneva and build the activities of all disarmament conferences and organizations on democratic foundations. 7. The world should be systematically informed by periodic reports at least twice a year on activities related to disarmament.	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)

This, however, does not exclude that during the preparatory phase, attention be devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this respect, the joint statement of agreed principles still serves its purpose of being a guideline for the disarmament process as a whole. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian delegation in ENDC/245, it might be considered whether this statement could be suitably supplemented. In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, this should preferably be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of these principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1961 itself intact.

The implementation of a comprehensive programme in the field of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with further developments and progress in the overall political world situation The three cornerstones are: disarmament, international security and peace.

During our last session, several delegations referred to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) requesting this Committee to renew its effort to make progress toward general and complete disarmament. The Netherlands delegation is of the opinion that during the preliminary phase studies could take place on the question of general and complete disarmament. The Indian delegation (ENDC/PV.404) called on the United States and the USSR to submit revised versions of their draft treaties concerning general and complete disarmament. The Polish delegation (ENDC/PV.406) proposed more specifically that the two co-chairmen prepare a new draft for the *first* stage of disarmament. An alternative approach might also be considered by the Committee, namely to start with an examination of the characteristics and requirements of the *final* stage of a process of general and complete disarmament. On the basis of such a study it could be tried subsequently to trace out a route along which this final stage can be reached. A similar method was proposed by the Swedish delegation as far back as 1964 (ENDC/PV.202). Perhaps it could offer the advantage of getting a better insight in the political requirements and structural needs of a disarming world.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr. 1, 7 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 14 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
1. In the nuclear field, in which the Nuclear Weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objectives of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation by: - the halting and the reversal of the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions: especially by a second Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons; - the earliest conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all Nuclear weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests; - further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include assistance to the IAEA in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards systems; the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities: agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials: study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies: an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear fuel cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes: and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; - the establishment of additional nuclear weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from Nuclear Weapon States. 2. Assurances, as appropriate, by Nuclear Weapon States designed to increase the confidence of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack. 3. Other weapons of mass destruction:	Other measures in the field of disarmament, confidence building and improvement of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes could significantly contribute to the lessening of international tensions and to the creation of a situation conducive to the adoption of additional disarmament measures. Such measures as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be undertaken forthwith. Other measures, including relevant regional agreements and the progressive reduction of military expenditures should be undertaken as soon as possible. The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones and zones of peace constitute one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Regional considerations in a particular area may require that formal procedures and arrangements to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be flexible and that there should be alternative ways and methods to suit the particular character of each zone. Solemn pledge by States to strictly observe the principle of non-use of force or threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States would contribute to create a climate of confidence among States, and it should be accompanied by measures such as: a. Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories; b. Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases; c. Freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets of States, particularly those of nuclear-weapons States and other militarily significant States; d. Submission of reports to the United Nations by States of their military expenditures on a standardized basis.	Regional measures for military détente and disarmament. Measures such as mutual reductions of armed forces together with the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament, above all in those areas where military confrontation is particularly serious.	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	

production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and regulating their destruction;

- a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

- continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles with a view to consideration of agreements on the prohibition of any new weapons which may be identified.

4. Conventional weapons and armed forces:

- agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

- conventions prohibiting or limiting the future use in armed conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be indiscriminate in their effects or may cause unnecessary suffering;

- agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

5. The measures listed above should form part of a balanced programme of disarmament and provide for adequate verification including if appropriate, the possibility of on-site inspection. Verification provisions should, be so designed as to ensure the effectiveness of agreements and to enhance mutual confidence.

(Also see Chapter VIII)

V. MEASURES, STEPS (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
The Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the following measures set forth in the Three-year Disarmament Plan: 1. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (which presumably will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session). 2. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction (in this case, too, it is assumed that the convention will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session). 3. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) in which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to admit them to their territory. 4. The establishment of at least one new nuclear-weapon-free zone of the type created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 5. The signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by States entitled to become parties to those instruments although they have not yet done so. 6. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake not to embark on new installations of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. 7. The convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure that the status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is respected by all States, especially by nuclear-weapon States and the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean. 8. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States which would establish a moratorium on the testing of new nuclear-weapon-launching systems. 9. The conclusion of an agreement or treaty between the two major nuclear-weapon States which would stipulate, as a first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, a balanced 10 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear-weapon systems and a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of such systems.	(See Chapter IV)		(See Chapter III, points 7, 8 and 9)	Regional measures for military détente and disarmament. Measures such as mutual reductions of armed forces together with the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament - above all, in those areas where military confrontation is particularly grave.	In order to implement the mentioned principles, the following measures are suggested for incorporation within the framework of the programme of action on disarmament. These measures would constitute a starting-point for negotiations, the goal of which is general and complete disarmament, as is declared in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles between the United States and the USSR issued in 1961. 1. As initial and preliminary steps: A. Comprehensive studies of conventional arms control and disarmament from all aspects, to be undertaken by a qualified group of experts on, *inter alia*: a. The international transfer of conventional weapons; b. The possibility of mutual limitation of the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces, according to regions. B. Preliminary measures parallel to the comprehensive studies: a. A request by the United Nations General Assembly to the major arms supplying countries, in particular, the United States and the USSR, to start consultations on voluntary restraint measures with due regard to the security of recipient countries; b. On the initiative of the States of the region, the convening of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments, provided that there exist appropriate conditions; c. A request to the Secretar-General or a watch-dog committee, to follow (i) the current state of affairs of the international transfer of conventional weapons and (ii) the development of the consultations of the major arms-supplying countries envisaged in (a) above or in the regional conferences, envisaged in (b) above, and to keep the United Nations General Assembly informed on these matters. 2. As to future steps: After a certain period of time a review of the implementation of the initial and preliminary steps should be conducted. After this review further measures should be worked out and agreed upon according to paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles during a transition period leading to the	(See Chapter IV)

10.The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by all nuclear-weapon States, or at any rate by the two major nuclear-weapon States, in which they would undertake to halt production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

11.The establishment by the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, of a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than the thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets.

12.The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake, as soon as the Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote 25 per cent of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.

13.The conclusion of a treaty or convention on the prohibition of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be considered to be excessively harmful or to have indiscriminate effects in the light of humanitarian and military considerations.

14.The reform of the Convention on environmental warfare in order to prohibit the use of all scientific or technological techniques to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes.

15.The preparation of the study provided for in resolution A/32/88A concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

The agendas for the thirty third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendation resulting from that review.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the Guidelines of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail

plete disarmament.

A decision on appropriate measures to implement the initial steps should be taken at the special session devoted to disarmament.

V. MEASURES, STEPS (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at the latter's second special session devoted to disarmament. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.						

VI. STAGES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and state carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subseqent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.	The very character of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is ill suited to set any meaningful timetables in the context of a "Decade". It remains to be seen what the net result will be at the end of the ten year period. No amount of pressure, nor the best efforts of the Committee to meet certain "target" dates can alter that fact. It is unlikely that a precise schedule and fixed time spans would be helpful in achieving the very goal we are trying to reach. It would therefore be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to any particular pattern. Of course, it is quite different matter to agree on a certain sequence of measures, to be carried out within specified periods of time, in a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. (See Chapter V)	Taking into account the Agreed Principles and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions mentioned above, and further taking into account agreements already achieved on collateral measures, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should envisage dealing in successive phases with the main elements mentioned (see Chapter IV). An attempt should be made to decide upon these various phases and to outline the possible content of each phase. (Also see Chapter III)				(See Chapter IV)	

VI. STAGES (continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February, 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978

(See Chapter IV)

VI. STAGES (continued)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslvakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978

VII. MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.		A review of the programme of disarmament could take place each year in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.	1. The General consider, annually, the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme . Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the overall situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to armaments and disarmament. The United Nations Disarmament Commission might be reactivated and entrusted with a part of this task. 2. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the asistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued. 3. There should be more conferences and scientific exchanges among scientists and experts from various countries on the problem of the arms race and disarmament. 4. Universities and academic institutes should be encouraged to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditure and disarmament. 5. The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among public opinion. 6. The feasibility of convening in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied.		Negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament are being conducted in various forms: on a bilateral basis, particularly where States with the greatest military and war industry potential are concerned; within particular groups of States directly concerned, including negotiations at the regional level; in special bodies set up to discuss the disarmament problem as a whole or individual aspects of it and composed of States representing the major political groupings and geographical areas of the present-day world. Each year, questions relating to disarmament are given a prominent place in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. On the whole, these various types of negotiations and discussions have proved their usefulness. They will unquestionably be used in the future as well. At the same time, the achievement of radical changes in dealing with the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all States without exception, requires consideration of it in the broadest and most authoritative possible international forum. Such a forum,must, first of all, be truly universal, and all States must be represented in it; secondly, it must provide an opportunity for examining the whole range of disarmament questions with the necessary expertise, with due regard for all circumstances and in the necessary detail; thirdly, it must be given the power to take effective decisions. These prerequisites would be met by convening a World Disarmament Conference, and the Soviet Union continues to believe that such a conference should be held. A special session of the United Nations General Assembly could also be an appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in all their scope, for deciding through joint efforts on the ways and means of resolving them and for working out a long-term programme of practical measures. In order to ensure that its results amount to something more than decisions containing general provisions in favour of disarmament of the kind with which the archieves of the United Nations are already overflowing, such a special session of the General Assembly and the manner in which it is organized must not be routine in nature. It should be a very particular kind of session. It should be prepared, organized and held in such a way as to ensure a break-through in solving the problems of disarmament. All its work should fully reflect the high responsibility of all States in the world and,	1. The General Assembly should examine annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years the General Assembly should examine the comprehensive programme and revise it as appropriate. 2. A thorough study should be made of the question of convening at an appropriate time an adequately prepared world disarmament conference, and of its institutionalization. 3. Until such time as a world disarmament conference is convened, the General Assembly should hold regularly - for instance, every three years - special sessions devoted to disarmament. 4. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on specific questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued. 5. In view of the growing complexity of disarmament questions, States Members of the United Nations should endeavour to strengthen their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their permanent Missions in this field. 6. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be continuously strengthened and efforts should be made to ensure periodic publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. 7. More conferences and scientific interchanges should be held between scientists and experts from various countries on problems of the arms race and disarmament. 8. Universities and otheracademic institutions should be encouraged to hold continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditures and disarmament. 9. The intensification of exchanges and publication of relevant information and data should provide an atmosphere of greater sincerity and trust between States and a steady increase in knowledge of and interest in these matters among the public. 10. A worldwide "Disarmament Day" should be established under the auspices of the United Nations.	[See Chapter VIII]

possess the most powerful armaments and armed forces.

The holding of special session of the General Assembly should not, of course, push aside the question of a World Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Union conceives of the convening of such a session as an interim stage which should, by its decisions, prepare the way for a broad and far-reaching review of the problem of disarmament at the World Conference. The session should not be burdened with strict time limitations or with the procedure normally followed at General Assembly sessions, including special sessions.

VII. MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS (Continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
All States undertake to work towards the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking into account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.	Since the contradiction between the urgent necessity to curb the arms race and stagnation in disarmament efforts is becoming increasingly intolerable, it is imperative for all States to exert fresh efforts to overcome this situation and to review and improve the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. The United Nations has, under the Charter, a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly the General Assembly should exert utmost efforts to ensure the observance of the principle as embodied in the Declaration on Disarmament and the full implementation of the Programme of Action on Disarmament. To this end it is essential that: a. The General Assembly remain the main political decision-making organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and will be responsible for monitoring the implementation of disarmament measures; b. The First Political Committee of the General Assembly deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and international security; c. An organic link to be established between the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, currently the main body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. For this purpose it is necessary that: i. All Member States of the United Nations may submit directly proposals on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiations in the CCD and attend meetings of the working bodies thereof whenever such a proposal or proposals are examined; ii. The representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations be assigned an enhanced role in the CCD; d. The review of the present composition of the CCD and the creation of the necessary conditions for the participation of all nuclear-weapons States in the work thereof be made; e. The CCD be presided by a chairman on the basis of monthly rotation; f. The CCD adopt its rules of	All channels for the conduct of negotiations should be effectively used by the States of the world for the solution of vital problems connected with the ending of the arms race and achieving disarmament. On the whole, the existing system of negotiations - multilateral, bilateral and regional - is suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament. The existing types of negotiations should continue to be used in order to reach the necessary international agreements. A breakthrough in solving the disarmament problem, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that it should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a world Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could, with expertise and in sufficient depth, consider the entire range of disarmament questions. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure thorough preparation of and practical agreement on appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a world Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. The United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament should become an important international forum for a broad discussion of approaches of principle to the solution of disarmament questions as well as of the main areas in which priority efforts should be made by States in this sphere. The convening of the special session and its decisions should contribute to the work of existing forums of disarmament negotiations which are responsible for the elaboration of practical steps and agreements aimed at ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.		The General Assembly 1. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make it possible for non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in certain meetings to be decided by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, through the submission of written and oral proposals and participation in the discussions thereon; 2. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to replace the present co-chairmanship institution by a bureau of four members, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau should be selected from the States belonging to the military blocs and the other from the group of neutral and non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The chairmanship should rotate in alphabetical order on a monthly or sessional basis betweel all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; 3. Decides, in the light of the new tasks and responsibilities entrusted upon the United Nations Secretariat as a result of the programme of action, to make a corresponding increase in the resources of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, especially in the field of studies and follow-up of disarmament agreements. (Details to be discussed at a somewhat later stage of the preparations for the session.)	a. The General Assembly of the United Nations having adopted the comprehensive programme of disarmament should also decide on a precise timetable and schedule for the consideration and negotiation of specific instruments and other measures so that the entire process is completed by the end of the next decade. b. The General Assembly should make regular review of progress made on disarmament at its annual regular sessions and at periodic special sessions held not later than 5 yearly intervals. c. The Conference of the Committee for Disarmament should continue to be the main negotiating body under the auspices of the United Nations. d. To make the Conference a more realistic and effective forum it should be restructured to enable the participation of all nuclear weapon States in it. Restructuring the CCD should include: a. Abolition of the system of Co-Chairmen; b. Expansion by a modest figure consistent with efficiency and equitable representation; c. Greater link between CCD and the United Nations and revision of its rules to permit participation of non-members which show interest in the subject being negotiated; d. Encouragement of parallel disarmament negotiations on specific items in the comprehensive programme provided that the United Nations shall be given regular reports of such negotiations.	In accordance with its Charter and innumerable resolutions of the General Assembly, the United Nations has a primordial role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. The former requires the General Assembly to keep itself duly informed regarding all steps taken in the sphere of disarmament, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral. The deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world conference on disarmament on terms acceptable for all Member States. The organization and procedure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be modified so as to be acceptable for participation by China and France. World public opinion should receive adequate information on the progress of work on disarmament, so that it may exercise its influence for the reintensification of the efforts begun with a view to obtaining positive results in this field. Non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations must have at their disposal all the documentation necessary for them to carry out their supplementary work effectively.

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
The experience gained since the establishment of the United Nations shows that, for maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required for disarmament negotiations - deliberative and negotiating. The largest possible number of States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership. Where the deliberative function is concerned, it is undeniable that the General Assembly, at its regular sessions, cannot deal adequately with the numerous disarmament items which are always included in its agenda. Accordingly, until such time as a consensus is reached on convening and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference - which could play the same role in its own sphere as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development plays with regard to economic and social matters - it seems desirable to hold regular special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With regard to the negotiating body which functions within the framework of the United Nations, namely the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is obvious that it too has not been in a position to fulfil the extremely important task required of it in its own field of competence. Among the reforms necessary to increase its effectiveness, priority ought to be given to the following: the co-chairmanship system should be replaced by a chairmanship to be held on a monthly rotating basis by non-nuclear-weapon States represented in CCD, thereby helping to make it easier for China and France to participate in its work; a standing sub-committee of the whole should be established; and appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that, without prejudice to its limited member membership, CCD can receive such co-operation as all States, or at least all Members of the United Nations, may wish to extend to it. States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which have not yet established in Geneva adequately staffed permanent delegations to the Committee should endeavour to do so as soon as possible.		The existing negotiating machinery, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, in spite of all the efforts made and the suggestions and proposals advanced, has failed to produce tangible results in the field of disarmament commensurate with the demands of peoples and the security requirements of the countries of the world. Since the consideration of the problems of disarmament as a whole is related to the national security of all States and to international security in general, the starting-point must be the participation of all States in the negotiations on the basis of full equality in accordance with the principles and actions called for in the declaration and programme of measures to be adopted by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. An essential prerequisite for the proper organization of negotiations on disarmament and for the adoption of effective measures relating to the basic problems of disarmament is the concentration of such negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The United Nations will be able to fulfil the historic mission for which it was created if it succeeds in bringing about the cessation of the arms race and in implementing concrete measures in the field of disarmament. The strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field requires the direct exercise by the General Assembly of its competence with respect to negotiation and the preparation and monitoring of the implementation of disarmament measures. The General Assembly should organize in-depth discussions on the arms situation, based on the principles which must govern disarmament. The General Assembly, as the main body concerned with political decisions, the basic forum which examines all of the problems of disarmament in its regular sessions or in special sessions, should discuss the situation of disarmament negotiations either in terms of specific topics or as a whole; adopt decisions, resolutions and recommendations on this question and decide on the establishment of negotiating forums, co-ordinate their activity and receive reports from them on the status and	(See Chapter III, point 7)	All channels for the conduct of negotiations should be effectively used by States for the purpose of solving vital problems connected with ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. On the whole, the existing system of negotiations - multilateral, bilateral and regional - is suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament. The existing types of negotiations should be utilized further in order to reach the necessary international agreements. A breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that the problem should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a World Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could consider with expertise and in sufficient depth the totality of disarmament questions. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a World Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. A World Disarmament Conference should be convened in .... A preparatory committee is being set up for its practical preparation.		Proposals are also being put forward to the effect that decisions should be taken regarding the machinery of disarmament negotiations. It seems to us that a considerable degree of care and caution should be shown here. This question should be considered closely only after general and specific tasks in the disarmament field, that is to say, substantive issues, have been determined. We see no need for abandoning or radically restructuring the existing channels for negotiations. What is needed is that existing bodies should continue to function with greater efficiency, and it is our task to make full use of their capacities. Long experience in disarmament negotiations leaves no room for doubt that the main obstacles to the solution of disarmament problems are not the negotiating machinery but rather the powerful forces in a number of countries which seek to perpetuate the arms race and international tension. The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament. The agenda for the special session also includes discussion of the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which the Soviet Union and a number of other countries consider to be of outstanding importance. The Conference should become such a forum that will make it possible to proceed from the declarations and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions. The Conference will be able to achieve in the best possible way the goals set by the special session.

General Assembly will examine the draft treaties prepared in different negotiating forums, put them into final form and recommend them to States for signature.

Accordingly, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly should concern itself exclusively with the problems of disarmament and security.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should resume its activity and proceed to an examination of the entire range of disarmament problems and the development of efforts undertaken in this field.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, comprising all the Members of the Organization, will be able to concentrate all disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. It will be able to negotiate the disarmament problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly and exercise supervisory functions with respect to the implementation of international agreements in the field of disarmament.

Disarmament negotiations, under the firm direction and control of the United Nations and carried out in bodies with clearly defined agendas and priorities, should be compartmentalized in various categories of activity, such as the consideration of all problems relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition, reduction and elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; the negotiation of measures to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons at the world and regional levels; discussion of the problem of the freezing and gradual reduction by stages of the military budgets of States; the adoption of collateral measures of military disengagement and disarmament.

Within this framework a decision can also be adopted concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States and all nuclear-weapon Powers.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.			It is recognized that there is a close inter-relationship among disarmament, international security, peaceful settlement of disputes and a climate of confidence. During the period of the negotiations for the disarmament measures listed above, there should be parallel negotiations in the appropriate forums for the establishment or development of United Nations peace-making and peace-keeping machinery and procedures in order to increase, and ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of disarmament efforts, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for the strengthening of international security. Nevertheless, as already pointed out above, progress in one of these categories of measures should not be made dependent on progress in the other and vice versa.	A dominant feature of the contemporary world situation is the widening gulf of world-wide economic, social, national and political contradictions. The complexity of the problems facing the peoples is compounded by the economic crisis, magnified by the crises of energy, foodstuffs, raw materials and finance. The intensification of the armaments race, the stockpiling of new and devastating weapons and the increase in military expenditure gravely imperil international security and peace and at the same time impose a heavy burden on all the peoples. The vertiginous growth of inflation and the economic crisis can be largely attributed to the armaments race and to the immense expenditure on military purposes. This process is heightening international instability, endangering the security of some States, areas and continents, and threatening the peace of the whole world. The move towards relaxation which has begun in recent years is still in its fragile infancy and needs to be consolidated by the joint efforts of all States.		It is undeniable that there is a close relationship between disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of a climate of confidence. During the period of negotiations on the disarmament measures listed above, parallel negotiations should be carried on in the appropriate organs for the establishment or development of machinery and procedures for peaceful settlement and peace-keeping within the United Nations in order to increase international peace and security and to ensure that they are maintained. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of efforts for disarmament, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for strengthening international security. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out above, progress in one of these spheres should not be made dependent on progress in the other, and vice versa.	The process towards GCD under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the United Nations Charter effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping Operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 7 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should: 1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process. 2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. 3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries. 4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. 5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament. 6. Seek to restrain the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, utilizing all means which could lead to bilateral, regional and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments. 7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements. 8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by: - publicising the final documents of the Special Session, in particular through Non-Governmental Organizations, mass media and educational systems; - facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions; - improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications; and - encouraging study and research on disarmament. 9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or world-wide: - to inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres; - to invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis; - to improve communications between governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation. In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace	There is a direct link between disarmament and international peace and security since the latter cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry nor be sustained by military alliances and doctrines of strategic superiority or of deterrence. Furthermore, the existing nuclear arsenals and the addition of new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction do not ensure or strengthen national security. There is also an integral link between disarmament and development. The spiralling arms race and the resulting waste of resources are incompatible with the need for accelerated economic and social development and for the establishment of the New International Economic Order. Nevertheless progress in one of these areas should not be contingent upon progress in the other. Elaboration of a system of reporting to the United Nations on the resources released through the reduction of military expenditures as a result of disarmament measures and of a set of principles for channelling of such resources for development purposes taking particularly into account the needs of developing countries.			(See Chapter IV)		

carry out studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises.

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, *inter alia*:

- the international transfer of conventional weapons;
- the possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
- the proposal for a United Nations Register of Weapons Transfers.

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the Special Session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the *ad hoc* group of governmental experts.

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis.

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
	The fact that the arms race continues unchecked and is steadily gathering momentum and that no satisfactory progress has been made in the disarmament negotiations, creates the risk of another world war of annihilation. The problem of disarmament has to be solved if international peace and security are to be safeguarded so that peoples can devote their efforts to development and progress and work unhindered towards the goal of a free and independent life.	(See Chapter VII)	The arms race involves an enormous waste of resources which could be used to advance the well-being of peoples. At the present time, the world is spending approximately $350 billion a year on armaments. The war machine requires ever greater human resources, diverting people from peaceful creative work. This hampers the solution of such important and pressing problems facing mankind as the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness, the development of new sources of energy, extensive exploration of the ocean and outer space, and the prevention of disastrous environmental changes. It also calls for urgent measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament. Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great.	(See Chapter IV)	Four-fifths of the world's military expenditure is now being devoted to conventional armaments. If the conventional arms race continues at the present rate, the prospect of using the resources now being diverted to military purposes towards improving the economic and social conditions in the world, in particular, those of the developing countries, will be further narrowed.	The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament. Among efforts to avert a new war, especially a nuclear war, the supplementing of political détente in Europe by military détente is of special importance. In recent years there have been some changes for the better on this continent. The Soviet Union considers itself in duty bound to protect, consolidate and follow up these achievements. In October 1977, in an effort to strengthen security on the European continent, the Soviet Union submitted constructive proposals forming a programme of action for consolidating military détente in Europe. These proposals were officially submitted by the Soviet delegation at the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the States participating in the European Conference. They envisage the conclusion by the participants in the European Conference of a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other; the groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members; consistent implementation of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act; and the reaching of agreement not to conduct military exercises involving more than, say, 50,000-60,000 men. These are some additional observations which the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make now that the Committee is about to enter an important stage in its work, that of drafting the final documents.

CCD/567/Add.1
19 June 1978

ENGLISH ONLY

Tabulation of Working Papers and Proposals on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Addendum

On page 5 of document CCD/567, of 10 April 1978, after no. 22 add:

23. Netherlands: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Working Paper containing a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization, 30 March 1978, CCD/565

24. Italy: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Working Paper on international mechanisms for disarmament, 24 April 1978, CCD/568

In section VII. Machinery and Procedures for Disarmament Negotiations, under the column bearing the name "Netherlands" add the symbol CCD/565, 30 March 1978, and text reading as follows:

Proposal

In the opinion of the Netherlands, a number of recent developments in the field of disarmament as well as the international situation warrant a reconsideration of the idea of an international disarmament agency. With possibly more and more complicated multilateral disarmament treaties, a need seems to arise for a permanent organization to streamline the consultations and the implementation measures.

Therefore, the Netherlands proposes that an International Disarmament Agency (IDA) be established.

To that effect, the Netherlands suggests that in the final document of the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament an invitation should be included to seek the views of all member States on such an international disarmament agency.

Introduction

In the past, several suggestions and proposals have been made to establish a standing disarmament organ or an international disarmament agency, e.g. in 1973 both Sweden 1/ and the Netherlands 2/ expressed

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1/ CCD/PV.601 of 13 April 1973 and CCD/PV.610 of 5 July 1973.

2/ CCD/PV.617 and CCD/410 of 31 July 1973.

detailed views on this subject in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The standing disarmament organ, as proposed by the Netherlands would firstly be entrusted with the verification of a treaty banning chemical weapons. However, it was envisaged from the beginning that such an organ could take upon itself other tasks, such as the verification of other arms control and disarmament treaties as well as the organization of review conferences provided for in such treaties. In the absence of prospects, at that time, for substantial multilateral disarmament agreements as well as for other reasons, the ideas put forward by Sweden and the Netherlands were not pursued to any further degree. At present, the international situation seems to be more responsive to a reconsideration of these ideas. Indeed, several countries suggested the establishment of such an organ during the preparations of the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament or made proposals which are relevant for a discussion on this subject.

Possible functions of an international disarmament agency

In this working paper an international disarmament agency is envisaged as the operational framework for the implementation of international arms control and disarmament treaties, with functions mainly in the field of verification. In addition, it is thought that such an agency could be instrumental to the preparation and organization of review conferences already provided for in several disarmament treaties and could serve as a clearing house for information on disarmament.

The idea takes into account the following considerations and ongoing developments:

(a) A convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction seems within reach in the foreseeable future. It seems probable that such a convention will provide for rather extensive consultations between parties, in particular technical discussions on the precise agents to be banned or restricted and on implementation measures. The treaty would probably provide for rather extensive notification and verification procedures. Besides regular political and technical discussions between parties, a permanent staff seems necessary for the implementation of the convention.

(b) A treaty banning nuclear tests seems also within reach. An international seismic system will in all probability be established to exchange and process seismic data. A consultative organ of parties to the treaty seems necessary, both with respect to solving technical and organizational problems of the seismic system - including the administration of international seismic data centra - as to discuss other matters with respect to the implementation of the treaty, such as working out procedures for on-site inspection and the actual carrying out of such inspections.

(c) Also for other existing and future multilateral disarmament agreements there may be a need for consultations between interested countries, in particular by the parties to these treaties, as well as for implementation measures. With more and more complicated multilateral disarmament treaties, a need seems to arise for a permanent organization to streamline the consultations and the implementation measures. Otherwise, a substantial number of consultative commissions, some of them with permanent staffs, seems required, all perhaps differently organized.

(d) The proposal by France to establish an international agency for satellite observation commands particular attention. The Netherlands shares the view of France that the present situation that information which can be obtained by satellite is in the hands of only a few countries is undesirable, in particular in cases where such information is a prerequisite for the verification of multilateral treaties. The Netherlands recognizes, however, the practical problems to establish an international satellite agency. It is also of the view that observation by satellite cannot provide all information necessary to verify present and future arms control treaties. For example, satellites cannot provide most or all verification functions with respect to a ban on underground nuclear tests or chemical disarmament. It would therefore be necessary not to concentrate on satellite observation only but to combine different verification tasks and methods in one agency, which would be the international disarmament agency.

(e) Several disarmament treaties now provide for more or less regular review conferences. An international disarmament agency as proposed could provide the operational framework for the organization of review conferences. Preparations and proceedings of review conferences could thus be streamlined.

The existence of permanent consultative machinery could also facilitate the organization of review conferences, thereby rendering them more efficient.

(f) Relevant information with respect to the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements could be combined in one organization. Data on various disarmament measures, such as for instance stockpile-destruction, seismic data, results of inspections and fact-finding missions could be stored with one organization which would act as a clearing house for information on all implementation efforts in the field of disarmament.

A possible approach

In the view of the Netherlands the international disarmament organization could be set up initially for the implementation of a particular disarmament treaty, and could then gradually be given more functions dependent on emerging needs and taking into account experience gained. The existence of a permanent disarmament organization would make it possible during negotiations on other disarmament measures to allot certain functions to the organization and thus avoid creating new bodies. The agency would, of course, only perform functions which are specifically given to it by the parties to particular arms control and disarmament treaties. A link with the United Nations seems also desirable.

Structure of the organization

The agency could be constructed along the familiar pattern of many international organizations, such as a plenary conference, a board and a secretariat. Membership of the conference would pose no problem if the agency would function in the context of one arms control or disarmament treaty only, since the members of the conference would be the parties to the treaty. As a nucleus for a disarmament organization having more functions, the conference would have to be open-ended. Rights and duties of individual members would then have to be determined by their adherence to the treaties under consideration.

While the conference, as a rule, would only meet at certain intervals, the board would have to be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Members of the board would be elected by the conference. Its main functions could be envisaged as providing practical guidance to the work of the agency on the basis of guidelines to be given by the conference.

The secretariat, headed by an administrator, would consist of a permanent staff and such additional panels of experts as may be required for the performance of *ad hoc* or highly specialized activities, such as special investigations or technical studies.

Summary and conclusion

Above some preliminary views are given by the Netherlands. It is recognized, of course, that careful study and consideration is necessary before the international community can decide on the establishment of a new international organ. Also, results of ongoing disarmament negotiations, in particular with respect to chemical weapons and the comprehensive test ban, would have an influence on the subject. The Netherlands proposes,therefore, a number of steps which could ultimately lead to the establishment of an international disarmament agency if and when the world community considers it opportune.

As a first step, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would seek the view of Governments on this question, in particular on the functions to be given to an international disarmament agency, its structure and its link with the United Nations. Answers could be expected by Governments before the 34th Session of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General could make an analysis of the different ideas and opinions expressed by member States.

A next step could be that the General Assembly, if the answers warrant such a step, decides to establish a committee which would further negotiate on the structure and functions of a possible disarmament organization. The last step could be the actual establishment of such an organization, for example at a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Consequently, the Netherlands proposes the following wording to be included in the final document of the Special Session:

"The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of member States with respect to the functions and organization of a possible international disarmament agency and to submit these views and an analysis thereof to the 34th session of the General Assembly".

In the same section, under the column bearing the name "Italy" add the symbol CCD/568, 24 April 1978 and text reading as follows:

The Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides an important opportunity to consider and to evaluate existing multilateral mechanisms and to make suggestions and recommendations for their improvement.

In a review of the adequacy of international disarmament machinery, the following elements should be considered:

(1) the vital interest of all nations in the outcome of disarmament negotiations and the need for a more conscious and direct participation of all States in disarmament endeavours;

(2) the special responsibility incumbent upon nuclear-weapon powers and other militarily significant States and their primary role in effective progress toward disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament;

(3) the desirability of a better co-ordination among bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, with a view to over-all achievements toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament;

(4) the necessity for a parallel strengthening of the international security system and of the establishment of adequate verification mechanisms in order to assure the effective implementation and the strict fulfilment of agreed disarmament measures.

Against this background, Italy believes that the Special Session should focus its attention on the following main components of the international disarmament machinery:

(a) United Nations General Assembly

The General Assembly provides the natural and most appropriate forum for the consideration, on a universal basis and with the participation of all member States, of the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

In view of rationalizing debates and rendering decision-making more effective, all disarmament items should be allocated to the first committee, which should mainly concentrate its activity on disarmament and international security matters.

To this end, any other suitable revision of the procedures should be readily envisaged, bearing in mind the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Ad hoc Committees of the General Assembly could be set up to deal with issues deserving special consideration.

While the General Assembly should remain the regular forum for the annual review of disarmament problems, it might be appropriate to convene, in due course, a further Special Session for the specific purpose of:

(a) appraising the implementation of the Programme of Action;

(b) identifying guidelines for the next sequence of negotiations;

(c) considering and possibly adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(b) Security Council

Consideration should be given to the specific contribution which the Security Council could make to disarmament progress.

To this effect, it is suggested that the Security Council should review the implementation of its responsibilities in the field of the regulation of armaments under article 26 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the Security Council might consider the advisability of establishing, under article 29 of the Charter, subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes, beginning with a committee, divided into regional sub-committees, to control the international transfer of conventional weapons.

(c) Machinery of Negotiation: the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

Because of their very complex nature, effective disarmament negotiations at the multilateral level can be undertaken only within a body of limited dimensions, operating by consensus.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has proved to be the most qualified forum for the achievement of substantive disarmament measures intended to have universal application.

The CCD should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body in the field of arms control and to carry out all of its responsibilities in the pursuit of effective agreements relating to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament. The CCD should, _inter alia_, intensify its efforts in view of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament negotiations.

It is widely recognized that the role of the CCD would be consistently enhanced by the association of those nuclear-weapon States which do not yet participate in its deliberations.

In addition, the CCD might be recommended to review its structures and methods of work in view of:

(a) envisaging a limited increase in its membership which would ensure a greater geographical and political balance in its composition;

(b) opening its meetings, under appropriate circumstances, to all interested United Nations member States. Such States could participate as observers in plenary meetings, being allowed to submit written proposals and to take part in their discussion before the Committee. The same proposals would be circulated as official documents of the CCD.

While the present degree of autonomy and flexibility of the CCD should be maintained as an essential condition of the effectiveness of the negotiation process, a closer liaison between the CCD and the United Nations might be secured by requesting the CCD to address to the General Assembly a progress report following the spring session and periodic special reports on particular topics, as appropriate.

It could also be suggested that the Committee, at the beginning of its activities every year, should seek to reach a broad agreement on the work to be accomplished during its two sessions and to establish a methodical schedule of negotiations to be conducted within the period considered.

The work of the CCD could be further improved by the establishment -- as soon as it is deemed appropriate by a sufficient convergence of views among the members -- of functional working groups which would negotiate draft treaties or accord consideration, informally and in depth, to specific items, with the assistance of experts.

Finally, the CCD might be invited to consider the possibility of opening its plenary meetings to the public.

(d) Machinery for verification

While strengthening the world security system, on a parallel with progress made in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should consider the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification of multilateral disarmament measures.

Such a body, to be instituted by international agreement following appropriate studies and consultations, would operate in the framework of the United Nations. It would be designed to supervise, from both the technical and legal viewpoints, the implementation of treaties in force, so as to ensure full compliance with their provisions.

To this effect, the organ of verification should employ whatever technological and scientific means -- such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices -- might be usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures.

(e) United Nations Centre for Disarmament

The organization and functioning of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be carefully assessed with the aim of improving its effectiveness and capability, in order that it may:

(a) carry out, with the necessary expertise, studies and research as needed for the clarification of specific disarmament issues;

(b) provide broader information and stimulate a greater awareness on the part of international public opinion regarding disarmament problems.

CCD/567*
31 August 1978

Original ENGLISH

Tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament

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* Reissued for technical reasons. This document was originally circulated in English only on 18 April 1978. Translation into French, Russian and Spanish has now been provided and the document is being circulated in these three languages only.

CCD/568
24 April 1978
Original: ENGLISH

ITALY

Working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament

The Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides an important opportunity to consider and to evaluate existing multilateral mechanisms and to make suggestions and recommendations for their improvement.

In a review of the adequacy of international disarmament machinery, the following elements should be considered:

(1) the vital interest of all nations in the outcome of disarmament negotiations and the need for a more conscious and direct participation of all States in disarmament endeavours;

(2) the special responsibility incumbent upon nuclear-weapon powers and other militarily significant States and their primary role in effective progress toward disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament;

(3) the desiderability of a better co-ordination among bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, with a view to over-all achievements toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament;

(4) the necessity for a parallel strengthening of the international security system and of the establishment of adequate verification mechanisms in order to assure the effective implementation and the strict fulfilment of agreed disarmament measures.

Against this background, Italy believes that the Special Session should focus its attention on the following main components of the international disarmament machinery:

a. United Nations General Assembly

The General Assembly provides the natural and most appropriate forum for the consideration, on a universal basis and with the participation of all member States, of the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

In view of rationalizing debates and rendering decision-making more effective, all disarmament items should be allocated to the first committee, which should mainly concentrate its activity on disarmament and international security matters.

To this end, any other suitable revision of the procedures should be readily envisaged, bearing in mind the recommendations of the _Ad Hoc_ Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmement.

Ad hoc Committees of the General Assembly could be set up to deal with issues deserving special consideration.

While the General Assembly should remain the regular forum for the annual review of disarmament problems, it might be appropriate to convene, in due course, a further Special Session for the specific purpose of:

(a) appraising the implementation of the Programme of action;

(b) identifying guidelines for the next sequence of negotiations;

(c) considering and possibly adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

b. Security Council

Consideration should be given to the specific contribution which the Security Council could make to disarmament progress.

To this effect, it is suggested that the Security Council should review the implementation of its responsibilities in the field of the regulation of armaments under article 26 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the Security Council might consider the advisability of establishing, under article 29 of the Charter, subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes, beginning with a committee, divided into regional sub-committees, to control the international transfer of conventional weapons.

c. Machinery of Negotiation: the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

Because of their very complex nature, effective disarmament negotiations at the multilateral level can be undertaken only within a body of limited dimensions, operating by consensus.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has proved to be the most qualified forum for the achievement of substantive disarmament measures intended to have universal application.

The CCD should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body in the field of arms control and to carry out all of its responsibilities in the pursuit of effective agreements relating to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament. The CCD should, inter alia, intensify its efforts in view of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament negotiations.

It is widely recognized that the role of the CCD would be consistently enhanced by the association of those nuclear-weapon States which do not yet participate in its deliberations.

In addition, the CCD might be recommended to review its structures and methods of work in view of:

(a) envisaging a limited increase in its membership which would ensure a greater geographical and political balance in its composition;

(b) opening its meetings, under appropriate circumstances, to all interested United Nations member States. Such States could participate as observers in plenary meetings, being allowed to submit written proposals and to take part in their discussion before the Committee. The same proposals would be circulated as official documents of the CCD.

While the present degree of autonomy and flexibility of the CCD should be maintained as an essential condition of the effectiveness of the negotiation process, a closer liaison between the CCD and the United Nations might be secured by requesting the CCD to address to the General Assembly a progress report following the spring session and periodic special reports on particular topics, as appropriate.

It could also be suggested that the Committee, at the beginning of its activities every year, should seek to reach a broad agreement on the work to be accomplished during its two sessions and to establish a methodical schedule of negotiations to be conducted within the period considered.

The work of the CCD could be further improved by the establishment -- as soon as it is deemed appropriate by a sufficient convergence of views among the members -- of functional working groups which would negotiate draft treaties or accord consideration, informally and in depth, to specific items, with the assistance of experts.

Finally, the CCD might be invited to consider the possibility of opening its plenary meetings to the public.

d. Machinery for verification

While strengthening the world security system, on a parallel with progress made in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should consider the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification of multilateral disarmament measures.

Such a body, to be instituted by international agreement following appropriate studies and consultations, would operate in the framework of the United Nations. It would be designed to supervise, from both the technical and legal viewpoints, the implementation of treaties in force, so as to ensure full compliance with their provisions.

To this effect, the organ of verification should employ whatever technological and scientific means -- such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices — might be usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures.

e. United Nations Centre for Disarmament

The organization and functioning of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be carefully assessed with the aim of improving its effectiveness and capability, in order that it may:

(a) carry out, with the necessary expertise, studies and research as needed for the clarification of specific disarmament issues;

(b) provide broader information and stimulate a greater awareness on the part of international public opinion regarding disarmament problems.

CCD/569
24 April 1978
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Working paper on a methodological investigation for computerized scanning of chemical literature

Introduction

A disarmament treaty prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons will need provisions for verification as well as other methods for strengthening confidence between the parties to the treaty. Different methods have been discussed in the CCD. The former leader of the Swedish delegation to the CCD, Minister of State, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, pointed out the potential value of collecting, systematizing and disseminating information contained in scientific and technical literature (ENCD/PV.391, 20 August 1968). This method has also been discussed at informal meetings with chemical experts at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Manual scanning of relevant literature is a time-consuming task. Work of this kind demands a wide coverage of journals and other open sources. However, there is today an increasingly large number of abstract publications which facilitate access to the world literature within a special subject Many of these abstract publications appear also on magnetic tapes and are available for direct computer scanning. This facilitates further the following of the literature within a desired field. It therefore seemed worthwhile to investigate suitable means and methods for utilizing such databased abstract publications and evaluate their possible applicability in connexion with a chemical weapons treaty.

Aims

The method for the computerized literature search should ideally catch only relevant items from the immense amount of papers and articles that are published.

When weighing manual versus computerized retrieval of literature, one must observe that computerized retrieval is advantageous when many combined concepts shall be watched. It is possible to look out, "manually", for material under the heading of one keyword, but to follow combinations of keywords requires a much larger effort. An evaluation of the size and usefulness of different databases has made it clear that the most comprehensive coverage will be obtained when several databases are searched simultaneously. However, this has not been applied in the study reported on in this working paper.

Investigation

1. In this study the computer-readable version of Chemical Abstracts (CA) was used, i.e. Chemical Abstracts Condensates (CAC). This data-base provides access to chemical information included in more than 10,000 serial publications, printed all over the world. In 1977 Chemical Abstracts contained references to ca 410,000 papers, patents, reports and books. Chemical Abstract Condensates, which is issued weekly, contains the bibliographic description of every item abstracted in the Chemical Abstracts, plus the keywords used for the issue index. The bibliographic description includes, e.g. source document, bibliographic citations, document titles, names of chemical substances. The keyword index is produced by specialists in various subject areas.

The study consists of two parts. First a preparatory study was carried out on a material from five issues of Chemical Abstract Condensates within the subject field of biochemistry and organic chemistry. This material consisted of 26,488 references and was manually searched, read and analysed in order to find all relevant references.

The five issues of the printed version of Chemical Abstract Condensates used were read through by two chemists experienced in questions related to chemical warfare problems. References were selected by the readers according to the "most interesting subject" in the paper and with regard mainly to the degree of toxicity. The selected references were then reclassified by a highly qualified scientist in order to take into consideration also the concepts "novelty" and "military" interest.

Different kinds of search strategies were formulated and tested on the "known" material in order to find the most successful one, i.e. the search strategy which would retrieve the relevant references. This "known" material was also to be used as a standard for comparison with the output from the subsequent computerized search.

Secondly, in the main study the selected search strategies obtained in the preparatory study were applied to 20 subsequently published issues of Chemical Abstract Condensates, containing 128,740 references. The output, i.e. the lists of references, obtained by means of the applied search strategies, was treated in the same way as the material in the preparatory study, i.e. they were scanned by the two chemists and selected references classified by the scientist.

Formulation of search strategies

Two search strategies were formulated in the following way in order to retrieve the largest number of relevant references. Keywords were selected and compiled into different groups, and combined into the search strategies, which were tested. Two sets of combinations of these groups formed the search strategies finally used, Alfa and Beta respectively.

The groups and examples of pertinent keywords are briefly described in table 1.

Table 1. Description of keyword groups used in the search strategies

Description	Example of pertinent keywords	Number of keywords in the group
General expressions of toxicity	TOXIN	4
General expressions of warning or danger	DANGER	21
Substances with effects on skin and mucous membrane	MUSTA[1]	3
Organs, i.e. lung	PULMON[1]	9
Cholinesterase inhibitors	CARBAM[1]	7
Cholinergic system	CHOLINEST[1]	4
Organs and functions	RESPIRAT[1]	6
Chemical structures	FLUOR	6
Chemical warfare agents	SARIN	27
Laboratory methods	ISOLAR[1]	6
Gases and aerosols	GAS[1]	5
Toxic effects	VOMIT[1]	32
Delimitating or inhibiting effects	BLOCK[1]	7
Total number of keywords		137

[1] Parts of words can be used as keywords.

Alfa was intended to retrieve the largest possible number of relevant references within a reasonable amount of the references resulting from the computer output, i.e. recall should be as high as possible. Beta should result in a still more reduced output as compared to Alfa without losing too many relevant references, and thereby resulting in giving a higher precision.

The measures used to evaluate the search strategies were expressed as follows:

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{Number of retrieved relevant references}}{\text{Number of all relevant references in the database}}$$

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{Number of retrieved relevant references}}{\text{Number of all retrieved references}}$$

$$\text{Size of reduced database (per cent)} = \frac{\text{number of retrieved references}}{\text{total number of references in the database}} \times 100$$

Results

Some of the results of the study are presented in table 2.

Table 2. Results obtained by the search strategies, Alfa and Beta, preparatory and main studies

	Search Profile	Size of reduced database		No. of retrieved relevant references	Recall	Precision
		Total No. of retrieved references (output)	% of original database			
Preparatory study	Manual search	-	-	35	-	-
	Alfa	1 138	4.3	31	0.89	0.03
	Beta	260	1.0	22	0.63	0.09
Main study	Alfa	5 019	3.9	88	-	0.02
	Beta	1 139	0.88	60	-	0.05

It is impossible to give recall in the main study because of the lack of knowledge of the total number of relevant references in the material.

It was calculated that the probability of retrieving new information relevant to the chemical warfare-subject by the described method is fairly high ($p > 0.8$), assuming that such information appears in at least two or more different abstracted references.

Conclusions

The present methodological investigation has shown it is possible to formulate effective search strategies for computerized searching of databased literature references for information concerning chemical warfare agents. The method makes it possible to substantially diminish the amount of work needed for searching manually the corresponding amount of literature. The results imply that with search strategies of the types used it is possible to reduce the database (in this investigation Chemical Abstracts Condensates) to 1-4 per cent of its original size, while still retaining 63-89 per cent of relevant references in the material.

It seems possible to improve the method and also to apply it to several more databases.

Terms of Reference for the Continued Work of the CCD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events

Recognizing the valuable and important work carried out by the *Ad Hoc* group and presented to the CCD in its report of 14 March 1978 (CCD/558); taking note of the suggestion by the *Ad Hoc* group that it conduct additional work and also of a similar suggestion by the Japanese delegation (CCD/PV.776) the CCD decides that the *Ad Hoc* group should continue its work by studying the scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental test of a global network of seismological stations of the kind which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty.

The studies should include the elaboration of instructions and specifications for the following items

- data to be routinely produced at participating stations (level I data)
- data format and procedures for level I data transmission through the WMO communication network
- procedures to be used for data analysis at data centres
- format and procedures for the exchange of wave form data (level II data)

The organization and procedures of the work of this group shall remain the same as those defined by the decision of the Committee of 22 July 1976. The *Ad Hoc* group will hold its first meeting under its new mandate during the week beginning 24 July 1978. The group should present a progress report after each of its sessions. The group should report the results of its work to the Committee during its spring session of 1979. After considering the final report of the *Ad Hoc* group the Committee will consider the question of desirability of carrying out an experimental exercise.

CCD/571
10 May 1978

Original: ENGLISH

Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

1. On 25 August 1977, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament adopted a consensus decision to set up, at the beginning of its 1978 spring session, an Ad Hoc Working Group to discuss and elbaorate a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

2. At its thirty-second session in 1977, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/80 under the item entitled "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade", in which the Assembly, *inter alia*, took note of the above-mentioned decision of the CCD and requested the Committee to continue its work on this subject and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978.

3. At its 776th plenary meeting on 2 March 1978, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with the decision reached at its 765th plenary meeting on 25 August 1977, adopted by consensus the terms of reference establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group to discuss and elaborate a draft comprehensive programme for disarmament. By those terms of reference the Group would (a) take as its basic working tests all Committee documents on the subject of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, starting with the 1961 USSR/USA Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations and also taking into account other documents that may be submitted to the Committee during the course of its work, both by members and by non-members of the CCD; (b) request the Secretariat to circulate as CCD documents all documents submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament on a comprehensive programme for disarmament; (c) be guided by the CCD's procedural decision adopted at its 746th plenary meeting on 21 April 1977, relating to the establishment of ad hoc working groups; and (d) submit a report on its work to the CCD before the end of the 1978 spring session.

4. On 20 March 1978, the Ad Hoc Working Group held its first meeting and devoted it to the consideration of procedural and organizational matters, particularly with respect to documentation for its work. At that meeting, it considered three papers prepared by the Secretariat: (a) a paper dated 6 March 1978, containing an updated version, requested by Nigeria, of the document of 3 March 1977 entitled "Informal Background Paper on Comprehensive Negotiating Programme"; (b) a note by the Secretariat dated 13 March 1978, containing for the Group's consideration in connexion with a request by India on behalf of the group of 15 for a tabulation of documents on the comprehensive programme for disarmament: (1) a tentative and preliminary list of relevant documents on the comprehensive programme for disarmament to be tabulated; and (2) a preliminary and tentative list of headings that might be used for arranging the proposals to be so tabulated; and (c) a note by the Secretariat

dated 20 March 1978, containing a list, for the Group's consideration, of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme for disarmament submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

At its second meeting on 22 March 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group after considering further the papers submitted by the Secretariat above, decided to request the Secretariat to prepare the said tabulation, based on the lists of documents and headings contained in the Secretariat's papers above and also taking into account the suggestions made by various delegations concerning those lists.

5. At is meeting on 3 May 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group took note of the documents prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with its request which would be useful for future work on the comprehensive programme for disarmament. In view of the lack of time, however, and bearing in mind the various options availableto the General Assembly with respect to this subject, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group decided to recommend to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmame that the tabulation paper (CCD/567) should be annexed to the Committee's special report to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

CCD/572
10 May 1978

Original: ENGLISH

Terms of reference for the CCD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

In accordance with the decision reached at its 765th meeting on 25 August 1977, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament hereby establishes an *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee to discuss and elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the CCD for consideration.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group will have as the basic texts for its work all the working papers and draft proposals on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which have been submitted to the CCD starting with the Joint Statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 1961. It shall also take into account other documents that may be submitted to the CCD during the course of its work both by members and non-members of the CCD. The Committee requests that the Secretariat circulate as CCD documents those documents and proposals on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which have been or may be submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In discharging its functions the *Ad Hoc* Working Group will be guided by the decision of the CCD of 21 April 1977 relating to the establishment of *Ad Hoc* Working Groups.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group will submit a report on the work of the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the CCD before the end of its Spring Session.

The Committee requests the Secretariat to provide necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Working Group including interpretation and translation services and preparing unofficial summaries of the Working Group's proceedings.

CCD/575 (VOL.I and VOL.II)
11 May 1978

Original: ENGLISH

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

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SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Introduction

1. By its resolution 32/88 of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,[1] including a recommendation that the General Assembly request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to submit to the Special Session "a special report on the state of the various questions under consideration by the Conference".

2. In its resolution 32/77, the General Assembly requested the CCD to continue negotiations and, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its consideration; and to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at the Special Session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-third session. In its resolution 32/80, the General Assembly similarly requested the CCD to continue its work on the subject of a comprehensive programme and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its Special Session devoted to disarmament. In its resolution 32/78, the General Assembly also urged the three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations related to nuclear-weapon testing, with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the CCD by the beginning of its spring session in 1978, and requested the Committee to take up the agreed text resulting from those negotiations with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its Special Session Devoted to Disarmament.

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[1] Official records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41 and Corr.1), para. 18.

3. The following report has been prepared in direct response to those requests. It consists of two volumes. Volume I contains a part I, briefly covering the basic facts concerning the establishment, work and significant specific achievements of the Committee from its first meeting in early 1962 to the present date, followed by a part II, dealing directly with the current state of questions under consideration in the Committee. Volume II provides additional details on more recent views of delegations on questions under consideration in the Committee and developments relevant thereto.

VOLUME I

PART I - ESTABLISHMENT, WORK AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1962-1978)

A. Establishment, Agenda, Organization of Work, Membership and Procedures

Establishment, Agenda and Organization of Work

4. Prior to the establishment in 1961 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) -- the forerunner of the present Committee on Disarmament (CCD) -- multilateral disarmament negotiations within the framework of the United Nations took place, for the most part, in bodies of relatively restricted membership, composed exclusively of representatives of the two major military groupings of Europe and North America. The last multilateral negotiating body of that type functioning before the ENDC's establishment was the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, created outside but linked to the United Nations, and that Committee terminated its activites in June 1960. From that date until the creation of the ENDC, no significant multilateral negotiations took place, other than tripartite negotiations among the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of a nuclear-weapon test ban.

5. In early 1961, the Soviet Union and the United States announced that they had reached an understanding to continue an exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and a resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition was to be agreed upon and to inform the General Assembly at its sixteenth session, later in 1961, of the progress made. In its resolution 1617 (XV)[1], dated 21 April 1961, the General Assembly took note of the statements made by the United States and the Soviet Union at its fifteenth session on the question of disarmament. In September 1961, a statement containing agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament was issued jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union.[2] The statement pledged, inter alia, that "States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve ...... the widest possible agreement at the earliest

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 16A (A/4684/Add.1).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

possible date". On 25 September 1961, the United States submitted to the General Assembly a proposed programme for general and complete disarmament and, the following day, the Soviet Union submitted a memorandum on "Measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament".

6. The two countries reported, however, that they had not been able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. By its resolution 1660 (XVI)[1], dated 28 November 1961, the General Assembly, after welcoming the agreement of the two Powers, noting that they wished to resume disarmament negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition had yet to be agreed upon and considering it essential that those two principal parties should agree and accept a negotiating body, urged "the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory" before the conclusion of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. By its resolution 1722 (XVI)[2] dated 20 December 1961, the Assembly again welcomed the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the United States on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament be based on those principles; endorsed "the agreement that had been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, whose membership would be Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America" and recommended "that the Committee, as a matter of utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching .... agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

7. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee of Disarmament (ENDC), as it was officially titled, held its first meeting on 14 March 1962 at the Foreign Minister's level. One member of the Committee, France, decided not

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[1] General Assembly Official Records, Sixteenth session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5100).

[2] General Assembly Official Records, Sixteenth session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5100)

to participate, but its place on the Committee has been retained to the present date. The Foreign Ministers decided at that meeting to organize the Conference so as to permit simultaneous work on general and complete disarmament, on confidence-building (collateral) measures and on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

8. Briefly summarized, the ENDC concentrated largely on the question of general and complete disarmament from 1962 to 1965, mainly on the basis of two proposals -- one submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union, entitled "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control"[1/] and another submitted by the United States, entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world"[2/]. During 1962 and 1963, however, the Committee, first in a Sub-Committee set up for that purpose and later in its plenary meetings, actively participated in the negotiation of a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water -- the so-called limited test ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in August 1963 (see section on "Concrete Results", paras. 23 to 25).

9. In 1966, the ENDC reported to the General Assembly that it continued to regard general and complete disarmament as "the primary goal of its future work" but that "in order to achieve the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date", it had continued consideration of such measures as could be agreed upon prior to the achievement of that goal, in particular the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. As a result of growing emphasis on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, consideration of disarmament, both in the ENDC and the General Assembly, was dominated by that question until mid-1968, when a non-proliferation treaty negotiated in the ENDC was transmitted to the General Assembly and commended by the Assembly (see section on "Concrete Results", paras. 26 to 32).

1/ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex I, section C (ENDC/2).

2/ Ibid., section F, (ENDC/30)

10. In mid-1968, the ENDC adopted the following comprehensive provisional agenda for its future work, which has remained unchanged to the present time:

"1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.

"2. Non-nuclear measures.

Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"3. Other collateral measures.

Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

"4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

"The co-chairmen note the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any meeting of the Committee."

11. The Committee noted that its agenda had been adopted in response to recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968 for bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.

12. From 1969 to date, discussion in the Committee has centred largely on the question of a comprehensive test ban (CTB), the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques and, most recently, the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the Committee has continued to recognize general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the final goal of all disarmament efforts.

13. At its twenty-fourth session in 1969 the General Assembly adopted resolution 2499A (XXIV),[1] endorsing the call of the Secretary-General for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade to coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade, and resolution 2602E (XXIV),[2] declaring the Decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and specifically calling on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, to work out "a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control". At the repeated request of the General Assembly, the Committee has considered the question of such a comprehensive programme, but without reaching any concrete agreement. In 1977, the Committee decided to set up, at the beginning of its 1978 session, an *ad hoc* working group to study the question in detail (for more details, see part II, sub-section "Comprehensive disarmament programme").

14. During 1969 and 1970 the Committee, while continuing consideration of the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons, as well as a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, as requested by the General Assembly, concentrated its efforts on an agreement, first proposed by the Soviet Union, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed, which led to a final agreement on the subject (see section on "Concrete Results", paras. 33 to 38).

15. During 1971, the Committee concentrated its attention on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, which led to an agreement banning bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as a first step towards a total ban on both biological and chemical weapons (see section on "Concrete Results", paras. 39 to 43). Active efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons have continued. In 1972, a draft convention on the subject was submitted to the Committee by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR. In 1973, a comprehensive working paper

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No. 30 (A/7630).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No. 30 (A/7630).

on the subject was put forward by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Draft conventions were submitted by Japan in 1974 and by the United Kingdom in 1976.[1]

16. During 1975 and 1976, the attention of the Committee focused increasingly on the question of prohibiting military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, resulting in the preparation of a draft convention on the subject broadly acceptable to the Committee and subsequently referred by the General Assembly to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification (see section on "Concrete Results", paras. 44-48).

17. During the period of the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s, the General Assembly also requested the Committee to prepare a number of special reports, including (a) a series of special reports on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban (1970, 1971 and 1973); (b) a report on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, to be submitted as a part of the Committee's report on a comprehensive test ban (1974); and (c) a special report on the results achieved on the question of prohibiting the military use of environmental modification techniques. All of these special reports were submitted as separate sections of the Committee's regular annual reports to the General Assembly. In addition, the General Assembly, in its resolution 3261F (XXIX),[2] decided to undertake a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, to be carried out by an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the auspices of the Disarmament Committee, and requested the Committee to transmit the study to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. That report, prepared by the expert group established under the Committee's auspices (CCD/467), was transmitted to the General Assembly as a separate document (CCD/476) and was subsequently published as a United Nations document.[3]

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[1] All the documents mentioned in para. 14 are identified in part II of Vol.I under the heading "Question of the prohibition of chemical weapons", paras. 70 to 74.

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9631).

[3] United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7.

18. On its own initiative, the Committee also held a great number of informal technical meetings with the participation of experts, particularly on a comprehensive test ban, biological and chemical weapons, environmental modification techniques and new weapons of mass destruction. In July 1976, the Committee also established an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, which held a series of sessions from 1976 to 1978, when it issued a final report.[1/]

Membership and Procedures

19. During the past decade the Committee has been enlarged, first by the addition of Japan and Mongolia in July 1969, then by the additon of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia in August 1969, and lastly by the addition, at the beginning of 1975, of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaire. After the first enlargement in 1969, the name of the Committee was changed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The General Assembly endorsed the 1969 enlargement in its resolution 2602B (XXIV)[2/] and the enlargement agreed in 1974 in its resolution 3261B (XXIX).[3/] In the latter resolution, the Assembly expressed the conviction that to effect any future changes in the composition of the CCD, the procedure followed in that resolution should be observed.

20. With regard to procedures, the Committee agreed from the beginning that the Chair should be rotated in the sequence of meetings in English alphabetical order. The Committee also agreed that the permanent Co-Chairmen of the Committee should be the representatives of the USSR and the United States of America, who should consult with each other and other delegations, as desirable, with the aim of facilitating both the formal and informal work of the Committee. The Co-Chairmen also assumed responsibility for preparing the first draft of the Committee's annual report. During the first year, a

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[1/] (The contents of special reports submitted up to the end of the 1978 spring session are briefly summarized in the section on "Concrete Results", paras. 22 to 54.)

[2/] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No. 30 (A/7630).

[3/] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9631).

Sub-Committee, consisting of the three nuclear-weapon States only was established to study the question of a comprehensive nuclear-weapons test ban; from the second year on, however, the Committee has occasionally decided that study of a particular question can be best carried out by an ad hoc working group of the whole set up for that particular purpose. Up until recent years the verbatim records of the Committee were made known to the public after a two-week delay, and other Committee documents were not made available to the public and other United Nations Members until they were included as annexes to the annual report which the Committee made to each session of the General Assembly. Up until 1976 the Committee's press communiqués were very brief. From the beginning to the present time, all meetings of the Committee have been closed to the public, press and others, unless the Committee decided otherwise. In practice, it has been possible recently for any United Nations Member to submit documents to the Committee to be issued as official Committee documents and members of the Committee have, on occasion, submitted working papers containing documents prepared by non-members of the United Nations, if submitted as their own paper.

21. A number of Committee members, including Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia, urged throughout the years various changes in Committee procedures and in 1975, 1976 and 1977, a number of changes were adopted (for details, see part II, section on "Question of organization and procedures of the Committee").

B. Concrete Results of the Committee's Work: Agreements and significant expert reports achieved by the Committee or with its active participation

Treaties and conventions

22. In the preceding section, outlining the work of the Disarmament Committee during the sixteen years of its existence, mention had been made of five specific multilateral arms limitation or disarmament agreements, in the form of treaties and conventions, that have been achieved with the significant participation of the Committee. A more detailed description of each of those agreements follows, together with a brief account of the negotiating history in each case.

(1) Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water (limited test-ban Treaty)

23. In the first days of the Committee's work, on 21 March 1962, a Sub-Committee, consisting of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, was established to continue consideration of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. Among the proposals before the Sub-Committee were draft agreements put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, dealing with the subject matter. In August 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the Committee two alternative draft treaties[1] one of which was comprehensive in nature and the other of which proposed, as a first step, a ban on tests in all environments except underground, with no international verification and with a cut-off date of 1 January 1963. The two States made clear, however, that they would not accept an uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests in any form.

24. On 6 November 1962, by its resolution 1762A (XVII),[2] the General Assembly condemned all nuclear-weapon tests, asking that they cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963, and recommended that, if the parties most concerned could not agree on such a comprehensive ban by that date, they should immediately prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The resolution also requested the Disarmament Committee (ENDC) to reconvene immediately to resume negotiations in the matter. The Committee did so, concentrating its efforts on the question throughout the first half of 1963, urging the nuclear Powers concerned to reach early agreement among themselves and contributing a number of useful suggestions for making progress towards the desired goal. On 5 August 1963, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom signed an agreement in Moscow banning nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in the three environments proposed. At its subsequent session in

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[1] Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to March 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, section O (ENDC/58) and section D (ENDC/59).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth session, Supplement No. 17 (A/5217).

late 1963, the General Assembly adopted, as resolution 1910 (XVIII),[1] a draft resolution submitted by the seventeen participants in the Disarmament Committee, noting with approval, the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and calling on all States to become parties to it.

25. The treaty entered into force on 10 October 1963 and as of the present date, 100 countries have become parties to it. (For a description of further efforts in the CCD to reach a CTB agreement, see part II).

(2) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

26. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament, introduced in the ENDC in 1962 by both the Soviet Union and the United States, contained provisions to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons or their acquisition by countries not already possessing them. The first draft treaties restricted to that particular problem, however, were submitted to the Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union on 17 August and 24 September 1965, respectively. Despite considerable similarity between the two drafts, there were significant differences, particularly concerning the control of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances. Eight members of the Committee, referred to as the group of eight -- Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic -- pointed out in a joint memorandum[2] of 15 September 1965 that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but only a means to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. They were "convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery".

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth session, Supplement No. 15 (A/5515).

[2] Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January-December 1965, document DC/227, annex I (ENDC/157).

27. On 19 August 1966, the same eight Committee members submitted a second joint memorandum,[1] reiterating their primary emphasis on the need for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other hand.
28. In late 1966, the General Assembly adopted two draft resolutions on the subject. The first, resolution 2149 (XXI)[2] sponsored by the Soviet Union and 14 other States, including the United States and the United Kingdom, appealed to all States to achieve an early agreement in the non-proliferation matter in accordance with the principles in resolution 2028 (XX).[3] The second, sponsored by 47 States, specifically referring to resolution 2028 (XX) and urging all States to reach an early agreement on the matter, called on the ENDC to give high priority to the question, but also stressed the need in such an agreement for security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States by nuclear-weapon States.
29. The three nuclear-weapon States held that agreement on the important question of non-proliferation should not be dependent on the implementation of other disarmament measures. On 24 August 1967, separate but identical draft treaties on the subject (incomplete, however, with regard to verification) were submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union as a compromise approach. In essence, the draft treaties provided for the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, while also providing for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the non-proliferation context. After considerable debate, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2346 A (XXII),[4] calling on the ENDC to continue its work on the matter, taking all proposals and views into account. Revised identical drafts

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[1] Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I (ENDC/178).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first session, Supplement No.16 (A/6316).

[3] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth session, Supplement No.14 (A/6014).

[4] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second session, Supplement No.16 (A/6716).

were submitted to the ENDC on 18 January 1968. The revised identical drafts included an agreement on Article III dealing with verification, and was accompanied by a series of understandings relating to the implementation of that Article. The drafts also included a provision (Article V) assuring the availability of the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States, a provision (Article VI) containing an undertaking of the nuclear Powers to pursue negotiations with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and a provision (Article VII) on the right of States to conclude agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. On 11 March 1968, the two nuclear States submitted a joint draft on the subject, which incorporated some additional changes. That draft was submitted to the General Assembly, together with the proposals and working papers put forward in the ENDC.

30. At the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly in early 1968, the joint draft treaty, revised to reflect the objections of several delegations, was commended by the General Assembly in its resolution 2373 (XXII),1/ adopted by a vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions. The resolution expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty, and requested the ENDC and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations towards nuclear disarmament, as well as towards general and complete disarmament.

31. In the discussion on the draft resolution, a number of the group of eight were among those who continued to express dissatisfaction with the Treaty, based primarily on alleged deficiencies concerning the commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to further negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban and to reduce their nuclear arms, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and uninhibited access of the non-nuclear States to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions.

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second session, Supplement No.16A (A/6716/Add.1).

32. The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970, and as of the present date, 103 countries have become parties to it. A Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty was held in May 1975.

(3) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and on the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

33. By its resolution 2340 (XXII), the General Assembly established an *Ad Hoc* Committee to explore the practical means of promoting international co-operation on matters related to the sea-bed. That Committee decided, however, that the question of a possible arms race on the sea-bed should be pursued in the context of disarmament negotiations and, on 1 July 1968, the Soviet Union formally raised the matter in a Memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament, submitted to the ENDC. On 14 July 1968, the United States also informed the Committee of its official interest in the general subject. The ensuing debates in the Committee and at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly revealed widespread general support for limitations on the utilization for military purposes of the world's sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond territorial waters; but a number of States, including the Soviet Union, supported a complete demilitarization of the area, while the United States and a number of other Member States favoured an agreement prohibiting only the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. In its resolution 2454 B (XXIII),[1] the General Assembly took no position on the specific approach to the question, but noted the Soviet Memorandum and called for urgent measures to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament, which was generally considered to include limitations on the use of the sea-bed for hostile purposes.

34. On 18 March 1969, the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty to the Disarmament Committee, providing for the use of the sea-bed exclusively for peaceful purposes, with a complete demilitarization of the sea and ocean environment beyond a coastal zone of 12 miles. A number of Committee Members supported the draft, but several countries expressed doubts that agreement

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third session, Supplement No.18 (A/7218).

could be reached on such a comprehensive agreement in the foreseeable future, while the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and others, held that a number of military uses of the sea-bed were necessary for self-defence against submarines, that the prohibition of conventional weapons on the sea-bed would present insuperable problems of verification, and that the United States accordingly considered that any international ban should be directed solely against the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, whether nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological. On 22 May 1969, the United States submitted its own draft treaty along those general lines and also stipulating that the sea-bed would include all the area covered by the seas or oceans beyond a 3-mile band.

35. After extensive debate and consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States reached agreement on a compromise solution, reflected in a joint draft treaty submitted to the Committee on 7 October 1969. The draft provided in the main for a prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed or ocean floor beyond the "maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention" (i.e., 12 miles) any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their supporting structures and installations.

36. The revised joint draft was welcomed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2602 F (XXIV)[1] but referred back to the CCD for further elaboration. On 23 April 1970, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted a revised draft treaty, meeting a number of objections to the former draft, and a new revision on 1 September introduced additional changes.

37. That new draft, the basic provisions of which remained unchanged, was commended by the General Assembly in its resolution 2660 (XXV)[2] by a vote of 104 in favour to 2 against, with 2 abstentions. Those opposing the treaty

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Supplement No.30 (A/7630).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth session, Supplement No.28 (A/8028).

objected in particular to the limited scope of the Treaty and to certain references in it to the definition of the outer limits of the sea-bed zone defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention.

38. The Treaty came into force on 18 May 1972 and as of the present date 64 States have become parties to it. A review Conference of Parties to the Treaty was held in June 1977. The Conference requested the Committee, in consultation with States Parties to the Treaty, to consider further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, on the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

(4) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention)

39. In its first resolution on 24 January 1946, the General Assembly envisaged the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States, in their "joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations" of 1961, agreed that any programme of general and complete disarmament should contain provisions for eliminating chemical and bacteriological weapons. The 1968 agenda of the Disarmament Committee specifically envisioned consideration of the question.

40. In July 1969, the United Kingdom, believing that if no progress was possible on chemical weapons, biological weapons should be regulated separately, submitted to the Committee a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare. The United Kingdom draft was supported by the United States. In September 1969, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted to the General Assembly a draft convention providing for the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons. In March 1971, after extensive debate on the subject, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly, the latter countries agreed to a prohibition limited to biological and toxin weapons, as a first step, and submitted to the Committee a new draft convention providing for such a ban. In general the twelve Committee members referred to as the group of 12 — Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico,

Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia— continued, however to support the concept of a ban including both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and, in September 1971, submitted a memorandum to that general effect.

41. The Soviet Union and the United States, on 5 August 1971, submitted separate but identical texts of a draft convention still limited to a ban on biological and toxin weapons, but with a somewhat broader scope, and that draft was further revised in September 1971. The draft contained a commitment (Article IX) to continue negotiations towards agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

42. By its resolution 2826 (XXVI),[1] the General Assembly commended the new draft convention with no opposing votes.

43. The Convention came into force on 26 March 1975 and as of the present date, 76 countries have become parties to it.

(5) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention)

44. In July 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States made a joint statement advocating effective measures to overcome the danger of the use of environmental modification techniques. They also decided to explore the problem jointly. The Soviet Union requested the inclusion on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of an item on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, and in September introduced a draft resolution on the subject, with a draft convention annexed to it. The General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 3264 (XXIX),[2] recognizing the need for an international convention banning any such action, taking note of the draft of the Soviet Union and other views and suggestions on the subject and requesting the Committee to proceed to the early achievement of an agreement on the text of an appropriate convention.

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth session, Supplement No.29 (A/8429).

[2] Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No.31 (A/9631).

45. In August, 1975, after considerable discussion in the Committee, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee identical texts of a draft convention prohibiting the "military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party". Late in the same year, the General Assembly noted with satisfaction the submission of the identical drafts, also noted that other delegations had offered suggestions regarding the draft and requested the CCD to continue its negotiations on the subject.

46. At the 1976 session of the Committee, a number of suggestions for improvement of the identical drafts were put forward by members of the group of 12 as well as by some Western members, both in plenary statements and in an Ad Hoc Working Group set up to consider the proposed text. In the main, the suggestions sought to broaden and clarify the scope of the ban. Although the two States sponsoring the draft convention maintained, in effect, that the language of the text had been very carefully worked out and that any changes would upset its delicate balance, they agreed to "understandings" interpreting certain key terms and affirming that certain environmental modification techniques previously mentioned in an illustrative list would be prohibited. An article providing for a Treaty review conference was also added. The Ad Hoc Working Group still failed to reach a consensus in the matter, and Argentina and Mexico, in particular, continued to maintain that certain phrases limiting the scope of the ban might actually legitimize many acts of environmental warfare. Finally, the Committee agreed to transmit to the General Assembly, as an annex to its report, the report of the Group containing the draft convention, as well as dissenting views and reservations thereon.

47. On 10 December 1976, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 96 in favour to 8 against, with 30 abstentions, resolution 31/72, which, inter alia, referred the Convention to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification and requested the Secretary-General to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. Earlier, a draft resolution had been introduced by Mexico and sponsored by 12 other countries, stressing the concern already expressed that the draft convention might legitimize certain environmental modification techniques, urging the deletion of the qualifications in the convention creating that misunderstanding and requesting the CCD to continue the negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on a widely acceptable agreement. The General Assembly, however, after according priority to the draft resolution adopted as resolution 31/72 (see above), decided by a vote of 49 to 42, with 35 abstentions, not to put the 13-State resolution to a vote.

48. On 18 May 1977, the Convention was opened for signature at Geneva by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention. It was signed by 46 States, but has not, as yet, entered into force.

Special Reports

49. As noted above, the Disarmament Committee, particularly during the last ten years, has carried out a number of special studies at the request of the General Assembly, and has submitted reports on such studies to the Assembly. One major study not specifically requested by the General Assembly has recently been prepared by an ad hoc group of seismic experts established by the Committee and will be submitted to the General Assembly at its next session. A brief description of these reports follows:

(1) 1970, 1971, 1973 and 1974 -- special reports each year on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, prepared at the request of the General Assembly in resolutions 2604B (XXIV), 2663B (XXV), 2934B (XXVII) and 3078B (XXVIII)

50. The special reports on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests consisted mainly of the views and recommendations of CCD delegations in the light of informal meetings on the subject held during the various years with the participation of experts on the subject, principally experts in the field of seismic detection and identification of nuclear tests. In general, the reports concluded that these exchange of views had been fruitful, contributed significantly to a greater understanding of the question and served as a groundwork for further progress towards the desired ban.

(2) 1975 — a special report on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, submitted as a part of the Committee's annual report on a comprehensive test ban, requested by the General Assembly in a resolution 3261D (XXIX)

51. The special report on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions was submitted, as requested, as a part of the section of the Committee's annual report for 1975 on the question of a comprehensive test ban. The special section noted that a number of experts had participated in the discussions on the subject; that most members had agreed that it was not possible for a State not possessing a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a programme of peaceful nuclear explosions without, in the process, achieving a nuclear-weapon capability; and that many members had urged universal adherence to the NPT as a solution to that problem, while others had urged additional international restraints on peaceful nuclear explosions. It also reported

however, that several members had noted that the NPT Review Conference in mid-1975 had stated that the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the NPT and that India had specifically disagreed with the view that such peaceful explosions should not be permitted outside the framework of the NPT. The special role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in applying appropriate safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was recognized by virtually all delegates.

(3) 1975 -- a special report on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects, prepared by an expert group under the auspices of the CCD, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3261F (XXIX)

52. The special study conveyed a consensus, reached by the experts preparing the report, on certain principles to be taken into account in creating nuclear-weapon-free zones. A convergence of views on specific aspects of those principles was also reflected in the study. The experts did not report agreement, however, on a number of peripheral questions, such as whether or not there was a distinction between an explosion of nuclear weapons and that of a nuclear explosive device. They also did not reach consensus on the definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the definition of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States with respect to such zones. At the following session of the General Assembly, the comprehensive study was welcomed by most delegations; but some, including Mexico, expressed dissatisfaction that the report had not included those definitions. The General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 126 to none, with 2 abstentions, resolution 3472A (XXX),[1] inviting governments, IAEA and other international organizations concerned to report their views on the subject to the Secretary-General by mid-1976 to be conveyed to the next session of the General Assembly. It also adopted, as resolution 3472B (XXX)[1] and by a vote of 82 to 10, with 36 abstentions, a draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and Zaire, containing a definition of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as well as of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards such zones and towards the States included therein.

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[1] Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth session, Supplement No. 34 (A/10034)

(4) 1976 -- a special report on the results achieved on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, requested by the General Assembly in resolution 3475 (XXX)

53. The report on the above subject, submitted as a separate part of the Committee's annual report for 1976, consisted of a detailed description of the development of negotiations on the subject during the year and the views expressed by the various delegations.

(5) 1978 -- report of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts set up by the CCD to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events

54. The report of the Group (CCD/558) unanimously adopted by experts from eighteen member States participating in the Group and from six non-member States participating by invitation, was noted by the Committee on 21 March 1978 and will be submitted to the General Assembly. The report describes in considerable detail how seismological science could be applied in a co-operative international effort to facilitate verification of a comprehensive test ban. It concludes that such a co-operative effort should comprise three elements: a systematic improvement of the observations reported from a network of more than fifty seismological observatories around the globe; an international exchange of these data over the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meteorological Organization; and processing of the data at special international data centres for the use of participant States. The Group also saw the need for some steps, such as an experimental exercise, which could be taken initially to assist the establishment of such a co-operative data exchange system, estimates the capability of the system and provides illustrative estimates of its cost.

PART II - STATE OF QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE CCD

55. There follows a brief descriptive account of the state of each of the various principal questions under consideration by the Committee. Members' views on those questions may be found in volume II of this report.

Question of nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban

General

56. Questions of nuclear disarmament, including the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and substantial reductions of nuclear armaments with the ultimate goal of their complete elimination, continue to be the highest priority items on the agenda of the Committee. The Committee also maintains a strong interest in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and members have frequently stated their positions on that issue, as well as on the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.

57. Other nuclear disarmament issues before the Committee include a proposal by the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States, and also on the assumption of an obligation by the nuclear States to proceed to a gradual reduction of the already accumulated stocks of those weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction; a suggestion by Japan that the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for nuclear weapon purposes be reconsidered with a view to contributing to the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and to bringing more countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; a number of proposals by Romania, beginning with the non-use of nuclear weapons and the banning of the deployment of nuclear weapons and their withdrawal from the territories of other States, within a programme aimed at the complete elimination of such weapons; and a draft convention prohibiting nuclear neutron weapons, introduced by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.

Comprehensive nuclear test ban

58. The Committee's highest priority remains the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Many members have expressed extensive views on this issue. As noted in Part I of this Report, the Committee prepared special reports to the General Assembly directly on that subject in 1970, 1971, 1973 and 1974 and has reported in detail on the subject annually.

59. In both 1967 and 1971, Sweden submitted detailed suggestions for a treaty to ban all nuclear-weapons tests, providing for verification primarily by national means, but also including the possibility of on-site inspection on the invitation of the party suspected of carrying out a nuclear-weapon test. In 1971, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a joint memorandum expressing their views with regard to a number of aspects of the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CCD/354), and, in 1973, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a further memorandum also dealing with these questions (CCD/396).

60. In 1977, the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee a draft convention on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (CCD/523).

61. In 1977, Sweden submitted to the Committee the text of a draft treaty based on its previous suggestions but with some modifications in order, inter alia, to cover the question of peaceful nuclear explosions (CCD/526/Rev.1).

62. In mid-1977, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom announced that they were engaged in trilateral talks on the subject of a test ban.

63. In resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly at its thirty-second session urged the three nuclear-weapon States involved in the trilateral talks regarding the comprehensive test ban to expedite their efforts and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the CCD by the beginning of its spring session. In the same resolution, the Assembly requested the CCD to take up the matter with utmost urgency with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

64. The United States, the United Kingdom and USSR informed the Committee that they are continuing tripartite negotiations with a view toward reaching agreement on the provisions of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty. In reporting to the Committee on 16 March 1978, the three parties stated that they shared the widely-held view that an international exchange of seismic data will play a major role in verification of compliance with

the treaty. It was also stated that the three parties are keenly aware of the great importance that the members of the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament attach to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty and will continue their best efforts to complete the tripartite negotiations as soon as possible. The Committee was informed that, following a brief recess for consultations in capitals, the tripartite negotiations were resumed on 4 May 1978. As of the date of this report, no agreed text resulting from these negotiations has been transmitted to the Committee for its full consideration with a view to the elaboration of a treaty on the subject, as requested by General Assembly resolution 32/78.

65. At the Committee's 1978 spring session, a number of delegations expressed regret that the talks had not yet had the desired results, while other delegations expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved at those talks.

66. In a matter related to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Committee has held informal meetings virtually every year during the past ten years, with the participation of experts, mainly on the subject of the possible verification of such a ban by seismological means. In 1976, the Committee established an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, which continued the first phase of its work up until March 1978, when it submitted its report (CCD/558) to the Committee recommending the establishment of a global network of seismological stations and the carrying out of a practical exercise. After the Committee had considered the report of the Ad Hoc Group, it decided (CCD/570) that the Group should continue its work by studying the scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental test of a global network of seismological stations of the kind which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, as well as under a protocol covering nuclear explosions, which would be an integral part of that treaty. The Group is due to report the results of the new phase of its work to the Committee during its 1979 spring session.

"Nuclear Neutron Weapon" or "Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation Weapon"

67. On 9 March 1978 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559). The co-sponsors considered that production and deployment of such a new weapon, which they consider to be a new weapon of mass destruction, would have a destabilizing effect on the current politico-military situation and on disarmament negotiations, and would escalate the arms race to a new and more dangerous level.

68. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany rejected that proposal mainly on the grounds that nuclear neutron weapons are nuclear weapons, which they do not consider to be new weapons of mass destruction, and that such weapons should be dealt with along with other nuclear weapons rather than separately.

69. Several other States also expressed views on the issue and on the proposed draft convention.

Question of the prohibition of chemical weapons

70. Since the conclusion, in 1971, of the Committee's work on the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975, the Committee has continued consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction (the use of such weapons is already banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but many States have reserved the right to retaliate in kind and some maintain chemical weapons for deterrence and retaliatory purposes). Since the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention also covers toxins, which are chemical substances, it, in essence, constitutes a first step towards a prohibition of chemical weapons.

71. Consideration of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction has been influenced largely by three draft conventions and detailed working papers and statements presented to the Committee by various members, as follows: (a) a draft convention submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian SSR, providing for a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons (CCD/361); (b) a draft convention submitted by Japan providing for a ban on

all chemical weapons in principle, but with a phased application of the various categories of chemical agents as their prohibition became verifiable (CCD/420); (c) a draft convention by the United Kingdom based on elements from the drafts in (a) and (b) above, together with certain new ideas (CCD/512); and (d) a working paper submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia, containing detailed suggestions for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons (CCD/400), as well as working papers and statements containing proposals for the elaboration of a draft treaty presented by various Committee members, including Canada, Italy, Japan, United States and Yugoslavia.

72. During 1977 Italy, supported by a number of delegations, put forward a proposal for establishing a working group with the participation of experts, in order to begin the consideration of the basic principles of a draft convention pending the joint initiative announced by the United States and the Soviet Union. In its resolution 32/77 of 12 December 1977 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the General Assembly requested the Committee to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on chemical weapons, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its Special Session.

73. In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union announced in Moscow their intention to consider a joint initiative for presentation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of chemical weapons. On 9 May 1978, those two States informed the Committee that they had held intensive bilateral talks since 1976 on a joint initiative to assist the Committee in achieving early agreement on a complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, as well as providing for the destruction of existing chemical weapons. The two parties have also informed the Committee that agreement in principle has emerged on most, although not all, points in the area of scope. They have also reported that they are in agreement that the convention should contain provisions clearly specifying the procedures for declaring chemical-weapons stockpiles and making declarations relating to the means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. However, measures relating to the disposition of those means of production require further negotiation.

The two parties have further informed the Committee that they share the view that arrangements for adequate verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements, including the creation of a consultative committee. The Committee has also been informed that, while the two parties have agreed on some arrangements and procedures in the area of verification, no agreement has yet been reached on certain important issues, including specific methods of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the disposition of the means of production for chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. The United States and Soviet Union have stated to the Committee that they will continue their best efforts to complete the bilateral negotiations on a joint initiative on this important and extremely complex problem as soon as possible.

74. In the Committee, numerous formal and informal meetings with experts have been held on a chemical weapons prohibition. These meetings have covered discussion of the draft proposals before the Committee and the possible consequences of a treaty on chemical weapons, along with technical matters considered necessary for evaluating the drafts, especially the scope and verification provisions of a treaty on chemical weapons. In the course of these discussions with regard to the scope of prohibition to be contained in a treaty, a narrowing of the views towards a nearly comprehensive ban has developed, while differences remain with respect to verification issues.

75. In keeping with its own agenda and resolution 32/77 the Committee has continued to treat the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as a high priority item.

Question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

76. During the last three years, the Committee has considered various issues relating to new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In 1976, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention (CCD/511) to the CCD proposing a comprehensive prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and indicating that the weapons to be covered would be specified through negotiations. Several members of the Committee supported the draft convention. Some members, including the United States, rejected the approach of an omnibus treaty. In 1977, the Soviet Union submitted a revised version (CCD/511/Rev.1) of its draft

convention which was based on 1948 United Nations definition of weapons of mass destruction as "... atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above ...". This draft convention included a list of possible new weapons of mass destruction as well as a provision for the conclusion of special agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction in conjunction with the conclusion of a broader, general agreement which would ban the development of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

77. The United States and a number of other members continued to maintain that the best way to prevent development and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction would be to keep the question under review, developing agreements dealing with particular new types of such weapons when they had been clearly identified.

78. The Committee has held a number of informal meetings on the subject, with the participation of experts.

79. During the spring 1978 session, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to establish a group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement (CCD/564).

Question of prohibition of radiological weapons

80. The question of the prohibition of radiological weapons was discussed in the Committee in 1970. Subsequently, in 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union informed the Committee that they were working on a joint initiative for possible presentation to the Committee on the prohibition of radiological weapons and recently indicated that considerable progress had been made in that regard.

Question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

81. In Part I of this report, the history of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of general and complete disarmament is outlined, showing that the Committee has, since 1965, devoted the greater part of its attention to specific collateral measures.

82. The problem of conventional weapons has been raised in the Committee by a number of members. Among others, the delegations of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, made statements and suggestions concerning the international transfer of conventional weapons and the possibility of regional agreements in this field. The delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungarian People's Republic, Mongolian People's Republic, Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. It was emphasized by a number of members of the Group of 15 and others that the question of conventional weapons should be considered only within the framework of general and complete disarmament and that it should not divert attention from the top priority issues of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of chemical weapons. Some members of the Committee also stressed that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the major military States. They pointed out that the recent emphasis on conventional weapons had not led to any diminution in the transfer of such weapons.

83. By its resolution 2602E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s, the General Assembly requested the Committee to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all disarmament problems as a guideline to chart its future work and negotiations. The Committee has given increasing attention to the question of formulating new approaches, or guidelines, for general and complete disarmament.

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

84. A number of documents on the subject have been submitted to the Committee, to the General Assembly and, most recently, to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

85. Among the principal documents submitted to the Committee are the following: (a) a working paper submitted in 1970 by the Netherlands containing some introductory remarks on steps towards a comprehensive disarmament programme (CCD/276); (b) a working paper submitted in 1970 by Italy, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/309); (c) a joint draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted in 1970 by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia (CCD/313); (d) a working paper submitted by Romania in 1975 on steps to be taken within a disarmament programme (CCD/449); (e) a working paper submitted by Nigeria in 1976, on conclusions of the mid-term review of the disarmament decade (CCD/510); (f) a Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and on disarmament, submitted by the USSR in 1977 (CCD/522); (g) a working paper containing a draft of a comprehensive programme sibmitted by Mexico in 1977 (CCD/545); (h) a working paper dealing with the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Italy in 1978 (CCD/548); (i) a draft programme of action for the Special Session, submitted by the United Kingdom and also sponsored by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, containing a draft proposal of action being submitted to the Preparatory Committee (CCD/549 and Corr.1); (j) a working paper submitted by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaîre, containing the text of document A/AC.187/55 submitted by the same countries to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session (CCD/550/Rev.1 and Corr.1); (k) a working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR in 1978 (CCD/552); (l) a working paper on the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Romania (CCD/553); (m) a working paper submitted by Sweden, containing the text of Preparatory Committee document A/AC.187/95 (CCD/554); (n) a working paper containing suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme, submitted by Nigeria (CCD/555); (o) a working paper submitted by Mexico containing the text of document A/AC.187/56, already approved by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session (CCD/560); and (p) a working paper submitted by Mexico, containing the text of document A/AC.187/89/Add.1 submitted to the Preparatory Committee (CCD/561 and Add.1).

86. A number of Committee members, although not submitting formal documents have presented extensive views on the matter of such a programme, including the suggestion for the elaboration of the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles into a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The essence of the joint programme noted under (c) above was submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session by its three Committee sponsors, joined by Ireland, Morocco and Pakistan; and the Assembly, in its resolution 2661C (XXV), specifically requested the Committee to take the programme contained in the document into account in its future work on a comprehensive disarmament programme. Thereafter, the question was discussed each year in the Committee with no formal action. In its resolution 31/68, dealing with the Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly urged the Disarmament Committee to adopt, during 1977, a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of disarmament in accordance with resolution 2602E (XXIV).

87. At the Committee's 1977 session, a series of five informal meetings were held on the subject, but no common view emerged on the content of the proposed programme. The Committee therefore decided that a working group to consider the problem should be set up at the beginning of the Committee's 1978 session. In its resolution 32/80, the General Assembly took note of that decision and, as noted above, requested the Committee to continue its work on the subject and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its Special Session.

88. On 2 March 1978 the CCD set up an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to discuss and elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament and adopted its terms of reference. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held two meetings at which it discussed organizational matters, particularly with respect to documentation for its work. At its third meeting, the Group adopted its report to the Committee. In that report, the Group took note of the documents prepared by the Secretariat at the Group's request, and which would be useful for future work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In accordance with the recommendation of the Group, the Committee decided to annex, to the report of the CCD to the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the tabulation of proposals as prepared by the Secretariat (CCD/567, in English only -- see Annex A to Volume II of this report).

Question of further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed

89. The Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, held in 1977, requested the Committee on Disarmament, in consultation with States parties to the Treaty, to consider promptly further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

90. Since that time, several members of the Committee have expressed support for further steps to be taken by the Committee in that regard.

CCD Organization and Procedures

91. The CCD has considered its organizational and procedural arrangements over the years in order to increase its effectiveness and adapt to the growing international interest in disarmament matters. The membership of the Committee was increased in 1969 and again in 1974 to the present number of 31 countries.

92. Following a number of suggestions for modifying the organization and procedures of the Committee put forward in recent years by various delegations — including Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia — the group of 15, in 1976, called for: (a) the creation of a standing sub-committee; (b) inclusion in the Committee's communiqué of brief factual summaries of the substance of the discussions at the meeting in question, and (c) preparation of the first draft of the Committee's annual report by the Secretariat. In 1977, some of these suggestions were reiterated by 12 members of the group of 15. The Committee decided to put these various modifications into effect, except that of establishing a permanent sub-committee.

93. More particularly, the Committee, while adhering to its fundamental principle of consensus adoption of all decisions, adopted the following modifications in its organization and procedures:

- verbatim records of the Committee's plenary sessions and the CCD working documents are now sent immediately to New York and made available to all United Nations Member States as soon as they are received from Geneva (CCD/532);
- press communiqués of plenary sessions have been expanded to reflect, in greater detail, the substance of the Committee's deliberations, each representative being responsible for providing the Secretariat with an authorative summary of his statement;

- preparation of the first draft of the Committee's annual report, once the responsibility of the Co-Chairmen, now falls to the Secretariat;
- each year, unless otherwise decided, the Committee will be convened at the third Tuesday of February and its report shall be transmitted on the last Thursday of August; at the beginning of the first session, and thereafter as the need arises, it shall discuss the organization of its work (CCD/477 and CCD/PV.665);
- provisional guidelines for the establishment of ad hoc working groups have been adopted to expedite and facilitate the Committee's work in drafting agreements (CCD/532).

94. The CCD has provided for the submission of documents by United Nations Member States, not members of the Committee, for circulation as official documents of the Committee, and has also, in two instances, invited interested United Nations Member States, not members of the Committee, to participate in special working groups meeting under Committee auspices, most recently the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

95. During the 1978 spring session of the Committee, many members addressed themselves to the ongoing discussions with respect to disarmament machinery taking place in New York in preparation for the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. The delegation of the Netherlands submitted a working paper on a possible International Disarmament Organization (CCD/565). The delegation of Italy submitted a working paper dealing with the main elements of the international disarmanent machinery, in which specific suggestions were put forward concerning the improvement of the organization, structure and methods of work of the Committee and the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification of multilateral disarmament measures (CCD/568).

96. With respect to the Committee, the group of 15 submitted a working paper (CCD/563) recommending: (a) strengthening of the existing link between the General Assembly and the CCD; (b) replacement of the system of co-chairmanship by a system to be agreed upon; (c) adoption by the CCD of its own rules of procedures; (d) examination of relevant procedures to improve the effectiveness of the CCD, including inter alia the establishment of a standing sub-committee of the whole; and (e) opening the Committee's plenary meetings to the public. In addition to the proposals and consideration of the

members of the Committee on procedures and organization, all relevant United Nations Special Session Preparatory Committee documents on the issue were circulated in the Committee

97. All the members of the Committee are of the opinion that the Committee should intensify its efforts to discharge its responsibility as a principal forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. Members of the group of 15 and others have insisted that changes in the organization and procedure of the Committee constitute a basic requirement for improving the Committee's performance and have indicated that such changes are necessary in order to adapt the Committee to the new international conditions which have developed since its establishment. Other members of the Committee have stated that the effectiveness of the Committee's work is primarily connected with the expression of the political will of Committee members; that they would be ready to accept some changes in the Committee on the condition that such changes would lead to enhancing the Committee's effectiveness; and that the improvement of forms and methods of the work of the Committee should be carried out with great discretion in order not to disturb the established organizational basis, which has proved to be effective.

CCD/573/Corr.2(VOL.I)
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ENGLISH ONLY

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

CORRIGENDUM

page 72, para. 180

"CCD/554" should read "CCD/559"

CCD/573 (VOL.I and VOL.II)
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VOLUME II

Positions of Member States on Questions Under Consideration

98. This part of the report contains the substance of the positions of the member States of the Committee on the various questions under consideration. Under each heading, the positions taken by members prior to the 1978 spring session of the Committee, but which the members themselves desired to have incorporated in this report,[1] are set forth. These positions are followed by views expressed by members during the 1978 spring session, held from 31 January to 11 May 1978.

99. All documents submitted to the Committee relating to the various questions in this report are listed by subject in Annex B to the report.

Question of nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban

General

100. On 8 April 1969, the delegation of the United States made a rather comprehensive proposal on a cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes and then suggested the essential elements of a cut-off agreement (ENDC/PV.401). After some interval of time, on 11 August 1977, the delegation of Japan took up the matter again emphasizing the importance of such a measure with regard to reducing the degree of inequality inherent in the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States and thus encouraging more States to adhere to that Treaty (CCD/PV.761).

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[1] The recent views of all members on all questions on the CCD agenda may be found, in summary, in the annual report of the Committee to the General Assembly 1976 and 1977.

101. Romania has stressed the view that any genuine disarmament effort must start with an examination of the motive factor of the present arms race in nuclear weapons, since the accumulation and continuous technological refinement of such weapons lie at the root of the insecurity existing in the world today. The delegation has also stressed that it would continue to urge that problems of nuclear disarmament should be placed at the centre of the Committee's activities. In that respect the delegation has presented its proposals and priorities on which the CCD should concentrate its work, as follows: (1) a solemn pledge by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them or threaten to use them against States not possessing such weapons; (2) a ban on the deployment of further nuclear weapons in the territory of other States; (3) the withdrawal of nuclear arms from the territory of other States; (4) an end to the refinement, testing and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; (5) a halt to the production of the fissionable material for military uses, the use of existing materials for peaceful purposes and the transfer of a proportion of them for use by all States under arrangements for broad international co-operation; and (6) the reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them (CCD/PV.731 and 768).

102. Over the years, the delegation of Mexico has stressed the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States and the alarm aroused by their constant quantitative and above all, qualitative development. With particular regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the delegation has recalled the General Assembly resolutions regretting the absence of positive results from the talks during the past years and urging the United States and the Soviet Union to broaden the scope of their talks, and has stressed that it was important for the Committee to be kept informed of the progress of the talks and hoped that those two States could act accordingly (CCD/PV.688). In 1977, the delegation of Mexico stressed the encouraging effects that unequivocal statements of the President of the United States, Mr. Carter, calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, as well as certain pronouncements of General Secretary Brezhnev which were similar to the former in some respects, might have for disarmament negotiations. It also mentioned the words of President López Portillo of Mexico, who in his inaugural address had called for an end to all genocidal weapons which threatened the survival of mankind. More specifically, it stressed the necessity that the Committee concentrate its 1977 endeavours on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement (CCD/PV.728).

103. The delegation of Yugoslavia has often noted that the arms race continues unchecked in all fields: on the ground, on the sea, on the oceans as well as in the air and in the outer space and that this applies equally to both nuclear and conventional weapons. It has stressed that particular attention is being paid today to research and development in the field of armaments. Expressing concern at such development, the delegation has expressed the hope that the CCD would be able to make definite progress towards the preparation of international agreements on some long-standing questions in that field which have been on its agenda for many years (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Yugoslavia has also pointed out that development in the application of nuclear energy for military purposes, like the advancement of military technology as a whole, had by far outpaced the tempo of negotiation of the Committee on measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament and that old unsettled problems are compounded by new ones, even more complex and dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining international peace and security (CCD/PV.757).

104. The delegation of the United Kingdom has stressed the pressing need to end the nuclear arms race and to begin to reduce such arms as a first step towards their abolition in the framework of a comprehensive disarmament programme, noting that three of the nuclear Powers had assumed that obligation under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty (CCD/PV.757).

105. In India's view, the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as established by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 13/78 (XIV) of 1959, should be the main guiding principle in all disarmament efforts. Lasting world peace could only be achieved by total disarmament with the highest priority given to nuclear disarmament including the elimination of all nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. India was of the firm opinion that stockpiles of all nuclear weapons must be reduced and eventually eliminated so as to arrest the danger of the proliferation of such weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an important measure to promote an atmosphere of peace and security could be the outlawing of the use or threat of nuclear weapons for all time to come. The General Assembly of the United Nations by its resolution 1653 (XVI) had declared that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of

humanity and that any State using nuclear weapons is to be considered as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. India was of the view that that declaration should be reaffirmed at the Special Session and made applicable also to the threats to use such weapons. No distinction should be made as regards the intended victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, for these weapons and the systems of their delivery are intercontinental in nature and would not make any distinction as to whether a particular region has been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not. India would even propose a ban on the very possession of nuclear weapons, as the most cruel and indiscriminate weapons in existence. In discussing nuclear disarmament, the delegation noted, it was said that nuclear weapons are necessary as a deterrent against war and that only the assurance of their use constitutes the core of deterrence. India did not accept that view. India was of the view that the doctrine of mutual deterrence is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. While conferring legitimacy on the possessi and even use of nuclear weapons, it had shown that levels of deterrence do not deter but in fact provoke the arms race to higher levels. A basic principle on which India insisted in disarmament negotiations was that all measures should be non-discriminatory with regard to the constraints and obligations assumed by parties to them. India would assess any future measures by the same yardstick of fair and equal access for all States without discrimination and equal obligations for all.

106. With regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the delegation of Mexico submitted, in 1977, a letter concerning the tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/525) and referred to the scope and significance of the Treaty (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the United States, recalling that the United States had ratified Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1971, called attention to the recent announcement of President Carter that the United States would sign and seek ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty, providing for the application of the Treaty to the territories in Latin America of countries located outside the area. The delegation stated that the effect of United States adherence to Protocol I would be to ban the testing, use, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons in United States territories in Latin America; however, it would not affect the right of United State

naval vessels to call at ports in those territories or affect freedom of navigation on the high seas surrounding Latin America. The delegation also stressed the desire of the United States to contribute towards bringing the Latin American nuclear-free zone fully into effect throughout the world and to averting the dangers of nuclear proliferation (CCD/PV.745). The delegation of Mexico welcomed the announcement of the United States and called on France, the only country concerned by Protocol I that had not acceded to it, to make the Protocol complete. It recalled that the 1967 interpretation of the Preparatory Commission for the denuclearization of Latin America concerning the absence in the Treaty of provisions relating to the question of the transit of nuclear weapons through Latin American territory. The delegation of Mexico also called on the Soviet Union to accede to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, by which nuclear-weapon States agreed to respect the objectives of the Treaty. At the first meeting of the summer session of 1977, the delegation referred to the importance it attached to the signature by the President of the United States, on 26 May, of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty (CCD/PV.745 and 750). On 27 April 1978 the delegation of Mexico welcomed the Soviet Union's announcement of 25 April that it would adhere to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/PV.785).

107. On the same subject, the delegation of Romania, recalling that General Assembly resolution 31/70 commended the attention of Governments, international organizations and the CCD to the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and requested them to examine the question further and to take steps to promote the attainment of this important goal, requested that the problem should be kept on the Committee's agenda as a means of encouraging the efforts of States to create such zones. In that connexion, Romania reaffirmed its interest in establishing new relations of co-operation and neighbourliness between the countries of the Balkans, so that that area, like any other area in Europe and on other continents, might be transformed into a zone of peace and peaceful co-operation (CCD/PV.731).

108. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that the Committee on Disarmament must also be constantly alive to the concerns of the international community which manifest themselves through a desire to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. We must not lose from the range of our vision the

constant desirability of safeguarding additional areas and environments from falling victim to the nuclear arms race. We trust that the forthcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Denuclearization of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, apart from its immediate preoccupations, will constitute an important stimulus to our search for new possibilities in that regard (CCD/PV.735). With respect to the NPT, the delegation of Poland stated in 1977 that while most crucial, the question of a comprehensive test ban is not the only angle to the larger issue of nuclear disarmament. The CCD would be well advised not to ignore or under-estimate such problems as the ever present threat to the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We must not forget that the landmark achievement, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is still not universal and that a number of States with significant military and economic potential are not parties to it. Poland attaches the utmost importance to the agreements concluded between the major exporters of nuclear materials and installations. We view them as legitimate ancillary efforts at the consolidation of the NPT (CCD/PV.735).

109. With reference to nuclear-weapon-free zones and the proposed peace zone of the Indian Ocean, the delegation of Japan maintained that a concrete and realistic way to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their security was to explore a solution based upon the prevailing political and military conditions in each region (CCD/PV.761).

110. The delegation of Pakistan, while noting that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States, held that the non-nuclear-weapon States must lend strong impetus to the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives (CCD/PV.748). The delegation noted that the General Assembly had responded to the wishes of a majority of States in various regions by adopting resolutions urging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, notably in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It held that non-nuclear-weapon States must take initiatives towards regional security against the nuclear threat from within or without their regions by establishing such zones and that, instead of retarding progress by setting conditions, the nuclear-weapon States should take an active part in their establishment (CCD/PV.765). The

delegation of Pakistan stressed the belief that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia would be in the common interest of all countries of the region and that the international community should continue to encourage all such regional initiatives (CCD/PV.748).

111. On the question of nuclear non-proliferation, the delegation of Japan, in 1977, made a comprehensive statement setting forth Japan's basic policy. The delegation maintained that the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt concrete measures of nuclear disarmament and the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination were the two elements making up the very fabric of the non-proliferation Treaty régime; if the obligation was not fulfilled and the right guaranteed, the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty would be jeopardized and the achievement of its universality made more difficult. Trying to freeze the legitimate rights and activities of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty even partially, out of the fear of nuclear proliferation, was not the right way to solve the problem; and in fact, it might be described as a case of the remedy being worse than the disease. The delegation added that, after reviewing the non-proliferation Treaty system and examining the central dilemma in the Treaty between the commitment to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and the equally important commitment to promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it had concluded that it was not reasonable for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to be unilaterally forbidden, for the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, to operate reprocessing plants and that their operation should be allowed under certain objective conditions, for example, upon the entry into force of both the non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty, the implementation of the proposed international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme and extracting plutonium in a form inappropriate for the production of nuclear weapons. The delegation also proposed a variety of measures, some to be taken within the framework of the non-proliferation Treaty and others outside. Among the former were (1) positive measures to guarantee the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, specifically access to a supply of natural uranium, as well as

enrichment and reprocessing services, reactors and other facilities, as well as related technologies; (2) stricter safeguards requirements on peaceful nuclear activities of States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty; and (3) submission by all nuclear-weapon States of their civil nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards and strengthening of the IAEA role.

112. Among measures to be taken outside the non-proliferation Treaty framework, the delegation of Japan stressed, were (1) steps to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons, such as the United States/USSR agreement on notification of missile launching tests and military exercises; (2) early conclusion of the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks; (3) conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, towards which negotiations in the Committee should start at the earliest possible date; (4) cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (5) strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of solutions reflecting the prevailing political and military conditions in each region; (6) international arrangements for physical protection of nuclear materials during storage and transportation; and (7) measures in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to control effectively sensitive technologies and materials that could lead to nuclear-weapon capability. The delegation emphasized that the latter measures should be implemented taking into account the economic and other relevant facts and held that Japan could not do without reprocessing and recycling of spent uranium fuel to secure stable energy supplies. It added that Japan was ready to support the international fuel cycle evaluation programme, provided it did not hamper Japan's nuclear energy programme and urged participation in it of the greatest number of interested countries, including the so-called nuclear-threshold countries. The delegation concluded that the present task of the international community could not be accomplished by freezing the legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of those States which had developed atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, and that what was now required was not to establish a "philosophy of denial" but to implement the existing nuclear non-proliferation régime in a constructive manner so that the initial ideal of a programme of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advocated by President Eisenhower as "Atoms for Peace", would be attained (CCD/PV.761).

113. With regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the delegation of Pakistan has stated that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of critical importance, not only for the vulnerable non-nuclear-weapon States but also for the international community as a whole in its non-proliferation and disarmament efforts; that concept, it has held, is in the long run, in the interest of the nuclear-weapon States themselves (CCD/PV.748). The delegation has further stated that Pakistan fully shares the renewed concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation and has taken several initiatives to avert that danger. However, the approach being advocated by the so-called "London Club", i.e. to place trust in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in unilateral controls and restraints on the transfer of nuclear technology, even under the strictest international safeguards, is not likely to succeed, the delegation maintained. Pakistan has always felt that the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be effective unless it was subscribed to by the major threshold Powers and unless the security of the non-nuclear States was effectively safeguarded. The policy of restraints and embargoes on the transfer of nuclear technology can not be successful for several reasons, the delegation has held, and the best course is to ensure that nuclear technology is acquired under the necessary controls and safeguards. Sooner rather than later, the developing countries are bound to adopt a common position on the issue, thereby leading to further difficulties in North-South relations. The only durable solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the delegation has maintained, lies in building an international climate of trust and confidence in which nations would not feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons and towards that end, the world must focus its attention on the more basic tasks in the field of disarmament, i.e. preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, immediately reducing the existing level of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, and initiating methods towards their eventual destruction and complete elimination (CCD/PV.765).

114. The positions of Brazil as regards the specific problems referred to in this section, as well as the whole spectrum of questions related to disarmament that have been dealt with in this volume, have been expressed over the years in the Committee with all pertinent details. Reflections of these positions have also been expounded in document A/AC.187/49, submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

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115. In 1977, the delegation of Italy expressed the belief that measures might be adopted to strengthen the system of nuclear non-proliferation, without ignoring the prejudicing of the right of all States to develop, acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes -- a right which must be safeguarded in the most effective way (CCD/PV.763).

116. In its first statement at the 1978 spring session, the Soviet delegation described three proposals put forward in late 1977 by Mr. L. Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, relating to (a) the cessation of nuclear weapons, (b) the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and (c) "mutual renunciation" of the production of neutron bombs. (The delegations views on the first and third items are outlined in the sections on those subjects, below.)

117. The proposed production ban, the Soviet delegation explained, would apply to all nuclear weapons -- "whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles" -- and, sumultaneously, the nuclear States could undertake to initiate a gradual reduction of the existing stockpiles of such weapons leading to their complete destruction. The delegation pointed out that the proposal would put an end to the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons and declared the readiness of its Government to begin negotiations with all other nuclear States to work out a practical solution of the problem. It added that the Soviet Union had no objection to the participation of non-nuclear States in such negotiations in view of the universal interest in nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.767).

118. The delegation of Mongolia, emphasizing the view that there was no alternative to nuclear disarmament, shared the view of the Soviet Union in the matter (CCD/PV.773). The delegation of Poland also stressed the significance of the new Soviet initiatives (CCD/PV.768). The delegation of Hungary, noting the concern of world opinion, held that the Committee's most important task was to conclude current negotiations before it, particularly in the nuclear field, beginning with a full test ban followed by a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and their destruction (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Romania continued to urge that nuclear disarmament remain at the centre of the Committee's activities, noting its previous proposals for priorities in that field (CCD/PV.768). The German Democratic Republic also attached great importance to efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and prohibit the production of any types

of nuclear weapons, noting that the Socialist States had submitted specific proposals in that field, such as those in the memorandum of the USSR on the arms race and disarmament and in a recent working paper (CCD/552) on a comprehensive disarmament programme (CCD/PV.781). In its concluding statement at the spring session, the Soviet delegation set forth new proposals put forward in April 1973 by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev in the field of disarmament. These proposals provided for the following measures to be put into effect within a definite time limit: (a) halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) halting the production of and banning all other types of weapons of mass destruction; (c) halting the development of new types of highly destructive conventional arms; (d) renouncing the expansion of armies and increases in the conventional armaments of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of countries associated with them under military agreements. In those proposals, it was pointed out that the process of disarmament could be started with the cessation of the production of nuclear arms. It was also stressed therein that, in order to remove the peril of the use of nuclear weapons, joint efforts of all the nuclear Powers were needed. The Soviet Union was opposed to the use of nuclear weapons, it was doing and would continue to do its utmost to prevent an atomic war. That was the firm line of the USSR and it would be guided by it in its action. In line with its fundamental policy aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union had also decided to accede in due manner to the international Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. Thus the Soviet Union, like other nuclear weapon Powers, would assume the obligation not to assist any Latin American States in gaining access to nuclear weapons and not to use such weapons against States parties to the Treaty (CCD/PV.789).

119. Mongolia, emphasizing the importance of the participation of all the nuclear States in a future international agreement on a full nuclear test ban, drew attention to the need for further strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime. The reinforcement of the IAEA safeguards in all possible ways would contribute to that, the delegation held. It also emphasized the importance of the measures undertaken by some nuclear States to prevent the risk of nuclear conflict, and called upon the other nuclear Powers and States of military and economic importance to assume practical obligations to assist in the prevention of a nuclear threat.

120. The delegation of the United States stressed that the United States was not seeking disarmament agreements which merely channelled competition in convenient directions, but significant disarmament. In support of this point, the delegation reiterated its willingness, as announced by President Carter in 1977, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, on a reciprocal basis, by as much as 50 per cent (CCD/PV.767).

121. The delegation of Sweden also underlined the priority of nuclear disarmament stressing that every country was affected by the nuclear arms race and, accordingly, by every nuclear disarmament measure or lack of such measures. That fact was one justification for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Committee on Disarmament, as well as an incentive for middle-sized and small non-nuclear-weapon States to be active in disarmament work. Moreover, nuclear disarmament was a key to real progress in other areas of disarmament, such as that of conventional arms. The delegation held, however, that prior to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, the Committee could not conceivably accomplish more in the nuclear field than a total test ban and that any additional progress in the field during that period would have to be made at the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The delegation also noted that nuclear disarmament was crucial in the battle against nuclear-weapons proliferation and that the main reason for the lack of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the fact that the major nuclear States had not accepted the full consequences of that Treaty (CCD/PV.767).

122. The delegations of Nigeria (CCD/PV.769) and Hungary (CCD/PV.770) expressed similar views with respect to the NPT, suggesting that a full test ban might be the first positive step in that direction. The Nigerian delegation further held that world opinion was now demanding direct measures of real disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, in its qualitative as well as its quantitative aspect (CCD/PV.769). The delegation of Hungary held that it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of a nuclear test ban from the point of view of the prevention of dissemination of atomic weapons and the success of future negotiations on other disarmament questions. The delegation of India cited from the communiqué recently issued by Prime Minister Desai of India and

President Carter of the United States to the effect that stockpiles of nuclear weapons must be reduced and eventually eliminated and that the danger of the proliferation of such weapons must be arrested. In that connexion, the Indian delegation also stressed the importance of an international agreement not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Noting that the General Assembly had declared such actions contrary to international law and a crime against mankind in its resolution 1653 (XVI), the delegation held that the Special Session of the General Assembly should reaffirm that view with regard to all countries, without distinction as to whether they belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not. In fact, the delegation would support a general ban on the possession of nuclear weapons, as the most cruel and indiscriminate weapons in existence (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India added that India had set an example by unilaterally renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and called on the major nuclear-weapon States to work out some agreed immediate steps that would be taken within a reasonable time (CCD/PV.786). The delegation of Ethiopia stressed its support for the declaration of Africa and the Indian Ocean as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged the nuclear States to refrain from assisting South Africa (CCD/PV.786).

123. With particular regard to the SALT talks, the delegation of the United States, noting that negotiations both at the bilateral talks and in the CCD were parts of a coherent whole, pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States had recently agreed to extend the validity of the SALT I arms limitation agreements until a SALT II accord could be achieved. It added that a SALT II agreement was taking shape, which it hoped would lower the level of strategic arms on both sides, impose certain qualitative constraints on potentially destabilizing weapons development and set the stage for even more substantial limitation in a SALT III agreement (CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the hope for both qualitative and quantitative limitations in an early SALT II agreement (CCD/PV.771).

124. The delegation of Mexico stressed the importance of General Assembly resolution 32/87G, adopted by 134 votes, including those of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in which the recent statements of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union favouring broader nuclear disarmament were cited and in which the General Assembly urged those two States to implement those declarations as soon as possible (CCD/PV.767).

125. The delegation of Hungary expressed satisfaction that it had learned from the statements of the parties directly involved that SALT II offered favourable prospects and stressed the beneficial influence that a successful outcome of the talks could have on the international climate, on strengthening existing agreements and promoting the rapid solution of other questions (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Mongolia stressed the importance of the successful conclusion of SALT II (CCD/PV.773). The German Democratic Republic pointed out that a successful conclusion of a SALT II agreement would contribute significantly to the consolidation of the process of international détente and also to the solution of the problems facing the Committee. The German Democratic Republic was therefore sincerely interested in achieving real progress and resolutely opposed actions by forces hostile to détente, which were designed to prevent agreements on the limitation of the arms race as well as the transition to real disarmament (CCD/PV.775). The delegation of Mongolia also stressed the importance of a successful conclusion at SALT II (CCD/PV.771).

126. Italy held, in its document CCD/548, that nuclear-weapons-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation régime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions existed, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area (CCD/548).

127. Referring to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the delegation of Romania pointed out that such an objective could be achieved only by eliminating the cause of the danger of proliferation and, in particular, by destroying existing nuclear weapons and at the same time taking decisive measures for nuclear disarmament. It stressed the view that some measures, while intending to prevent the danger of proliferation, were impeding to free access of States to the use of nuclear technology for development. In that respect, Romania held that any limitation or restriction of the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in a situation where the arms race was going ahead unchecked, would affect the already precarious balance between the rights and the obligations on which NPT was based (CCD/PV.768 and 731).

128. Also with regard to the question of non-proliferation, the United States announced that, on 10 March 1978, President Carter had signed into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The delegation stated that this was an attempt to balance concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation with the important need for nuclear power to meet energy demands throughout the world. The delegation stated that the act provides for a system of controls and incentives to give the world time to improve and strengthen mechanisms which will safeguard against misuse of nuclear energy technology by emphasizing the importance of fuel cycle safeguards as a condition for continued United States co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States. One of the ways the Act does so, the delegation pointed out, is by exercising positive control -- in the long term -- over the retransfer and reprocessing of materials produced through any transferred sensitive nuclear exports from the United States. The United States also re-emphasized its commitment to make every reasonable effort to assure that the benefits of nuclear energy are available to all (CCD/PV.781).

Comprehensive nuclear test ban

129. With particular reference to a nuclear test ban, the delegation of Mexico has repeatedly recalled that the General Assembly has adopted thirty-six resolutions on the subject, having on seven occasions "condemned" all nuclear-weapon tests and repeatedly stressed that the continuance of such tests would intensify the arms race. The delegation of Mexico has emphasized that the General Assembly has also reiterated its conviction that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is not valid reason for delaying the conclusion" of a comprehensive test ban. Citing the President of the United States, the delegation, in 1977, thought conditions were right for achieving such a ban (CCD/PV.728 and 748).

130. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that the Polish Government has always considered the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be one of the major international legal instruments which went a long way towards containing the threat of nuclear war, accidental or otherwise. We believe, however, that for the Treaty to be fully effective it is imperative

to strengthen that instrument and to make it really universal. While supporting international co-operation in, and the promotion of, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Poland has always consistently advocated the need for a greater measure of effectiveness of the application of IAEA safeguards in order to preclude any remote chance of pursuing such peaceful utilization of the atom as a vehicle whereby to acquire military nuclear capability. The Polish Government, therefore, welcomed an agreement reached recently by 15 States, among them Poland, which establishes strict guidelines on nuclear export safeguards, imposing important transfer limitations on nuclear materials and technology. Poland has noted with satisfaction the positive assessment of these guidelines by many non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope that this arrangement will soon gain wide support as another step towards consolidation of the non-proliferation régime and increased and equal security for all (CCD/PV.735).

131. With direct reference to the verification question, the delegation of Mexico has repeatedly urged the Committee to act in accordance with the General Assembly's reiterated conviction noted above, either by achieving a permanent agreement or through a unilateral or agreed moratorium (CCD/PV.736).

132. With reference to participation, the delegation of Japan has shared the view that the halting of all military tests by the major nuclear Powers would not jeopardize their military security, and has suggested that the Committee should work out either a draft treaty or basic principles for such a treaty and present them to the General Assembly with a request for comment, thus giving non-participants in the Committee the opportunity to express their views; that it should negotiate the final text of the treaty and have it endorsed by the General Assembly or, if that was not possible, referred back to the Committee with relevant comments; and complete the draft treaty, taking those comments into consideration, for submission at the next session of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.746).

133. In statements in 1977, the delegation of Pakistan considered it imperative to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in the immediate future and held that the two major nuclear-weapon States should agree to an immediate suspension of such tests (CCD/PV.765). Noting that

nuclear explosions for military or peaceful purposes were indistinguishable, the delegation held that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions must be regulated in the context of a comprehensive test ban and that matters would be simplified by a moratorium on all peaceful nuclear explosions until agreement had been reached on that question (CCD/PV.748).

134. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that it has been repeated many times in the Committee that a comprehensive test ban treaty is one of the most important elements in the effort to halt the arms race and prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question has actually been on the agenda of the Committee for well over ten years, that is, since 1963, when the limited test ban Treaty was concluded. The sole official reason why it was not then possible to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty was the existence of different concepts regarding ways and means of exercising control over implementation of the obligations assumed. That problem is still an important obstacle, the delegation has held, although it is not now the only one, as others have since appeared. The delegation has further stressed that, in the meantime, the development of military nuclear technology has gone its own independent way, following its own logic and its own requirements, and that, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 568 nuclear tests were conducted during the period between the signing of the Moscow Agreement and the end of 1975 alone, 498 of them by the three nuclear States members of the CCD. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that these tests resulted in the creation of a number of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and the perfecting of existing ones (CCD/PV.757).

135. The delegation of Italy has also repeatedly stressed that it attaches the highest priority to the achievement of an agreement banning all nuclear-weapon tests. While welcoming as a positive step forward the tripartite consultations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, the delegation of Italy felt that the Committee should promptly start negotiations in order to recognize points of convergence in the different drafts already submitted to the Committee and to search for a broadly acceptable treaty language. The delegation also felt that the problem of verification of a CTB deserved further study, in order to find

means and methods to assure compliance with the treaty combining the exchange of teleseismic data with on-site inspection whenever needed. In that light Italy welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events and noted that two Italian scientists were taking an active part in its work (CCD/PV.728, 760, 763).

136. In 1977, the delegation of Poland welcomed with satisfaction the trilateral statement of 16 March 1977 on the progress towards a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Together with the unanimous report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events, they were welcome manifestations of concerted action which would hopefully be crowned with the elaboration, without delay, of a comprehensive test ban as a major step towards effectively checking the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.735).

137. The delegation of Canada has pointed out that Canada's determined opposition to all nuclear testing is well known and has often been stated. Canada has always recognized that verification was among the principal difficulties obstructing the achievement of a CTB. The modification in the Soviet Union's traditional position on verification in the memorandum of Mr. Gromyko presented to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, and which has since been reflected in the updated Soviet draft CTBT, augurs well for the required compromise on this difficult question, the delegation has maintained. Meanwhile, the problem of verification, especially as regards on-site inspection, could be further eased, in the delegation's view, if the concept of the joint consultative committee advanced in the Swedish draft treaty could be accepted. Another issue, central to the difficulties experienced in arriving at a CTB, the delegation has held, is the continuing grave concern relating to the use of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes. Unless and until some effective means can be devised to make absolutely sure that there would be no weapons-related benefits from PNEs, no such explosions should be contemplated under a CTB treaty. That, too, was a very valid feature of the Swedish draft treaty (CCD/526/Rev.1). The delegation has also stressed that all Committee members understand the difficulties that will remain so long as the CTB treaty fails to win the

support of all nuclear-weapon States. Without minimizing those difficulties, Canada has continued to believe that the two major nuclear States, having in mind the stage they have reached in the development and sophistication of their respective nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility to set the trend in the right direction. Canada has repeatedly expressed confidence that the CCD can eventually produce a valuable CTB treaty. It has also noted that part of the treaty's worth will, of course, reside in how persuasive it is to the nuclear-weapon States that do not participate in the work of the CCD. To that end, Canada has expressed the belief that the treaty should have an initial duration period that would be long enough to encourage those other nuclear States to recognize that their own interests and the cause of the world peace would be served by their early accession to a comprehensive test ban treaty (CCD/PV.760).

138. The delegation of Egypt has expressed the belief that the effectiveness of a comprehensive test ban treaty requires the adherence to it, not only of all nuclear-weapon States, but also of potential nuclear States. The delegation has also been of the view that all non-nuclear States should benefit from peaceful nuclear explosions under a test ban treaty, provided that effective international supervision ensures that any use of such explosions will not lead to or facilitate the acquisition by States of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.748).

139. At the Committee's 1977 session, the delegation of Sweden expressed the hope that a CTB could be achieved before the opening of the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament in early 1978. The delegation further suggested that a possible approach to facilitate an early agreement on an early signing of such a treaty could be to make its entry into force dependent upon the final cessation by the United States and the Soviet Union of their nuclear-weapon tests. In case transitional arrangements were needed, they could be laid down in a protocol that should be negotiated under the auspices of the Committee and that would enter into force upon signature by the two nuclear States. Another solution would be to include provisions for transitional arrangements in the treaty itself. It would be possible under both those formulas for Committee members and other States to sign and ratify the treaty before the United States and the Soviet Union had actually terminated their tests. The treaty should also contain provisions for an

international exchange of seismological data and for a verification procedure involving on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. For clarification of events pertaining to the subject matter of the treaty, the treaty could also include provisions for the services of a consultative committee set up for that purpose. The treaty should ban nuclear weapon tests or explosions of other nuclear devices in all environments, thus constituting an independent and comprehensive treaty not complementary to the partial test ban treaty. It was not only desirable but, in the long term, fundamental that all nuclear-weapon States become parties to the agreement, but if the situation required, the Committee could envisage the inclusion of a provision which would make it possible for a party to withdraw from the treaty if all nuclear Powers had not adhered to it within a specified period of time (CCD/PV.729). The delegation added that, while the ultimate goal of a CTB agreement must obviously be universal adherence, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States should not be made a precondition and that the two major nuclear Powers, which were overwhelmingly superior in nuclear arms and which had committed themselves to a comprehensive test ban in both the 1963 partial test ban Treaty and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, must start the process towards achievement of the desired goal (CCD/PV.729 and 733).

140. In presenting its draft convention (CCD/526) to the Committee, the delegation stressed that it was comprehensive in scope, but with suggested transitional arrangements, if considered necessary, for the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under international supervision, the details of which could be worked out later to be included in protocols to the treaty. With particular regard to peaceful explosions, however, the delegation held that they should be allowed, even under international control, only when they were of overriding national or international importance. Assurance of compliance with the treaty, the delegation further pointed out, was based on the concept of verification by challenge, i.e. involving the voluntary agreement of the party to be inspected. Special provisions concerning co-operation of all parties in a world-wide seismic data exchange should be included, possibly in an additional protocol to the treaty. The draft treaty

also proposed the creation of a consultative committee of parties to the treaty, the functions and activities of which could also be elaborated in a protocol. An appeal to the United Nations Security Council could be the last step in the verification procedure. The delegation also pointed out that the draft provided for the immediate withdrawal of any party at a given time if all nuclear-weapon States had not adhered to the treaty by that time. The delegation formally proposed that a working group be set up as soon as possible to negotiate a comprehensive test ban agreement (CCD/PV.733).

141. On the specific question of verification of a test ban treaty, the delegation of Japan, holding that on-site inspections were generally considered indispensable, has proposed the establishment of a verification committee, consisting of experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which would be empowered to request additional data regarding a seismic event, if required, and to decide whether or not an on-site inspection should be carried out (CCD/PV.733).

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142. In its statement on the subject of a nuclear weapon test ban at the opening of the Committee's 1978 spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union, continuing to stress the importance of such a ban, cited the 1977 statement by Mr. L. Brezhnev to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to agree that, together with a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests for a definite period, a moratorium should be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The delegation hoped that the new position would clear the road for the conclusion of a treaty which the world eagerly awaited. Noting the ongoing trilateral negotiations on the subject, the delegation stressed that its position in those talks was based on Mr. Brezhnev's recent initiative and hoped that the negotiating partners would adopt an equally constructive approach (CCD/PV.767).

143. At the same time, the delegation of the United States, holding that the elusive goal of a comprehensive test ban at last appeared to be near, cited a recent statement of President Carter before the General Assembly advocating an end to all explosions of nuclear devices, whether for peaceful or military purposes. The delegation added the view that any treaty on the subject should be applicable to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and that,

for the former, such an agreement would inevitably lead to a reduced dependency on nuclear weapons and, for the latter, it would substantially reduce the incentive to develop a technology leading to a capability to carry out nuclear explosions; for both groups, the delegation held, an agreement on a full test ban would strengthen collective non-proliferation efforts. With particular regard to the trilateral talks, the United States delegation reported progress. It noted that the complexity of the question had thwarted previous efforts to achieve such a ban, but hoped that the results of the trilateral talks could soon be presented to the Committee so that it could complete its work on a multilateral agreement which would attract the broadest possible adherence. The United States also expressed the view that a CTB would help to bring a halt to the qualitative nuclear arms race and serve as an important measure which would support collective non-proliferation efforts (CCD/PV.767).

144. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting the great importance the Committee placed on the quick completion of the trilateral negotiations, expressed similar views with regard to the early presentation of the results of the talks to the Committee so that it could elaborate what could prove to be an historic arms control measure (CCD/PV.768).

145. The delegation of Mexico, citing the various operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 32/78 outlined above, and noting that it had been supported by the three nuclear-weapon-States participating in the trilateral talks, regretted that the talks had not had the desired results, thus reducing the Committee to enforced inactivity, which the delegation hoped would be only temporary (CCD/PV.767).

146. The delegation of Sweden (CCD/PV.767) and the Netherlands (CCD/PV.779) expressed views similar to those of Mexico. Sweden stressed that world opinion expected the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament to initiate a more fruitful phase in disarmament negotiations and that the Committee had a special responsibility to report substantial progress on the main issues to the Special Session if it was to continue to be considered a credible negotiating body. The delegation, accordingly, formally proposed that the Committee remain in permanent session during the spring of 1978 until it had fulfilled the request of the General Assembly. The delegation added the view, however, that a comprehensive test ban could be truly significant only in combination with other nuclear disarmament measures (CCD/PV.767).

147. The delegation of Pakistan, holding that the achievement of a chemical weapons ban was really a question of establishing mutual confidence and that a solution would be found through a political decision, welcomed the continuing bilateral consultations and looked forward to further progress in that matter (CCD/PV.748).

148. The Romanian delegation shared the view that the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests was one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Committee which could certainly prove to be an important step on the way of the nuclear disarmament. It also stated that the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would not in itself eliminate the danger of a nuclear war since large quantities of such weapons were accumulated in the world. Accordingly, this delegation viewed the true significance of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in direct relationship with other radical measures which must follow on the way to nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.768).

149. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) welcomed the reports of progress in the trilateral talks, stressing the importance of the various Soviet concessions in making the current favourable situation possible and urging a show of equal flexibility on the part of the other two negotiating partners. While recognizing, however, that the prospective agreement of the three nuclear States was of considerable significance, most of those delegations noted that such an agreement would constitute only a further step towards a general and complete test ban with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, including China and France. Hungary hoped that the participants in the talks would shortly be able to resolve outstanding problems and that the much desired treaty would at last be signed; such an outcome could have a beneficial influence on the international climate and on the strengthening of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, and might promote the rapid solution of other questions. Poland stressed that the impact of such a development on the slowing down of the nuclear arms race would be dramatic, even though it was generally recognized that any long-term objectives of such

a comprehensive treaty could be secured only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Mongolia emphasized the view that partial solutions of the problem had led to further perfection of new weapons of mass destruction such as the neutron bomb. In presenting its views, the German Democratic Republic stressed the importance of the preliminary work already accomplished by the Committee on the subject of a nuclear test ban.

150. The delegation of Nigeria, while encouraged by the statements of the participants in the trilateral talks, regretted the absence of a definite indication of the date when an agreed text of an agreement could be expected by the Committee. Accordingly, it supported the Swedish proposal for a permanent spring session as the only possible alternative (CCD/PV.769).

151. The delegation of India also stressed that a comprehensive test ban should not be seen as an end in itself but only as a means towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world and that such a ban without the participation of China and France could not be truly effective. It pledged itself, however to study carefully the results of the trilateral talks and to participate actively in the Committee's efforts to elaborate a treaty acceptable to all. In this connexion, it noted India's ceaseless efforts to bring a halt to nuclear testing and its participation in the *Ad Hoc* Group of seismological experts (see below). It again stressed that India's nuclear energy programme was devoted exclusively to the peaceful uses of such energy and that it had not and did not intend to carry out any nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India also stressed the importance India attached to the early conclusion of a CTB acceptable to all and welcomed the current trilateral talks (CCD/PV.786).

152. The delegation of Iran, stressing the importance of presenting a CTB treaty to the Special Session, noted the temporary solution to the PNE problem provided by the new Soviet position. It was to be hoped that the negotiators in the trilateral talks, having taken responsibility for this issue, would soon submit an agreement to the CCD; otherwise, Iran would insist that discussion be brought to the multilateral table (CCD/PV.778).

153. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.771), and Japan (CCD/PV.776) also welcomed the hopes expressed by the participants in the trilateral talks. Japan urged the early conclusion of consultations on both

a test ban and chemical weapons so that the Committee could elaborate treaties on the subjects, holding that undue delay would create a general dissatisfaction that might discourage adherence to the future treaties. If unable to reach full agreement on key elements of a comprehensive test ban despite urgent efforts, the delegation suggested, the participants should declare, at the Special Session, a moratorium on nuclear test explosions including peaceful explosions, at least until a comprehensive treaty was achieved. They should also make a joint declaration of intent to present the elements of such a full ban to the Committee at its summer session, at the latest. The delegation of the Netherlands held that any agreement on the subject should be of substantial duration, aiming at the cessation of tests for all time; the treaty should also be so designed as to encourage the adherence of as many non-nuclear-weapon States as possible (CCD/PV.779).

154. With particular regard to the treatment of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a weapons test ban, the delegation of Japan, holding that peaceful explosive devices were indistinguishable from nuclear devices used for military purposes, proposed that any comprehensive nuclear test ban contain a provision to the effect that no State party should conduct peaceful explosions until agreement had been reached on appropriate international controls (CCD/PV.776). As noted above, the United States continued to advocate the prohibition of all nuclear explosive devices. The Netherlands also believed that the treaty should prohibit nuclear-explosion activities for any purpose (CCD/PV.779).

155. With regard to the drafts of test ban treaties submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union (CCD/523) and Sweden (CCD/526/Rev.1), several Socialist States members mentioned the Soviet draft as one of the principal contributions to a solution of the problem, while Sweden and several other countries referred, in particular, to the verification provisions of the Swedish draft.

156. On 16 March 1978, the delegation of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of all three States participating in the trilateral talks, reported to the Committee that substantial progress had been made towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty; a number of

important points had already been agreed; and on some outstanding issues, the differences between the positions of the participants had narrowed. The three nuclear-weapon States were keenly aware of the great importance that the members of the General Assembly and the CCD attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty and would continue their best efforts to complete the tripartite negotiations as soon as possible. (CCD/PV.780). (For tripartite views on the report of the Ad Hoc Group, see below, paragraph ...)

157. The delegation of the United States, noting that the joint statement had been cautiously worded because of the critical stage of the negotiations, assured the Committee that the United States, for its part, was pressing strongly for an early test ban agreement and believed its two negotiating partners were doing the same; it hoped, accordingly, to reach a point soon where the Committee could play an important role in the consideration of the agreement (CCD/PV.781). Similarly, the Soviet Union assured the Committee that the three participants were keenly aware of the great importance that the General Assembly and the Committee attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a test ban treaty and that they would continue to exert their best efforts to that end (ibid.).

158. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic welcomed the news that substantial progress had been achieved in the trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. An early successful conclusion of a treaty on the subject would considerably help to reduce the threat of nuclear war, and the security of all States would thus be strengthened. The delegation therefore hoped for such a conclusion, which should be followed by further agreements on a complete halt to the production of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.781).

159. The delegation of Canada, noting its satisfaction with the progress achieved in the trilateral talks, stressed the importance of the Committee's contribution to the common tasks (CCD/PV.782).

160. The delegation of Sweden, noting that the statements of various representatives of the three Powers participating in the trilateral talks had been somewhat encouraging, but at the same time inadequate, stressed that the non-nuclear States had good reason to be impatient in the light of the continuing arms race and their experience with the past history of disarmament negotiation, as well as their insight into the test ban problem.

Again reminding the three States of General Assembly resolution 32/78, adopted with their support, the delegation queried whether the political will expressed in that resolution still existed. The Swedish Foreign Minister had recently stated that the three States had the responsibility to conclude their test ban negotiations in time for the Disarmament Committee to elaborate a draft treaty for submission to the Special Session of the General Assembly. That view was shared by many other Governments and the three States concerned must be aware that a full test ban was long overdue (CCD/PV.783). The delegation of Ethiopia, noting its long-standing position to help achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control and welcoming the five treaties and conventions which had resulted from the work of the CCD and the important negotiations being undertaken, stressed that much remained to be done to achieve a comprehensive test ban (CCD/PV.786).

161. The Soviet delegation noted with satisfaction that certain progress had been recently achieved in the negotiations on the question of concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the negotiations which are being conducted at present in Geneva by the USSR, USA and United Kingdom. It expressed the hope that the matter would be brought to completion and thata a corresponding treaty would be signed in the near future and this would be an appreciable achievement in the struggle for peace and security. The delegation also expressed the hope that the group of scientific seismic experts would fulfil successfully also the new task entrusted to it, the task of studying scientific and methodological principles of a possible testing of the global network of seismic stations which could be set up in the future for the purpose of international exchange of seismic data under a treâty banning all nuclear weapon tests (CCD/PV.789).

162. In the discussion of the question preceding the submission of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts set up in 1976 to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, the delegation of Sweden continued to stress the need for an international system consisting of a network of selected seismological stations, a communications network and international data centres, in order to facilitate the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In that connexion, the Swedish Government

declared its readiness to operate and finance such an international data centre. Noting that the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts would soon submit its report to the Committee the Swedish delegation urged an early Committee decision concerning the continuation of efforts to establish an international data exchange system. It welcomed an earlier suggestion by Japan that an "experimental exercise" might be carried out, but cautioned that such an exercise should not delay the establishment of the international system, which should be fully operative by the time a comprehensive test ban treaty entered into force. The delegation believed further that verification by non-seismic means, such as by on-site inspections or by satellite observation, should also be carried out with genuine international participation, such as the consultative committee proposed in the Swedish draft treaty on the subject. The consultative committee would play an advisory role, should meet fairly regularly and should maintain a close liaison with the international seismic data system, the delegation added (CCD/PV.767).

163. The delegation of Czechoslovakia expressed similar views on the importance of establishing, through close co-operation among selected national seismic stations a world seismic network capable of contributing effectively to the verification of a nuclear-weapon test ban agreement (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also considered the establishment of such a system as a necessary precondition for the elaboration of an effective treaty verification procedure (CCD/PV.771).

164. The delegation of Japan also held that the organization of international data exchanges would be the most important and valuable contribution that the Committee could make towards facilitating the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and praised the Ad Hoc Group for its intensive work. The delegation urged a continuation of the work of the Group through the conduct of experimental exercises and offered to host informal technical meetings of the experts to make preparations for such exercises. While recognizing that the possible creation of an international verification organ, such as the consultative committee proposed by Sweden, might have to await the results of the trilateral negotiations on a test ban, the delegation stressed that preparations could be made now for the operation of the international data exchange system and that the proposed exercises could be carried out simultaneously with the trilateral talks so that the desired exchange system might become operative whenever the

required political and legal decisions were made. In this way, the delegation concluded, the Committee would make a great contribution to the process of achieving a comprehensive test ban, and the data exchange system would also be useful for the supervision of a moratorium on nuclear tests (CCD/PV.776).

165. On the more general aspects of verification, the delegation of Mongolia continued to maintain that national detection devices, supplemented by international co-operation in an exchange of seismological data, should be sufficiently effective, particularly when also supplemented by the possibility of on-site verification, as proposed by the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.773).

166. The delegation of India was of the view that verification should not be rigid. Insistence on only one type of verification or a set of verification methods would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. Verification should be a judicious combination of national and international means. India's active participation in international co-operation in detection of seismic events, the delegation of India noted, dated back to as early as 1958. In the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts to consider international means to detect and identify seismic events set up in 1976, India had taken an active part. (CCD/PV.786).

167. During formal consideration of the Ad Hoc Group's report after its submission to the Committee, the delegation of Sweden reminded the Committee of its willingness to finance, establish and operate in Sweden an international data centre of the type proposed by the Group. The delegation added that it envisaged that, as part of the continued work of the Group, one data centre would be established and operated on a temporary basis, and Sweden was prepared to put such a temporary centre into operation in the course of 1978 at its own cost, assuming that the anticipated test ban agreement involved a monitoring system. The delegation considered such experiments indispensable for the further elaboration of a monitoring system under a comprehensive test ban treaty that would ensure full access to all relevant data to all parties to the treaty. The delegation also considered the report of the Group a valuable contribution to efforts to establish a monitoring system acceptable to all and expressed its appreciation for the work of all participants in the Group, both members of the Committee and non-members (CCD/PV.779). Sweden also submitted a working paper (CCD/562) containing suggested terms of reference for the continued work of the Group.

168. The delegation of the Netherlands, sharing the Swedish view that treaty negotiations must be carried out by the international community as a whole, considered the results of the Ad Hoc Group not only satisfactory, but in a sense unique in that it proposed for the first time a system of international verification measures primarily directed towards nuclear-weapon States. The delegation hoped that more countries in the Southern Hemisphere would participate in the seismic system. It also wondered what kind of arrangements with WMO were necessary in order to use the WMO telecommunications system. The delegation of the Netherlands also noted with great interest Sweden's offer to set up an international data centre, adding that the establishment of an international seismic system could bring additional benefits, such as observations of earthquakes to assist UNDRO and for scientific work. Expressing appreciation for the Group's work, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal that the Group be given a new mandate and that a decision be taken by the Committee to plan the recommended tests so that the system could become operational as soon as possible after a test ban agreement was reached (CCD/PV.779).

169. In reporting to the Committee on the status of the trilateral negotiations, the delegation of the United Kingdom, still speaking for all three participants, added that they shared the widely held view that an international exchange of seismic data would play a major role in verification of compliance with the treaty. They considered that all parties to the treaty should have the right to participate and to receive seismic data provided by the international exchange, whether or not they contributed seismic stations to the global network. The three negotiating partners had actively participated in the work of the CCD's Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts and had carefully studied the report, to which experts from a substantial number of States had made valuable contributions. They agreed that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty, and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing on the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group. Speaking for the United Kingdom alone, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal to continue the work of the Group in order to carry out its experimental exercise (CCD/PV.780).

170. The delegation of the Soviet Union hoped the Group's report would be valuable and useful and, while agreeing in principle to the conduct of an experimental exercise, considered it obvious that since the international network of seismographic stations was being set up in connexion with the tasks of verifying compliance with the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the exercise could in practice be carried out only after that treaty had been concluded and when it was known which principal States Parties would decide on the exercise and place their seismographic stations at the disposal of the global network. However, it might be useful to start preparatory work for such an exercise even before the treaty entered into force and that work could be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group. The Committee might therefore consider the prolongation of the Group's work and the definition of a mandate in terms of principles and methods to be used for the experimental exercise (ibid.).

171. The delegation of the United States commended the report and supported its recommendations to conduct an experimental exercise, as well as re-mandating the Group to carry out preliminary preparation for such an exercise. It noted, however, that the Group's current mandate did not permit assessments of the adequacy of any system of international seismic data exchange. With particular regard to the statement of the Soviet delegation (see preceding paragraph) the delegation stated that the tripartite agreement should not be interpreted as implying that the recommendation of the Group that they be authorized to carry out an experimental exercise should not be carried out now. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to extend the Group's mandate and join with others in the proposed exercise (ibid. 789 and 779).

172. The delegations of Egypt (CCD/PV.782), the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.779), India (ibid.) and Italy (ibid.) also welcomed the report. The Federal Republic of Germany also supported the proposal to extend the Group's mandate and noted that its seismological centre in Graefenburg had proved its capability to co-operate in international seismic experiments. The delegation of India was particularly impressed that experts from twenty-three countries had reached consensus on the report and considered the timing opportune, as it came in the midst of the very active tripartite negotiations on a test ban treaty and its significance had been recognized by the three participants. The delegation also observed that the report had rightly noted the weakness of the

Southern Hemisphere in numbers of seismic stations. India was happy that it had several such stations. That fact clearly brought out the active participation that India had always had in the test ban field from 1958, when the first group of seismic experts met in Geneva (CCD/PV.780). The Italian delegation expressed the view that the Group's report had the merit of bringing out in a clear light a number of questions fundamental to the solution of the problem of verification. Italy supported the idea of planning an experimental exercise on the basic elements of the system of international co-operation to detect and to identify seismic events proposed by the Ad Hoc Group (CCD/PV.780). The delegation of Egypt welcomed the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on seismic events, particularly insofar as the Group found evidence of prospects for a further reduction of uncertainties and for narrowing the remaining areas of differences (CCD/PV.782).

173. The delegation of Japan, urging early conclusion of a test ban agreement, with negotiations in the Committee not later than the 1978 summer session, held that further work in the seismic field could constitute an accelerating factor in that process if the Committee proceeded promptly with the technical establishment of the recommended seismic data exchange system. To that end, the experimental exercise should be conducted, purely on a technical basis, even before the treaty came into force. If the exercise was delayed until after the entry into force of the treaty, as proposed by the Soviet Union, a complete verification system would not be able to function until over a year after that date, a delay which caused Japan real concern. Moreover, the delegation continued, since the Ad Hoc Group had not been able to assess the adequacy of any proposed system, such adequacy would be assessed only by the parties to the treaty after its entry into force, and the experimental exercise would provide the necessary data for working out arrangements for a later international exchange of seismic data. As a possible compromise to meet the position of the Soviet Union, the delegation suggested that the Ad Hoc Group first be requested to submit to the Committee a report on the preparatory stage of the proposed exercise, including a detailed programme of experimental testing. The Committee could then decide whether such testing could be carried out without giving rise to political difficulties and,

if so, could request the Group to proceed with a second stage, which would in turn be approved by the Committee before the final evaluation. Lastly, the delegation confirmed its readiness to host an informal technical meeting of experts in Tokyo during 1978 (CCD/PV.781).

174. The delegation of Canada, observing that it fully supported the report of the Ad Hoc Group, felt confident that an international exchange of seismic data could play an important role in a future test ban treaty and saw a need to create a network for such an exchange, which the Group had indicated was technically feasible. Although all countries did not have an equal capacity to monitor seismic events, an international network would put all parties on an equivalent footing in terms of the availability of data (CCD/PV.782).

175. The delegation of Egypt, also welcoming the Group's report as a helpful contribution towards a verifiable test ban, supported the conduct of the proposed experimental exercise and the draft terms of reference for the Group's future work submitted by Sweden. At the same time, the delegation observed that, however important agreements on verification procedures might be, it was important that negotiations on the treaty itself should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely (CCD/PV.782).

176. The delegation of Sweden expressed satisfaction that the three States participating in the trilateral talks had made clear that they agreed that an international seismic data exchange would play a major role in verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty and that all parties to the treaty could have equal rights to participate and receive the data provided. Confirming its support for the report of the Ad Hoc Group, the delegation held that the next obvious step was to obtain practical experience in setting up such a system and, to that end, Sweden had proposed a new mandate for the Group (CCD/562) and hoped for an early decision so that the Group could resume its work at the beginning of the Committee's summer session. Noting that Canada, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States had expressed support for the new mandate, the delegation shared the concern expressed by the Japanese delegation over the position of the Soviet Union that parties to the treaty should decide whether to conduct experimental testing. Holding that such a decision would mean that the treaty would lack its main instrument of verification for one year, the delegation also suggested that the proposed further work of the Group be carried out in two phases, beginning with a

preparatory phase after which the Committee would consider the desirability of carrying out the actual experimental exercise. The delegation concluded that the outcome of the test ban negotiations, including the renewal of the seismic Group's mandate, would affect the possibilities for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Disarmament Committee to function constructively in the future (CCD/PV.783).

"Nuclear Neutron Weapon", or "Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation Weapon"

177. Early in the Committee's 1978 spring session, the USSR and other Socialist States members proposed the specific prohibition of the "neutron bomb" as a particularly inhumane weapon of mass destruction. The United States and a number of other members did not accept the definition of that weapon as a new weapon of mass destruction.

178. In proposing the mutual renunciation of production of such bombs, the delegation of the Soviet Union held that the cause of world peace was threatened by the emergence of the new and inhumane weapon and that it was particularly dangerous because it was being described as a "tactical" and "harmless" weapon. Such a position tended to efface the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons, making use of the latter weapons more likely. The delegation stated that the position of the Soviet Union on that matter had been clearly expressed as follows by L.I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "The Soviet Union is decisively against the development of a neutron bomb ... but if this bomb is developed in the West — developed against us, which no one even attempts to conceal — then it should be clearly understood that the USSR will not stand by as a passive observer. We shall be faced with the necessity of meeting this challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies and friends. In the last analysis all this will raise the arms race to an even more dangerous level. We do not wish this to happen and therefore we propose that agreement be reached on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb so as to save the world from the emergence of this new weapon of mass destruction of human beings. Such is our sincere desire, such is our proposal to the Western Powers." The delegation urged the Western countries to treat the Soviet proposal with all seriousness and responsibility (CCD/PV.767). The Soviet position on banning the neutron bomb was

strongly supported by Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770 and 783), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the GermanyDemocratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 783). India believed it is equally urgent to ban development and deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology. Thus India believed that the development and deployment of the new weapon called the "neutron bomb" or the "reduced blast and enhanced radiation" bomb should be banned. Any development which would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons should be strongly resisted (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, unless measures were taken to avert the trend towards production and deployment of the neutron bomb, the arms race might be intensified and the ongoing disarmament negotiations jeopardized. It was in that vein that the delegation viewed the concern expressed by many delegations in connexion with the production and deployment of the neutron bomb (CCD/PV.786).

179. Among the principal arguments put forward in favour of such a ban by the Socialist States were the following: (a) the neutron was an indiscriminate and particularly cruel weapon of mass destruction, which could be used offensively as well as defensively and, eventually, strategically as well as tactically; (b) deployment of such weapons in Europe would be incompatible with détente and the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and would impede disarmament negotiations in other forums; (c) its development and deployment would result in counter-measures, thus escalating the arms race to a new and more dangerous level without any military or security advantages to either side; (d) the deployment in Europe of supposedly "clean" tactical nuclear weapons would lower the threshold of nuclear conflict; (e) the neutron bomb was not "clean" and, on the contrary, would produce persistent radioactive fallout; and (f) introduction of the bomb would have a destabilizing effect on the current politico-military situation and on disarmament negotiations. Mongolia spoke of the special responsibility of all Members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and called for more action in the matter of the neutron bomb by certain States of Western Europe so as not to violate the principle of equal security and alter the existing military and strategic balance.

180. In introducing their draft text (CCD/554) of an international agreement on the production, deployment and stockpiling of nuclear neutron weapons in March 1978, the Soviet Union stressed the view that the neutron bomb was on a par with such cruel and barbaric weapons as biological and chemical weapons, but that its true nature was being concealed. The explosion of one neutron bomb, it maintained, was equivalent in destructive power and unfavourable genetic effects to some dozens of traditional nuclear weapons of a similar yield. The delegation again emphasized that it was easier to prevent emergence of a new weapon than to ban it once it was in the arsenals of the States and held that a decision to produce and deploy neutron bombs would be as significant as the earlier decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. With particular regard to the draft agreement, the delegation urged immediate joint work on the preparation of an agreed text as another major contribution towards limiting nuclear arms and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war (CCD/PV.778 and 782).

181. In rejecting the Soviet draft treaty banning nuclear neutron weapons, the delegation of the United States charged the USSR with engaging in a propaganda campaign which focused on a single aspect of the dangerous confrontation of conventional forces and nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and with attempting to divert the CCD's attention from serious attempts to develop arms control agreements that would contribute to international security. The United States delegation explained, in plain talk, that the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon was a nuclear weapon and, as such, a weapon of mass destruction specifically mentioned in the United Nations 1948 definition of mass destruction weapons. Neither the scientific principles underlying the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon nor the concepts of their application were new, the delegation pointed out, and, therefore, it should be discussed in the context of limitations on nuclear weapons, not new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation also explained that, in light of the three-to-one tank advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon was being considered as defence against a possible massive tank attack in that theatre. It was pointed out, however, that no decision has as yet been made regarding either the production or deployment of the weapon. The delegation reiterated the US President's hope that the Soviets would agree to begin addressing the question of tactical, or theatre,

nuclear weapons, including reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapons and the SS-20. Several thousand tactical nuclear weapons were already deployed in Central Europe on both sides, the delegation pointed out, and it was only appropriate to address this issue in its entirety rather than one weapon at a time (CCD/PV.778).

182. The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that the United Kingdom Government considered that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The draft Programme of Action (CCD/549), of which the United Kingdom was a sponsor, called for the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race. The delegation therefore regretted that the Soviet Union had made a one-sided propaganda attack on enhanced radiation weapons whilst going ahead with the deployment of devastating new weapons systems of their own. The delegation considered that the reputation of the CCD as a serious expert body should be carefully preserved. The delegation hoped that instead of hearing any more of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies the Committee would be getting from them serious proposals for balanced and realistic steps towards the control of the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.779).

183. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed similar views, stressing that the Soviet Union, while mounting a propaganda attack against enhanced radiation weapons, was going ahead with the deployment of its far more deadly SS-20; the delegation also held that the new bomb had been developed for defence use against military targets, such as tank forces, that only an aggressor would have to fear its use and that it could not accept the singling out of one weapon in a one-sided manner without putting it in its proper context of the East-West balance of military forces.

184. The draft convention to prohibit the bomb was vigorously supported by Mongolia (CCD/PV.773 and 783), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.774), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.781), Hungary (CCD/PV.783), Poland (ibid.), and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.775 and 785). In addition to arguments previously put forward against deployment of the bomb, Bulgaria held that the draft convention was in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and with world opinion. The German Democratic Republic held

that the draft convention provided for equal obligations for all parties with no unilateral advantages for anyone. In reply to charges that the Soviet Union possessed more dangerous weapons, the delegation maintained that there was an approximate military balance in Europe and the deployment of the neutron bomb represented an attempt to upset that balance to the unilateral advantage of the West. Quoting Professor Burhop, President of the World Federation of Scientists, the German Democratic Republic delegation pointed out that the neutron nuclear weapon was a weapon *par excellence* for the aggressor who had the intention to conquer intact towns and industrial centres of another country. It also stressed that deploying that cruel weapon in the European States of NATO, including a neighbouring State of the German Democratic Republic would constitute an open threat to the physical existence of the German Democratic Republic people (CCD/PV.775). Mongolia emphasized that in submitting the draft convention, the Socialist States members of the Committee were guided by a sincere desire to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction of people, for they were deeply aware of the danger which nuclear neutron weapons present to peace and international security (CCD/PV.783).

185. Hungary held that the declared aim of deployment of the bomb was to change the balance of conventional forces in Europe and that its deployment would be an attempt to create a direct link between the conventional and the nuclear phases of military conflict. Hungary believed that criticism of the slow progress of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty might increase if the neutron bomb was deployed and that near-nuclear States might be tempted to develop such a usable nuclear weapon.

186. Poland agreed that such deployment might have an impact on the non-proliferation régime. Bulgaria and Poland stressed that the Committee on Disarmament was the appropriate place to discuss the problem. Poland added that the neutron bomb could not be considered as a "bargaining chip" in another disarmament forum. Bulgaria urged that Committee discussions on the question begin without delay so that a new disarmament measure, filling a threatening gap in the field might be submitted to the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Hungary expressed the view that besides

the harmful and dangerous consequences of the eventual deployment of the neutron weapon, it had also become clear that the weapon would not offer lasting advantages for those who were pressing for a decision on its production and deployment. There was, therefore, no doubt that attempts would be made to use the weapon as a "bargaining chip" at arms limitation and disarmament talks and to increase economic and political pressure on other countries. For those reasons, the Committee should conduct urgent negotiations on the mutual prohibition of the neutron weapon. Poland observed that, whether or not the neutron bomb was based on a new scientific principle, it was a new weapon of mass destruction and the Committee was duty bound to seek to prevent its emergence, as it had banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the hostile use of environmental modification techniques, Czechoslovakia pointed out several characteristics of the neutron weapon, clearly indicating that it was a new weapon of mass destruction and an offensive weapon that might be used especially for the suppression of national liberation movements in local conflicts in any part of the world. (CCD/PV.785).

187. The delegation of Egypt also referred favourably to the draft convention of the Socialist States members, holding that recent developments in the production of new weapons of mass destruction had already cast a shadow over the Committee's present session, as well as over arms control negotiations outside the Committee. The delegation considered those developments particularly alarming since they had taken place after the Committee had begun serious efforts to achieve a ban on all weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.782).

188. The delegation of the Netherlands said that its Government shared many of the concerns and doubts which had been expressed with respect to the enhanced-radiation, reduced-blast (ERRB), weapon, also called the neutron bomb. The debate on the weapon could be welcomed in so far as it focused the Committee's attention again on the place and role of nuclear weapons in the security system. The Committee should, however, accept the facts as they really are and not indulge in disregarding the complexities of the

problems involved. The Netherlands Government would wholeheartedly welcome a situation in which it would be possible to prevent the introduction of the ERRB weapon. That implied that all aspects of the balance of forces should be taken into account, the Netherlands delegation concluded (CCD/PV.783).

189. Later in the course of the spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union stated that, should this new major initiative be implemented, all States of the world would be on the winning side. The delegation decisively rejected attempts aimed at justifying the development and deployment of neutron weapons based on references to changes in the military balance of forces in Europe. Those efforts, the Soviet delegation stressed, are groundless because, as it has been recently clarified once again at the most authoritative level in the Soviet Union, the USSR has not been enlarging its armed forces in Central Europe for a long time and does not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or by a single tank. Having noted the statement by the United States to the effect that it had put off a decision on the manufacture of nuclear neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation noted that, in that connexion, the Soviet Union has also expressed its intention not to begin production of neutron weapons if the United States did not produce it. It also held that this created the necessary prerequisites for the fruitful examination of the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons in the Committee (CCD/PV.789).

190. The delegation of Yugoslavia stressed that it had always determinedly upheld the prohibition of all types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the "nuclear neutron weapon" or "reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon". The production of such weapons could only give added impetus to the nuclear arms race and thus take the world even further from the ultimate goal it was striving for — general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation the solution of problems concerning the maintenance of international peace and security on a durable basis could not be sought by creating new types and systems of weapons for mass destruction, but primarily by taking vigorous measures for disarmament, particularly nuclear (CCD/PV.789).

Question of the prohibition of chemical weapons

191. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that it speaks from the standpoint of a country not possessing chemical weapons, and on whose territory there are no such weapons. It has stressed that it is possible that some of the different attitudes to certain questions concerning the banning of chemical weapons arise precisely from the fact that not all States are in the same position regarding possession of chemical weapons. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, chemical weapons represent a particular danger for smaller countries, perhaps even more than for bigger ones, because they do not usually possess an arsenal of different kinds of highly potent weapons; in addition, most of those countries do not possess the appropriate capacity for chemical and medical defence against such weapons. Past experience has seemed to confirm that view. Chemical warfare agents, the delegation has held, were used during the post World War II period only against those armies which did not possess them; and for that reason, in future discussions about chemical weapons, the CCD should pay due attention to the security problems of all States and not, as has been the case so far, in the opinion of the delegation, consider the problem primarily from the standpoint of the security and mutual relationships of countries possessing chemical weapons. The delegation has further considered that a comprehensive ban would be the only lasting solution, but has not opposed a phased approach to such a ban if each step in the process towards the desired goal is strictly defined and linked to a time limit. Otherwise, the delegation has concluded, a partial solution should in fact help to preserve the present situation and postpone the solution of the problem ad infinitum.

192. In early 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that as was well known, Poland and other Socialist countries opted for a comprehensive elimination of all chemical weapons, even if eventually reached through successive partial stages. The delegation was of the opinion that the ultimate prospect of a final solution would have a catalytic effect upon the pace of our efforts towards that goal. Much more complex and challenging, admittedly, the question of a generally acceptable verification system was the eventual compromise formula and would inevitably have to reflect the fact that chemical weapons production characteristics, and the corresponding verification system, had

more in common with biological weapons than with nuclear ones. It also stood to reason that a widely acceptable verification mechanism in a future agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons must take due account of the following three considerations: (a) the existence and the general acceptance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; (b) the degree of uncertainty as to the size and character of the existing stockpiles of "C" weapons; and (c) the specifics of the chemical industry and its close relationship to the growth of national economies of States. The Polish delegation was confident that a satisfactory agreement could be worked out on all outstanding and difficult questions, if the flexible position of the Soviet Government on the elimination of chemical weapons, displayed in its recent memorandum (CCD/522), was matched with equal flexibility and goodwill on the part of other parties. Poland was prepared to join in a constructive search for such common ground in an effort to see chemical weapons eliminated for ever from the armories of all States (CCD/PV.735).

193. On the verification question, the delegation of Yugoslavia has considered that a unified system of national and international control measures would be one of the possible ways of organizing the verification process, with particular emphasis on the prevention of proliferation. The delegation has added the view that countries not possessing chemical weapons should have no particular difficulty in accepting on-site inspection in certain cases, provided all States parties were equally liable to such inspections. Finally, the delegation has stressed that verification should ensure: (1) controlled destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, (2) efficient supervision to ensure that the ban on development and production is respected and (3) prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons and technology, (CCD/PV.742).

194. In 1976, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany emphasized that his country, which in 1954 had pledged itself under international law to manufacture neither nuclear, biological nor chemical weapons, attached great importance to the progress being achieved in the deliberations concerning a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation supported the renewed request addressed to the CCD by the General Assembly to accord high priority to that question. Although during the last year the CCD had failed to produce any visible progress towards a prohibition, the delegation did not think the work carried out had been in vain. In 1975, five countries

had presented working papers dealing chiefly with the exceedingly complex questions of definition and verification. The paper presented by the Federal Republic of Germany on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents (CCD/459) attempted to develop, on the basis of objective criteria, a practicable method of distinguishing between warfare agents and other toxic substances, which were not to be considered as such. In the delegation's view, the submission of so many working papers testified to the continuing determination of many countries not to relax the efforts to secure the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/696).

195. With regard to verification, the delegation held that the question was without doubt the most important and the most difficult of the problems still unresolved, and that it was also the reason for the modest progress made so far towards a convention. The effectiveness of a verification system, the delegation held, depended on a combination of different means, and there was no doubt that the evaluation of statistics and a centralized information exchange system would be useful in this respect. However, the value of these elements should not be overrated, the delegation held, for in the final analysis, the system would not be sufficiently effective without international on-site inspections. Such inspections should, as a rule, be of a routine nature, the delegation believed. In other words, it should be possible to carry them out without having to give any special reasons. Inspections on challenge, or invitation, which would have to be based on suspicion, should play a merely supplementary role. Also, the regularity of inspections would be a key factor in confidence-building, whereas restriction of the system mainly to inspections based on suspicion could spread distrust and place a strain on relations between States. The delegation noted further that some countries had expressed concern that international verification systems, especially on-site inspections, would ultimately mean the surrender of commercial and military secrets. The Federal Republic, however, was convinced that a verification system could be designed that would ensure the protection of secrets, at least to the extent that they were legitimate within the meaning of the convention. It had already been said, the delegation concluded, that the same concern was expressed when the

IAEA safeguards system was first discussed, but that it had since proved to be unfounded. Today IAEA safeguards were being applied in many parts of the world and there had been no complaints about attempted espionage (CCD/PV.765).

196. Czechoslovakia welcomed progress in so far as positions regarding the scope of the ban were concerned and noticed that there seemed to be more support for the view that all chemical weapons should be banned which — as was known — was the original view of the Socialist countries (CCD/PV.742). The delegation shared the view that the question of control could quite reliably be solved by means of a system of national means of control combined with the necessary international procedures (CCD/PV.747 and 759).

197. The delegation of Romania has supported the prohibition of the development and production of all chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles. In its view, a global approach would best satisfy the criteria for a genuine disarmament measure. It would also create the confidence necessary to stimulate other priority measures in the field of disarmament. Emphasizing that the Committee had at its disposal an exhaustive technical expertise, Romania has supported the idea of setting up a working group to consider a synthesis of the various ideas expressed on the basic provisions of such a treaty.

198. In the Romanian delegation's view, the draft treaty should be drawn up in accordance with the following criteria: (1) the scope of the treaty should be as broad as possible; (2) the purpose of the treaty should be clear and must have the same weight for all State parties, large or small, developed or less developed; (3) the treaty should help to increase confidence among State parties; (4) any partial treaty should lay the groundwork for the continuation of efforts to adopt measures prohibiting agents not yet covered by the treaty; and (5) the treaty must not hamper research in chemistry and its application for peaceful purposes.

199. The Romanian delegation regarded the prohibition of the production of chemical weapons as a stage in the process of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to eliminate chemical weapons must therefore be regarded as directly linked to efforts to eliminate other arms from the arsenals of States.

200. On the particular issue of verification, the Romanian delegation, recognizing the importance of the problem, stated that it had no preconceived ideas concerning the methods to be used. Regardless of whether the methods in question were national or international, the system of verification could always prove to be a very difficult problem to solve if control was separated from the concept of international co-operation. In the opinion of the delegation, it was essential that the verification system envisaged should be based on a number of principles, namely respect for the equality and sovereignty of State parties, non-interference in their internal affairs and the desire for sincere co-operation in order to achieve disarmament. Those principles would provide all the conditions for a verification system corresponding to international law and capable of increasing confidence among the parties to the treaty. The delegation has attached importance to the proposal that the verification system should include, together with technical methods, a certain institutional framework. As not all States were able to pursue rapid development in the field of chemistry, such institutional framework would give to the less-advanced States an opportunity for direct and effective participation in the verification activities (CCD/PV.743).

201. The delegation of India noted that India had supported the General Assembly resolutions which in successive sessions accorded highest priority in the disarmament field to weapons of mass destruction and, accordingly, listed chemical weapons as the second priority item after nuclear items. India was therefore pleased to learn that the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the Chemical Weapons question had reached a promising stage. It recognized that a CW agreement involved complex and protracted negotiations and hoped that the CCD would be able to start negotiations at the earliest time. India had always called for a comprehensive ban on CW so that all chemical agents having the capacity to act as chemical weapons could be wiped out once and for all. India had no chemical weapons and had no intention of acquiring them, the delegation added.

202. The delegation of Japan has maintained that the prevailing view is that a ban on chemical weapons should cover not only super-toxic compounds, but also other lethal agents and that the ban should be based on the general purpose criterion, supplemented by a toxicity criterion, such as the LD 50 spectrum criterion suggested by Japan in 1976. The delegation, considering the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended) as a useful model

for defining the scope of the ban, has suggested that banned agents be listed in three annexed lists rather than attempting to ban a category of weapon. The first list, the delegation has explained, would cover single-purpose super-toxic agents, the second would cover dual-purpose agents and the third would be for other chemical substances that had the dangerous characteristics of chemical weapon agents or that were precursors of binary weapons. Parties to the agreement should give notification of their activities with regard to the substances on the third list but, if it was felt necessary to control them strictly, they could be transferred either to the first or second lists following a periodic review. The delegation has also suggested a procedure for determining the agents to be included on the lists, as well as time-tables for the destruction of stocks on the two primary lists. Finally, the delegation has suggested that paragraph (b) of article I of the United Kingdom draft, concerning a ban on munitions, equipment or systems designed to deliver chemical agents for hostile purposes, should be modified to read: "munitions, equipment or systems designed to fill up, install or deliver such agents specified in the preceding paragraph (a), or chemical substances which are to show the same effect as those agents specified in paragraph (a) when the fired munitions reach their targets". In that connexion, the delegation has presented a working paper (CCD/529) entitled "Some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons". Concerning the destruction of stockpiles, the delegation of Japan has held that all single-purpose super-toxic agents (to be included in suggested list one) should be destroyed within five years, for example, with on-site verification, and that dual-purpose agents (to be included in the second list) should also be controlled to ascertain that their amounts did not exceed a State party's requirements for peaceful purposes. On the question of verification, the delegation of Japan has held that the prevailing view was that international verification, including on-site inspection, was necessary and that such inspections could supplement national means without unjustifiable intrusion (CCD/PV.739).

203. The delegation of Mexico has advocated the elimination of all chemical weapons. It had repeatedly expressed regret that the joint initiative on an international agreement prohibiting the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare, which the United States and the Soviet Union, in 1974, had agreed to consider, has not yet materialized. With regards to the

general prospects for the achievement of a broadly acceptable ban, the delegation noted in 1977 the many proposals already before the Committee that might help to overcome the obstacles to agreement (CCD/PV.728).

204. The Canadian position, as outlined by its delegation, is that bilateral discussions between the USSR and the United States should lead very soon to the point where the CCD will be able to take up this important subject in a more meaningful way than is now possible. In the interim, Canada was giving further thought to the helpful United Kingdom draft and to the several thought-provoking comments that it has stimulated (CCD/PV.760). Canada had pointed out that to be effective, any prohibition on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and any agreement on their destruction must include concrete measures for effective verification of these provisions. For its own part, Canada had publicly renounced the first use of chemical weapons, and had also reported that it had destroyed its stocks of WW II mustard gas. It would be useful for those countries which had not yet done so also to announce their current national policies with respect to CW issues. Canada has also suggested that all States should agree to prohibit the production and development of agents, munitions and delivery systems, while those States having CW stocks would agree to the destruction of an agreed quantity of their stocks within a fixed period. In the Canadian view, such a phased approach should lead, in agreed and verified stages, to an eventual total ban on all lethal CW agents and munitions, including stockpiles, which would be used for hostile purposes (CCD/PV.740).

205. In 1977, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, noting that it supported the continuation of CCD efforts to reach an understanding on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, held that the absence of a ban on the development and production of chemical weapons in recent years had favoured the emergence of new chemical weapons. The development of binary chemical warfare agents had confronted the world with new problems and had not facilitated chemical weapons agreement. Moreover, new means of delivery had added to the dangers inherent in that terrible weapon of mass destruction, and it was therefore necessary to agree upon the prohibition and destruction of all chemical warfare agents without delay. With regard to the draft conventions of Japan and the United Kingdom, the

delegation stressed that those documents showed how difficult and complicated it was to find a generally acceptable partial delimitation of means of warfare; and the ideas and solutions presented in those documents could not be regarded as satisfactory and provided no solution for the prohibition of binary chemical warfare agents, the effective prohibition of which was essential. In the view of the delegation, the draft convention tabled by the Socialist States Members in 1972 provided a solution to that problem, among others. Its comprehensive character guaranteed a radical prohibition of chemical weapons and the purpose criterion upon which it was based would ensure that no chemical industry would produce any chemical warfare agents in the future. The delegation also held that a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons would entail the same advantages for all States. Articles II and III of the United Kingdom draft convention caused the delegation serious concern. It did not share the opinions that the obligation of parties to the convention to supply information on their chemical weapons before the coming into force of the convention was acceptable. Such an arrangement would injure the principle of equal security, with the consequence that a State possessing chemical weapons might give information on them without having the guarantee that other States would follow suit (CCD/PV.747).

206. With regard to the verification of compliance with a ban on chemical weapons, the German Democratic Republic delegation fully agreeing with the proposals contained in working paper CCD/403 and with the explanations given by the USSR was against the establishment of an international control organ with far-reaching control powers, because such an organ would legitimize interference in the internal affairs of other States and lead to the discovery of military and commercial secrets. In the delegation's view, a balanced combination of national means of control and of international procedures fully ensured the verification of compliance with a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic also attached great importance to the realization of the announced joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States. An agreement on the prohibition of the most dangerous, lethal chemical weapons might be an important step towards a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Such an agreement should, however, contain provisions to

ensure that the prohibition of the most dangerous, lethal chemical weapons would be but an initial phase to be followed by an all-embracing ban on chemical weapons. Along these lines, the delegation was ready to play an active and constructive part in working out an appropriate convention (CCD/PV.747).

207. The delegation of Egypt has emphasized the need for a provision in the text of a draft convention on chemical weapons to ensure that timely and effective assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, could be rendered to a country victim of aggression through the use of such weapons. The delegation supported the idea that possible collective action could be taken by other countries in such a case. The delegation has also stressed the following positions with regard to a chemical weapons ban: (a) obligations emanating from a treaty on the subject should start, in principle, upon ratification, while measures for destroying the stockpiles could be effective upon signature; (b) the ban should cover the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, their equipment and means of delivery, as well as the destruction of existing stocks; (c) the danger of a chemical weapon should not be measured by the degree of its toxicity alone, but also by the availability of protection against it, as well as by the kind of means of delivery; (d) the general purpose criterion for defining the scope of the prohibition should be recognized, but more detailed provisions should be elaborated in the annexes to the treaty; such provisions should be revised and updated periodically; and (e) effective implementation of the prohibition should be ensured by a combination of national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable verification system.

208. The delegation of Italy has noted on many occasions that the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the priority tasks facing the CCD. While acknowledging the divergency of views subsisting on two of the key elements of an agreement, namely the scope and the verification system, the Italian delegation felt that the CCD had before it material enough to achieve substantial progress before the Special Session of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament. Italy supported the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom, considering it as a constructive and realistic

"step-by-step" approach. The delegation proposed the establishment of an Ad hoc working group, with the participation of experts, in order to elaborate the basic principles and the main elements of a future agreement (CCD/PV.728, 741 and 760). The latter Italian proposal was supported by many delegations.

209. In July 1977, the delegation of the United Kingdom expressed its gratitude to all the delegations which had commented on the draft chemical weapons convention it had tabled in 1976, and made some further explanations regarding its position on points of detail. The United Kingdom believed that the scope of the treaty should be as wide as possible. Defoliants, however, were better dealt with in a "use" convention such as that banning military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Nor did the United Kingdom believe that a CW convention should ban irritants used for crowd control. Any convention should cover binary weapons. Detailed supplementary criteria for delineating the scope of a convention might usefully be put into a protocol. The United Kingdom believed that many of the fears expressed about the verification measures proposed in the draft were unfounded. Similar fears had been expressed about IAEA safeguards and had not proved justified. The United Kingdom welcomed the bilateral consultations in progress between the United States and the USSR and hoped they would proceed rapidly and constructively (CCD/PV.752).

210. At the 1977 session of the Committee, the delegation of Pakistan, holding that the achievement of a chemical weapons ban was really a question of establishing mutual confidence and that a solution would be found through a political decision, welcomed the continuing bilateral consultations and looked forward to further progress in the matter (CCD/PV.748).

211. Poland expressed the view that the ultimate goal of CCD's deliberations on chemical disarmament was the strengthening of the ban of the use of chemical weapons as laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in order to preclude any possibility of chemical warfare. In practical terms that meant that the CCD must start to work towards a régime which inter alia would render irrelevant the reservations that a number of States Parties made with regard to the option of retaliating in kind. In that respect the most effective and credible arrangement, the delegation held, would be a ban on the production and development of "C" weapons and the elimination of all stockpiles of chemical warfare agents. It was confident that such a step would not only

alleviate, but put to rest, the ever-present threat of chemical warfare. The call for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons was gaining ever wider support as the only reasonable and effective solution, the delegation held. Any successful negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons must recognize that fundamental fact. The delegation also welcomed the new round of the intensive Soviet-American talks which aimed at the formulation of a joint initiative as a first step towards a comprehensive ban. With respect to verification, Poland held that, to be really effective, a verification system must be tailored specifically to each and every arms-limitation or disarmament agreement negotiated. The delegation was satisfied that national means of control over compliance with a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, combined -- as suggested in the memorandum of the USSR on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament (CCD/522) -- with certain supplementary control procedures with regard to the verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, would be quite adequate. The delegation was also of the view that a comprehensive CW convention must provide either for the dismantling or for the conversion to peaceful civilian uses of all chemical weapons manufacturing facilities. No matter how sophisticated and fail-safe the non-intrusive method employed to verify that declared "C" weapons plants had stopped production, the delegation maintained, without actually being dismantled, the mere moth-balling of such plants would tend to breed suspicion as to the credibility of such a convention. Such a solution, moreover, might suggest, even against the best intentions of the parties, that the ban was of a provisional and tentative character (CCD/PV.764).

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212. In the discussions at the Committee's 1978 spring session, both the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the primary importance attached by all countries to the question of prohibiting chemical weapons. The Soviet Union reminded the Committee that it had long advocated a complete and radical solution of the problem of both biological and chemical weapons. It advocated that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should provide simultaneously for the renunciation of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as for the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons; only such a fundamental solution of the problem could finally and entirely eliminate the threat of the use of chemical means of warfare and place on an equal footing all countries, whether or not they possessed that type of weapon.

213. Both the Soviet Union and the United States also noted that bilateral negotiations on the subject were continuing, with a view to the elaboration of a joint initiative to be submitted to the Disarmament Committee. Both countries also reported that some progress had been achieved in those talks, both with regard to the scope of the agreement and to its verification, but that several important questions still remained to be resolved. The Soviet Union stressed that the problem was a complex one and that time would be needed for its solution, while the United States conceded that it could not predict with certainty when the joint initiative might be completed. The United States assured the Committee, however, that it was continuing to make every effort to reach a prompt agreement on such an initiative, to be followed by the elaboration in the Committee of an agreement eliminating all chemical weapons (CCD/PV.767).

214. The United States further stated its belief that a chemical weapons convention would directly engage any country with a modern chemical industry and pose new challenges in the area of verification. These challenges, the delegation said, create an opportunity to work out innovative forms of international co-operation which, in turn, could build the confidence of States Parties that the future convention is being fully complied with by others and lead to further general confidence which would enable active pursuit of broader multilateral disarmament measures in the years ahead. The United States provided assurance that it was making every effort to reach agreement on a joint initiative at an early date (CCD/PV.767).

215. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771) and India (CCD/PV.771) specifically welcomed the information on the progress of the bilateral talks and hoped for an early agreement on the remaining points of the joint draft to be submitted to the Committee for elaboration. Poland believed that the fact that the two Powers had been able to register a large measure of understanding on such difficult questions as the scope of the ban, the elimination of stocks and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities, as well as on certain verification issues, augured well for an eventual broad-range agreement. Hungary, noting that its basis position was still that reflected in the draft convention submitted by the Socialist States members in 1972, was pleased to learn that the joint draft under preparation provided for the broadest possible ban on chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia also expressed particular satisfaction that

agreement had been reached that the ban would be comprehensive in scope, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks. The delegation of Mongolia also reaffirmed its interest in a comprehensive solution of the problem and urged other participants in the discussions on the subject to make more constructive efforts to achieve that goal, which would be a genuine manoeuvre of disarmament (CCD/PV.773). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also considered that a comprehensive approach to the subject was now possible and hoped the joint initiative would soon be forthcoming (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of India, stressing the high importance that the General Assembly attached to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, also expressed satisfaction that the bilateral talks on chemical weapons had reached a promising stage and urged every effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. Recognizing that negotiations on a chemical weapons agreement would be complex, it urged that the Committee be enabled to begin its work at an early date. The delegation further noted that India had always favoured a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons and affirmed that it had no intention of acquiring such weapons (CCD/PV.771).

216. The delegation of Japan stated that if general agreement had already been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the scope of the chemical agents to be named in a CW agreement, Japan urged those two States to present those key elements of agreement to the Committee; if no agreement had been reached, at least the basic positions of the two States should be explained to the Committee (CCD/PV.776).

217. The delegation of Iran, in welcoming the news of progress at the bilateral talks, stressed the note of doubt it had detected concerning prospects for overcoming the remaining differences. The delegation had hoped that the joint initiative would be easier to realize than a full-scope treaty but if this proved not to be the case, the advantages of focusing on a first-step approach might be lost. The issue was vital to future disarmament talks, was highly political and technical and involved potentially more countries than most measures discussed previously; therefore, work on the issue must be pursued in the Committee pending the results of the bilateral talks (CCD/PV.778).

218. Late in the spring session, the delegation of the United States again stated that considerable progress had been made towards a United States/USSR joint initiative in the matter and that the pace of the bilateral work was being accelerated, but that there were still major issues to be resolved, particularly with respect to verification of compliance with a treaty (CCD/PV.781).

219. In summing up the current situation, the Soviet Union pointed out that very useful and extensive preparatory work on the prohibition of chemical weapons had been carried out in the Committee. The delegation mentioned in that connexion the great number of working documents submitted on the subject by member States as well as non-members, and the three draft conventions on the subject now before the Committee. It further stressed that the Committee had not only persistently pursued the goal of chemical weapons ban, but had intensified its efforts to achieve progress. The delegation concluded that the necessary prerequisites for the Committee's further productive work had been created in the current bilateral United States/USSR negotiations aimed at preparing a joint initiative on the subject in the Committee (CCD/PV.781). The delegation of Ethiopia observed that much remained to be done to achieve a ban on chemical weapons (CCD/PV.786).

220. The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that during the work of the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament, there were continued negotiations on questions related to developing a joint USSR-United States initiative in the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Delegations of the USSR and United States in their joint statement have already informed the Committee that, in the course of the negotiations, further progress was achieved, particularly from the viewpoint of reaching agreement on scope of the prohibition and on all related questions. The area of mutual understanding became broader also on verification problems pertaining to a very difficult and complicated sphere which is so sensitive for States. The Soviet delegation expressed its conviction that on some still outstanding aspects of those questions there could be found a solution of the kind which, while ensuring a reliable fulfilment of all obligations of States Parties assumed under the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, would not, at the same time, infringe upon the sovereign rights of those States and would not lead to disclosing state or industrial secrets of one kind or another (CCD/PV.789).

221. The delegation of Sweden reminded the Committee that the acquisition of chemical agents, weapons and delivery systems was not the only decisive factor involved in achieving an offensive chemical warfare capability, because it was equally important to acquire the necessary training, planning and organization to enable operational use of those weapons. Therefore, any international convention on the subject should not only prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons but also other preparations for offensive chemical warfare (CCD/PV.785).

222. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that it would give full support to the joint declaration of the Soviet Union and the United States to assist the Committee in achieving early agreement on a prohibition of all chemical weapons. The delegation observed that having once been a victim of the horrors of chemical weapons, Ethiopia attached special importance to the urgency of an agreement on the subject (CCD/PV.786).

223. The delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the only suitable solution of the verification problem lay in a combination of national and international procedures as proposed in a variety of documents, including the 1972 draft convention of the Socialist countries. The delegation added the view that on-site inspections would be technically immensely demanding and could not be carried out without negative consequences for the sovereign rights of contracting parties (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of India, held that verification procedures for all disarmament agreements should be flexible. Insistence on only one type of verification method would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. At the same time, verification should not be used as a pretext for affecting security or other interests of States (CCD/PV.771).

224. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that the experience it had gained with international controls, connected with the ban it had accepted on the production of chemical weapons, had not hampered development of the German chemical industry and that it wished to share that experience to help develop a control system for a multilateral chemical weapons ban (CCD/PV.777).

Question of the Prohibition of New Types and Systems of Weapons of Mass Destruction

225. The Romanian delegation has declared its support for the conclusion of an agreement in the field of new weapons of mass destruction that would prove to be both possible and useful. The purpose of the agreement would be to express, in an international instrument, the political will of States not to

direct certain achievements of science and technology towards military purposes. The basic conclusion which emerged from the debates in the Committee, the delegation has maintained, is that new types of weapons of mass destruction are already on the point of entering into the arms race. The role of the Committee is therefore to mobilize political will in order to prevent the extension of military rivalry in that new field. Once that political will has been consolidated, the technical aspects of the problem, even though they seemed complex could, as in so many other cases, be solved. The delegation has further stated that the negotiation of such a new agreement should take into account some basic requirements, as follows: (1) the consideration of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction must not divert the attention of the Committee from its responsibility to work for the adoption of effective disarmament measures related to the already existing weapons of mass destruction in the military arsenals of States and, first and foremost, nuclear weapons; (2) as a step intended to create greater confidence, the agreement must occupy a clearly defined place in the context of disarmament negotiations and at the same time stimulate further efforts in that direction; (3) as the agreement would be preventive in character, it must satisfy two particularly important conditions. On the one hand, it must not in any way or on any pretext hamper technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes or its application in the interest of the economic development of peoples, particularly of the developing countries. On the other hand, the coverage of the agreement, which concerns a field that is changing constantly, must be subject to periodic review in the light of the advances in science and technology. The viability of the agreement, the delegation concluded, would doubtless depend on the balance between the rights and obligations stipulated for the States parties (CCD/PV.743).

226. Canada has expressed the belief that, as has been demonstrated by the thorough and lengthy discussions on the Soviet proposal, there is no justification for the belief that new weapons of mass destruction based on new applications or new principles of science threaten to appear in the foreseeable future, let alone in the near term. If the possibility of any such development were to become in any way a tangible prospect, the delegation believes, the CCD had the means to give immediate international attention to the danger the delegation has held, however, that there is, nothing in the record of the Committee's lengthy and broad consideration of the Soviet

initiative to suggest to Canada that anything like an "umbrella" agreement could be of any practical value.even if one could be worked out. The delegation has further held that experience has shown that each type of weapon possesses its own special set of problems, and not only with respect to verification. The requirement is always, therefore, to understand the precise problem and to devise a specific agreement to meet the particular need and to encourage the broadest possible international adherence. The delegation has also maintained that, until something more tangible comes into view on which it can focus in a practical way, it would support the commonsense approach suggested by the United Kingdom delegation, that the Committee should seek "a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a request to this conference to keep the matter under review."

227. In 1977, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that, while supporting the aim of preventing the development of new weapons of mass destruction, it believed that a single treaty on the subject would have to be so general in its scope and so vague in its definitions that it would not be effective. A more fruitful approach, it held, would be a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of such weapons coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review (CCD/PV.757).

228. The delegation of Italy held that the question of the prohibition and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons should be dealt with bearing in mind the 1948 United Nations resolution, which contained suitable criteria likely to ascertain the actual emergence of new types of such weapons that scientific and technological progress might foster. This complex problem -- of a fundamentally preventive nature -- had to be carefully studied and kept under review by the CCD, without however diverting attention from the priority issues (CCD/PV.760).

229. In 1977, the Swedish delegation said that Sweden had welcomed the Soviet initiative to try to put a definite obstacle to potentially disastrous new arms developments, but had concluded that it was unfortunately not possible to achieve an omnibus agreement to ban new weapons once and for all time. In the delegation's view, the most appropriate way to prevent the development of such weapons would be to engage the Committee on Disarmament in a procedural review of the pertinent areas to detect future dangerous signs and, if such were detected, to conclude rapidly agreements on the particular new types of weapons involved. Accordingly, it supported the United Kingdom proposal for a firm general condemnation by the world community, coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review (CCD/PV.764).

230. The United States believes the most effective approach to dealing with new weapons of mass destruction is by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they are identified. Linking negotiations on specific agreements to conclusion of an omnibus treaty covering all new types of weapons of mass destruction in general, in the United States view, threatened to obstruct scientific development in areas where it would neither be necessary nor advisable. Furthermore, dealing with principles not currently understood or relationships among known principles that have not as yet been conceived, would prevent dealing in a well-considered manner with the problem of bringing weapons of mass destruction, based on new principles or new relationships, under control. The United States believes the CCD should keep this issue under continuing review, as it currently does in its informal meetings on the subject, with a view toward negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction as they are identified (CCD/PV.761).

231. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that it was somewhat disappointing to listen to some delegations dismissing out of hand as irrelevant certain areas of science and technology where there was good reason to fear potential new weapons of mass destruction, such as the use of acoustic or electromagnetic waves to affect human targets. At a time when technology, especially weapons-related technology, was developing by leaps and bounds it was hardly possible to deny the realism of warnings against a breakthrough that might well doom many thousands of people. In that connexion, the delegation noted that, when leading scientists first grasped the potential destructiveness of nuclear energy, some of their contemporaries labelled their discovery as "sheer fantasy". The Polish delegation considered it significant and timely that, apart from requesting the CCD to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, on the prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, the General Assembly deemed it also proper to urge all States "to refrain from any action which would impede international talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."

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232. At its 1978 spring session, the Committee continued to keep the question under active discussion. From the beginning of the session the Soviet Union, noting that 90 States had supported General Assembly resolution 32/84A, urged a comprehensive ban on all new weapons and systems of mass destruction on the basis of its revised draft agreement (CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Soviet position was strongly supported by the delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 783), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773). For example, the German Democratic Republic noted that the NATO countries seemed ready to negotiate a ban on a new weapon of mass destruction only when the development of such a weapon could be clearly identified and wondered if that position meant that negotiations in the field could begin only after such weapons had been developed and were already in the arsenals of States. It specifically opposed such a position, holding that the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which were likely to be misused as an instrument to change the military balance, must be prohibited from the very beginning by a comprehensive and preventive agreement.

233. India also supported the Soviet initiative to ban the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in conformity with its principled opposition to all weapons of mass destruction including those in stockpiles of nations today. India is of the view that it is important that the CCD should lend its support to all efforts which would nip in the bud the development of future generation of weapons and systems of mass destruction. India also believes it would not be enough to prevent the development and deployment of weapons and systems based on new scientific principles and that it is equally urgent to ban the development and deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology; otherwise, the exercise of banning new weapons and systems of mass destruction would become meaningless.

234. Czechoslovakia held that research and technological development belonged, at the present stage, among the main factors of the arms race. The delegation believed that a comprehensive ban of development and manufacture of new types

and systems of weapons of mass destruction would be the best way to avoid the possibility of military misuse of scientific discoveries for creating new weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.775).

235. In direct response to the view of the Western countries that it was difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement in the matter because the possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, the Soviet Union stressed that it could not accept such a view, since it was precisely an agreement in principle that was needed, to be followed, when necessary, by additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. The revised draft convention of the Soviet Union (CCD/511/Rev.1) fully met that need, the delegation maintained (CCD/PV.782). The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.783) and Poland (ibid.) also stressed that a comprehensive agreement on the subject would not preclude the possibility of future agreements to ban specific types of weapons. A number of Socialist States members also stressed that the General Assembly, in its two-part resolutions 32/84A and B, had given a clear and unmistakable mandate to the Committee for achieving a ban on new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation of Egypt also referred to the two resolutions and stressed that it looked forward to meaningful discussions of the problem in the Committee (CCD/PV.782).

236. The Hungarian delegation maintained that the appearance of new sophisticated weapons, among others the cruise missile and the neutron weapon, testified to the expansion of a concept that each weapon made possible by scientific and technological progress should be developed and deployed. It emphasized that new achievements were at the threshold of military application and that, in these conditions, the tendency of a technological race would inevitably lead to a qualitatively new phase in the arms race. The foreseeable dangers of this coming phase for peace and stability and for disarmament were substantially greater than before, the delegation held. In the delegation's view, another example was the development of weapons which, by the manner of their deployment, were difficult or impossible to verify with means and devices used for the verification of existing arms limitations agreements. Efforts to halt and reverse the arms race would inevitably fail if disarmament forums did not follow closely developments of that type (CCD/PV.783).

237. The Mongolian delegation, in reaffirming its position, stressed the urgent need to place a reliable barrier in the way of the technological arms race, which today was becoming more real than ever before (CCD/PV.783).

238. The Soviet Union noted that the general question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction and of radiological weapons was being examined bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States (CCD/PV.767, 781 and 782).

239. The Federal Republic of Germany recalled the resolution on mass destruction weapons "based on new scientific principles" which was sponsored by ten countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the General Assembly at its thirty-second session and adopted on 12 December 1977 with a majority of more than 100 votes. The invitation to the CCD contained in operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, reading "while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified", was a good basis for further intensive discussion. The delegation also held that it should be possible to elaborate a convention that would save mankind from developing new types of mass destruction weapons in that sphere (CCD/PV.771).

240. Later in the session, the Soviet Union stated that it would continue to urge the need for further efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Together with a comprehensive agreement, the Soviet Union also advocated the conclusion of special agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In that connexion it drew attention to the new initiative of the Socialist countries concerning the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the urgency of the problem of the earliest possible conclusion of such a comprehensive agreement and of such special agreements had recently not only not diminished but, on the contrary, increased. The course of modern scientific and technological progress bore witness to the fact that, by reason of the latest successes in the fundamental sciences and the high level of technology, the probability of the

emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was increasing. All that was causing growing concern in the world over the danger of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. In order to make more purposeful and thorough the Committee's work of establishing the agreed text of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly its work on the definition of the prohibition's scope, a group of qualified governmental experts should be established under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement.

241. To that end, the delegation submitted a draft decision (CCD/564) for the Committee's consideration, noting its belief that the setting up of such a group would meet the wishes of the General Assembly in the matter and also narrow the divergences of views on the subject in the Committee (CCD/PV.782). The Soviet proposal was supported by Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.775 and 785), the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland (CCD/PV.783) and Mongolia (ibid.). The delegation of Egypt thought that meaningful discussion might lead to the establishment of a working group with the task of elaborating an agreement or agreements on the subject (CCD/PV.782).

242. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that, in keeping with its view to come closer to the goal of genuine disarmament, the nuclear Powers should take concrete steps to avoid the development and production of increasing numbers and more devastating types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.786).

243. The delegation of the United States, on the last day of the spring session, reiterated its decision that the most effective approach to the issue of new weapons of mass destruction was by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. Dealing in a loose, even vague manner, the delegation said, with principles not clearly understood or relationships among known principles that had not yet been conceived would merely create the illusion of having dealt with the problem of new weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, he pointed out, the omnibus treaty approach supported

by some members of the Committee, would inevitably lead to continuous haggling over the designation of new weapons as new weapons of mass destruction. The United States believed the CCD should keep the issue under continuing review in the course of its informal meetings on the subject and opposed establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group to consider the question as proposed by the delegation of the USSR.

Question of the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons

244. The United States stated that considerable progress had been made towards a joint initiative on radiological weapons, holding that such a ban, while relatively less significant than a CTB or a CW convention, would be a logical step to fill a gap in the panoply of existing arms control measures and to head off possible development of hitherto untried weapons of mass destruction mentioned in the 1948 United Nations definition. The delegation believed the CCD could consider a comprehensive prohibition on radiological weapons without interfering with higher priority issues before it, and thus effectively guard against this potential threat by acting promptly and dealing with such weapons before rather than after they were in the arsenals of States. The negotiations of such a ban would be an appropriate task for the Committee (CCD/PV.767 and 781). Most delegations welcomed the bilateral talks on the subject and hoped for early results.

245. The Soviet Union emphasized that it is difficult to remove weapons of one kind or another, which have already been developed, from the arsenals of States, and that, consequently, it is much more reasonable, advisable and correct to prevent their emergence in advance (PV.721) and called upon the Committee on Disarmament to take into consideration that circumstance (PV.736). In that connexion, it stressed the possibility and need for concluding specific agreements on the prohibition of specific types of weapons which are not yet in the arsenals of States but which can be developed and produced, in cases when the danger of the development of such weapons becomes clear. The Soviet Union pointed out that radiological weapons, the prohibition of which is being now negotiated between the USSR and the USA, is precisely such a specific case. It clarified that it

meant the prohibition of the development of weapons on the basis of the use of the spent fuel of atomic reactors and of other radioactive materials designed to injure human beings through radioactive emissions and to contaminate terrain, water, military hardware and military and civilian targets (PV.760).

246. At the last meeting of the spring session, the delegation of the United States reported that the two sides were close to full agreement on a possible joint initiative for the CCD, but stressed that the United States shared the view that work on a possible radiological weapons convention should in no way interfere with work on the Committee's other tasks (CCD/PV.789).

Question of General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict and Effective International Control

General

247. The Italian delegation in 1977, stressed the importance of a patient and conscientious search for initiatives and solutions which would make it possible to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The delegation thought that the pursuit of that ultimate objective called for the removal of a number of obstacles which could be eliminated only by a process of patience and gradual rapprochement, during which initiatives aimed at strengthening confidence would be undertaken simultaneously with realistic disarmament measures, accompanied by appropriate guarantees. Italy also remained convinced of the need to undertake a programme of systematic and general disarmament in accordance with consistent and coherent general criteria (CCD/PV.728).

248. The delegation of Yugoslavia has held that, in order to make real progress toward fundamental disarmament agreements, simultaneous action should be taken in the following three directions: (1) the acceleration of negotiations and the conclusion of international agreements on those problems of disarmament which have been discussed in the CCD for several years; (2) the undertaking of the most serious efforts and urgent measures aimed at halting the unabated arms race at its source, which now represents one of the basic obstacles to achieving progress on disarmament; (3) the implementation, consistently and fully, of all the objectives and provisions of international agreements in the field of disarmament and not just those selected by individual preference. In the absence of a broader and agreed programme of action and simultaneous progress in these three fields, the delegation has further maintained the treaties concluded so far have failed to provide an important contribution to the solution of the substantial problems of disarmement. The delegation has added that if these treaties are not followed very soon by new agreements and by positive development with regard to halting the arms race at its source, they will lose their validity if only because of the fast technological development in the field of armaments, which is making the arms race increasingly dangerous and complex (CCD/PV.742).

249. The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, on the whole, negotiations in certain most important fields were slow in coming. At the same time, far too many technical and financial resources which should have been devoted to combating poverty and promoting economic and social development for developing member countries were diverted to the arms race (CCD/PV.786).

250. At the last meeting of the spring session, the representative of Mexico (H.E. Ambassador Alfonso García Robles) made a statement in which he recalled that at the opening meeting of the Committee, held on 14 March 1962, the Representative of the Secretary-General had stressed the importance of both the work which was about to begin and the contribution which members of the United Nations, whether militarily powerful or not, could make to that work, as well as the need to achieve concrete results. Ambassador García Robles stated that the words "concrete results" should serve as the basis for the assessment of the situation to be made at the forthcoming Special Session of the

General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For that reason the delegation of Mexico, together with that of Sweden, had submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session a draft of an introduction to the Final Document which begins as follows: "The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further. No 'effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' have materialized, and still less has there been any progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Neither has it been possible to free, for the purposes of economic development, any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources and energy, both material and human, that are squandered on the unproductive and wasteful arms race, which places a great burden on both the developing and developed countries". The representative of Mexico concluded by stating that the two texts which he had quoted had to be kept very much in mind in order to obtain a balanced and objective idea of what the CCD had achieved and what the Special Session should accomplish (CCD/PV.789).

251. Regarding the question of conventional arms, in 1966, the delegation of the United States presented 6 principles which could be used as a basis for regional agreements in the conventional arms field. In 1970, they recommended 3 additional steps that States could take unilaterally which in their cumulative effect, even without formal binding agreements, could constitute reliable arms limitations on a regional basis (CCD/PV.437). In 1975, they suggested that it would be useful for the CCD to identify and discuss principles of conduct that could be applicable on a worldwide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms. The United States suggested 4 principles as follows: (a) States to judge whether the supply or acquisition of arms will have adverse effects on regional or international security; (b) consultations among interested States on the

possible effects of arms acquisitions; (c) States to limit their acquisition of arms to those deemed indispensable for their security so as not to divert resources unnecessarily from economic and social development; and (d) States to consider applying the same criteria to the export of equipment and technology for armaments production as they apply when authorizing the export of arms (CCD/PV.665). In 1976, the delegation of the United Kingdom spoke in support of that United States proposal (CCD/PV.708). In 1977, the United Kingdom delegation once more urged discussion of the possible arrangements for multilateral restraint in conventional arms transfers and welcomed the initiatives in that field taken by the United States, and in the United Nations by the Government of Japan (CCD/PV.757).

252. At the Committee's 1978 spring session, the delegation of the United States, in pointing out that the danger posed by nuclear weapons was most likely to result from escalation of a military conflict initiated with conventional weapons, expressed its belief that the CCD should devote some of its energies to dealing with the problems associated with conventional arms. The United States was of the view that much more should be said and done about the massive diversion of resources to the accumulation of conventional arms and that the responsibility of curbing the horizontal spread of conventional weapons must be shared between suppliers and recipients as well. In the United States delegation's view, the CCD possessed both the expertise and political representation to consider and develop measures in this area which would increase stability in a number of regions in the world and contribute significantly to the advancement of ultimate disarmament objectives, (CCD/PV.781).

253. With regard to the particular problem of conventional arms, the delegation of Italy expressed the view that in parallel with nuclear disarmament, urgent measures of co-operation should be promoted in view of bringing to a halt the conventional arms race. To that end, Italy envisaged the establishment, under

article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission divided into regional subcommissions, entrusted with the task of controlling the international transfer of conventional weapons (CCD/PV.760). (See also CCD/568).

254. With more direct reference to European regional disarmament, the delegation of Romania has pointed out the urgency being increasingly felt in Europe for adopting practical measures of disarmament and military disengagement. On that continent, more than in any other part of the world, there was an unprecedented concentration of armed forces and modern armaments, including nuclear weapons and, there, the two military blocs confronted one another. The delegation has added that the strengthening of peace and security in the world could not be divorced from the development of the situation in Europe. To the extent that the Committee, as a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, wished to make a genuine and lasting contribution to disarmament, it must also devote special attention to the continent of Europe (CCD/PV.731).

255. India took the position that while it was not opposed to a discussion of the question of conventional weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament, it would oppose any attempt to divert attention from the highest priority items that could only be discussed on a global basis. Furthermore, India could not accept the proposition that nuclear weapons and conventional weapons should be weighed in the same scale (CCD/PV.771).

256. The delegation of Ethiopia also thought that conventional arms control should be carried out in the framework of general and complete disarmament and should not divert attention from priority issues of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.786).

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257. At the 1978 spring session of the Committee, virtually all delegations have continued to recognize general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts. Specific comments, however, were made largely in the context of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

258. The Italian delegation, in joining the consensus in the adoption of the final report of the CCD to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, regretted that, due to the opposition of a delegation, it had not been possible to regroup the statements made by various delegations on the problem of conventional weapons under a separate heading entitled "Question of conventional arms and regional disarmament" (CCD/PV.789).

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

259. Early in 1977, the delegation of Mexico, referring to the General Assembly's request in resolution 31/68, proposed that the Committee take as a basis for its discussion on a comprehensive programme of disarmament document A/8191, which should be revised in the light of developments since its submission to the General Assembly in 1970. Later in the summer session of 1977, noting it appeared that the Committee would begin consideration of the question of such a programme at the outset of its 1978 session, the delegation introduced, as a contribution to that task, a preliminary draft comprehensive programme (CCD/545 and Corr.1) which, the delegation said, largely reproduced the contents of document A/8191, with certain changes, including one serving to draw attention to the degree of responsibility to be borne by the principal nuclear-weapons States in implementing various measures (CCD/PV.765).

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260. Early in its 1978 spring session, the Committee decided to establish the ad hoc group to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The group would use as its basic working texts all Committee documents on the subject, beginning with the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations and taking into account other documents submitted to the Committee during the course of its work by members or non-members of the Committee.

261. During the discussions, the following new documents on the subject were submitted to the Committee: (a) a working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Italy (CCD/548); (b) a working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR (CCD/552); (c) a working paper on the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Romania (CCD/553); (d) a working paper containing suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme, submitted by Nigeria (CCD/555); and (e) a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization, submitted by the Netherlands (CCD/565).

262. In addition, a number of delegations submitted documents reproducing working papers or other views on the same general subject that they had already submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. Among these were: (a) a draft programme of action for the Special Session, submitted by the United Kingdom and also sponsored by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, containing a draft proposal of action being submitted to the Preparatory Committee (CCD/549 and Corr.1); (b) a paper submitted by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Yugoslavia and Zaire, containing the text of document A/AC.187/55 submitted by the same countries to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session (CCD/550 and Corr.1); (c) a paper submitted by Sweden, containing the text of Preparatory Committee document A/AC.187/95 (CCD/554); (d) a paper submitted by Mexico (CCD/560) containing the text of document A/AC.187/56, already approved by the Preparatory Committee; (e) a paper submitted by Mexico (CCD/561 and Add.1) containing the text of document A/AC.187/89/Add.1 submitted to the Preparatory Committee; and (f) a working paper submitted by Italy on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568).

263. In submitting its document CCD/548, the delegation of Italy stated that it offered a realistic contribution to the framing of an orderly and articulated set of guidelines for future disarmament negotiations in appropriate forums, but stressed that it was not intended to counter any other formal working document already before the Committee. The first part, the delegation pointed out, dealt with basic principles for such negotiations, such as the observance of a degree of flexibility, the maintenance of a balance between nuclear and

conventional measures, the co-ordination of global and regional initiatives, the acceptance of a step-by-step approach to prevent destabilizing effects and facilitate agreement on effective verification measures; the second part offered a suggested set of priority measures, involving in the first instance nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but including conventional weapons (CCD/PV.767). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed CCD/548, which it believed contained good suggestions for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be drawn up by the Committee; such a programme, by its nature, had to be conceived as a long-term instrument (CCD/PV.771).

264. In introducing its paper on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568), the Italian delegation pointed out that the first part of the paper, dealing with the role of the United Nations in disarmament, suggested that the First Committee of the General Assembly concentrate its future efforts in the main on problems of disarmament and international security; the paper also suggested that in connexion with the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the role of the Security Council under article 26 of the United Nations Charter should be reviewed and that the Council itself consider creating, under article 29, subsidiary organs charged with specific tasks in the field of arms control, particularly a committee, divided into regional sub-committees, entrusted with control of international conventional arms transfers (CCD/PV.784). (The Italian delegation made additional observations on the parts of CCD/568 concerning organization and procedures of the CCD and possible international verification machinery, which are noted under the section on "CCD Organization and Procedures" and the sub-section on "Question of establishing an international disarmament organization", below).

265. Introducing document CCD/549, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that, while it did not wish to duplicate discussions taking place in the Preparatory Committee in New York, it thought it would be useful to circulate in the Committee the document submitted to the Preparatory Committee, to be taken into account along with other relevant documentation such as the Mexican paper CCD/545 and the Italian paper CCD/548.

266. In introducing document CCD/552 on behalf of seven Socialist States Members, the Soviet Union confirmed the continued relevance to the problem of its 1977 Memorandum and noted that the new working paper was based on proposals presented by the same sponsors to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session, as well as proposals, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, that had recently been put forward (see the section on nuclear disarmament). The sponsors of the paper, the delegation added, proceeded from the premise that a comprehensive disarmament programme should define fundamental purposes and principles, which should include such principles as that of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages, the universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations, the principle that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly the nuclear Powers and States possessing the most powerful weapons and armed forces, together with such other principles as should be used for guidance in matters of disarmament. The programme should then propose specific disarmament measures in all possible areas and, finally, put forward basic provisions dealing with forms of negotiations and the negotiating machinery to be used (CCD/PV.773). Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) made similar statements in explanation of the document. Mongolia stated that it proceeded from the premise that the programme of action on disarmament should include the main areas in which efforts must be made to achieve the elaboration of suitable international agreements. At the same time, it was extremely important to define the fundamental provisions and principles which should underlie negotiations on, and the solution to, questions relating to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament (CCD/PV.773).

267. Introducing its document CCD/553, the delegation of Romania, holding that the need for a comprehensive disarmament programme arose from the growing anxiety of the international community concerning the unprecedented accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, noted that the need had become more urgent as a result of the preparations for a Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Arms control measures achieved so far, the

delegation held, had had no perceptible impact on the dynamics of the arms race and, accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the Special Session was the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament capable of leading to general disarmament. Such a programme (a) must place disarmament negotiations in perspective once again, creating a real impetus to reverse the escalation of arms and gradually to reduce and eliminate the factors responsible for such escalation; (b) must consist of a systematically organized combination of measures leading up to major objectives and to the final goal of general and complete disarmament, with each specific measure opening the way for other measures in the framework of the general pattern; (c) must be comprehensive in order to mobilize the political will of States, with the various measures in the programme negotiated concurrently as organic parts of a single effort; (d) must meet the interests of all States and be carried out with the participation of all, with global, regional and bilateral measures all incorporated into a unitary concept; and (e) must not simply represent a plan of efforts to achieve the objective within a reasonable time period but also suggest ways and means of achieving the desired goal (CCD/PV.774).

268. Introducing document CCD/554, the delegation of Sweden noted that it contained some key elements of a programme of action for disarmament and the machinery for negotiations to that end. It was focused on subjects in which Sweden had long taken a special interest, such as nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of particularly inhumane weapons, the reduction of military budgets, the reorganization of the CCD and the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament; it also proposed that a second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982 (CCD/PV.774).

269. In introducing documents CCD/556 and 557, the delegation of Pakistan noted that they had already been submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session and that their submittal to the Committee was a formality. The papers represented an attempt to focus on issues which, in the view of Pakistan, deserved increasing attention and were of particular concern to developing countries (CCD/PV.778).

270. Introducing documents CCD/560 and 561 and Add.1, the delegation of Mexico noted that the papers were self-explanatory supplements to its paper CCD/545 and gave the following principal reasons for presenting them to the Committee for consideration in its work on a comprehensive disarmament programme: (a) regarding document CCD/560, Mexico was convinced that the programme to be prepared by the Committee must, like the comprehensive programme of 1970, contain a section defining the fundamental principles for implementation of the programme, and the Mexican document set forth 25 such principles, including affirmations that the final objective should be general and complete disarmament, that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should have the highest priority and that the United Nations has a primordial role in disarmament; (b) regarding document 561, the paragraph of most use to the Committee was undoubtedly the one to the effect that the Committee should undertake preparation of a comprehensive programme as soon as it had undergone the reforms envisaged in the draft Final Document of the Conference and that the programme should contain procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations and ensuring that the General Assembly was kept fully informed; (c) lastly, document CCD/561/Add.1 contained an additional 15 illustrative measures which might be included in the Committee's comprehensive programme of disarmament if they were not included in the short-term programme of action that might be adopted by the Special Session (CCD/PV.780).

271. Introducing document CCD/550, in the name of its seven sponsors, the delegation of Egypt stressed the following three main aspects of the question of a disarmament programme: (a) such a programme was an urgent matter in light of the continuing accumulation of arms, particularly nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction; (b) priority should be given to nuclear, chemical, incendiary weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in that order, while regional conflicts should be ended by eliminating their causes, thus bringing about the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons on both the regional and global level; and (c) confidence-building measures should be completely observed by all States and the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force in any form against any State would constitute such a measure. The delegation also expressed satisfaction that an ad hoc working group had been set up to elaborate a comprehensive programme (CCD/PV.782).

272. In commenting on document A/AC.187/55, India held that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be elaborated at a United Nations deliberative body, as had been proposed in that document. The measures of a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been correctly defined as a middle road between the current step-by-step approach and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. India was of the view that although eight years of the Disarmament Decade had passed, very little progress in regard to the comprehensive programme has been achieved. Therefore, the time had come to consider specifically the setting up of a body entrusted with the task of elaborating such measures within a specified time frame.

273. The delegation of Iran, stating that consideration of a comprehensive disarmament programme was especially appropriate now to plan future disarmament measures, agreed that such a programme need in no way depend on or conflict with the action programme to be decided by the Special Session, as the latter would presumably focus on more immediately achievable goals while the former would fit those goals into the framework of a larger process to extend over a longer time period. The delegation commented, however, that discussion of a comprehensive programme could not be a substitute for the negotiation of disarmament measures (CCD/PV.773).

274. The United States also pointed out that there were limitations to what could be accomplished by a comprehensive programme, particularly since it was not possible to set binding deadlines for negotiations that were, by their very nature, consensual. The delegation also hoped that the working group would consider not only proposals now before the CCD, but those that might be submitted in the future (CCD/PV.767).

275. In 1977, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressing itself to the question of the armament balance in different regions of the world, stressed the importance of the question of conventional arms. The world-wide expenditure for the procurement of arms was high and the question was complex. While hoping for progress in the important talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the delegation also drew attention to certain developments influencing the regional balance of armaments. A regional approach to partial measures of disarmament would certainly not only raise the level of security and confidence in those regions, the delegation held, but also set free resources that were indispensable for development and increase the level of the autonomous efforts of developing countries in

those regions. It went without saying, the delegation held, that such an approach would, in most cases, concentrate more on conventional arms, and it hoped that that subject would find more attention in the CCD (CCD/PV.715).

Question of establishing an international disarmament organization

276. The question of establishing some type of international disarmament agency has been raised from time to time in the Committee, particularly in recent years, mainly by Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan. Often the suggestion was linked to the question of a ban on chemical weapons, with delegations suggesting that an international organization could, as a first task, assume the role of assisting in the verification procedures of any future agreement in that field.

277. At the 1978 spring session of the Committee, the delegation of Italy stated that the establishment of an international organization to supervise ~~the~~ implementation of disarmament agreements would be of great value (CCD/PV.778). Subsequently, the question was raised again by the Netherlands in a more concrete form, and the delegation submitted a document on the subject, entitled "Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency" (CCD/565) proposing the creation of such an agency "to streamline" disarmament consultations and implementation measures and suggesting that the Special Session of the General Assembly, in its Final Document, include an invitation to all member States to submit their views on such an agency.

278. In introducing the document to the Committee, the delegation of the Netherlands stressed that several countries, including Italy, had recently shown interest in a disarmament organization because a number of important disarmament agreements now approaching conclusion would require rather elaborate permanent machinery for consultations between parties and for substantial implementation and verification tasks. The only existing Treaty of such a complicated nature was the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it had used the existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out its verification requirements; but no such organization existed to carry out such needs for a chemical weapons ban or a nuclear test ban, for example. Such an organization could also be entrusted with organizing review conferences for various treaties and, as it gained experience, could be given other appropriate functions. As more disarmament measures were achieved, it would be important, the delegation held, to have an impartial body, for example under United Nations auspices, which could contribute to the implementation of such agreements. In that connexion, the delegation expressed support for the premise of a recent French proposal to establish an international

observation satellite agency, because internationalization of satellite information seemed essential in the long run; however, satellites could not perform all verification functions — as was clear from the NPT, a CTB or a chemical weapons ban — and it therefore seemed better to combine the French proposal with the idea of the Netherlands for an international organization so as to make it possible to combine all sorts of implementation functions. The delegation realized that much more careful consideration would be required before any final decision in the matter could be taken and therefore proposed only that the views of United Nations Member States on the matter be sought. If further steps proved warranted by the responses received, the Committee on Disarmament or an ad hoc Committee might be given the task of working out the modalities of such an agency and the second Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament could take a decision on its establishment (CCD/PV.783).

279. The delegation of Italy also submitted a working paper (CCD/568) suggesting that the United Nations consider establishing machinery to verify multilateral disarmament agreements. In introducing the paper, the delegation expressed the view that the document of the Netherlands (CCD/561) contained ideas worthy of being discussed, studied in depth and elaborated. Italy felt that the problem of verification of compliance with disarmament measures as a whole should be reconsidered with a view to tackling it and, if possible, solving it by reference to uniform and coherent criteria in an appropriate international context. It was of the opinion that the international organ of verification suggested in working document CCD/568 should employ whatever technological and scientific means — such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices — might be usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures (CCD/PV.784).

Question of Further Measures to Prevent an Arms Race on the Sea-bed

280. With regard to the Sea-Bed Treaty, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that, in June 1977, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty had reaffirmed the commitment undertaken by the Parties to the Treaty in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning the demilitarization of the sea-bed, and it requested the CCD, in consultation with the States Parties to the Treaty, to proceed without delay to the examination of further measures aimed at preventing the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. The delegation also noted that the General Assembly at its thirty-second session had adopted an appropriate resolution on the subject. The Soviet Union was an advocate of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. Proceeding from this, it supported the Conference's decision and was ready to begin consultations with other States members of the CCD concerning the procedure for starting, in the Committee, the discussion of the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed (CCD/PV.767).

281. The delegation added that the Sea-Bed Treaty, to which over 60 States were parties, should be regarded as a link in the chain of international limitations restraining the nuclear arms race, since it limited the possibilities of deployment of nuclear weapons in an environment which constituted most of the surface area of our planet. At the same time, it created the prerequisites for the complete exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the sphere of the arms race by committing States parties to continue negotiations on the further demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.781).

282. The delegation of Poland, referring to the Sea-Bed Treaty and to General Assembly resolution 32/87 A, wished to alert the Committee to the fact that under the terms of that resolution the Committee was expected to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in the vast sea-bed and ocean floor environment. In presenting the draft of that resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Poland had stressed that what actually was at stake was a blueprint for the Committee's further crucial new step towards full demilitarization of the sea-bed. In Poland's opinion, any comprehensive programme of disarmament the CCD might elaborate in the future must provide for early and constructive efforts to discharge the responsibility resting on the Committee in that regard. The delegation expressed the hope that the

readiness of the Soviet Union to begin consultations with other States on the most effective implementation of the General Assembly's request would soon be emulated by other States members of the CCD and States Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty (CCD/PV.768). Similarly the delegation of Mongolia said it presumed that, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution on the subject, the Committee would proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.773).

283. The delegation of the United States expressed the view that the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty had not only achieved its primary purpose, but had also played a broader role in preventing the emergence of an arms race on the sea-bed. The United States stated that it had seen no evidence of an arms race on the sea-bed to date, and saw little prospect for one in the future. In light of that fact, the delegation stated, it did not believe that it was necessary for the Committee, or any other fora, to consider further disarmament measures in this area at the present time; however, it believed that this subject should be kept under careful review (CCD/PV.789).

CCD Organization and Procedures

284. The delegation of Romania has emphasized the ever greater and more urgent responsibility incumbent to the Committee to take firm action to adopt effective disarmament measures within the terms of reference assigned to it. The meagre result achieved during the 15 years of its existence has in no way affected the arms race which is continuing unchecked at an ever faster rate. It is evident that the required new course for the Committee's activity would not be reached through disparate, incoherent approaches, however important the problems might be. This delegation has further pointed out that firm action to pull the negotiations out of deadlock and focus them on the adoption of practical and effective measures of disarmament is an important political

problem. Such actions could be taken first of all by mobilizing the political will of all States, primarily of those States which bear the main responsibility for disarmament. In those circumstances, the setting in which action is to take place assumes particular importance. It is obvious that the disarmament negotiations could not be revitalized without a steady improvement in the way the Committee functioned. The attention which Romania has always devoted to the organization of the Committee's activities is based on the fact that disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirements of the democratization of international life and participation by all States, on an equal footing, in solving international problems. The delegation has also held that the General Assembly, at its Special Session devoted to disarmament, would closely examine the activity of the CCD and its role and place in disarmament negotiations. The delegation has asked the Committee to lay down its programme of work for that session in accordance with the decision taken in 1975 and has emphasized the necessity to set up the procedure and the organizational framework for considering and deciding on proposals aimed at a thorough improvement of the Committee's function (CCD/PV.731).

[illegible] In 1977, the United Kingdom drew attention to lessons which could be learned from the negotiation of the convention on environmental warfare. In order to reduce the problem that many Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee had not been able to provide any input to the negotiating process and had had insufficient time to consider a treaty text before being asked to give their approval at the General Assembly, the delegation suggested that, when the Committee decided to set up an ad hoc working group for the negotiation of a treaty, a period of notice of not less than one month might be given to all States Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee. Such States might be invited to contribute to the negotiating process by submitting either written or oral statements, according to their preference, and they might also be offered an invitation to participate more fully in the Committee's negotiations; when the Committee completed its work on a treaty, notification might be sent, together with the treaty text, to all States Members of the United Nations which had not participated in the working group, preferably at least three weeks in advance of discussion of the text in the General Assembly (CCD/PV.729).

286. The delegation of Yugoslavia has held that the Committee, in order to fulfil its mandate, should endeavour to improve and promote the substance and methods of its work. It should not be satisfied with the status of a *quasi* negotiating body, without taking initiatives and actions of its own. In addition it should not be permitted that the CCD, as the only organ of its kind in the field of disarmament negotiations, should simply wait for ready-made solutions to be presented from outside and only then start acting as a negotiating body. In particular the CCD should not be a body to which final solutions are offered, as that was no way for an international forum to perform its tasks and rise to its challenges. The delegation has also stressed that the Committee should initiate appropriate actions, actively participate in all phases of negotiations, influence decisions being taken in the disarmament field and orient its negotiations in accordance with scientific and technological developments in the field of armaments, bearing in mind the real needs of the international community in this field. If this was not done, the delegation believed, the CCD would remain as ineffective as it has been so far and would not be able to adjust to the requirements and the conditions of the present day world. The delegation of Yugoslavia has also supported changes in the methods of the Committee's work in order to strengthen its capacity to negotiate on a basis of democracy and equality, holding that the Committee, established outside the United Nations framework, reflected the circumstances and conditions of that time but that, since then, many things have changed in the international community. The delegation has also held that, at the present time, a large number of member countries are supporting appropriate changes in the methods and character of the work of the Committee, or the way it is managed, and doing so in the best interests of the Committee itself, deeply convinced that the Committee must reflect the needs of its time, rather than to be overcome by them, and must promote its efficiency as a negotiating body (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Yugoslavia has further held that as long as the results of the Committee's negotiations failed to keep abreast of technological developments, the Committee would continue to revolve in a vicious circle. The fact that disarmament problems are exceedingly complicated, and that the political will of all members of the international community is needed if they are to be solved, should not be used to justify the meagre results being achieved or

the lagging tempo of negotiations, the delegation has maintained. It has further held that in the fifteen years of its existence, the Committee has still not become a negotiating body in the full sense of the word, as it should be, but became such a body only when its two Co-Chairmen submitted for its consideration the agreed texts of an international agreement. In 1977, the delegation stated that the Committee as a whole would have had much material for negotiation during 1977 but, regrettably, that possibility had been reduced to a minimum by the Committee's engagement in the direct negotiating process being made dependent on the outcome of bilateral and trilateral consultations, a procedure which did not help it to achieve the best results. The delegation expressed regret at cases of circumvention of the Committee, the conduct of negotiations outside its framework, and failure to inform it of the course and results of bilateral and trilateral talks. It stressed that the Committee as a whole should take active part in all stages of the negotiation of the international agreements that they are supposed to prepare and held that, instead of constantly striving to create conditions enabling other States that are not members of the Committee to make a useful contribution to its work, the Committee was continuing to narrow its own frameworks and to curtail its own abilities. The delegation argued further that all countries, regardless of their size or military power, were equally interested in disarmament questions which have the most direct bearing on the security of each State. It stated that for that very reason, the international agreements in the field of disarmament rest on respect for the basic interests of all members of the world community and that they should be the product of the joint efforts of States for, only if they are, can they win general support. The delegation of Yugoslavia expressed the view that this is still not always the case with the present treaties and that this fact in itself should act as a warning (CCD/PV.757).

237. On the question of the Committee's organization and procedures, the delegation of Mexico noted its previous recommendations in favour of a calendar of work, preparation of the annual report by the Secretariat, replacement of the co-chairmanship and establishment of a permanent sub-committee. With

more specific regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed (1) that nuclear-weapon-States not be permitted to hold the chairmanship; (2) that beginning in 1978, the three groups represented in the Committee each designate one of the group for a three-year term as members of the Committee's "bureau", with each member holding the chairmanship for one of the years 1978-1980 while the other two would serve as vice-chairmen; (3) that the same procedure be repeated at the 1981 session and every three years thereafter; and (4) that the present rotation of the chairmanship be abolished (CCD/PV.728). The delegation has repeatedly reiterated its view that replacement of the institution of the co-chairmanship would be indispensable to create conditions favourable for the participation of France and China in the Committee (CCD/PV.746). The delegation of Mexico also stated in 1977 that the failure to establish an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons ban had rendered virtually impossible any substantive contributions by the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee to negotiations on those items during 1977. It added, in that connexion, that the contribution of the members of the group of 15 could prove to be most useful, precisely in a situation where there were no "identical drafts" of the United States and the Soviet Union. With more particular reference to the question of organization and procedures of the Committee, the delegation quoted from the opinions of a number of Member States of the United Nations regarding the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; in the delegation's view, the majority of those opinions reflected an impatience with the paucity of the results of the Committee's endeavours, which in large measure derived from its inadequate organization and procedures and which should not be ignored. The delegation then referred to two previous proposals aimed at improving the Committee's organization and procedures: the establishment of a standing sub-committee of the whole to negotiate specific drafts and the substitution of the co-chairmanship by a system more in keeping with United Nations practice and with the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The decisive argument for carrying out the latter, the delegation held, was the indisputable need for the participation of the other two nuclear-weapon States in the Committee's work, which the present system understandably precluded; in that connexion, the delegation also pointed out that a number of opinions it had quoted had emphasized the need to associate all nuclear-weapon States with disarmament negotiations and that several had referred specifically to the prerequisites of changing the system of co-chairmanship. As an alternative to the co-chairmanship, the delegation recalled its proposal for a monthly rotating chairmanship among the non-weapon States members of the Committee, holding that such a system would in no way detract from the role played by the present Co-Chairmen of the Committee. The delegation hoped that it would prove possible for the Committee to achieve tangible negotiating results, as well as changes in its structure, before the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/PV.762).

288. The delegation of India has held the view that the CCD, with all its inadequacies and imperfections has been a useful forum and that it can continue to function even more effectively if some essential changes in its structure and working procedures are made. The delegation has noted as positive developments the fact that the reports of the CCD to the General Assembly sessions are now far more substantive and meaningful, that the records of the CCD discussions are now available to all the members of the United Nations and to the public at large, and that the CCD's working programme now follows an agreed calendar of work. As regards the institution of Co-chairmanship, India is of the view that it should be altered not because a change by itself would make it easier for China and France to participate in its work, but because India feels that all the members of the CCD, or for that matter any international forum, should have the same rights and responsibility. India prefers the basis of monthly rotation among all members. As regards the suggestion to establish a standing sub-committee of the whole, India would like to examine this proposal further. India also supports the suggestion that States, not members of the CCD, should have the right to submit proposals or views they might have on measures of disarmament under negotiations in the CCD and to attend meetings whenever such proposals are examined. As a rule the plenary sessions of the CCD should not be closed but should be opened to the press and to the others who wished to attend them. In addition to the report that the CCD submits to the General Assembly at the beginning of the General Assembly session, it should also submit periodic reports (CCD/PV.771).

289. The delegation of Canada has stressed that, whatever changes may be made, Canada believes that the CCD should continue to adhere to the procedure of consensus. It would be an improvement, the delegation believes, if some means could be found to involve interested United Nations members, not members of the CCD, in the process of negotiation at a suitable stage in the development of a text, but it would be counter-productive if new departures in that direction were seriously to undermine the business-like advantages that derive from the limited membership of the CCD. Concerning the co-chairmanship, Canada has stated that any advantage of its modification in the context of persuading all nuclear powers to be associated in a constructive way in the negotiations of international agreements of increasing significance in the field of arms control and disarmament should be objectively evaluated. If the co-chairmanship were to be set aside, the Canadian delegation would prefer to see each individual country treated as an equal, individual sovereign State and not as a member of a group. It would object to being arbitrarily and unjustifiably defined by a group label that may have some validity elsewhere in some United Nations circumstances, but could have no part in matters of peace and security. Canada would, therefore, not wish to see a future rotational system for the chairmanship based on grouping, as such a system would not do justice to the fact that members of the CCD participate in its work as individual States (CCD/PV.731).

290. The United States, in 1977, stated its belief that the Committee should retain a flexible attitude toward its procedures and organization, but stressed the importance of retaining the characteristics which make the Committee a viable negotiating forum rather than a place for political posturing. The delegation emphasized that, if the Committee were to continue as an effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, it was essential that the Committee continue to operate on the principle of consensus and that it maintain limited, but representative, membership. The United States also stated that it was prepared to consider organizational changes, but cautioned against discarding methods proven to be effective just for the "sake of change" (CCD/PV.767).

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291. At the 1978 spring sessions, as in the past, many delegations commenting on the question of specific modifications in CCD organizational procedures also commented in a general way on the performance of the Committee as a whole. In the following paragraphs, such general views are first presented, followed by the views of various delegations on specific proposals for further organization and procedural changes in the Committee.

292. The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the significance of the Committee as an authoritative and effective international negotiating body and hoped other members would contribute to a solution of the common problems so that it could achieve further concrete results (CCD/PV.767). The delegation also stated that the Committee had become increasingly active, particularly in recent years and had been intensifying its work, going deeper into problems and concentrating its attention increasingly on the main areas of disarmament (CCD/PV.781). The delegation of Hungary held that the Committee, as the sole organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations, had a well-defined place in the machinery of such negotiations and that it was generally recognized that it would continue to be needed in the future (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Bulgaria, stressing the significance of the five treaties and conventions worked out as a result of the Committee's efforts, expressed amazement at various negative assessments of the Committee's work, which it considered prejudicial and unwarranted (CCD/PV.772). The delegation of the United Kingdom also stressed that the Committee had not only achieved several treaties but had made a substantial contribution to the general improvement in the international atmosphere and had increased understanding of the problems of disarmament and the ways of overcoming them (CCD/PV.786).

293. The delegation of India held that, with all its inadequacies, the Committee had been a useful forum. It would function even more effectively with some changes in its structure and working procedures, but India did not agree that it should be replaced by some other negotiating body (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation added the view that effective mechanisms were important not only for making progress in negotiations but also to help generate political will (CCD/PV.786).

294. The delegation of Japan supported the idea that the CCD should modify parts of its organization and procedures so as to introduce measures for improvement, with a view to strengthening its function while reflecting the voices and opinions of the countries which were not members of the CCD, as well as strengthening its ties to the United Nations General Assembly. However, it was firmly convinced that the CCD had been effectively discharging its responsibility as a forum for negotiations, and that it was undoubtedly the most appropriate organ for further negotiations, and hence that it should continue to be an indispensable negotiating body in the future (CCD/PV.776).

295. The delegation of Italy, noting that the Committee had played a leading role in the elaboration of most of the treaties so far concluded, held that while it was not perfect, radical changes should not be made or existing bodies dismantled without any real necessity. The Committee had irreplaceable skills and experience and had recently adjusted its methods of work to meet the changing needs; it should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body (CCD/PV.778). The delegation of the United Kingdom considered the Committee to be one of the most important international bodies in the world, since it was the principal multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and disarmament was one of the most important world tasks (CCD/PV.779).

296. On more specific matters, the delegation of Mexico, stressing the view that there was widespread support for improving the structure and methods of work of the Committee and specifically for changing without delay the present system of co-chairmanship, urged the Committee to reconsider the proposal previously put forward by Mexico and others to set up a standing sub-committee of the whole and to abolish the co-chairmanship. Reminding the Committee that the group of fifteen had unanimously supported the proposal to establish a sub-committee contained in working paper CCD/530 of 1977, the delegation quoted extensively from that document concerning the

advantages of establishing the sub-committee and suggested that the document be used as a basis for further consideration of the matter. With regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed that the many previous suggestions of Mexico on the subject, the latest of which recommended a monthly rotation of the chair among all non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, might be used as a basis for a resumption of consideration of the matter. Mexico's reason for not including nuclear-weapon States in the suggested rotation was the same as that for excluding such States from the presidency of the General Assembly, the delegation said (CCD/PV.767).

297. The delegation of Sweden also continued to support the elimination of the co-chairmanship on the grounds that the world of 1978 was considerably different from that of 1962, when the institution was established. The delegation suggested that a Committee "bureau" be established consisting of four members, one Chairman and three Vice-Chairmen, two of which would be chosen from the States belonging to the military blocs and two from the group of neutral or non-aligned States; under that arrangement, the chairmanship of Committee meetings could rotate among all Committee members on a monthly or sessional basis. Sweden also recommended that the formal meetings of the Committee be made public unless decided otherwise and that all United Nations Members who submitted proposals to the Committee should be entitled to address the Committee during the discussions of such proposals in the plenary meetings (CCD/PV.767).

298. The delegation of Romania continued to expect changes in the Committee's activities that were urgently demanded by the large majority of States (CCD/PV.768). The delegation of Nigeria, calling for a realistic examination of the Committee by its members, stated that an effective negotiating forum should ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, should not be unduly restrictive, should have a democratic structure and should take into account the many changes that had taken place in the world since 1961 (CCD/PV.769).

299. The delegation of India noted that, as a result of recent discussions on organization and procedures, the annual reports were now more substantive and meaningful, the records of the Committee were not made available to all United Nations Members and to the public and the work programme followed an agreed calendar ensuring the orderly conduct of business. A change should be mad

however, in the institution of the co-chairmanship, the delegation believed, not because such a change would make it easier for China and France to participate in the Committee, however desirable that might be, but because all members of an international forum should have the same rights and responsibilities. For the same reason, however, the delegation saw no reason to deny the nuclear-weapon States the right to act as chairman and preferred a procedure of monthly rotation among all members. The proposal to establish a standing sub-committee should also be carefully studied. India also supported the suggestion that non-members should have the right to submit proposals or views on measures under negotiation in the Committee and to attend meetings when such measures were examined. It also believed that the plenary meeting should not, as a rule, be closed to the press and public particularly since the *verbatim* records of those meetings were now being made available to the public. Lastly, the delegation believed that, in addition to its annual report to the General Assembly, the Committee should submit periodic reports (CCD/PV.771).

300. The delegation of Iran said it would consider changes in the Committee's organization and procedures that would advance the ultimate goal of achieving substantial measures of arms limitations, in particular any modifications that would bring all the nuclear-weapon States into the negotiations. With reference to the co-chairmanship, the delegation held that any remedy for the present situation must also uphold the principle of the sovereign equality of States and, therefore, the best solution would be to rotate the chairmanship among all Committee members without excluding any State or group of States (CCD/PV.778).

301. The delegation of Italy believed that while a good negotiating structure could not remedy a lack of political will, the latter could be stimulated by, and gradually originated from, a better understanding through constructive discussions in an appropriate body. With particular regard to suggestions that the Committee should again be enlarged, Italy considered a limited forum to be essential for the efficient conduct of business and, although it would consider a small increase in the Committee's size, it believed that careful attention should be given to the capability of new members to contribute to disarmament negotiations. As an alternative, Committee meetings might be opened to other interested United Nations Members under appropriate conditions, possibly as observers. Other United Nations Members might also be allowed to submit written proposals for consideration as official documents and participate in the discussions of those proposals. With regard to strengthening the link with the United Nations, the Committee should maintain the degree of autonomy essential for creativity and productiveness, as well as the principle of consensus so essential in a body where the security interests of all States were involved. The Committee should, however, prepare periodic reports to the General Assembly after its annual spring session, as well as special reports on particular topics. The Committee should, at the beginning of each annual session, also agree on the work to be accomplished and on a methodical programme of negotiations. It should also seek agreement on setting up without delay functional working groups to negotiate draft treaties or to give informal considerations to specific items, when necessary with the participation of experts. With regard to the argument that the abolishment of the co-chairmanshi would make the Committee more attractive to the nuclear-weapon Powers not now participating in it, Italy believed that, in a body taking decisions by consensus elimination of the co-chairmanship would not affect the substance of the prerogatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which played a crucial role in the disarmament process and had a special responsibility for its promotion; on the other hand, if renunciation of the co-chairmanship would result in the participation of China and France, such a renunciation would be a gesture of goodwill highly appreciated by the international community (CCD/PV.778).

302. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany favoured improvements in the Committee's procedures and composition provided such changes would improve the Committee's efficiency (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Japan supported the idea of improving the Committee's organization and procedures with a view to enhancing its role, reflecting the views of non-members and strengthening the Committee's ties to the General Assembly (CCD/PV.776).

303. The delegation of Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773), and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) directly rebutted a number of the proposals outlined above for additional changes in the Committee's organization and procedures, in particular

the proposal to eliminate the co-chairmanship. Speaking generally, the delegation of Czechoslovakia considered the recently revised organization and procedures of the Committee, including maintenance of co-chairmanship, to be well-suited to the needs of the Committee's work; while the delegation was willing to consider any further meaningful and justified changes on their merit, it did not believe changes should be made hastily without due consideration. The delegation of Hungary pointed out that the Committee had already taken a number of decisions to strengthen or modify its practices, and held that in view of the urgent problems of halting the arms race, the Committee should set secondary matters aside and concentrate all its energies on the main tasks before it. Similarly, the German Democratic Republic stressed that the Committee had discussed all procedural questions freely and regularly over the years, which had resulted in important changes in the Committee's composition, as well as the adoption of a number of procedural changes as recently as 1977. All United Nations Members were now fully informed of the Committee's work and could participate in that work under various arrangements. Such flexibility should continue, the delegation held, on the basis of consensus and the equality of States, and no bureaucratic machinery should be established, for example in the form of a standing sub-committee.

304. The delegation of Mongolia stated that it regarded the CCD as an independent, multilateral negotiating body with solid working experience, and that the question which was now being raised repeatedly in the Committee with the clear aim of achieving a fundamental reorganization of its structure should be approached with all due seriousness (CCD/PV.773).

305. On the particular question of the co-chairmanship, the delegation of Hungary, pointing out that all countries recognized the reality of the important role played by the Soviet Union and the United States in world problems and in the maintenance of peace and international security, held that it followed that the unity of views and common initiative of those two States was essential for any important and lasting arrangement on disarmament. That fact justified the institution of the co-chairmanship in the Committee on Disarmament. The delegation added that it doubted that the abolition of the co-chairmanship would appreciably influence the attitude of those Powers that were so far not inclined to participate in disarmament negotiations. The key to the solution of major

disarmament problems, the delegation concluded, lay neither in the continuous reorganization of the Committee nor in the abolition of the co-chairmanship, but in much deeper considerations.

306. The delegation of Bulgaria pointed out that there had never been a single instance of high-handedness in the Committee on the part of the Co-Chairmen and that all members were equal, each chairing the Committee meetings in alphabetical order. Each member could not only present documents and proposals, but also oppose Committee decisions, all of which must be taken by consensus. The efficiency of the Committee's procedures had been amply demonstrated, and the Committee should be grateful to the Co-Chairmen for their hard work both in the Committee and outside it; there could be few results in the disarmament field without their active bilateral efforts. For those reasons, the delegation urged the Committee to concentrate its entire attention mainly on the most pressing problems of disarmament instead of diverting it to non-substantive matters. The delegation of Mongolia also held that the institution of the co-chairmanship involved the very principles on which the Committee was based.

307. Similarly, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that the existence of the co-chairmanship had never prevented equality in reaching Committee decisions; on the contrary, the close collaboration of the two Co-Chairmen had saved the Committee from lengthy discussions of matters which were the special responsibility of those two Powers. The delegation added that attempts to transfer the structure of other international bodies to the Committee on Disarmament could only harm the Committee. Its failure to achieve a greater degree of success was not due to its procedures, and changing its procedures would not significantly accelerate its work. The German Democratic Republic also referred to the question of the Committee's composition, noting that it had grown dynamically over the 16 years of the Committee's existence and holding that the present composition met essential requirements and should be maintained in principle.

308. On 17 March 1978, the group of 15 in the Committee submitted a working paper (CCD/563) on organization and procedures of the Committee. The paper stated that the following five changes deserved the highest priority:

(a) strengthening the existing link between the General Assembly and the Committee by permitting all United Nations Members to submit disarmament proposals on questions under the Committee's consideration and to participate in the Committee and its working bodies when such proposals were examined and by enhancing the role in the Committee of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations; (b) replacement of the co-chairmanship by a new system to be agreed upon based on existing proposals; (c) adoption of rules of procedures for the Committee; (d) examination of other procedures to improve the Committee's effectiveness, including the establishment of a standing sub-committee of the whole; and (e) opening the Committee's plenary meetings to the public.

309. In introducing the document on behalf of the 15 sponsors, the delegation of Mexico stressed the additional points that renunciation of the co-chairmanship could not prejudice the powers or legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, since all decisions were taken by consensus and that, on the contrary, such a gesture of renunciation would considerably enhance the moral stature of the two Powers; and that the rules of procedure to be adopted would incorporate all the customs and usages that had been gradually developed over the 16 years of the Committee's existence (CCD/PV.781).

310. In supporting the document, the delegation of Egypt emphasized that the co-chairmanship should be altered to satisfy the need for a change felt by Committee members, perhaps by monthly rotation, and that an organic link should be established between the Committee and the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/PV.782).

311. The delegation of the Soviet Union again noted that the Committee was the basic multilateral disarmament negotiating body and that it had actively participated and contributed to the elaboration of five disarmament agreements which, together with bilateral arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, constituted the most essential part of international agreements in the disarmament field. The delegation also affirmed that the practical results achieved by the Committee could have been more significant if the Committee's efforts had had the political and practical support of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers. Despite such objective difficulties, however, the Committee had proved itself to be a dynamic mechanism

for conducting multilateral negotiations on disarmament, a mechanism which was constantly improving the forms of its organization and procedure. In that connexion the Soviet delegation made additional comments on various specific aspects of the Committee's work and organization. On the question of the Committee's composition, the delegation stressed that, over the years, the Committee had made dynamic changes in membership reflecting the changes that had taken place in the world since its establishment. The present ratio of membership, with one half divided in equal numbers between the Socialist countries and the Western countries and the other half comprised of developing and non-aligned countries, reflected existing realities and took into account the interests of all States. The present Committee membership thus ensured the required representation while being reasonably limited to enable the Committee to act effectively and flexibly. On the question of the forms and methods of the Committee's work, the delegation pointed out (a) that the chairmanship of formal meetings was rotated in turn among all members in alphabetical order; (b) that informal meetings were regularly held on various questions to permit a more free exchange of views and the participation of technical experts if required; (c) that ad hoc working groups could be established for detailed scrutiny of draft agreements, for study of special questions and for seeking solution to various problems; (d) that bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations were conducted for various purposes, including the preparation of specific proposals; (e) that all decisions were taken on the basis of consensus, thus putting all Committee members on an equal footing; and (f) that the Co-Chairmen were increasingly assuming difficult tasks and responsibilities for the preparation of initiatives to solve various topical questions, playing an important organizational role without hampering in any way, but rather encouraging, initiative on the part of other members, and providing the specific knowledge of the subject matter under discussion which, unlike the case in certain United Nations bodies, was of particular importance in a working body having the more narrow task of elaborating draft disarmament agreements. While the delegation proceeded from the premise that improvements in the form and methods of work were both possible and desirable, as evidenced by the decisions in the matter taken at the 1976 and 1977 sessions of the Committee, reforms should not be an end in themselves and not made merely for the sake of reform, but should actually result in greater effectiveness to achieve greater results (CCD/PV.781).

312. The delegation of the United States, while understanding the impatience and concern of some Committee members that important matters were being discussed on a bilateral or trilateral basis, urged the Committee to bear in mind that the Committee had played an important substantive role in elaborating five arms control treaties, all of which were time consuming and required extensive bilateral or trilateral consultations. As examples, the delegation mentioned negotiations on the partial test ban from 1958 to 1963 — with continuing and promising negotiations continuing to the present day on a full test ban — and on the Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1962 to 1968. As a final word on the future of the Committee, which would be discussed at the upcoming Special Session of the General Assembly, the delegation reiterated its view that the Committee was a useful negotiating forum and should be retained as such with a size commensurate to its tasks; it also believed that its organization and procedures were operating effectively, although the United States would be prepared to accept structural changes if it appeared that a positive advantage would be gained thereby (CCD/PV.781 and 789).

313. The delegation of Poland stressed the view that, with many formidable new and old tasks, the Committee should be careful that the ultimate interests of disarmament did not suffer through a desire to reform existing mechanisms. In that connexion, the delegation associated itself with the views expressed by Italy concerning its reluctance to make radical changes and dismantle existing bodies without any real necessity. The delegation also emphasized that the two enlargements of the Committee's membership, in 1969 and in 1975, had reflected the growing interest in disarmament negotiations and had resulted, among other things, in a better political and geographical representation without turning the Committee into a mere debating forum. With regard to the method of work, the last few years had shown that the annual reviews or organizational procedures resulted in satisfactory procedural adjustments, such as the method of preparation of the Committee's annual reports, the new press release format and the variety of ways in which the Committee was now handling its work. Unacceptable additional demands, the delegation believed, might seriously strain the constructive spirit of accommodation now prevailing in the Committee and undermine its foundation as a viable and effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, based on the essential principle of consensus. Specifically, the delegation was not persuaded that the institution of the co-chairmanship should be replaced, particularly since it saw no tangible proof that the institution stood in the way of other nuclear-weapon Powers joining in the

common endeavours. Sharing the view that the treaties and conventions that the Committee had already helped to conclude represented the most essential part of the international achievements in the field, the delegation held that the list was unsurpassed in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, even though the Committee should not be overly satisfied so long as the arms race had not been stopped or reversed (CCD/PV.703).

314. The delegation of the Netherlands, summarizing the situation with regard to Committee's organization and procedures as the delegation saw it, held that it would be too easy to pretend that something was wrong with the Committee because of some understandable disappointments over the allegedly meagre results of its negotiations. Disarmament was a difficult and complex problem touching on the security of States and must be considered in various forums depending on the subject matter. The Committee on Disarmament had been created to meet the absolute necessity of having a worldwide forum to conclude agreements that would find worldwide acceptance, and it had accomplished important work and had other important work before it. There seemed to be a general feeling that such a body should have a restricted membership to make possible effective negotiations on complicated disarmament questions, and the delegation did not believe that suggestions for a rotating membership were practical. On the other hand, countries not members of the Committee should be permitted, even more than in the past, to circulate working documents and participate in special working groups, such as had occurred in the cases of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone group and the seismic group. It must be kept in mind, however, that the detailed negotiation of a particular treaty was a key Committee activity that did not require the participation of many countries. The delegation also feared that making the Committee meetings public might encourage propaganda exercises for the press. It suggested that the role of non-members in achieving agreements might be enhanced by giving the First Committee of the General Assembly ample time to consider the results of the Committee's work each year and to refer matters back to the Committee for further consideration if the First Committee did not consider the results satisfactory.

315. With regard to the position of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Committee, the delegation of the Netherlands held that it was obvious that no disarmament agreement could be concluded without their consent and active participation in its elaboration, but there was no need for the two Powers to have the special status of Co-Chairmen to make that position clear. The main objective should be to maintain the Committee as a serious and viable forum attractive to all nuclear-weapon States, since the agreement of the two principal nuclear-weapon States, while vital for any real disarmament measure, was not the only factor in world relations. The delegation had no strong feelings with regard to the establishment of a Committee "bureau" or steering Committee, provided that it would be a tool to accelerate Committee work efficiently and democratically and not become a kind of "inner circle". In conclusion, the delegation again stressed the importance it attached to the Committee, to its flexible procedures, to its restricted membership with substantial know-how and to its rule of consensus. The delegation considered the Committee basically sound and, while not opposing useful adaptations, as already indicated, believed there was no need for a fundamentally different forum. It hoped the Committee would make that position clear in its special report to the Special Session of the General Assembly (Ibid.)

316. The delegation of Italy, in introducing its working paper CCD/568 on international mechanisms for disarmament, confirmed its high regard for the work of the Committee, despite some disappointments, and stressed that Italy still considered it the most qualified body for the negotiation of international disarmament measures at the multilateral level and on the basis of consensus. The delegation pointed out, however, that its paper suggested that the Committee might (a) accept a limited increase in its present membership; (b) permit a broader participation of interested non-member States as observers with the right to present written proposals and to take part in the discussion of such proposals; (c) maintain a closer liaison with the United Nations by submitting progress reports after each spring session, as well as periodic reports on particular topics; (d) establish a methodical schedule of negotiations for its sessions at the beginning of each year's work; (e) establish functional working groups to negotiate draft treaties or to study specific items in depth with the assistance of experts; and (f) consider opening its plenary meetings to the public. The delegation further noted that its Government had not deemed it appropriate to formulate suggestions regarding the Committee co-chairmanship in a general and tentative working document because of the delicate and complex nature of the question, but confirmed the views it had expressed earlier on the subject and said it was prepared to accept any solution conforming to generally recognized international practices (CCD/PV.784).

317. The delegation of Romania held that the attention being given at the spring session to the role of the CCD in the framework of disarmament negotiations was justified by the unsatisfactory results achieved by the Committee so far and by the upcoming Special Session on Disarmament. Quoting from a number of documents on the subject submitted by Romania in the past to show its constant interest in the adoption of measures to improve and enhance the role of the United Nations and the Committee, the delegation stated that the views it was now presenting to the Committee on the subject of the Committee's organization and procedures were based on the recent Romanian document submitted to the Special Session Preparatory Committee (A/AC.187/71), affirming that the United Nations should exercise direct authority in the disarmament field concerning negotiations, the elaboration of draft agreements and the verification of implementation of agreements. The basic reason for the Committee's inactivity was a lack of political will of States, in contradiction to commitments undertaken by them in the United Nations Charter, and the role of any disarmament mechanism should be that of mobilizing and harmonizing such political will. In carrying out such a role, the organization and procedures under which negotiations were carried out could be decisive, particularly in a multilateral negotiating body such as the CCD. Committee reform was therefore not a case of change for the sake of change, but a means of increasing the Committee's efficiency and output; the positions of the various members towards procedural reform reflected their attitude on the degree of authority and competence the Committee should be given. The delegation listed five considerations that it considered indispensable for efficient Committee work: (a) the extension of the authority of the United Nations over the CCD's work; (b) democratization of Committee work and procedures; (c) the taking into consideration of the proposals and views of all member States on an equal footing; (d) the creation of conditions for the direct participation of all members in all phases of discussions and negotiations, as well as for the free access to the Committee of all other interested States; and (e) the use of open diplomacy within the Committee and the provision of accurate information to the public concerning the consequences of the arms race and the progress of disarmament negotiations. In expressing Romania's support for document CCD/563 submitted by the group of fifteen, as well as for other proposals aimed at Committee organization and procedures, the delegation concluded that a substantial majority of Committee members now stood for such changes. On the specific point of the co-chairmanship the delegation of Romania expressed its strong preference that the

CCD should be presided by all delegations in an alphabetical order. It also stated that no chairmanship formula based on the representation of military alliances would be acceptable. Changes in organization and procedures were a basic requirement for adjustment to the basic changes in international relations since the Committee's creation and not a matter to be directly linked with the question of participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in the Committee's work (CCD/PV.785).

318. The delegation of the United Kingdom, reaffirming its view of the value of the CCD as an institution, called attention to the gradual expansion of disarmament committees over the years, which reflected a growth of interest in the subject of disarmament. There had been a conflict between the desire to keep the negotiating committee small enough to facilitate the progress of the negotiations and the desire to contain as many States and points of the view as possible. Because of this, there could be no ideal size for a negotiating body but there was a strong case for bringing certain major powers into the negotiating of disarmament treaties and there should be arrangements to allow non-members of the CCD to participate on issues in which they had a particular interest. Considerable improvements in the working procedures of the committee had been made over the years, the delegation held, and the use of ad hoc working groups had proved valuable (CCD/PV.786).

319. The delegation of Ethiopia said it would support genuine measures which would enable the Committee to function more effectively and to continue as the main international negotiating forum on disarmament. It recognized the special responsibilities devolving upon the nuclear-weapon States and the need for maintaining the delicate balance in the Committee's membership, but measures should be sought to improve the working mechanism of that important negotiating machinery and at the same time to enable all nuclear-weapon States to participate in its work. It was with that understanding that the Ethiopian delegation supported working paper CCD/563 submitted by the group of fifteen.

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320. At the closing meeting of the spring session, the delegation of India, speaking on behalf of the group of fifteen, stated the views of the group on the concluding chapter entitled "Tasks Ahead" which the group had proposed to be added to the Special Report. From the beginning of the discussion in the Committee on the structure of the Special Report, a number of members of the group of fifteen had stressed the need to have a final chapter to the

Special Report, had suggested the title "Tasks Ahead", although they would not have objected to calling it "Conclusions", and had clearly stated the group's position in that regard on 27 April 1978. The group strongly believed that such a chapter was relevant because, under it, the CCD could affirm its commitment to look ahead and to pursue negotiations towards general and complete disarmament and could also indicate some of its specific plans for the near future. In addition, with a short, concluding chapter the structure of the report would be complete and not end abruptly. With this in mind, the group of fifteen had presented to the Committee at its informal meeting on 10 May a brief text for such a chapter for the consideration of the Committee, as follows: "Ever since the CCD was established as the principal forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, its primary objective has remained general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. But at the same time, the Committee has attempted to reach agreements on partial measures of disarmement. Over the years, the efforts of the CCD have fructified in several treaties and conventions. In the field of disarmament, where vital security interests of States are involved, progress on important issues is often not as quick as expected. The Committee would continue to discharge the tasks of finding solutions to the disarmament issues of foremost priority, i.e. a comprehensive text ban (CTB) and a ban on chemical weapons (CW). More recently, negotiations on CTB and CW have been carried out in forums outside the CCD. While not denying the importance of preliminary negotiations among the militarily significant States, inasmuch as this could facilitate mutual understanding, the Committee expects to have the opportunity soon to engage in actual negotiations on these most important issues. The Committee feels successful negotiation of these priority issues will constitute significant steps towards the achievement of its goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and international control. To this end, the CCD has a duty and an important task ahead." The group had explained that it was flexible as regards the contents, the length and even the title of this chapter and had presented the text with the view that a commonly acceptable formulation could be worked out. The group had further clarified that this brief position could be placed at the end of Part II of Volume I. In view of the lack of consensus for the proposal of the group of fifteen, the group finally decided not to press it further. The group would, however, propose that the text of the proposal and the views of the group on its proposal regarding the concluding chapter be included in Volume II of the Special Report.

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321. The present report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.I. LIKHATCHEV
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Signed) Adrian S. FISHER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. INTRODUCTION

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on 30 March 1961, **Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,** **Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly resolution 1378(XIV) of 20 November 1959,** **Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,** **The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.**	In resolution 1722(XVI) of 20 December 1961 by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the ENDC, it was recommended that the new Disarmament Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee should in its work take into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of the aforementioned principles. Paragraph 8 of the agreed principles stipulates that efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme for general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme. Since then progress has been made first and foremost in the field of collateral measures. But for reasons which are well known the hope that the main task of the Committee could be dealt with without interruption, "as a matter of the utmost urgency" (Res. 1722(XVI)), remained unfulfilled. In the course of its existence the Committee "gradually concentrated more of its efforts on the partial and confidence-building, or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called, than on general and complete disarmament".*/ This trend is discernible in the Provisional Agenda of work of the Committee, adopted in August 1968. Likewise, in its report to the XXIVth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Committee recognizes "the relationship of the various measures already achieved and those currently being considered	The Italian delegation considers that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should increase its efforts to give effect to resolution 2602 E concerning the question of general and complete disarmament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session. The part of that resolution which seems to us most faithfully to reflect the arguments presented in the United Nations by a large number of countries wishing to give a fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations is to be found in paragraph 4 of the operative part. The instructions given in that paragraph are closely related to the proposals for the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Italy at Geneva at the two preceding sessions of the Conference (see Working Papers ENDC/245 of 21 April 1969 and ENDC/263 of 23 August 1969). With a view to facilitating the opening of a highly desirable discussion on this comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Italian delegation, as members of the Conference are aware, has at the present session taken the initiative of organizing contacts with a number of other interested delegations with the idea of engaging in exchanges of view such as may give rise to a basic plan for possible subsequent discussion by the Conference.	The present Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in compliance with the request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) approved on 16 December 1969, by which the Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. From the contents of this resolution it follows that the General Assembly: 1. Has reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Nations in the attainment of disarmament. 2. Continues to consider, as it did in 1959, that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. 3. Has recommended that the negotiations related to disarmament should be based on the principles incorporated in the Joint Statement submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 20 September 1961, which was welcomed by the General Assembly. 4. Has the conviction that the current negotiations which must be continued and intensified, as well as the ones to be initiated should strive to achieve, in a parallel form, the cessation at an early date of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of additional agreements on specific collateral measures, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 5. Has the conviction that all governments should intensify without delay their concerted efforts towards the achievement of the objectives defined in the previous paragraph, and that the participation of all nuclear weapon powers is indispensable for	(See Chapter VIII)	At the present time, new prerequisites, both political and material, for more resolute progress towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament are now taking shape. In the past, including the years preceding the Second World War and the first post-war decades, such prerequisites did not exist. They do exist now. It is the duty of all States to make the utmost use of them in the interests of international peace and security and in the interest of the peoples. The Soviet Union is prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct negotiations on the most radical disarmament measures, going even so far as general and complete disarmament. It is prepared, in concert with its Warsaw Treaty allies, to take steps for the reciprocal dismantling of counterbalancing military-political groupings of States or, to begin with, of their military organizations. If not all parties are prepared to set about realizing these objectives at once, they should do so gradually, step by step. What is most important is to move on from discussions on ending the arms race to practical action.	In its resolution 2602 E(XXIV) of 16 December 1969 the United Nations General Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and inter alia requested the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations". A number of suggestions and documents were submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during 1970. In its resolution 2661 C(XXV) of 7 December 1970, the General Assembly inter alia expressed "its appreciation of the important and constructive documents and views submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including the working papers on a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the Netherlands on 24 February 1970 and by Italy on 19 August 1970, and the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 1 December 1970". In the same resolution, the General Assembly recommended to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "that it take into account in its further work and its negotiations" the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia (document A/8191) "as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future". In 1974 and 1975 the General Assembly adopted resolutions 3261 A (XXIX) and 3470 (XXX) which, in reviewing the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, urged that new efforts should be made to negotiate effective disarmament measures. At	

general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

Mainly as a result of the initiatives of the Romanian delegation (ENDC/PV.400) and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the XXIVth session of the General Assembly declared the seventies as a Disarmament Decade. Disarmament and social and economic development are the main objectives of all mankind for the coming years.

these efforts.

6. Has the conviction that peace, security and the strengthening of confidence in the world are correlated with progress in the field of disarmament and that from this progress particularly important economic and social consequences may derive.

7. Has the conviction that the diversion of enormous resources and energy, human and material, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to an unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries.

8. Has recommended that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress.

In the light of the above it would seem fully justified to state that the request of the General Assembly implies that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but all negotiations and other acts on this matter, whichever the forum and the form in which they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and ensure that the United Nations General Assembly be kept informed on their progress so as to permit it the proper performance of its functions including the constant evaluation of the situation.

In preparing the comprehensive programme, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has endeavoured to adjust itself not only to the last two requisites but also to the basic points that have been outlined at the beginning derived from an analysis of resolution 2602 E (XXIV). It is therefore in the light of those elements that the contents of the comprehensive programme that is now hereby submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration at its twenty-fifth session, should be interpreted.

It seems advisable to point out likewise that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same manner as it has been done in the various forums of the United Nations, that is, a a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the limitation, the reduction, or the elimination of armaments.

submitted a document entitled "Steps to be taken within a disarmament programme" (CCD/449). At the 1976 session Nigeria submitted a working paper on Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade (CCD/510) in which it referred inter alia to the adoption of a comprehensive programme as a primary obligation of the CCD during the Disarmament Decade.

On 10 December 1976 the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/68 in which inter alia it urged "the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to adopt, during its 1977 session a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade".

The present comprehensive programme of disarmament has been prepared in accordance with that request of the General Assembly.

In the light of the contents of resolutions 2602 E (XXIV) and 31/68 it would seem fully justified to state that the General Assembly's request means that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations conducted and other acts performed in this matter, in whatever place and form they are carried on, and that the programme should include effective procedures to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and to ensure that the United Nations General Assembly is kept informed of their progress so as to be able to perform its functions, including the continuous appraisal of the situation, properly.

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same sense in which it has been used in the various forums of the United Nations: that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, limitation, reduction or elimination of armaments or for the reduction of military forces.

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*/ The UN and Disarmament 1945-65, chapter 6, page 115.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
The States members of the United Nations at the eighth Special Session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States members therefore believe that a serious world-wide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes; to uphold the international rule of law: and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.	Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction on account of the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons man has ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone, at the disposal of only a few States, are sufficient to destroy all life on earth several times over. Yet the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated. This situation not only jeopardizes the peace and security of all States, but acts as a stimulating factor for the persistence of international tensions and conflicts in various regions of the world, aggravates existing differences among nuclear-weapons States, consolidates military alliances and brings ever nearer the threat of a nuclear confrontation for which nuclear-weapons States are in an ever-increasing stage of readiness. Furthermore, the arms race, which is both the cause and result of great Power rivalry, impedes the realization of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, especially those relating to the respect for sovereignty, the refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and adversely affects the right of peoples to freely determine their systems of social and economic development, the struggle of peoples against colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Military expenditures have reached the staggering figure of about $400 billion a year, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to nuclear-weapons States and their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of increasing expenditure spreading to other countries. Vast human, natural scientific, technological and financial resources are thus wasted in the preparation for war, when these resources could be channelled to eradicate hunger, disease and other pressing economic and social problems hampering development in many parts of the world. Disarmament has become the most urgent international objective. However, no real progress has been made in this crucial field. agree-		The need for a comprehensive programme of disarmament has evolved together with the increasing awareness that disarmament is a matter of universal concern and consequently it requires intensive and well organized efforts by all States. Past experiences in the field of disarmament negotiations have also demonstrated that measures, conceived separately and uncoordinated within a global perspective did not suffice to launch the process of a real disarmament, and had no practical effect on the dynamics of the arms race which continued unhindered and failed to mobilize the world-wide efforts towards disarmament.		In declaring the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade the United Nations General Assembly in the relevant resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 directed the Conference of the "Committee on Disarmament while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations". The time lapse between the adoption of that resolution and today has served to further strengthen the need for such a Comprehensive Programme which is now universally recognized as an essential element in the disarmament process. Negotiations in the CCD itself have been taken up in a rather haphazard manner depending mainly on the convenience of the co-chairmen or their perspective of what is ripe for consideration. Negotiations have also been taken up outside the CCD on issues of interest but with very little coordination with either the CCD or the United Nations. While it is recognized that the multifora approach to disarmament is useful and perhaps inevitable, it is essential to ensure the interrelationship of these efforts and their coordination so as to facilitate periodic review of overall progress.	

relate only to measures of limited restraint, but have not slowed the pace of the arms race, the only genuine disarmament agreement having been the Convention on the Prohibitiion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction. Negotiations for general and complete disarmament have been virtually abandoned for more than a decade.

General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapons States.

1. INTRODUCTION (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98 2 February 1978
It will, we believe, be obvious to anyone with some experience of disarmament negotiations that, in the five months which remain before not only the opening but the closure of the special session, it would be Utopian to think of completing the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that would obtain general approval. It is for that reason that we have put forward the idea of making provision, in the Plan of Action included in the working paper, for a Three-Year Disarmament Plan as a purely transitional measure. Such a plan - as was stated as long ago as 1 September 1977, when the representative of Mexico in the Preparatory Committee explained this point at the 16th meeting of the Committee - would not try to present a more or less exhaustive catalogue of disarmament measures that would be fated, as has happened so often in the past, to remain a scrap of paper. It would include only a selection of such measures, chosen from among the most urgent and meaningful ones, which it is thought may realistically and objectively be considered capable of being transformed into reality during the three-year period from June 1978 to May 1981. In this sense, therefore, the draft Programme of Action is not too ambitious. At the same time, however, in order to stress the transitional nature of this procedure and the fact that it in no way means the abandonment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the draft provides for another procedure which appears best suited for ensuring that, within a period of roughly 2½ years, it will be possible to draft a comprehensive, thoroughly negotiated programme, the implementation of which should lead to the attainment of that goal. The Three-Year Plan also includes provisions that will enable the General Assembly to keep the manner in which the Plan is being implemented under periodic review and to consider and adopt, as a second special session devoted to disarmament that would be held in May-June -	(See Chapter VIII)	Governments have not yet applied to the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the resolute and decisive measures which could bring about the reduction and elimination of arms and protect mankind from the danger of a new war. While the treaties and conventions concluded in recent years have made some contribution to creating a climate of understanding, they have not proved capable of curbing the arms race or ensuring the implementation of effective disarmament measures and they do not deal with the basic aspects of the armaments problem, notably nuclear weapons.	Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great. They include the Soviet-United States agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and at limiting strategic arms, as well as the Soviet-French agreement on the prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. They also include such measures for limiting the nuclear arms race as the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and on the non-emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and also the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. An important role in curbing the arms race belongs to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other measures agreed upon in recent years for preventing the spread of such weapons. These steps also include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes. Important proposals for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, for the prohibition of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are on the negotiating table. Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and on further limitation of the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States are currently in progress. A proposal has been submitted calling upon all the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The question of concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is under consideration. Thus, the political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The special session now is to translate into practical		Since the end of the Second World War, millions of lives have been lost as a result of military conflicts employing conventional weapons. The international community is witnessing an increase in the arms build-up in many parts of the world, to which the growing international transfer of conventional arms has been one of the major contributors. This trend, if continued, could further intensify the potential for conflicts. It is encouraging that, after a long period of negligence, a great number of countries now feel concern over the conventional arms race and, in particular, the increasing international transfer of conventional arms. As a result, a wide consensus is now emerging in favour of having these issues considered at the special session. These sentiments have been made clear by the statements of many States before the Preparatory Committee and at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, and in their views on the special session submitted to the Secretary-General. A number of private organizations concerned with disarmament have also supported these views.	

comprehensive programme of disarmament which will have been drafted.

terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, developed and developing.

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.	In the relevant resolution the General Assembly endorses the view that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal. Toward that end, the Assembly requests this Committee: 1. to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures; 2. to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects on the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations. In its last report to the General Assembly the Committee expressed its conviction of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. The Netherlands delegation fully shares the opinion that the strategic arms limitation talks, which had a promising beginning, are of the utmost importance. They may create a new and more rational relationship in the strategic balance of the two super-powers. Their successful outcome would certainly facilitate the conclusion of further measures in the field of armaments limitation and ultimately of disarmament. The consideration of a comprehensive programme inevitably raises the questions of priorities and deadlines. In this connexion reference should be made to the proposal of	United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378(XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722(XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up-to-date. United Nations General Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: '... to work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ...' (CCD/275). Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The highest priority should be accorded to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament.	The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and economic and social progress are attained.		In a situation in which nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, complete nuclear disarmament becomes the most important measure. The Soviet Union has always favoured the banning of nuclear weapons and their exclusion from the arsenals of States. It worked for this when nuclear weapons had just appeared. At that time the stockpiles of such weapons were not large and it was relatively easier to agree on their prohibition and elimination. Now that nuclear weapons have grown into a huge complex of types and systems of means of destruction, diverse in purpose, capacity and ways of delivering nuclear charges to the target, the problem of eliminating them has become much more difficult. But it can be solved in the present situation as well. The first thing necessary for this purpose is to stop the arms race, that is, to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons. At the same time, or immediately after that, reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons should commence, with the transfer of nuclear materials thus released to peaceful sectors of the economy. The ultimate goal of the reduction should be the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons - strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction of their means of delivery. Naturally, simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, measures should be taken for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and armaments of conventional types, which also pose a considerable threat to the world's peoples. It is evident that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only if all States possessing nuclear weapons take part in it. It is inconceivable that some nuclear Powers should be moving ahead towards eliminating their nuclear weapons while others are stockpiling and perfecting them. Therefore, all nuclear Powers should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as has been already stated by the Soviet side, to sit down at any time at the negotiating table together with all the other nuclear Powers for a comprehensive discussion of the nculear disarmament problem in its full scope and for a joint elaboration of concrete ways of its practical solution. The Soviet Union has no	The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and the New International Economic Order is attained.	The ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In view of the achievement of this final objective, agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and phased negotiating programme, dealing with all aspects of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

"balanced package deals" and of India for a "selective approach" (ENDC/PV.404).

It is, of course, in the nature of things, when there is a whole range of topics, to establish some sort of order or priorities. However, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation such a list can only be of a very tentative character. It should be flexible and may be subject to change - as has already been shown in the past - inasmuch as the political realities of the moment require. One should not overlook that the "partial measures" which have been adopted or are now under discussion, are, in fact, elements of different stages of the proposals for general and complete disarmament.

part in such negotiations, since all countries and all the peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 14 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
The States members of the United Nations at the eighth Special Session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States members therefore believe that a serious world-wide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes, to uphold the international rule of law and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.	General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapons States. Progress towards this objective would require the conclusion and implementation of agreements on genuine measures of disarmament according to the Programme of Action on Disarmament, the first priority of which shall be the outlawing of nuclear war, and the elimination of nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind. High priority must also be given to disarmament measures relating to all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Conventional weapons which give cause for grave concern should also be the object of disarmament agreements in the context of general and complete disarmament. The Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting the arms race and starting the process of genuine disarmament leading towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The order of priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be as follows: Nuclear weapons a. Prohibition of the use and as a first step, renunciation of nuclear weapons against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories. b. Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. c. The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their complete elimination constitutes an indispensable step towards avoidance of the danger of nuclear war and the setting in motion of the process of disarmament. d. The immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests is a most important task, and responsibility in this regard rests with the nuclear-weapon States. e. The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes. f. Urgent steps also are: - cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance, - freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, - prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems The two leading nuclear-weapon States bear a	The relaxation of international tension and related positive political processes can become truly established if they are accompanied and strengthened by measures of military détente, i.e. by new tangible results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. The principal and ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a firm and long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale. Specific partial measures aimed at limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the road to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a stable peace. Such partial measures should entail the prohibition and destruction of certain types of existing armaments, prevention of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the exclusion of certain spheres or regions of the world from the arms race, the systematic reduction of the military expenditures of States, the limitation of armaments and the achievement of disarmament on a regional basis, as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament. All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to adopt a constructive approach to negotiations and to demonstrate the political will to reach agreements.	The aim of the elaboration of a global programme for disarmament is to set in motion a guideline to chart the negotiations in this field so that the disarmament process could follow a rational course according to established objectives. A comprehensive programme of disarmament should answer the following three basic requirements: a. It should establish a unified concept for the organization of the negotiations in the field of disarmament. b. It should provide a system of disarmament measures, organically subordinated to the ultimate goal which is general and complete disarmament, thus integrating and co-ordinating the negotiations in a world-wide disarmament strategy. The negotiations should be carried on concurrently on several measures so that the efforts so organized could influence and support each other and open the way for further steps. To that end, absolute priority should be given to nuclear armaments given the grave danger they present for humanity and their impact for the acceleration of the arms race in other fields. c. It should be comprehensive, e.g. it should deal with all aspects of the problem of disarmament. Therefore, the programme should provide, along with the measures aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, intermediary steps, such as confidence building, collateral and partial measures. As to its scope, the negotiating programme should stimulate the universal and the regional as well as the bilateral efforts, all of them incorporated in the requisite global planning of the agreed objectives. The arms race carries with it the germ of the disruption of the military balance. A primary purpose of the comprehensive disarmament programme should be, therefore, the planning of the efforts aimed at preserving security and the military balance not through an increase in armaments but through their reduction. Consequently, the programme should aim at crossing the line from preventive and arms control measures to real disarmament measures. This implies, among others, that the basic factor in the elaboration		Thus the aim of a comprehensive programme of disarmament will have to be broadened beyond the original perspective of the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV). Such a programme should form a reference point not only for the CCD but for disarmament negotiations conducted in all other fora, so that taken together, these negotiations form a co-ordinated effort that will permit discernible progress in the overall objectives of general and complete disarmament. The ultimate objective of disarmament negotiations is the attainment of general and complete disarmament which will facilitate conditions of peace, security and a new international economic order. To this end a comprehensive programme of disarmament should aim at providing negotiators, at whatever forum, with an orderly, well balanced programme complete with a system of priorities and co-ordination that will ensure discernible and constant progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.	See chapter III

realization of the above measures, while the other nuclear-weapons States, as well as militarily significant States should contribute towards the attainment of these objectives.

g. Other measures:

i. Establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of arrangements among States of such regions. Respect by nuclear-weapons States of these zones and the statutes thereof by means of legally binding international instruments that include the obligation to refrain from the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones. The process of establishing such zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

ii. The status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be respected by all States, particularly by nuclear-weapons States and the major maritime users. In addition it would be desirable to create zones of peace in the region of the Mediterranean and wherever feasible.

iii. The formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, pending their final elimination.

Chemical weapons

The complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a treaty on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

Incendiary weapons and other specific conventional weapons with especially inhuman effects

The reaching of agreement on the prohibition or limitation of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons as well as use of specific types of conventional weapons which are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, constitutes an urgent task. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task as provided for in the General Assembly resolution convening the United Nations Conference in 1979.

Other weapons of mass destruction

Conclusion of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Conventional weapons

a. Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons and new systems of such weapons.

programme is the political will of States.

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/557, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
	b. The limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons on a global basis should be resolutely pursued in the context of general and complete disarmament. The limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe would constitute a significant step for the attainment of that goal. The States participating in negotiations on such measures in central Europe should therefore exert all efforts for the purpose of concluding, as soon as possible, an agreement on the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in that region. Reduction of armed forces The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfilment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency: a. Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament. b. Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the 35th regular session of the General Assembly in 1980 at the latest.					

II. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSES, AIMS, PRIORITIES (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
			The political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The crucial question now is to translate into practical terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, developed and developing.		It is clear beyond question that nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. It is, however, also evident that the goal of general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved without curbing the conventional arms race. The special session should, therefore, take up this question with a view to initiating a comprehensive study as a preliminary step to its final solution within the framework of general and complete disarmament.	

III. PRINCIPLES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme. (Also see Chapters II, IV, VI, VII, VIII)		United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up to date. United Nations General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: '... to work out .... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ...' (CCD/275). Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control . As regards the nature of the programme which the CCD should adopt, the Italian delegation feels that it should be both a programme of work and a commitment: a programme of work with respect to negotiations on the categories of measures being examined and to the suggested studies on international disarmament, and a commitment to open negotiations on a first round of reductions of armed forces and armaments. Finally, as to the form of the programme, we might consider, among other solutions, a joint statement of the Governments members of the CCD or, more simply, the adoption by the CCD of its own programme of work. (See also Chapter II)	1. The measures in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations undertaken in various treaties of disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the UN, and all new elements and possibilities in this area. The programme should be sufficiently realistic to be widely acceptable but at the same time ambitious enough to give thrust to the negotiations on disarmament. 2. Priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This does not mean, however, that progress should not be sought in any field of disarmament. Action should be taken as soon as possible whenever a measure or group of measures is ripe for agreement. The scope of the term "mass destruction weapons" should be studied. 3. The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the USA respectively, or the submission of new proposals. 4. The principle of balance should be kept in mind. It concerns both a numerical decrease of men in arms and types of arms to prefixed levels, and packages of disarmament measures by which an overall balance is achieved which is judged by all parties to be satisfactory in the light of their own security. Particular efforts will have to be undertaken by major powers in order to reduce the gap which exists between them and medium and smaller countries. 5. Verification methods form an indispensable part of disarmament measures. When elaborating such methods it must be recognized that a hundred percent certainty can never be obtained by any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. As a rule, a combination of several methods should be employed, mutually reinforcing one another in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain disarmament measure is being observed by all parties. 6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for peace-keeping and international security. Progress in the former should not however be made dependant on progress in the latter and vice versa.			1. The measures provided for in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations assumed in various treaties on disarmament, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and any new factor or possibility arising in this area. 2. The highest priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons. 3. Parallel to the negotiations on partial disarmament measures including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, the problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the USA respectively, or the submission of new proposals. 4. The principle of balanced disarmament should be kept in mind. This principle relates both to a numerical reduction of armed and certain types of weapons determined levels, and to sets of disarmament measures whereby an overall balance is achieved that all parties consider satisfactory from the standpoint of their own security. The militarily important Powers will have to make particular efforts to reduce the disparity between them and other countries. It is understood that the final solution with regard to the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can only be achieved in the context of general and complete disarmament. 5. Methods of verification form an essential part of disarmament measures. In devising such methods it must be recognized that 100 per cent certainty can never be attained with any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. A combination, in which several methods reinforce one another, should as a rule be employed in order to obtain the necessary assurances that a particular disarmament measures is being duly implemented by all	A global programme for disarmament should be based - inter alia - on the following general considerations and principles: 1. Negotiations on disarmament are essential for peace and have widespread repercussions. Although they may be influenced by international events, they cannot fail to constitute a dynamic and positive factor in the evolution of the political situation as a whole. 2. The great majority of States have expressed their determination to proceed along the twin paths of general and complete disarmament and adoption of specific measures. The two issues are closely linked, and the aim of future negotiations should be to continue harmoniously. 3. As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, disarmament efforts should be granted the active participation and the support of all States and other military significant States, which bear, in the disarmament process, a special responsibility. 4. Through efforts which have been continuing for over a quarter of a century, the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have definitely made some progress in the disarmament field by establishing specific agreements and by adopting an important series of principles which form, so to speak, the "charter" of disarmament: for example, the principles approved on 20 December 1961 and adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI). 5. In order to prevent the disarmament proress from creating imblances or strengthening positions of privilege, it will be necessary to adopt collective security measures and to carry out the most effective and appropriate verifications.

7. The necessity should be kept in mind of avoiding, when concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations.

8. A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to the benefit of developing countries.

9. In disarmament agreements every effort should be made not to prejudge or prejudice or other unresolved issues in any outside field.

10. Concerted efforts should be made to associate militarily significant States, in particular all nuclear-weapon powers, with the negotiations for disarmament.

11. Regional agreements in conformity with the UN Charter should play an important role for the attainment of the objectives envisaged. Measures in such a context might not only be concerned with disarmament but might also contain elements of a confidence-building nature.

12. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all efforts thereon, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral.

Public opinion should be given adequate information about armament and disarmament, so that it might bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of disarmament efforts.

6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for the maintenance of international peace and security. Progress in the former should not, however, be made dependent on progress in the latter, and vice versa.

7. It should be kept in mind that, in concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations must be avoided.

8. Efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on the Disarmament Decade, should be intensified in order to promote negotiations relating to disarmament and to ensure that human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. The steady acceleration of the arms race is incompatible with the efforts aimed at establishing the New International Economic Order, as defined in the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. Those efforts entail, more than ever, resolute action by all States to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of effective measures of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field.

10. Appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of multilateral organs of negotiations on disarmament in order to secure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

11. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, adopted in that connexion.

tions on disarmament should be coherently and globally planned, and should be so conceived as to provide the international community with clear guidelines. The disarmament process will then be able to follow a rational course from its initial or priority stages to its final culmination: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such disarmament should be accompanied by the establisment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenanace of peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

7. To achieve wide acceptance, the comprehensive programme envisaged should attempt to identify priorities and strike a balance among its various components and objectives, seeking its implementation in successive stages but without rigid time-limits.

Specifically, this programme would embody the following elements:
(a) a degree of flexibility in the following timetable set forth;
(b) a balance between the measures to be taken in the various fields of disarmament - thus nuclear disarmament would parallel conventional disarmament - in order to guarantee undiminished security to all States;
(c) an appropriate co-ordination of global and regional disarmament.

8. While pursuing the adoption of a comprehensive disarmament programme, negotiations should be carried out with new impetus and perseverance with the immediate objectives of halting and then reversing the arms race by means of specific measures affecting both nuclear and conventional arsenals.

III. PRINCIPLES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
						12. Public opinion should be supplied with adequate information about armaments and disarmament, so that it may bring its influence to bear to strengthen disarmament efforts.	Such measures should aim to facilitate the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament plan and would constitute an integral part of it. 9. Effective verification methods form an essential part of disarmament measures. A combination of several verification techniques should be applied whenever necessary, including those international means of inspection and control which would appear appropriate to ascertain that agreed disarmament obligations are being fully complied with by all Parties thereto. 10. Measures for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament should not prejudice the inalienable right of all States freely to accede to peaceful applications of scientific and technological discoveries.

III. PRINCIPLES (continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 march 1978
A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.	Disarmament negotiations shall be guided by the following principles: 1. All States have the right and the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. while disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear- weapons States have the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race. In this context, significant unilateral initiatives should be urgently undertaken by them in order to promote reciprocal restraint and accelerate the whole process of disarmament. 2. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that no individual State or group of States obtain advantage over others. 3. A mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapons States should be strictly observed. 4. Verification forms an indispensable part of disarmament measures. A single method of verification is rarely sufficient. A combination of methods could be devised, thus providing adequate means of verification of the implementation of disarmament measures. 5. Nuclear-weapons States shall undertake by means of a legally binding international instrument to respect the statutes of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace. 6. A substantial part of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be primarily devoted to social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries. 7. The United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has the primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order to effectively discharge this role, the United Nations shall be kept duly informed of all disarmament steps taken outside its aegis. 8. Measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper the exercise of the rights of all States to develop or to acquire without any discrimination nuclear technology or nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Access to such technology and materials should be subjected to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States.	Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages are the essential prerequisites for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out. The universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat of force must become a law of international life. In order to prevent the continuation of the arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction, and to the development of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes. If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful weapons and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite for further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific and effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament. Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the specific measures provided for in the agreements. The resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures	(See Chapter II)		a. In formulating the principles that should govern disarmament negotiations it should be borne in mind that disarmament constitutes a vital means to an end. It is an important cornerstone of a new international peace and security order which will combine the worldwide relief from the present nuclear over-kill capacity with an acceptable economic and social condition of living for all peoples. Until genuine disarmament is achieved, it is clear that world economic and social progress cannot run its full course. b. Disarmament is in the basic interest of all States both in its aspect as a sine qua non to international peace and security as a necessary input into the economic and social development of all States particularly the developing countries. Thus negotiations on disarmament should take account of this basic interest of all States; therefore all States should be enabled to participate in the formulation of disarmament instruments. c. In carrying out meaningful disarmament measures, States which have more weapons will have to give up more. Thus a special responsibility devolves on the nuclear weapon States in facilitating disarmament negotiations. All nuclear weapon States therefore should participate in such negotiations. d. Nuclear weapons consitute the gravest threat to mankind. Highest priority should therefore be given to measures leading to nuclear disarmament. e. Development and use of other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited as a matter of urgency. f. The important boost which disarmament will give to development efforts, and the importance to international peace and security of balanced world economic development dictates that efforts at meaningful disarmament negotiations be promoted so as to release vast human and material resources now tied to armament for use to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries. g. Public awareness of the dangers of the armaments race both in its military and economic aspects should be emphasized. Thus adequate and regular information should be released so that public opinion in all countries may bring its influence to bear on disarmament efforts. In keeping with its responsibility for disarmament, the United Nations should launch a new programme for the promotion of disarmament.	All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations. General and complete disarmament under effective international supervision should be the final objective of mankind. Gradual progress towards this end requires the harmonization of partial agreements and authentic measures for disarmament. A progressive reduction of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination should have the highest priority among such measures. The reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction should also be raised to a high priority. The development, production and storage of napalm and other incendiary weapons must be prohibited, and such as exist in the arsenals of all States should be destroyed. The international transfer of conventional weapons should be limited and regulated. International verification constitutes an indispensable part for many disarmament measures. The use of a combination of various methods of verification offers the best guarantee. The adoption of the disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner so as not to endanger the security of any State. The creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace constitutes one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear States must fulfil faithfully the obligations which, in accordance with the definition approved by the General Assembly, they have with regard to the nuclear-free zones and the States which comprise such zones. The reduction of the military budget of the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States would constitute a laudable measure of disarmament. There is a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other. Nevertheless, progress in one of those spheres must not be deemed subordinate to progress in the other and vice versa. The growing arms race and the resultant waste of resources are incompatible with the decision of the United Nations for the establishment of a new international economic order based on justice and equity.

in order to arrest and reverse the arms race, Member States commit themselves to comply with the above-stated principles and faithfully and thoroughly impelement the following Programme of Action.

GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION

a. All States, in particular the nuclear weapons States, are called to contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action;

b. Specific measures of the Programme of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof;

c. These measures shall be implemented in accordance with the above-mentioned priorities, bearing in mind the necessity to conduct, whenever possible, parallel negotiations on several measures with a view to reaching agreement on each of them as soon as possible;

d. Implementation should be in an agreed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade;

e. Implementation of disarmament measures should be facilitated by the speeding up of the process of resolving outstanding problems and disputes which threaten international peace and security. This should include application, where appropriate, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems faced by mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States.

informed of all efforts on disarmament whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, so that it may co-ordinate these efforts.

by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the economic andsocial development of the developing countries.

It is necessary to have an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear States.

The proliferation of non-nuclear weapons could endanger the security of all States and would make it even more difficult to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international supervision.

Access to nuclear technology for peaceful ends constitutes an inalienable right of all States which is subject only to the relevant provisions incorporated in multilateral instruments for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Conditions should be established for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, for it would help to narrow the gap between the developed and developing countries.

(See also Chapter VII)

III. PRINCIPLES (continued)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
	Although negotiated and adopted separately, all partial measures relating to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons should be made an organic part of the programme for implementating the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. All measures must be implemented subject to suitable control, with the participation both of States which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of States without such weapons. Such control must be strict and effective and must be exercised in such a way as to offer genuine guarantees that the agreements reached and the measures adopted will be effectively applied.		The following fundamental provisions and principles should form the basis of negotiations and decisions on the questions of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. 1. The relaxation of international tensions and the resulting positive political processes can be truly stable if accompanied and buttressed by measures of military détente, i.e. new concrete results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. 2. The principal, ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a stable, long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve the urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale. 3. Specific partial measures for limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the road to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of stable peace. Such partial measures should involve prohibiting and destroying certain types of existing armaments, preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, excluding certain spheres or regions from the arms race, systematically reducing the military expenditures of States, limiting armaments and achieving disarmament on a regional basis as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament. All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to display a constructive approach to negotiations and a political will to reach agreements. 4. Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantage are the essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out. 5. The universal acceptance and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat of force must become a law of international life. 6. In order to prevent a continuing arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass		The question of the conventional arms race and, in particular, the question of the international transfer of conventional arms, is unquestionably a delicate and difficult matter, since it is closely related to the domestic production of weapons, global as well as regional security and the security of recipient countries, the freezing of mutual arms levels and armed forces or their reduction, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. These and all other relevant aspects should be fully taken into consideration in the comprehensive study in order to secure, above all, the just and impartial treatment of all States. • • • • • • • • • • • It is recommended that the following principles be recognized in a declaration on disarmament in order to emphasize the relevance and importance of conventional arms control and disarmament: 1. Most of the world's military expenditures are being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts, parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament, to halt this diversion of resources and to bring about concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. 2. The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world produces a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control. 3. Conventional arms control and disarmament, with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, together with control of the development and production of new systems of sophisticated weapons with increased destructive power and strategic capability - which have blurred the classical distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons - will contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.	One would recall some general observations which, in our opinion, could be taken into consideration in the work that lies ahead. The declaration on disarmament, in our view, would have to include an objective evaluation of the current situation in the disarmament area and take stock of the results already achieved, but, most importantly, it should also contain formulations of fundamental provisions or principles which could form a basis for negotiations and decisions on matters relating to curbing the arms race and to disarmament. The purpose here is, apparently, to make those principles as universal as possible so that they maintain lasting value. They could then play a positive role in elaborating and implementing concrete disarmament measures. In the working papers prepared both by socialist countries and by other members of the Committee, it is proposed to define the general orientation of efforts to halt the arms race as well as specific priority tasks which could be embodied in the programme of action for disarmament. The majority of them are interpreted in an identical way and this is an encouraging sign. It permits the hope that in the final analysis a programme will be drafted which will be a realistic and practical one acceptable to all States. Priorities lacking objectivity and fixing a rigid time-limits for implementing certain specific tasks would hardly contribute to a successful implementation of this programme or assist the ongoing negotiations on complex disarmament issues.

warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes.

7. If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite of further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament.

8. Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the concrete measures provided for in the agreements.

9. The resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems facing mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/443, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation for: a. Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses. b. Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons. c. Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. d. Abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions. e. Discontinuance of military expenditures.	See chapter V	Progress in disarmament is not an isolated matter but is intimately connected with and influenced by problems of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In order to establish the international climate of confidence and good will necessary for progress, specific measures to build up confidence should urgently be agreed upon, including special studies on certain subjects. While progress is being made to build up confidence, the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should engage themselves to negotiate meaningful measures to prevent and limit armament as well as measures of disarmament, taking into account, inter alia, the special studies mentioned above. In the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through measures to prevent and limit armament as well as through measures of disarmament, there should be a balance among these categories of measures. In our opinion, the Conference should adopt a programme to guide its work and future negotiations, as recommended by the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution. The programme, in the preparation of which all governments members of the Conference should participate, might include the items indicated in the text prepared by the interested delegations. These items may be summarized as follows: Measures for increasing international confidence The development of the international situation and the improvement of confidence among States will obviously have a direct and favourable effect on the work of the Conference. The Conference should and can, however, contribute to the increase in international confidence by adopting a programme of work defining its undertakings and aims. Studies The Italian delegation believes that, with a view to helping to create favourable conditions for negotiations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might now initiate programmes of studies relating to the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Negotiations might also benefit from a preliminary work which would provide necessary clarification of certain important aspects of that question	A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation 1. The results achieved so far in the disarmament field and the agreements anticipated for the immediate future consist of partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of the final aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such results consist mainly of the following treaties: a. The 1925 Geneva Protocol. b. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959. c. The partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. d. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967. e. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and its two Additional Protocols of 1967, and f. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Particular attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from these treaties to the review conferences provided for in some of them, and when that is the case, to the adoption of measures intended to complete them. 2. Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement at an early stage of the Disarmament Decade on treaties and conventions whose contents have been for some time under consideration by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international forums should be urgently intensified. These instruments deal mainly with: a. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons. b. The prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. c. The ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests, and d. The establishment of an international régime for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including an international service, within the framework of the IAEA, for such explosions.		Prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests An important issue, on the solution of which the cessation of the arms race largely depends, is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. This problem should be tackled without waiting for the outcome of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament. The prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons will put an end to their qualitative improvement and prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground tests have only partially solved this problem. Furthermore, two nuclear Powers out of five have not acceded to the Moscow Treaty, and one of them China, still continues to carry out nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere. The time has now come to bring the task of stopping nuclear-weapon tests to a conclusion. Conditions are quite ripe for that, in particular as a result of the signing between the USSR and the United States of a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, establishing such a procedure for carrying out peaceful explosions as will preclude their use for perfecting nuclear weapons. As is known, in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, that is, a treaty prohibiting the conduct of nuclear test explosions in all environments and by all States. The draft of such a treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations at that time, and a year has already passed since the General Assembly declared itself in favour of holding concrete negotiations to reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, owing to the negative stand taken by some nuclear Powers, such negotiations have not started. It is necessary to begin them promptly. It is a known fact that the question of stopping underground nuclear tests was complicated by certain States which artificially exaggerated the problem of supervision. It was persistently alleged, in particular, that it was impossible without on-site inspections to tell natural seismic phenomena (earthquakes) from similar phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and that therefore, it was impossible to verify whether States were complying with their obligations with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Most experts never accepted that view, believing that national technical means and the international exchange of seismic data	A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation The results achieved so far in the disarmament field constitute partial or collateral measures which facilitate the pursuit of the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and form part of it. These results consist mainly of the following multilateral instruments at present in force: a. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925 (Geneva Protocol). b. The Antarctic Treaty, 1959. c. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963. d. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967. e. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its two Additional Protocols, 1967. f. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968. g. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1972. h. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1975. Special attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from those treaties, to the review conferences provided for in some of them and, where applicable, to the adoption of measures designed to supplement them.	The following main elements should be included in a comprehensive programme for action in the disarmament field: A. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. B. Conventional weapons. C. Other measures. A.1. Nuclear weapons, including non-proliferation a. Conclusion, as a measure of the highest priority of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) To this effect ongoing tripartite consultations between the USA, USSR and the UK should be speeded up in order to make it possible for the CCD to achieve at an early date a widely acceptable treaty. All nuclear weapon States should be urged to join in these negotiations as soon as possible. b. Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems It is necessary for the nuclear Powers to halt and then reverse the arms race. To this end vigorous efforts should be made to expedite the SALT negotiations. Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat of the very survival of mankind. c. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes d. Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime Universal adherence to the NPT should be actively encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives. Parallel efforts should be undertaken by nuclear

In connexion with the above programmes, the Conference might in particular examine the following points in depth:

a. Relationship between nuclear disarmament and the beginning of reductions in conventional means of warfare.

b. Determination of the geographical areas within which the first reductions in conventional means of warfare would take place. In other words, the Conference should address itself to the question whether the first "round" of reductions affecting armed forces and conventional armaments should be global in scope and apply to all States without distinction or whether it should initially apply only to some States. In the latter case, it would be necessary to study the criteria to be used for determining the States to which this first "round" of reductions would apply. Such States might be the principal world military Powers, or they might be States determined on the basis of a criterion that provides for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in a particular regional context. Before negotiations began, it would be necessary to clarify this important question of principle, for it is on the answer to this question that the political dimensions of the problem will depend. The nature of the negotiations would vary in more than one respect depending on whether those reductions to be negotiated applied to more or less numerous States and whether those reductions would be partial or global. (It should be noted, by the way, that the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided that the first phase of the reductions would be applicable only to some of the States parties to the treaty.)

c. Elaboration of technical criteria necessary for the implementation of reductions (categories of armaments to be reduced, levels, initial declarations, unit of measurement to be used in reductions, extent of reductions, creation of a disarmament organization, verifications, etc.)

d. Relationship between armament reductions and controls.

1. Prevention and limitation of armaments

The possibilities of giving effect as soon as possible to the measures specified below should be the object of persistent scrutiny and negotiations.

a. Nuclear weapons

i. A moratorium or cessation of testing and deploying new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

ii. The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses.

iii. A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

iv. The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon free zones.

v. A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of or the threat to use nuclear weapons.

b. Conventional armaments and armed forces

i. Convening of regional disarmament conferences at the initiative of the States of the region.

ii. The establishment of freezes or ceilings on the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces.

iii. Restrictions on the creation of foreign military bases and the stationing of troops and military equipment in foreign territories.

iv. Further prohibitions of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

2. Reduction of all armaments, armed forces and military expenditures

At the appropriate stage in the disarmament negotiations ways and means of carrying out the following measures should be thoroughly explored and actively negotiated

a. The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties.

treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. With the development of technology for detecting and identifying seismic phenomena, this view now enjoys practically unanimous support among scientists. However, even now some States suggest providing for the possibility of on-site inspection of actual circumstances if there is doubt as to compliance with obligations to stop underground nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable understanding on this basis.

Consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

It is quite clear that the threat of nuclear war would immeasurably increase if other States which at present do not possess nuclear weapons were to become involved in the process of developing and stockpiling such weapons. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences that would be brought about by the development of a situation in which the arsenals of parties in conflict in one region or another included nuclear weapons as well.

Hence the effective prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is essential. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which about 100 States have become parties, has achieved a great deal in this regard. The obligation to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a rule of international law.

It must, however, be taken into account that not all nuclear Powers have yet become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some non-nuclear States which are capable, in view of their industrial and technological level, of developing nuclear weapons of their own are also refusing to become

to reach agreement before the end of the Disarmament Decade on the treaties, conventions and proposals which have been under consideration for some time by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international organs should be urgently intensified. This work has included consideration of:

a. A complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

b. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

c. Further measures in the field of disarmament, in particular those aimed at achieving important qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear-weapon systems with a view to eliminating such systems from the arsenals of States.

d. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Other disarmament measures

Measures for whose implementation the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States is essential */

a. Nuclear weapons

i. A moratorium upon or the cessation of the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

ii. A ban on flight testing of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

iii. The cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the assignment of existing stocks to civilian uses.

iv. A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons.

v. A solution to the problem concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons or of the threat to use such weapons.

under article VI of the Treaty. Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States - as provided by article IV - the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

e. Nuclear-weapons-free zones

Nuclear-weapons-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation régime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions exist, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area.

A.2. Other weapons of mass destruction

a. Early conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is a most urgent feature. The two major military powers should engage in decisive efforts in view of finalizing their announced joint initiative. Simultaneously the CCD should materialize through concrete steps its commitment to the total elimination of chemical warfare agents.

b. Efforts should be made by the CCD to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, stockpiling and use of radioactive material weapons ("radiological weapons") as defined in the resolution dated August 1948 of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments.

c. Efforts should be made to avoid the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific

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*/ See footnote to section II, paragraph 3, above.

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/441, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/546, 31 January 1978
		Measures to prevent and limit armament This concerns mainly the "collateral" measures to which the Conference has devoted most of its efforts since the start of the discussions concerning the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament of 1962. Negotiations on these collateral measures were moreover envisaged in paragraph 8 of the USSR-United States Joint Statement of 1961. In spite of the fact that the procedure of negotiating collateral measures has caused certain imbalances which are not insignificant, it has had positive results, as is shown by the conclusion of some important international agreements. These collateral measures have, in addition, made another positive contribution: that of reviving hope for the resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the Italian delegation feels that the Conference should make a maximum effort to pursue negotiations on measures designed to prevent and limit armament. Among such measures, and apart from those which are now the subject of active negotiations (denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and prohibition of chemical and biological weapons), the most important and most urgent are the following: cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, the Conference, in adopting its programme of work, should expressly confirm the fact that it is giving priority to negotiations relating to those two measures so necessary to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Disarmament measures The Italian delegation would like to reaffirm that the raison d'être of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to negotiate disarmament measures, as soon as possible. They could obviously be facilitated by the creation of an international climate of increased confidence and by the completion of the studies referred to above. Although it would be difficult to fix a precise time-limit for the start of these negotiations, we feel that it would be extremely useful if a specific commitment on the subject were assumed now. This would have the important re-	b. Gradual reductions in nuclear and conventional armaments and armed forces. c. Gradual withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories. d. Reduction in military expenditures. 3. Elimination of armaments In accordance with the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should be the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for international peace-keeping.		parties to it. It is important, therefore, to make the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons genuinely universal. The Soviet Union supports all the decisions adopted in this respect by the United Nations. In the interests of consolidating the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it is also necessary to take actions of another kind. It is well known that in the process of their operation nuclear power plants produce and accumulate as a "by-product" a fissionable material - plutonium - which can be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. With the development of international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology possibilities of this kind will increase, including those of the States which have not assumed obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the States which supply nuclear materials, equipment and technology bear special responsibility in this connexion. Strict safeguards are needed to prevent international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons. This is not a question of commerce but a question of policy, a question of international security. The Soviet Union is also firmly in favour of perfecting in every possible way the system of supervision over nuclear installations and materials that is exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is ready to co-operate with all interested States to this end. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons Following the conclusion of the convention banning bacteriological weapons, the task of completely prohibiting and eliminating another dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction - chemical weapons - has become especially pressing. The use of such weapons as far back as the years of the First World War caused grave suffering and mass deaths. Since that time, however, chemical warfare technology has made great strides. New types of chemical weapons threatening people with still more agonizing death have been developed. Radical improvements have also been made in the means	vi. The complete prohibition of all techniques of environmental modification for military or any other hostile purposes. vii. The prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction. b. Conventional armaments and armed forces i. Further prohibitions of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of the subsoil thereof for military purposes. ii. The setting of ceilings for the level and types of conventional armaments and for the numerical strength of armed forces. iii. The elimination of foreign military bases and the creation of zones of peace. iv. The limitation and regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons. v. The reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council and of any other State with comparable military expenditures. Measures for which the political will of the States directly concerned may be sufficient a. Nuclear weapons The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. b. Conventional armaments and armed forces i. The convening, on the initiative of the States of the region, of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments. ii. The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties on the initiative of the States concerned. iii. The reduction of military expenditures. Elimination of armaments In accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should consist of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed	principles. The CCD should keep this question under review and consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific weapon which may be identified. B. Conventional Weapons a. Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be negotiated in parallel with nuclear disarmament progress as a part of a balanced comprehensive programme. New approaches for successful developments in this field should be sought, when appropriate, on a regional basis. b. Restraints on the transfer of conventional arms should proceed simultaneously with the limitation of arms and armed forces levels. In this respect, the establishment, on the basis of Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a Commission divided into regional subcommissions in which the main arms suppliers of each region would participate, should be envisaged, in view of keeping conventional armaments at the lowest possible level. To facilitate the setting up of the above-mentioned regional subsidiary organs with the consent of the parties concerned, the establishment of committees or separate parallel group in which the purchasing countries would participate might prove advisable. c. States should seek agreement, on the basis of consensus, on the prohibition or limitation of use of certain specific conventional weapons. C. Other Measures a. Conduct of pilot studies by a group of States on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, for the purpose of devising and testing jointly and effective international system of reporting for the military expenditure with the object of reducing military budgets. Reduction of

which is demanding more effective action by the CCD on disarmament. Such a commitment would be an incentive to Governments to take the necessary decisions, an incentive that would be strengthened if the commitment were assumed collectively by the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the competent body for disarmament negotiations.

Accordingly, at the time it adopts its own programme, the CCD should - in the opinion of the Italian delegation - give expression to the commitment of its States members to open negotiations on a first "round" of reductions of armed forces and armaments. This would better ensure a balance among the various categories: preventive, limitative and effective measures of disarmament.

General and complete disarmament

General and complete disarmament is the final goal of all CCD negotiations, and that has recently been confirmed by General Assembly resolution 2602 E. Consequently, a re-examination of general and complete disarmament plans by the CCD, as suggested by some delegations, should reflect the will of the States members of the CCD to pursue that objective. So far as the Italian delegation is concerned, it believes that it will be necessary for the CCD to bear in mind past experience so as to be able to resume the discussion on new bases. With that in view, and taking as its point of departure the USSR-United States General Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, the CCD might adopt a more articulated directive for the elaboration of a "programme" in line with that joint statement. A single treaty could hardly govern the implementation of the process of disarmament in all its phases. The "programme" should therefore serve as an overall agreement whose purpose would be to lay down in broad outline the approach to general and complete disarmament; it might envisage the conclusion of a series of treaties or agreements relating to the various phases of effective implementation of disarmament. This

which can now be used not only in combat areas, that is, against the armed forces of the other side, but also against the civilian population in vital centres of States.

The Soviet Union, together with many other countries, has long proposed that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical means of warfare. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacteriological weapons. However, the negotiations on this subject, which have already been going on for several years, still fail to offer prospects of such a comprehensive solution. A question that arises in this connexion concerns the possibility of starting with agreement on the prohibition and elimination of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to seek such a solution as well. A substantial contribution to this end could be the implementation of the Soviet-United States accord on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.

Supervision of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons should be based on national means. In this respect there exists a positive precedent in the convention banning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States.

There is not, and there cannot be, any reason for delay and the question of banning chemical weapons. What is needed is a demonstration of the political will and desire to reach generally acceptable agreement.

Prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

Scientific and technological progress poses the pressing problem of preventing the emergence of new types

for the maintenance of internal order and international peace.*/

countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development of mankind.

b. Publication by all States of more information about their armed forces and in particular about any kind of expenditure devoted to military purposes and a mechanism should be established under the United Nations auspices to collect such information.

c. Publication by the United Nations of all available data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data.

d. Preparatory studies on the conversion of the armaments industries of the principal developed countries should be initiated with the aim of providing alternative lines of production, while maintaining the employment rate at a constant level.

e. A United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development should be initiated as soon as possible after the Special Session.

f. The CCD should proceed, in consultation with the States party to the Sea-bed Treaty, to the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Parallel efforts should be made for the Outer Space in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Treaty.

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*/ In this matter more than others, the revision and up-dating of the draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962 are essential.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/552, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
					zones should actually be free of nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements should contain no loop-holes and should be fully consistent with the generally recognized rules of international law. Reduction of military budgets One promising approach to halting the arms race and to disarmament is the reduction of the military budgets of States. The resources thus released could be utilized for the economic and social progress of peoples and for accelerating the rate of economic growth, ensuring employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating disease and building new schools and universities. The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals for reducing military budgets and has, by its actions, set an example in that regard. Several years ago, it proposed that agreement should be reached on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was approved by the United Nations General Assembly, but so far it has not been implemented because of opposition by those States which are stubbornly pursuing a policy of increasing military expenditure. The Soviet Union is prepared to take a flexible position regarding the specific figure with which a reduction of military budgets would begin. A figure greater or smaller than 10 per cent could be agreed upon as a first step for 1977. What is important, however, is that this question should as soon as possible become the subject of businesslike negotiations between the States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States can and must give way to the practice of systematically reducing that expenditure.		

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
(See Chapter V)	(See Chapter II)	In accordance with the above purposes and principles, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Agreement must be reached on the simultaneous cessation of the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to any such weapons - whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or projectiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to make a start on the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons, and move towards their complete, total destruction. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interest of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind. Such measures can be bilateral and multilateral. Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This urgent measure, for the implementation of which all the necessary prerequisites exist, including the solution of the problem of effective verification of compliance, will make it possible to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the development of new types of such weapons. Consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be made more effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the national economies of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and destruction of stocks of such weapons. The elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction is long overdue. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacteriological weapons. There is not, and there cannot be, any reason for delay on the question of banning chemical	Negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament Negotiations on this item should be resumed and carried on without interruption concurrently with the negotiations on any collateral or partial measures, with the participation of all States, in all phases of the drafting of the clauses of the Treaty. They will provide the necessary impact on all other negotiations by constantly focusing the attention on the global framework to which all such parallel efforts are confined. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament a. Solemn undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States not to be the first to use the nuclear weapon; b. Solemn undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States at any time and under any circumstances; c. prohibition of the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States; total prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; d. withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States; e. cessation of the development and testing of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (including the comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons) f. cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; conversion of existing materials to peaceful purposes and transfer of a quota of such materials to be used by all States in the framework of a broad international cooperation; g. setting up of nuclear weapon-free zones of peace and cooperation in various regions of the world accompanied by effective guarantees by Nuclear Weapon States to observe their status; h. reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery; i. complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. During the negotiations on these measures the legitimate rights of all States should be fully observed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy on	It is suggested that the following points, among others, be included in the programme of action (points A-E). A. Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament The General Assembly 1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 198?; 2. Further decides that a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. B. Nuclear disarmament The General Assembly 1. (Appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/78); 2. Considers as a general guideline for further action that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular, the two leading nuclear-weapon States, carry the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament; 3. Concludes that negotiations should urgently be undertaken concerning measures outlined below aiming at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States: a. freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems; b. cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance; c. cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes; d. balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems; e. prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems; 4. Requests [illegible] the Committee on Disarmament to continue with the highest prio-	Nuclear disarmament: utmost priority should be given to the cessation of the nuclear race through: a. Urgent conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. b. A ban on the further development and testing of means of delivery of nuclear weapons. c. Measures to achieve significant qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems and the ultimate elimination of such weapons. d. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions and complete prohibition of the introduction of such weapons into areas where they now do not exist. e. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and submission of all nuclear programmes of all countries to IAEA safeguards. f. Promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries. g. Encouragement of universal adherence to the NPT. h. Complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction a. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, whether based on new scientific principles or on existing principles. b. Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. c. Prohibition of the use of all chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. Collateral measures of disarmament Bearing in mind the link between disarmament and development, effective measures must be taken to progressively free resources now being devoted to armaments for economic and social development particularly in the developing countries. To this end, a. Urgent measures for the reduction of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States and other States with comparable military budgets and earmarking the savings for economic and social development particularly of the developing countries.	(See Chapter III)

stration of the political will and desire to reach generally-acceptable agreement.

Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem is very urgently needed as a means of curbing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the destruction of human beings.

Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is an important measure of regional military détente; it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area, and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce the number of aircraft, artillery pieces, tanks and other modern types of conventional weapons, as well as the armed forces equipped with such weapons. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be eliminated; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.

Reduction of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and to provide assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of specific, businesslike negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.

Prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction

a. prohibition of the research and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

b. prohibition of the use, cessation of the production and destruction of the existing stockpiles and outlawing of all weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological or any other type);

c. complete prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes.

Collateral measures of disarmament and military disengagement

a. freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets starting with the budgets of the major, heavily armed Powers; setting up of a programme for progressive reduction of military budgets;

b. withdrawal within their national frontiers of foreign troops, their armaments and other combat equipment and demobilization of the withdrawn troops;

c. dismantling of military bases on foreign territories.

Confidence-building measures

a. discontinuance of military manoeuvres, particularly those of multinational nature, near the frontiers or on the territory of other States; prohibition of concentration of troops as well as of demonstrations of force directed against other States; conclusion of international agreements in this field starting in Europe;

b. prevention of military attacks due to accidents, miscalculation or communication failure; conclusion of international agreements in this field;

c. measures to reduce military activities on the ground, in the air and on the sea and oceans; complete prohibition of the use of the seabed and ocean floor and of the subsoil thereof for military purposes;

d. undertaking by all States to ban all forms of war propaganda and hatred among nations;

e. dissolution of military blocs.

nuclear disarmament;

5. Underlines the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;

6. Expects substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

C. Disarmament and development

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the results of which to be reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action atthe second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Decides that the expert study should have the following terms of reference (to be inserted at the special session on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution)

D. Particularly inhuman weapons

The General Assembly

Recommends that the 1979 United Nations Conference on Specific Conventional Weapons should seek agreement on the prohibition and restriction of use of certain conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, such as those the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by x-ray, incendiaries, land-mines and booby-traps, certain small calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons.

E. Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General to organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations

programme to promote public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, its effect on international peace and security, its economic and social consequences and its effect on the attainment of a new international economic order.

Conventional weapons and armed forces

a. Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons.

b. Gradual reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and defence of territorial integrity.

General and complete disarmament

The elaboration of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament should be continued pari passu other measures outlined above, with the participation of all States.

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 21 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
		would avoid the rigidity inherent in a single treaty and the difficulty of discussing problems which are not ready for negotiation. At the same time, it would maintain the concept of a prior commitment with respect to the evolution of the whole process, in its successive phases.			and systems of weapons of mass destruction. New types of weapons may appear even in the foreseeable future and may become commensurate in destructive capability with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, or even surpass them. At present there are no limitations whatsoever on the use of science for such purposes. This means that the most unexpected developments, whose consequences cannot be foreseen, may occur at any time. The danger is great, and it is necessary to find means to avert it. It was precisely these considerations that guided the Soviet Union when it proposed in 1975 the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. As is known, negotiations in this matter are already under way, which is a positive factor. In the course of the negotiations it has become desirable to specify the object of the prohibition that is, define new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union is ready to propose an approach which would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action - according to the method of use and the targets to be attacked or the nature of their impact. Some examples are ray weapons capable of affecting blood and intracellular plasma, infrasound weapons designed to damage internal organs and affect human behaviour, or genetic weapons whose use would affect the mechanism of heredity. If we take into account the fact that the forward march of science never stops, it is not difficult to realize that possibilities for the development of even more dangerous types of weapons may emerge in the future. New systems of weapons of mass destruction should not be developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons which are based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics can be made even more dangerous by introducing new technical elements of combat or support means. In this context, aero-		9. Specific measures to establish an international climate of confidence (CBM).

using transport space ships as a basis may serve as an example.

The question of the prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important and timely one; it embraces an essential aspect of the whole problem of disarmament and prevention of war. Negotiations on this question should be given top priority.

Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

Nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction unquestionably pose the greatest threat to mankind. But can anyone forget how many millions of human lives have been lost as a result of the use of so-called conventional armaments? Even in the period since the Second World War the destructive power of these weapons has increased manyfold. A modern tank is a weapon many times more deadly than a tank of the 1940s. The same is true of artillery, small arms and, of course, aircraft.

The military conflicts which have taken place in various parts of the world in recent years have shown the tragic consequences for people of the use of new models of conventional weapons and the vast destruction of material values which they cause.

Thus, past experience confronts States with the task of taking practical measures to reduce the number of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional armaments as well as armed forces equipped with those weapons. Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has repeatedly made concrete proposals in this regard. It has cited specific figures for ceilings on the strength of the armed forces of major States and has expressed willingness to conduct negotiations on the matter both within the framework of a programme of general complete disarmament and as a separate measure covering major States. These proposals have not been accepted. Even now, however, the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Given a desire for this on the part of all States possessing powerful armed forces, such negotiations could lead to positive results and to constructive agreements.

Similarly, the Soviet Union considers it desirable that new

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1967	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
					efforts should be made at the international level to bring about the elimination of all military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territory. The United Nations has, in many of its forums, expressed itself in very definite terms in favour of a solution to this problem both on a global scale and in relation to individual continents. However, no progress has been made in this regard - a fact which cannot but cause concern. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to co-operate actively and constructively in solving this problem. Zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions In recent years, States in various parts of the world have been ever more insistent in raising the question of carrying out regional measures of military détente and have particularly stressed that Powers which do not belong to a given region should not build up their armed forces or establish military bases there. Thus, the coastal States of the Indian Ocean are expressing concern at the fact that some States which are geographically very remote from the region are expanding their military bases there and increasing their military presence. Regarding such actions as a threat to their independence and security, these countries are putting forward the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union regards this proposal with understanding. Obviously, the key question here is to ensure that there are no foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, that bases which have been established there are dismantled and that no new bases are established. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it never has and does not now intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean. In resolving the question of foreign military bases along these lines, the Soviet Union would be prepared to join with other Powers in seeking ways to reduce on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and in the region directly adjacent to it. Naturally, measures		

account the generally recognized rules of international law regarding freedom of navigation on the high seas and the need for commercial stops at the ports of coastal States as well as for research. This question is of great importance to the Soviet Union, since virtually the only sea route navigable all the year round which links the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

The coastal States of the Indian Ocean are in favour of holding an international conference to discuss practical measures for transforming the region into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to consider the question of its attitude towards the convening of such a conference in the light of the considerations set out above.

The Mediterranean is another region where military tensions, particularly in connexion with the Middle East conflict, have at times reached dangerous proportions. With a view to reducing these tensions, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States some time ago that an agreement should be reached on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of Soviet and United States ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. This proposal still holds good, and it is in the interests of all States whose security in one way or another depends on the situation in the Mediterranean to work for its implementation.

The problem of military détente has great immediacy for the Middle East. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of halting the arms race in the Middle East within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

In various parts of the world, interested States are putting forward proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones. That reflects their desire for effective limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for a lessening of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals. It is prepared to co-operate in their implementation, having regard, of course, to what is possible in any given region where it is proposed to establish a denuclearized zone. It is important that such

IV. COMPONENTS, ELEMENTS, PROVISIONS (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
		Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. A major contribution could be made to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof complied strictly with their obligation; if the number of parties to this Treaty was increased and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out as soon as possible.	Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and their gradual elimination This objective should be conceived as the final stage of the goal of general and complete disarmament. a. gradual reduction of conventional armaments and national armed forces; conclusion of international agreements to ensure the effective implementation of all measures adopted in this respect; b. quantitative and qualitative ceilings of national armed forces and military equipment.	on a standardized reporting instrument by the group of experts on the reduction of military budgets (A/32/194) with the participation of States representing different geographical regions and, preferably, different military budgeting and accounting systems; 2. Further requests the Secretary-General to appoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyze the results of the pilot test, to further refine the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument; 3. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.		

Mexico l and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 7 February 1978
o see Chapter V)	The United Nations must increase its involvement in disarmament problems substantially by exercising direct powers with regard to the negotiation and formulation of disarmament measures and the supervision of their implementation. To this end, the General Assembly has laid down that disarmament negotiations carried on under the auspices of the United Nations are to be based on a programme of measures and action comprising the following elements in order of priority: A. The negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Such negotiations should be carried on without interruption in a forum especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. B. With regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament: - A solemn undertaking by all States not to use nuclear weapons; - Prohibition of the emplacement of new nuclear weapons in the territory of other States; - The withdrawal of nuclear armaments from the territory of other States; - Cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and of the means of delivering them; - Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; peaceful use of existing materials and the transfer of a quota of such materials for use by all States within the framework of broad international co-operation; - The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of peace and co-operation in different regions of the world; - The reduction and total destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them; - Total prohibition of nuclear weapons; - Guaranteed unlimited rights and opportunities for all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without discrimination; guaranteed expansion of research in this area with a view to applying the achievements of nuclear science for the development of all countries. C. With regard to the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction: - Prohibition of research, planning and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such		(Also see Chapter III points 1-6)	Guided by the purposes and principles set forth in the Declaration on Disarmament, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is essential to halt the nuclear arms race, ie. to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, and developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons; to begin reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and subsequently to proceed with their complete elimination. The limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of conventional weapons, which also pose a major threat to peoples, should be carried out parallel with nuclear disarmament. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interests of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind. Such measures can be bilateral and multilateral. Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This urgent measure, for the implementation of which all the necessary prerequisites exist, including the solution of the problem of effective verification of compliance, will make it possible to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the development of new types of such weapons. Consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be made more effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the national economies of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction is long overdue. Measures to ban the most dangerous types of chemical weapons can be taken as the initial step towards a radical resolution of the entire problem. Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem		In the year of its sixtieth anniversary, the Soviet State issued an appeal for agreement on the simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons, whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to begin gradually reducing their accumulated stocks of weapons, moving ahead to the point where they had been completely liquidated. This proposal was reflected in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. We expect this specific proposal to be taken into account in the drafting of the final documents. We are convinced that the question of nuclear disarmament occupies a prominent place in the drafts being prepared. In drafting the documents for the session, the Preparatory Committee cannot lose sight of such a crucial problem as prevention of the threat of nuclear war. The importance of practical steps in this regard hardly needs any detailed clarification. At the Soviet Union's initiative, this subject was discussed in connexion with the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. In the discussions during that session many delegations spoke in favour of continuing the consideration of the item in the Preparatory Committee. An important step forward was recently taken in the critical and urgent issue of halting nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union, as one of the participants in the current tripartite talks at Geneva, expressed its readiness to agree that a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be declared together with a ban for a limited period on all nuclear weapon tests. This proposal, in effect, opens the way to the speedy elaboration of a treaty imposing a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests. Unfortunately, in recent months, we have witnessed developments which may lead to the start of a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race, and here I have in mind the plans to develop and deploy neutron nuclear weapons. It appears to us that the documents which we shall prepare should impress upon States the need

- Prohibition of the use, cessation of the production, elimination of military arsenals and the outlawing of all existing or planned weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological, biological or of any other type);

- Total prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

D. With regard to the adoption of colateral measures:

- A freeze on and gradual reduction of military budgets in accordance with a definite programme. To start with, the military budgets of all States should be reduced by at least 10 per cent and half of the resources thus saved should be transferred unconditionally, to a United Nations development fund to be set up to support development efforts, particularly in countries with a national income of less than $200 per capita. By the end of a decade, that reduction should be in the order of 25-30 per cent of the original level of military budgets, and armed forces and armaments should have been reduced by the same proportion;

- The withdrawal behind national frontiers of foreign troops, their armamanets and other combat equipment, and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn;

- The dismantling of military bases situated in foreign territories;

- The gradual reduction of troops and armaments in the service of national armies by means of international agreements guaranteeing strict fulfilment of the undertaking entered into. To be effective, such reductions must not be of a token nature and, in a first stage, troops and armaments must be reduced by at least 10 to 15 per cent and by even more in large countries with powerful armies;

- An undertaking not to carry out military manoeuvres, particularly those of a multinational nature, near the frontiers or within the territories of other States or to concentrate troops or make shows of strength against other States;

- The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;

- Measures to reduce military activity effectively on the ground, in the air and on the seas and oceans;

- The dissolution of military blocs.

ing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of destroying human beings.

Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is an important measure of regional military détente; it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce aircraft, artillery, tank forces and other modern types of conventional weapons as well as armed forces equipped with them. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be dismantled; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.

Reduction of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and for assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of concrete, businesslike negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.

Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. It would be a major contribution to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof strictly complied with their obligations, if the number of parties to this Treaty was enlarged and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out at an early date.

called that on 24 December, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and President of the USSR Supreme Soviet, proposed on behalf of the USSR, to the Western States to agree on a mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb in order to rid the world of this new, inhuman weapon of mass murder.

V. MEASURES, STEPS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
(See Chapter VIII)	Although it is understood that there is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands delegation is nevertheless of the opinion that early preparatory work for a close international co-operation in the seismological field should continue to receive high priority in this context. Without prejudice to the eventual shaping of a verification system in a comprehensive test ban treaty, methods of seismological detection and identification will in any case constitute a fundamental element of such a system. Therefore, the Netherlands delegation attaches great importance to the implementation and follow up of the General Assembly resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data. It remains of the opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee (CCD/PV.432). The Netherlands delegation shares the view of the Italian delegation as expressed in documents ENDC/245 and ENDC/263 that pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. During this session of the Committee the curtain on the Disarmament Decade could be raised by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Measures of non-armament and arms limitation certainly contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, which may pave the way to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament. But apart from being an aid to "confidence-building", such measures have, of course, also an intrinsic merit of their own. They should not be limited to the nuclear field. Much time of this Committee will certainly be devoted to the conclusion of new agreements regarding chemical and biological warfare. Within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should also be made to reduce and eliminate conventional arms races. In this respect attention should be paid to the increasing build-up of arsenals and to the international trade in conventional armaments. Finally, with regard to the third category, it would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures can only start fruitfully, when the preparatory phase	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	The Twelfth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party held at Bucharest in November 1974, having examined the present world situation and established guidelines for the world policy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, took the view that the following measures should be adopted within a disarmament programme: 1. Steps should be taken to freeze and gradually reduce military budgets and to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 2. Every State possessing nuclear weapons must solemnly bind itself to halt the production of new weapons and begin to destroy existing weapons under appropriate agreements. This is the only way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and effectively warding off the danger of a devastating thermonuclear war. 3. Nuclear-free zones must be established, foreign military bases dismantled, the size of national armed forces gradually reduced, and troops stationed in the territory of other States withdrawn. 4. The reduction of troops, armaments and military expenditure must not be purely symbolic. At first they should be reduced by at least 10-15 per cent and in the heavily-armed countries by more. 5. Confidence and co-operation must be developed among States to create the conditions necessary for the suppression of antagonistic military blocs. All bellicose propaganda must be firmly ended. 6. The negotiations for general disarmament and, most important, for nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of practical measures to bring this about, must be conducted on a thoroughly democratic basis with the participation of all the States concerned. To this end it is essential to improve the work of the Disarmament Committee at Geneva and build the activities of all disarmament conferences and organizations on democratic foundations. 7. The world should be systematically informed by periodic reports at least twice a year on activities related to disarmament.	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)	(See Chapter IV)

has been sufficiently successful.

This, however, does not exclude that during the preparatory phase, attention be devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this respect, the joint statement of agreed principles still serves its purpose of being a guideline for the disarmament process as a whole. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian delegation in ENDC/245, it might be considered whether this statement could be suitably supplemented. In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, this should preferably be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of those principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1961 itself intact.

The implementation of a comprehensive programme in the field of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with further developments and progress in the overall political world situation The three cornerstones are: disarmament, international security and peace.

During our last session, several delegations referred to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) requesting this Committee to renew its effort to make progress toward general and complete disarmament. The Netherlands delegation is of the opinion that during the preliminary phase studies could take place on the question of general and complete disarmament. The Indian delegation (ENDC/PV.404) called on the United States and the USSR to submit revised versions of their draft treaties concerning general and complete disarmament. The Polish delegation (ENDC/PV.406) proposed more specifically that the two co-chairmen prepare a new draft for the *first* stage of disarmament. An alternative approach might also be considered by the Committee, namely to start with an examination of the characteristics and requirements of the *final* stage of a process of general and complete disarmament. On the basis of such a study it could be tried subsequently to trace out a route along which this final stage can be reached. A similar method was proposed by the Swedish delegation as far back as 1964 (ENDC/PV.2[illegible]7). Perhaps it could offer the advantage of getting a better insight in the political requirements and structural needs of a disarming world.

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr. 1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 14 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
1. In the nuclear field, in which the Nuclear Weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objectives of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation by: - the halting and the reversal of the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions: especially by a second Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons; - the earliest conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all Nuclear weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests; - further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include assistance to the IAEA in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system; the application of IAEA safeguards or all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities: agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials: study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies: an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear fuel cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes: and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; - the establishment of additional nuclear weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from Nuclear Weapon States. 2. Assurances, as appropriate, by Nuclear Weapon States designed to increase the confidence of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack. 3. Other weapons of mass destruction: - a convention prohibiting the development,	Other measures in the field of disarmament, confidence building and improvement of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes could significantly contribute to the lessening of international tensions and to the creation of a situation conducive to the adoption of additional disarmament measures. Such measures as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be undertaken forthwith. Other measures, including relevant regional agreements and the progressive reduction of military expenditures should be undertaken as soon as possible. The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones and zones of peace constitute one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Regional considerations in a particular area may require that formal procedures and arrangements to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be flexible and that there should be alternative ways and methods to suit the particular character of each zone. Solemn pledge by States to strictly observe the principle of non-use of force or threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States would contribute to create a climate of confidence among States, and it should be accompanied by measures such as: a. Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories; b. Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases; c. Freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets of States, particularly those of nuclear-weapons States and other militarily significant States; d. Submission of reports to the United Nations by States of their military expenditures on a standardized basis.	Regional measures for military détente and disarmament. Measures such as mutual reductions of armed forces together with the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament, above all in those areas where military confrontation is particularly serious.	[See Chapter IV]	[See Chapter IV]	[See Chapter IV]	

weapons and regulating their destruction;

- a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

- continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles with a view to consideration of agreements on the prohibition of any new weapons which may be identified.

4. Conventional weapons and armed forces:

- agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

- conventions prohibiting or limiting the future use in armed conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be indiscriminate in their effects or may cause unnecessary suffering;

- agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

5. The measures listed above should form part of a balanced programme of disarmament and provide for adequate verification including if appropriate, the possibility of on-site inspection. Verification provisions should, be so designed as to ensure the effectiveness of agreements and to enhance mutual confidence.

(Also see Chapter VIII)

V. MEASURES, STEPS (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
The Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the following measures set forth in the Three-year Disarmament Plan: 1. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (which presumably will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session). 2. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction (in this case, too, it is assumed that the convention will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session). 3. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) in which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to admit them to their territory. 4. The establishment of at least one new nuclear-weapon-free zone of the type created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 5. The signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by States entitled to become parties to those instruments although they have not yet done so. 6. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake not to embark on new installations of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. 7. The convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure that the status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is respected by all States, especially by nuclear-weapon States and the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean. 8. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States which would establish a moratorium on the testing of new nuclear-weapon-launching systems. 9. The conclusion of an agreement or treaty between the two major nuclear-weapon States which would stipulate, as a first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, a balanced 10 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear-weapon systems and a five-year	(See Chapter IV)		(See Chapter III, points 7,8 and 9)	Regional measures for military détente and disarmament. Measures such as mutual reductions of armed forces together with the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament - above all, in those areas where military confrontation is particularly grave.	In order to implement the mentioned principles, the following measures are suggested for incorporation within the framework of the programme of action on disarmament. These measures would constitute a starting-point for negotiations, the goal of which is general and complete disarmament, as is declared in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles between the United States and the USSR issued in 1961. 1. As initial and preliminary steps: A. Comprehensive studies of conventional arms control and disarmament from all aspects, to be undertaken by a qualified group of experts on, inter alia: a. The international transfer of conventional weapons; b. The possibility of mutual limitation of the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces, according to regions. B. Preliminary measures parallel to the comprehensive studies: a. A request by the United Nations General Assembly to the major arms supplying countries, in particular, the United States and the USSR, to start consultations on voluntary restraint measures with due regard to the security of recipient countries; b. On the initiative of the States of the region, the convening of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments, provided that there exist appropriate conditions; c. A request to the Secretar-General or a watch-dog committee, to follow (i) the current state of affairs of the international transfer of conventional weapons and (ii) the development of the consultations of the major arms-supplying countries envisaged in (a) above or in the regional conferences, envisaged in (b) above, and to keep the United Nations General Assembly informed on these matters. 2. As to future steps: After a certain period of time a review of the implementation of the initial and preliminary steps should be conducted. After this review further measures should be worked out and agreed upon according to paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles during a	(See Chapter IV)

of such systems.

10.The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by all nuclear-weapon States, or at any rate by the two major nuclear-weapon States, in which they would undertake to halt production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

11.The establishment by the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, of a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than the thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets.

12.The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake, as soon as the Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote 25 per cent of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.

13.The conclusion of a treaty or convention on the prohibition of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be considered to be excessively harmful or to have indiscriminate effects in the light of humanitarian and military considerations.

14.The reform of the Convention on environmental warfare in order to prohibit the use of all scientific or technological techniques to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes.

15.The preparation of the study provided for in resolution A/32/88A concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

The agendas for the thirty third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendation resulting from that review.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the Guidelines of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail

transition period leading to the final stage of general and complete disarmament.

A decision on appropriate measures to implement the initial steps should be taken at the special session devoted to disarmament.

V. MEASURES, STEPS (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at the latter's second special session devoted to disarmament. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.						

VI. STAGES

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/3[illegible], 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and state carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subseqent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.	The very character of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is ill suited to set any meaningful time-tables in the context of a "Decade". It remains to be seen what the net result will be at the end of the ten year period. No amount of pressure, nor the best efforts of the Committee to meet certain "target" dates can alter that fact. It is unlikely that a precise schedule and fixed time spans would be helpful in achieving the very goal we are trying to reach. It would therefore be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to any particular pattern. Of course, it is quite different matter to agree on a certain sequence of measures, to be carried out within specified periods of time, in a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. (See Chapter V)	Taking into account the Agreed Principles and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions mentioned above, and further taking into account agreements already achieved on collateral measures, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should envisage dealing in successive phases with the main elements mentioned (see Chapter IV). An attempt should be made to decide upon these various phases and to outline the possible content of each phase. (Also see Chapter III)				(See Chapter IV)	

VI. STAGES (continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February,1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978

[See Chapter IV]

VI. STAGES (continued)

Mexico	Romania	Romania	Bulgaria, Czechoslvakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Japan	USSR
CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978

VII. MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.		A review of the programme of disarmament could take place each year in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.	1. The General consider, annually, the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme . Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the overall situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to armaments and disarmament. The United Nations Disarmament Commission might be reactivated and entrusted with a part of this task. 2. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the asistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued. 3. There should be more conferences and scientific exchanges among scientists and experts from various countries on the problem of the arms race and disarmament. 4. Universities and academic institutes should be encouraged to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditure and disarmament. 5. The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among public opinion. 6. The feasibility of convening in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied.		Negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament are being conducted in various forms: on a bilateral basis, particularly where States with the greatest military and war industry potential are concerned; within particular groups of States directly concerned, including negotiations at the regional level; in special bodies set up to discuss the disarmament problem as a whole or individual aspects of it and composed of States representing the major political groupings and geographical areas of the present-day world. Each year, questions relating to disarmament are given a prominent place in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. On the whole, these various types of negotiations and discussions have proved their usefulness. They will unquestionably be used in the future as well. At the same time, the achievement of radical changes in dealing with the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all States without exception, requires consideration of it in the broadest and most authoritative possible international forum. Such a forum,must, first of all, be truly universal, and all States must be represented in it; secondly, it must provide an opportunity for examining the whole range of disarmament questions with the necessary expertise, with due regard for all circumstances and in the necessary detail; thirdly, it must be given the power to take effective decisions. These prerequisites would be met by convening a World Disarmament Conference, and the Soviet Union continues to believe that such a conference should be held. A special session of the United Nations General Assembly could also be an appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in all their scope, for deciding through joint efforts on the ways and means of resolving them and for working out a long-term programme of practical measures. In order to ensure that its results amount to something more than decisions containing general provisions in favour of disarmament of the kind with which the archieves of the United Nations are already overflowing, such a special session of the General Assembly and the manner in which it is organized must not be routine in nature. It should be a very particular	1. The General Assembly should examine annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years the General Assembly should examine the comprehensive programme and revise it as appropriate. 2. A thorough study should be made of the question of convening at an appropriate time an adequately prepared world disarmament conference, and of its institutionalization. 3. Until such time as a world disarmament conference is convened, the General Assembly should hold regularly - for instance, every three years - special sessions devoted to disarmament. 4. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on specific questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued. 5. In view of the growing complexity of disarmament questions, States Members of the United Nations should endeavour to strengthen their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their permanent Missions in this field. 6. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be continuously strengthened and efforts should be made to ensure periodic publication of the United Nations Disarmament **Yearbook**. 7. More conferences and scientific interchanges should be held between scientists and experts from various countries on problems of the arms race and disarmament. 8. Universities and otheracademic institutions should be encouraged to hold continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditures and disarmament. 9. The intensification of exchanges and publication of relevant information and data should provide an atmosphere of greater sincerity and trust between States and a steady increase in knowledge of and interest in these matters among the public. 10. A worldwide "Disarmament Day" should be established under the auspices of the United Nations.	(See Chapter VIII)

organized and held in such a way as to ensure a break-through in solving the problems of disarmament. All its work should fully reflect the high responsibility of all States in the world and, in particular, of the major Powers which possess the most powerful armaments and armed forces.

The holding of special session of the General Assembly should not, of course, push aside the question of a World Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Union conceives of the convening of such a session as an interim stage which should, by its decisions, prepare the way for a broad and far-reaching review of the problem of disarmament at the World Conference. The session should not be burdened with strict time limitations or with the procedure normally followed at General Assembly sessions, including special sessions.

VII . MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS (Continued)

Canada, FRG, Italy Japan Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 2 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czecholsovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 Februry 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
All States undertake to work towards the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking into account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.	Since the contradiction between the urgent necessity to curb the arms race and stagnation in disarmament efforts is becoming increasingly intolerable, it is imperative for all States to exert fresh efforts to overcome this situation and to review and improve the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. The United Nations has, under the Charter, a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly the General Assembly should exert utmost efforts to ensure the observance of the principle as embodied in the Declaration on Disarmament and the full implementation of the Programme of Action on Disarmament. To this end it is essential that: a. The General Assembly remain the main political decision-making organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and will be responsible for monitoring the implementation of disarmament measures; b. The First Political Committee of the General Assembly deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and international security; c. An organic link to be established between the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, currently the main body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. For this purpose it is necessary that: i. All Member States of the United Nations may submit directly proposals on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiations in the CCD and attend meetings of the working bodies thereof whenever such a proposal or proposals are examined; ii. The representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations be assigned an enhanced role in the CCD; d. The review of the present composition of the CCD and the creation of the necessary conditions for the participation of all nuclear-weapons States in the work thereof be made;	All channels for the conduct of negotiations should be effectively used by the States of the world for the solution of vital problems connected with the ending of the arms race and achieving disarmament. On the whole, the existing system of negotiations - multilateral, bilateral and regional - is suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament. The existing types of negotiations should continue to be used in order to reach the necessary international agreements. A breakthrough in solving the disarmament problem, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that it should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a World Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could, with expertise and in sufficient depth, consider the entire range of disarmament questions. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure thorough preparation of and practical agreement on appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a World Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. The United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament should become an important international forum for a broad discussion of approaches of principle to the solution of disarmament questions as well as of the main areas in which priority efforts should be made by States in this sphere. The convening of the special session and its decisions should contribute to the work of existing forums of disarmament negotiations which are responsible for the elaboration of practical steps and agreements aimed at ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.		The General Assembly 1. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make it possible for non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in certain meetings to be decided by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, through the submission of written and oral proposals and participation in the discussions thereon; 2. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to replace the present co-chairmanship institution by a bureau of four members, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen, Two members of the bureau should be selected from the States belonging to the military blocs and the other from the group of neutral and non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The chairmanship should rotate in alphabetical order on a monthly or sessional basis betweel all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; 3. Decides, in the light of the new tasks and responsibilities entrusted upon the United Nations Secretariat as a result of the programme of action, to make a corresponding increase in the resources of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, especially in the field of studies and follow-up of disarmament agreements. (Details to be discussed at a somewhat later stage of the preparations for the session.)	a. The General Assembly of the United Nations having adopted the comprehensive programme of disarmament should also decide on a precise timetable and schedule for the consideration and negotiation of specific instruments and other measures so that the entire process is completed by the end of the next decade. b. The General Assembly should make regular review of progress made on disarmament at its annual regular sessions and at periodic special sessions held not later than 5 yearly intervals. c. The Conference of the Committee for Disarmament should continue to be the main negotiating body under the auspices of the United Nations. d. To make the Conference a more realistic and effective forum it should be restructured to enable the participation of all nuclear weapon States in it. Restructuring the CCD should include: a. Abolition of the system of Co-Chairmen; b. Expansion by a modest figure consistent with efficiency and equitable representation; c. Greater link between CCD and the United Nations and revision of its rules to permit participation of non-members which show interest in the subject being negotiated; d. Encouragement of parallel disarmament negotiations on specific items in the comprehensive programme provided that the United Nations shall be given regular reports of such negotiations.	In accordance with its Charter and innumerable resolutions of the General Assembly, the United Nations has a primordial role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. The former requires the General Assembly to keep itself duly informed regarding all steps taken in the sphere of disarmament, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral. The deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world conference on disarmament on terms acceptable for all Member States. The organization and procedure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be modified so as to be acceptable for participation by China and France. World public opinion should receive adequate information on the progress of work on disarmament, so that it may exercise its influence for the reintensification of the efforts begun with a view to obtaining positive results in this field. Non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations must have at their disposal all the documentation necessary for them to carry out their supplementary work effectively.

on the basis of monthly rotation,

f. The CCW adopt its rules of procedures.

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
The experience gained since the establishment of the United Nations shows that, for maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required for disarmament negotiations - deliberative and negotiating. The largest possible number of States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership. Where the deliberative function is concerned, it is undeniable that the General Assembly, at its regular sessions, cannot deal adequately with the numerous disarmament items which are always included in its agenda. Accordingly, until such time as a consensus is reached on convening and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference - which could play the same role in its own sphere as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development plays with regard to economic and social matters - it seems desirable to hold regular special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With regard to the negotiating body which functions within the framework of the United Nations, namely the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is obvious that it too has not been in a position to fulfil the extremely important task required of it in its own field of competence. Among the reforms necessary to increase its effectiveness, priority ought to be given to the following: the co-chairmanship system should be replaced by a chairmanship to be held on a monthly rotating basis by non-nuclear-weapon States represented in CCD, thereby helping to make it easier for China and France to participate in its work; a standing sub-committee of the whole should be established; and appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that, without prejudice to its limited member membership, CCD can receive such co-operation as all States, or at least all Members of the United Nations, may wish to extend to it. States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which have not yet established in Geneva adequately staffed permanent delegations to the Committee should endeavour to do so as soon as possible.		The existing negotiating machinery, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, in spite of all the efforts made and the suggestions and proposals advanced, has failed to produce tangible results in the field of disarmament commensurate with the demands of peoples and the security requirements of the countries of the world. Since the consideration of the problems of disarmament as a whole is related to the national security of all States and to international security in general, the starting-point must be the participation of all States in the negotiations on the basis of full equality in accordance with the principles and actions called for in the declaration and programme of measures to be adopted by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. An essential prerequisite for the proper organization of negotiations on disarmament and for the adoption of effective measures relating to the basic problems of disarmament is the concentration of such negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The United Nations will be able to fulfil the historic mission for which it was created if it succeeds in bringing about the cessation of the arms race and in implementing concrete measures in the field of disarmament. The strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field requires the direct exercise by the General Assembly of its competence with respect to negotiation and the preparation and monitoring of the implementation of disarmament measures. The General Assembly should organize in-depth discussions on the arms situation, based on the principles which must govern disarmament. The General Assembly, as the main body concerned with political decisions, the basic forum which examines all of the problems of disarmament in its regular sessions or in special sessions, should discuss the situation of disarmament negotiations either in terms of specific topics or as a whole; adopt decisions, resolutions and recommendations on this question and decide on the establishment of negotiating forums, co-ordinate their activity and receive	(See Chapter III, point 7)	All channels for the conduct of negotiations should be effectively used by States for the purpose of solving vital problems connected with ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. On the whole, the existing system of negotiations - multilateral, bilateral and regional - is suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament. The existing types of negotiations should be utilized further in order to reach the necessary international agreements. A breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that the problem should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a World Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could consider with expertise and in sufficient depth the totality of disarmament questions. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a World Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. A World Disarmament Conference should be convened in .... A preparatory committee is being set up for its practical preparation.		Proposals are also being put forward to the effect that decisions should be taken regarding the machinery of disarmament negotiations. It seems to us that a considerable degree of care and caution should be shown here. This question should be considered closely only after general and specific tasks in the disarmament field, that is to say, substantive issues, have been determined. We see no need for abandoning or radically restructuring the existing channels for negotiations. What is needed is that existing bodies should continue to function with greater efficiency, and it is our task to make full use of their capacities. Long experience in disarmament negotiations leaves no room for doubt that the main obstacles to the solution of disarmament problems are not the negotiating machinery but rather the powerful forces in a number of countries which seek to perpetuate the arms race and international tension. The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament. The agenda for the special session also includes discussion of the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which the Soviet Union and a number of other countries consider to be of outstanding importance. The Conference should become such a forum that will make it possible to proceed from the declarations and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions. The Conference will be able to achieve in the best possible way the goals set by the special session.

results of negotiations. The General Assembly will examine the draft treaties prepared in different negotiating forums, put them into final form and recommend them to States for signature.

Accordingly, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly should concern itself exclusively with the problems of disarmament and security.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should resume its activity and proceed to an examination of the entire range of disarmament problems and the development of efforts undertaken in this field.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, comprising all the Members of the Organization, will be able to concentrate all disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. It will be able to negotiate the disarmament problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly and exercise supervisory functions with respect to the implementation of international agreements in the field of disarmament.

Disarmament negotiations, under the firm direction and control of the United Nations and carried out in bodies with clearly defined agendas and priorities, should be compartmentalized in various categories of activity, such as the consideration of all problems relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition, reduction and elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; the negotiation of measures to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons at the world and regional levels; discussion of the problem of the freezing and gradual reduction by stages of the military budgets of States; the adoption of collateral measures of military disengagement and disarmament.

Within this framework a decision can also be adopted concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States and all nuclear-weapon Powers.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

USA/USSR ENDC/5, 19 March 1962	Netherlands CCD/276, 24 February 1970	Italy CCD/309, 19 August 1970	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia CCD/313, 27 August 1970	Romania CCD/449, 13 March 1975	USSR CCD/522, 15 February 1977	Mexico CCD/545, 23 August 1977	Italy CCD/548, 31 January 1978
Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.			It is recognized that there is a close inter-relationship among disarmament, international security, peaceful settlement of disputes and a climate of confidence. During the period of the negotiations for the disarmament measures listed above, there should be parallel negotiations in the appropriate forums for the establishment or development of United Nations peace-making and peace-keeping machinery and procedures in order to increase, and ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of disarmament efforts, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for the strengthening of international security. Nevertheless, as already pointed out above, progress in one of these categories of measures should not be made dependent on progress in the other and vice versa.	A dominant feature of the contemporary world situation is the widening gulf of world-wide economic, social, national and political contradictions. The complexity of the problems facing the peoples is compounded by the economic crisis, magnified by the crises of energy, foodstuffs, raw materials and finance. The intensification of the armaments race, the stockpiling of new and devastating weapons and the increase in military expenditure gravely imperil international security and peace and at the same time impose a heavy burden on all the peoples. The vertiginous growth of inflation and the economic crisis can be largely attributed to the armaments race and to the immense expenditure on military purposes. This process is heightening international instability, endangering the security of some States, areas and continents, and threatening the peace of the whole world. The move towards relaxation which has begun in recent years is still in its fragile infancy and needs to be consolidated by the joint efforts of all States.		It is undeniable that there is a close relationship between disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of a climate of confidence. During the period of negotiations on the disarmament measures listed above, parallel negotiations should be carried on in the appropriate organs for the establishment or development of machinery and procedures for peaceful settlement and peace-keeping within the United Nations in order to increase international peace and security and to ensure that they are maintained. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of efforts for disarmament, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for strengthening international security. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out above, progress in one of these spheres should not be made dependent on progress in the other, and vice versa.	The process towards GCD under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the United Nations Charter effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping Operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (cont'd)

Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK CCD/549 and Corr.1, 7 February 1978	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zaire CCD/550 and Corr.1, 16 February 1978	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR CCD/552, 21 February 1978	Romania CCD/553, 21 February 1978	Sweden CCD/554, 21 February 1978	Nigeria CCD/555, 24 February 1978	Mexico CCD/560, 10 March 1978
In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should: 1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process. 2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. 3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries. 4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. 5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament. 6. Seek to restrain the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, utilizing all means which could lead to bilateral, regional and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments. 7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements. 8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by: - publicising the final documents of the Special Session, in particular through Non-Governmental Organizations, mass media and educational systems; - facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions; - improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications; and - encouraging study and research on disarmament. 9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or world-wide: - to inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres; - to invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis; - to improve communications between governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation.	There is a direct link between disarmament and international peace and security since the latter cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry nor be sustained by military alliances and doctrines of strategic superiority or of deterrence. Furthermore, the existing nuclear arsenals and the addition of new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction do not ensure or strengthen national security. There is also an integral link between disarmament and development. The spiralling arms race and the resulting waste of resources are incompatible with the need for accelerated economic and social development and for the establishment of the New International Economic Order. Nevertheless progress in one of these areas should not be contingent upon progress in the other. Elaboration of a system of reporting to the United Nations on the resources released through the reduction of military expenditures as a result of disarmament measures and of a set of principles for channelling of such resources for development purposes taking particularly into account the needs of developing countries.			(See Chapter IV)		

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace and security, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises.

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, inter alia:

- the international transfer of conventional weapons;
- the possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
- the proposal for a United Nations Register of Weapons Transfers.

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the Special Session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts.

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis.

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

VIII. MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (cont'd)

Mexico CCD/561 and Add.1, 10 March 1978	Romania A/AC.187/78, 31 August 1977	Romania A/AC.187/79, 31 August 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/81, 7 September 1977	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR A/AC.187/82, 7 September 1977	Japan A/AC.187/86, 13 December 1977	USSR A/AC.187/98, 2 February 1978
	The fact that the arms race continues unchecked and is steadily gathering momentum and that no satisfactory progress has been made in the disarmament negotiations, creates the risk of another world war of annihilation. The problem of disarmament has to be solved if international peace and security are to be safeguarded so that peoples can devote their efforts to development and progress and work unhindered towards the goal of a free and independant life.	(See Chapter VII)	The arms race involves an enormous waste of resources which could be used to advance the well-being of peoples. At the present time, the world is spending approximately $350 billion a year on armaments. The war machine requires ever greater human resources, diverting people from peaceful creative work. This hampers the solution of such important and pressing problems facing mankind as the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness, the development of new sources of energy, extensive exploration of the ocean and outer space, and the prevention of disastrous environmental changes. It also calls for urgent measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament. Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great.	(See Chapter IV)	Four-fifths of the world's military expenditure is now being devoted to conventional armaments. If the conventional arms race continues at the present rate, the prospect of using the resources now being diverted to military purposes towards improving the economic and social conditions in the world, in particular, those of the developing countries, will be further narrowed.	The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament. Among efforts to avert a new war, especially a nuclear war, the supplementing of political détente in Europe by military détente is of special importance. In recent years there have been some changes for the better on this continent. The Soviet Union considers itself in duty bound to protect, consolidate and follow up these achievements. In October 1977, in an effort to strengthen security on the European continent, the Soviet Union submitted constructive proposals forming a programme of action for consolidating military détente in Europe. These proposals were officially submitted by the Soviet delegation at the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the States participating in the European Conference. They envisage the conclusion by the participants in the European Conference of a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other; the groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members; consistent implementation of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act; and the reaching of agreement not to conduct military exercises involving more than, say, 50,000-60,000 men. These are some additional observations which the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make now that the Committee is about to enter an important stage in its work, that of drafting the final documents.

CCD/573
Annex A
(CCD/567)
(18 April 1978)

(ENGLISH ONLY)

Tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introductory Note by the Secretariat

At the CCD's informal meeting held on 23 February 1978, the representative of India, speaking as Chairman of the Group of 15 requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of working papers and proposals submitted to the CCD on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The present document incorporates the relevant parts of the working papers and proposals on the subject submitted to the CCD as well as a number of documents of the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session Devoted to Disarmament in accordance with the decision taken by the CCD's *Ad Hoc* Working Group at its meeting of 22 March 1978.

The contents of the following documents are tabulated in the original wording and in chronological order starting with CCD documents, followed by Preparatory Committee documents:

1. US/USSR: Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, 19 March 1962, ENDC/5
2. Netherlands: Working paper containing some Introductory Remarks on Steps Toward a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, 24 February 1970 CCD/276
3. Italy: Working paper on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 19 August 1970, CCD/309
4. Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia: Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 27 August 1970, CCD/313
5. Romania: Steps to be taken with a Disarmament Programme, 13 March 1975, CCD/449
6. USSR: Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Questions of Ending the Arms Race and Disarmament, 15 February 1977, CCD/522

7. Mexico: Working Paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a preliminary Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 23 August 1977, CCD/545

8. Italy: Working Paper on the Question of the Drafting of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 31 January 1978, CCD/548

9. Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Working paper on a draft programme of action, 2 February 1978, CCD/549 and Corr.1

10. Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire: Working document containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation, 16 February 1978, CCD/550 and Corr.1

11. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working Paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 21 February 1978, CCD/552

12. Romania: Working Paper on the Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 21 February 1978, CCD/553

13. Sweden: Working paper on elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations, 21 February 1978. CCD/554

14. Nigeria: Suggestions for inclusion in a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, 24 February 1978, CCD/555

15. Mexico: Working paper on some fundamental principles and norms for inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977, 10 March 1978, CCD/560

16. Mexico: Working paper on an outline of a draft final document of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 10 March 1978, CCD/561 and Add.1.

17. Romania: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on a programme of measures and action (A/AC.187/78).

18. Romania: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on a negotiating machinery for disarmament problems (A/AC.187/79)

19. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/81).

20. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and USSR: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper on basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament (A/AC.187/82).

21. Japan: Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Working paper containing a proposal concerning the conventional arms race (A/AC.187/86).

22. USSR: Working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.187/98).

LISTS OF DOCUMENTS TABLED IN THE ENDC AND CCD FROM 1962 TO 1978 ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

I. Question of Nuclear Disarmament, Including a Nuclear Test Ban

  A. General

  B. Nuclear test ban

  C. "Nuclear Neutron Weapon" or "Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation Weapon"

II. Question of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

III. Question of the Prohibition of New Types and New Systems of Weapons of Mass Destruction

IV. Question of Prohibition of Radiological Weapons

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  B. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

VI. Question of Further Measures to Prevent an Arms Race on the Sea-Bed

VII. CCD Organization and Procedures

I. Question of nuclear disarmament, including a nuclear test ban

A. General

ENDC/3	USSR	Memorandum of the government of the USSR on disarmament negotiations in the ENDC	19.3.62
ENDC/5	USSR & USA	Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations	19.3.62
ENDC/16	Czechoslovakia	Memorandum by GDR	27.3.62
ENDC/C1/1	Poland	Memorandum on zone in Europe	28.3.62
ENDC/87	Brazil and Mexico	Declaration of 29 April by five Latin American Governments	6.5.63
ENDC/91	USSR	Note to the USA dated 20 May	27.5.63
ENDC/93/Rev.1	Ethiopia, Nigeria and UAR	Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States on 25 May	18.6.63
ENDC/172	USA	Working paper on the transfer of fissionable material obtained by the destruction of nuclear weapons	8.3.66
ENDC/180	Ethiopia	Memorandum concerning an approach to the realization of UN resolutions on banning nuclear weapons, denuclearization of Africa and World Disarmament Conference	22.8.66
ENDC/186		Final Act of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, held at Mexico City on 30 August 1966 and 31 January to 14 February 1967	21.2.67

ENDC/227	USSR	Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament	16.7.68
ENDC/241 & Annexes I to IX	Mexico	Working Paper on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones	24.3.69
CCD/241/ Add.1*	Mexico	Establishment of nuclear-free zones Working document	24.3.70
ENDC/268 & Annexes I to V	Mexico	Report on the first session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)	15.9.69
CCD/342	Mexico	Working Paper on some basic facts relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol II	19.8.71
CCD/359	Mexico	Working Paper containing a list of the documents of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and of the statements by the Mexican delegation dealing wholly or partially with that treaty	14.3.72
CCD/394	Mexico	Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	20.2.73
CCD/439	Mexico	Letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the CCD	6.8.74
CCD/464	Mexico	Letter dated 6 August 1975 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	8.8.75
CCD/467		Letter dated 18 August 1975 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	18.8.75

CCD/470	Mexico	Working paper containing a draft definition of the concept of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and a draft definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of such zones	21.8.75
CCD/476		Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects	28.8.75
CCD/522	USSR	Memorandum of the Soviet Union on Questions of Ending the Arms Race and Disarmament	15.2.77
CCD/525	Mexico	Letter dated 25 February 1977 from the Leader of the Permanent Delegation of Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitting two declarations relating to the commemorative meeting on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco held in Mexico City on 14 February 1977	25.2.77

B. Nuclear test ban

ENDC/9	UK & USA	Draft Treaty of 18.4.61	23.3.62
ENDC/11	USSR	Draft Agreement of 27.11.61	22.3.62
ENDC/13	USA	Address by President Kennedy	23.3.62
ENDC/20/Rev.1	USSR	Message by USSR Government	9.4.62
ENDC/23	USSR	Message by Mr. Khrushchev to to Mr. Ikeda	9.4.62
ENDC/24	UK & USA	Joint Statement by Mr. McMillan and President Kennedy to Mr. Khrushchev on 9.4.62	11.4.62
ENDC/25	UK	Message from Mr. McMillan to Mr. Khrushchev on 10.4.62	11.4.62
ENDC/27	USSR	Message from Mr. Krushchev to Mr. McMillan	16.4.62
ENDC/28	Brazil, Burma Ethiopia, India Mexico, Nigeria Sweden, UAR	Joint Memorandum	16.4.62
ENDC/29	USA	Questions with respect to ENDC/28	17.4.62
ENDC/31	USSR & USA	Statement by President Tito	18.4.62
ENDC/32	USSR	Statement with respect to ENDC/28	19.4.62
ENDC/34	USSR	Report by Mr. Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet of USSR	25.4.62
ENDC/35	USA	Statement by US Representative at 28th Meeting	26.4.62
ENDC/37	USSR & USA	Appeal by a delegation of Hiroshima	7.5.62
ENDC/38	USSR	Letter from World Federation of Scientific Workers	14.5.62
ENDC/43	USSR	Statement by USSR Government on US High Altitude Explosion	4.6.62
ENDC/45	USA	Report by US Department of Defense on Project Vela	16.7.62
ENDC/46	USA	Statement by US State Department on remarks by Mr. Khrushchev	16.7.62
ENDC/47	USSR	Speech by Mr. Krushchev at World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace at Moscow	16.7.62

ENDC/49	USSR	Tass Communiqué of 13.7.62	16.7.62
ENDC/51	USSR	Statement by USSR Government on 22.7.62	23.7.62
ENDC/56	Brazil	Note by Government	17.8.62
ENDC/57	USSR	Appeal by Supreme Soviet of USSR	17.8.62
ENDC/58	UK & USA	Comprehensive Draft Treaty	27.8.62
ENDC/59	UK & USA	Partial Draft Treaty	27.8.62
ENDC/63	G.A.	Resolution 1762 (XVII)	8.11.62
ENDC/66	UK	Document submitted by USA and USSR Scientists at Pugwash Conference	4.12.62
ENDC/67 & Corr.1 & Corr.2	USSR	Article in Izvestia on 11.11.62	7.12.62
ENDC/71	Mexico	Message from the President of the Senate	12.12.62
ENDC/72	Mexico	Appeal by Mexican Congress	19.12.62
ENDC/73 and Corr.1	USSR	Letters of 19.12.62 and 7.1.63 from Mr. Khruschev to President Kennedy	22.1.63
ENDC/74	USA	Letter of 28.12.62 from President Kennedy to Mr. Khruschev	23.1.63
ENDC/76	USSR	Tass statement on resumption of underground tests by the US	12.2.63
ENDC/78	UK & USA	Memorandum of position	1.4.63
ENDC/80	USSR	Tass statement on French nuclear tests, dated 23 March	5.4.63
ENDC/82	USA	Statement by Senator Humphrey in the US Senate on 7 March	8.4.63
ENDC/85	USA	Letter from US scientists in the "Washington Post" 9 April	22.4.63
ENDC/94	Ethiopia, Nigeria and the UAR	Joint Memorandum	10.6.63
ENDC/96	Sweden	Synopsis of suggestions by non-aligned Members	19.6.63
ENDC/99	Mexico	Suggestions on interim arrangement	2.7.63

ENDC/100/Rev.1	USSR, UK & USA	Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater	30.7.63
ENDC/101	USSR, UK & USA	Moscow communiqué of 25 July	30.7.63
ENDC/102	USA	President Kennedy's address to the nation on 26 July	30.7.63
ENDC/103	USSR	Statement by Mr. Khruschev on 27 July in Moscow	30.7.63
ENDC/104	Italy	Statement by Foreign Minister on 25 July	30.7.63
ENDC/105	Mexico	Statement by Foreign Secretary on 27 July	30.7.63
ENDC/106	Czechoslovakia	Government's communiqué of 29 July	30.7.63
ENDC/120	USA	Message of President Johnson to ENDC	21.1.64
ENDC/121	Brazil	Communiqué of Brazilian Government	21.1.64
ENDC/123	USSR	Memorandum on Collateral Measures	28.1.64
ENDC/129	USSR	Communication from the USSR Academy of Sciences	20.3.64
ENDC/140	USSR, UK, USA	Joint Statement on the Anniversary of the Moscow Treaty	6.8.64
ENDC/141	USSR	Statement by Mr. Khruschev	4.8.64
ENDC/144	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria UAR	Joint Memorandum	14.9.64
ENDC/145	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, UAR	Joint Memorandum	14.9.64
ENDC/154	Sweden	Memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions	2.9.65

ENDC/155	UK	Notes on United Kingdom research techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions	9.9.65
ENDC/159	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, UAR	Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	15.9.65
ENDC/177	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the UAR	Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	17.8.66
ENDC/182	USA	Working Paper on Determination of the Location of Seismic Events	25.8.66
ENDC/191	Sweden	Memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty	19.7.67
ENDC/213	USA	Statement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission dated 25 January 1968 on Project Gasbuggy	25.1.68
ENDC/232	UK	Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	20.8.68
ENDC/234	Italy	Working Paper on Underground Nuclear Explosions	23.8.68
ENDC/235	Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the UAR	Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	26.8.68
ENDC/242	Sweden	Working Paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests	1.4.69
ENDC/246	Nigeria	Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	15.5.69
ENDC/248	Canada	Working Paper listing recent Canadian scientific papers on seismological research with abstracts now available	21.5.69
ENDC/250	Italy	Additional suggestions on underground nuclear explosions, following the Italian working paper (ENDC/234) of August 1968	22.5.69
ENDC/251	Canada	Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban	23.5.69
ENDC/252	USA	Working Paper on Seismic Investigation Proposal	23.5.69
ENDC/251/Rev.1	Canada	Revised Working Paper on requests to Governments for information about exchange of seismological data	18.8.69

ENDC/257	Sweden	Working Paper describing the Hagfors Seismological Observatory in Sweden	14.8.69
ENDC/258	UK	Further Notes on United Kingdom Research of Techniques for Distinguishing Between Earthquakes and Underground Explosions	14.8.69
ENDC/259	Canada	Remarks by G. Ignatieff, Representative of Canada, at Informal Meeting on CTB, Wednesday, 13 August 1969	14.8.69
ENDC/260	Japan	Statement by Ambassador K. Asakai at the informal meeting of ENDC on 13 August 1969	14.8.69
ENDC/261	India	Statement by Ambassador M.A. Husain at the Informal Meeting of the ENDC held on 13 August 1969 to consider the question of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban	14.8.69
ENDC/262	USA	Remarks by Ambassador James Leonard on Seismic Data Exchange and the Canadian Working Paper (ENDC/251) at Informal Meeting on 13 August 1969	14.8.69
CCD/284		Letter dated 30 March 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly Document A/7967	8.4.70
CCD/284/Add.1		Letter dated 24 April from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly Document A/7967/Add.1	29.4.70
CCD/284/Add.2		Letter dated 10 June 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly Documents A/7967/Add.2 and A/7967/Add.3	16.6.70
CCD/284/Add.3		Letter dated 5 August 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly Document A/7967/Add.4	10.8.70
CCD/284/Add.4		Letter dated 25 August 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly Document A/7967/Add.5	28.8.70

CCD/296	UK	Working paper on verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	28.7.70
CCD/298	USA	Working paper introducing "Seismic Data from Rulison"	4.8.70
CCD/305	Canada	Working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions	10.8.70
CCD/306	Sweden	Technical working paper on a comparison of two systems for verification of a comprehensive test ban	12.8.70
CCD/323	Netherlands	Working paper concerning seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions	18.3.71
CCD/327	Canada	Working Paper on the Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions	29.6.71
CCD/327/Add.1	Canada	Explanatory comments on Working Paper on Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions	7.7.71
CCD/329	Sweden	Working Paper on seismological verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests	29.6.71
CCD/330	USA	Working Paper containing remarks of Dr. Stephan Lukasik, Director of the US Advanced Research Projects Agency, regarding research on seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions, presented at Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971	30.6.71
CCD/331	Italy	Working Paper on the problem of underground nuclear explosions	1.7.71
CCD/336	Canada	Working Paper on possible progress towards the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests	22.7.71
CCD/340	Pakistan	Working paper suggesting some provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests	12.8.71

CCD/345	Japan	Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro, the Japan Meteorological Agency, concerning the usefulness of the employment of ocean-bottom seismographs and a universally acceptable means of determining the magnitude of seismic events, presented at the Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971	24.8.71
CCD/348	Sweden	Working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (revised version of the Swedish working paper ENDC/242, 1 April 1969)	2.9.71
CCD/349	Netherlands	Working paper on the seismicity of the USA, the USSR and China	7.9.71
CCD/351	UK	Working paper containing comments on the Canadian study of the Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions (CCD/327) and on its implication for the expanded seismic array system outlined in the United Kingdom working paper CCD/296	23.9.71
CCD/354	Burma Egypt Ethiopia Mexico Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Sweden Yugoslavia	Joint memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	30.9.71
CCD/363/Rev.1	UK	Working Paper on seismic yields of underground explosions - estimating yields of underground explosions from amplitudes of seismic signals	25.4.72
CCD/364	**Australia** New Zealand	Letter dated 20 June from the Permanent Representatives of Australia and of New Zealand to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a message from the Prime Ministers of Australia and of New Zealand to the Co-Chairmen concerning the imminent series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific	20.6.72

CCD/370	Peru	Letter dated 14 June 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the series of tests in the atmosphere with nuclear weapons in the Pacific	20.6.72
CCD/376	Canada Japan Sweden	Working Paper on measures to improve tripartite co-operation among Canada, Japan and Sweden in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means	20.7.72
CCD/378	Canada	Working Paper containing bibliography of Department of Energy, Mines and Resources papers relevant to seismological verification problems	25.7.72
CCD/379	Sweden	List of publications bearing on seismological discrimination of nuclear explosions and earthquakes and available from the Research Institute of National Defence, Stockholm, Sweden	27.7.72
CCD/380	Canada Sweden	Working Paper on an experiment in international co-operation: short-period seismological discrimination of shallow earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions	27.7.72
CCD/386	United Kingdom	Working Paper on seismic data handling and analysis for a comprehensive test ban	22.8.72
CCD/388	USA	A review of current progress and problems in seismic verification	24.8.72
CCD/397	Sweden	Working Paper with points to be considered by experts on the verification of ban on underground nuclear explosions	24.4.73
CCD/399	Japan	Working Paper on problems in determining the body wave magnitude	24.4.73
CCD/401	United Kingdom	Working Paper on a review of the United Kingdom seismological research and development programme	28.6.73

CCD/402	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the estimation of depth of seismic events	28.6.73
CCD/404	USA	A programme of research related to problems in seismic verification	5.7.73
CCD/405	Sweden	Working Paper reviewing recent Swedish scientific work on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions	10.7.73
CCD/406	Canada	The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means	10.7.73
CCD/407	USA	Comments on CCD/399, concerning magnitude determinations	10.7.73
CCD/408	Japan	Working Paper on comparison between earthquakes and underground explosions observed at the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory	10.7.73
CCD/409	Italy	Some observations on detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions - prospects of international co-operation	10.7.73
CCD/411	Norway	Letter dated 16 July 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Norway - on seismic research at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR)	31.7.73
CCD/416	Netherlands	Some observations on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear test explosions	28.8.73
CCD/431	USSR USA	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests	16.7.74
CCD/438	Sweden	Underground nuclear test activities in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973	1.8.74
CCD/440	United Kingdom	Working Paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources	13.8.74

CCD/441	Japan Sweden	Working Paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden	13.8.74
CCD/442	Japan	Working Paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events	13.8.74
CCD/454	Japan	Working paper concerning views of a Japanese Expert on arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE)	7.7.75
CCD/455	IAEA	Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects	7.7.75
CCD/456	USA	Working paper on arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs)	10.7.75
CCD/457	Canada Japan Sweden	Working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference held 14 - 19 April 1975 to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means	14.7.75
CCD/459	United Kingdom	Working paper on safeguards against the employment of multiple explosions to simulate earthquakes	24.7.75
CCD/468/ Rev.1	Japan	Comments on the informal meetings of PNE experts by Japanese Ambassador M. Nisibori on 18 July 1975	21.8.75
CCD/474	India	Informal meetings on the question of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the CTB note being taken of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX) - Comments made by Ambassador Mishra of India on 18 July 1975	26.8.75
CCD/481	Sweden	The Test Ban Issue	26.3.76
CCD/482	Sweden	Working Paper on co-operative international measures to monitor a CTB	26.3.76

CCD/484	Norway	Letter dated 8 April 1976 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper on some new results in seismic discrimination	9.4.76
CCD/486 + Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the United Kingdom's contribution to research on seismological problems relating to underground nuclear tests	12.4.76
CCD/487 + Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the processing and communication of seismic data to provide for national means of verifying a test ban	12.4.76
CCD/488	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the recording and processing of P waves to provide seismograms suitable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions	12.4.76
CCD/489	Japan	Working Paper on the estimation of focal depth by pP and sP phases	13.4.76
CCD/490	Canada	The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means	20.4.76
CCD/491	United States	Current status of research in seismic verification	20.4.76
CCD/492	United Kingdom	Text of a statement on a comprehensive test ban made by Mr. Fakley at an informal meeting of the CCD on Tuesday, 20 April 1976	21.4.76
CCD/493	Japan	Working Paper containing statement by Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro at the informal meetings with participation of experts on a Comprehensive Test Ban on 20 April 1976	26.4.76
CCD/495	Sweden	Terms of reference for a group of scientific governmental experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	24.6.76
CCD/496 + Corr.1	United States USSR	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes	23.6.76
CCD/509	Finland	Letter dated 28 July 1976 from Mr. Leif Blomqvist of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on Finnish capabilities of seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions	28.7.76

CCD/513		First Progress Report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	6.8.76
CCD/523	USSR	Draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests	22.2.77
CCD/524	Japan	Working paper on location capability of a multi-array stations system	24.2.77
CCD/526	Sweden	Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments	1.3.77
CCD/526/ Rev.1	Sweden	Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments	5.7.77
CCD/528 + Corr.1		Second progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	1.3.77
CCD/534		Third progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	28.4.77
CCD/536	New Zealand	Letter dated 20 July 1977 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the views of the Government of New Zealand on a comprehensive test ban treaty	22.7.77
CCD/540	Japan	Working paper on focal depth resolvability of a multi-array stations system	3.8.77
CCD/542		Fourth progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	11.8.77

CCD/558	Secretariat	Letter dated 9 March 1978 from the chairman of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and to identify seismic events to the Co-chairmen of the CCD transmitting the final report of the Ad Hoc Group	9.3.78
CCD/558/ Add.1	Secretariat	Report to the CCD of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and to identify seismic events: Appendices	7.3.78
CCD/562	Sweden	Terms of reference for the continued work of the CCD Ad Hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events	13.3.78
C. "Nuclear neutron weapon" or "Reduced blast-enhanced radiation weapon"			
CCD/559	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR	Draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons	9.3.78

II. Question of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

ENDC/254		Letter dated 1 July 1969 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the ENDC transmitting the Report on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use	7.7.69
ENDC/256	Poland	Working Paper concerning the Report of the Secretary-General of 1 July 1969 on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use	22.7.69
ENDC/265	Argentina Brazil Burma Ethiopia India, Mexico Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Sweden UAR Yugoslavia	Working Paper on a proposed declaration by the United Nations General Assembly regarding prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare	26.8.69
ENDC/266	Canada	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Warfare: Draft United Nations General Assembly Resolution	26.8.69
CCD/283	USA	Working Paper on Chemical Warfare Agents and the Commercial Chemical Industry	16.3.70
CCD/285 + Corr.1	Hungary Mongolia Poland	Working Paper submitted by the delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Polish People's Republic in connexion with the draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons	14.4.70 & 15.4.70
CCD/286	USA	Working Paper on Toxins	21.4.70
CCD/288	Japan	Working Paper on the Question of Verification for Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons	30.4.70
CCD/289	Italy	Suggestions regarding the possible convening of a group of experts to study the problem of controls over chemical weapons and the way in which such a group should function	30.6.70

CCD/293	USA	Working Paper comparing nerve agent facilities and Civilian Chemical Production Facilities	16.7.70
CCD/295	Morocco	Working Paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons	28.7.70
CCD/299	Czechoslovakia	Working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons	6.8.70
CCD/300	Canada	Working Paper on the verification of prohibitions of the development, production and stockpiling and the use of chemical and biological weapons	6.8.70
CCD/301	Japan	Working Paper on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons	6.8.70
CCD/302	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the elements for a system of control of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons	6.8.70
CCD/303	USSR	Working Paper on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons	6.8.70
CCD/304	Italy	Additional Working Paper on the problem of controls over chemical weapons	6.8.70
CCD/308	UK	Working Paper on Verification of CW Arms Control Measures	18.8.70
CCD/310	Argentina Brazil Burma Ethiopia India Mexico Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Sweden UAR Yugoslavia	Joint Memorandum on the question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Methods of Warfare	25.8.70
CCD/311	USA	Working Paper on economic data monitoring as a means of verifying compliance with a ban on chemical weapons	25.8.70
CCD/314	UAR	Working Paper concerning suggestions on measures of verification of a ban on chemical and biological weapons	1.9.70

CCD/315	Hungary Mongolia Poland	Working document concerning the introduction of a safeguard clause - CCD/285 - to the draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (Doc. A/7655) made by Mr. J. Winiewicz, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 464th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	3.9.70
CCD/320	Netherlands	Working Paper concerning the prohibition of chemical warfare agents	2.3.71
CCD/322	Sweden	Working Paper on a model for comprehensive agreement concerning the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological means of warfare	16.3.71
CCD/324	Sweden	Working Paper on the destruction of chemical and biological means of warfare	30.3.71
CCD/332	USA	Working Paper on CW verification	5.7.71
CCD/333	Sweden	Working Paper on aspects of the definition of "toxins"	6.7.71
CCD/334	Canada	Working Paper on atmospheric sensing and verification of a ban on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons	8.7.71
CCD/335	Italy	Working Paper on some problems concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons	8.7.71
CCD/343	Japan	Working Paper on a biological approach to the question of verification on the prohibition of chemical weapons - Organophosphorus chemical agents	24.8.71
CCD/344	Japan	Working Paper containing remarks of Prof. Shunishi Yamada, the University of Tokyo, concerning the question of verification on the prohibition of chemical weapons, presented at the informal meeting on 7 July 1971	24.8.71

CCD/352	Argentina Brazil Burma Egypt Ethiopia India Mexico Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Sweden Yugoslavia	Joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	28.9.71
CCD/360	USA	Work Programme regarding negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons	20.3.72
CCD/361	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Mongolia Poland Romania USSR	Draft Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	28.3.72
CCD/365	USA	Working Paper on definitions of controlled substances	26.6.72
CCD/366	USA	Working Paper on storage of chemical agents and weapons	20.6.72
CCD/367	USA	Working Paper on the destruction of chemical weapons	20.6.72
CCD/368	USA	Working Paper: Statistics relating to production and trade of certain chemical substances in the United States	20.6.72
CCD/369	USA	Working Paper on United States domestic legislation regarding chemical substances	20.6.72
CCD/371	United Kingdom	Working Paper on remote detection of chemical weapon field tests	27.6.72
CCD/372	Sweden	Working Paper on two groups of chemical agents of warfare	28.6.72
CCD/373	Italy	Working Paper on identification and classification of chemical warfare agents and on some aspects of the problem of verification	29.6.72
CCD/374	Japan	Working Paper on the question of a criterion to be used to characterize super-toxic chemical agents	5.7.72
CCD/375	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on some aspects of the definition, classification and prohibition of chemical agents	5.7.72

CCD/377	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the elements of a system for the control of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons	20.7.72
CCD/381	Finland	Letter dated 21 July 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on definitions of chemical warfare agents and on technical possibilities for verification and control of C-weapons with particular regard to a Finnish project on creation on a national basis of a CW-control capacity for possible future international use	27.7.72
CCD/383	Netherlands	Working Paper on the possibility of delimitating nerve gases within the field of organophosphorus compounds	1.8.72
CCD/384	Sweden	Working Paper on domestic legislation in Sweden regarding chemical substances	8.8.72
CCD/387	Canada	Working Paper on toxicity of chemical substances, methods of estimation and applications to a chemical control agreement	24.8.72
CCD/395	Sweden	Working Paper on the concept of amplified verification in relation to the prohibition of chemical weapons - The principal role of verificiation in disarmament treaties	6.3.73
CCD/400	Argentina Brazil Burma Egypt Ethiopia Mexico Morocco Nigeria Sweden Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	26.4.73
CCD/403	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Mongolia Poland Romania USSR	Working Paper on ways of implementing control over compliance with the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	28.6.73
CCD/410	Netherlands	Working Paper on an international organ for the support of a CW convention and other disarmament agreements	31.7.73

CCD/412	Finland	Letter dated 9 August 1973 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Finland - On the progress of the Finnish project for the creation of a national basis of a CW control capacity for possible future international use	14.8.73
CCD/413	Japan	Working Paper on the main points of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction	21.8.73
CCD/414	Canada	The problem of defining chemical substances in a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons	21.8.73
CCD/420	Japan	Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	30.4.74
CCD/427	Sweden	Some observations on the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction presented by the Delegation of Japan on 30 April 1974 (CCD/420)	2.7.74
CCD/430	Japan	Working Paper containing views of Japanese experts on the scope of prohibition and on the verification for organophosphorus compounds for the informal meetings with participation of experts of the CCD in 1974	12.7.74
CCD/432	Finland	Letter dated 12 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents - Progress of a Finnish research project	16.7.74
CCD/433	Canada	The problem of defining compounds having military significance as irritating and incapacitating agents	16.7.74
CCD/434	Canada	Destruction and disposal of Canadian stocks of World War II mustard agents	16.7.74

CCD/435	USA	Working Paper on toxicity of chemical warfare agents	16.7.74
CCD/436	USA	Working Paper on chemical agent destruction	16.7.74
CCD/437	USA	Working Paper on diversion of commercial chemicals for weapons	16.7.74
CCD/452	Japan	Modification of the wording used in a draft convention (CCD/420) on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	8.4.75
CCD/453	Finland	Letter dated 2 July from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents - progress of a Finnish research project	4.7.75
CCD/458	Federal Republic of Germany	Working paper on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents	22.7.75
CCD/461	Sweden	Working paper on a model for delimitating chemical warfare agents in an international treaty	29.7.75
CCD/466	Japan	Working paper concerning the scope of chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of the national verification system	5.8.75
CCD/473	Canada	Working paper on use of measurements of lethality for definition of agents of chemical warfare	26.8.75
CCD/483	Japan	Working Paper on the question of chemical warfare agents to be prohibited by the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	8.4.76
CCD/485	Sweden	Working paper on some aspects of on-site verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons	9.4.76
CCD/497	United States	Verification of destruction of declared stocks of chemical warfare agents	29.6.76
CCD/498	United States	The use of seals and monitoring devices in CW verification	29.6.76
CCD/499	United States	Review of proposals for defining chemical warfare agents in a CW Agreement	29.6.76

CCD/501	Finland	Letter dated 1 July 1976 from the Ambassador in charge of Political Affairs at the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper by the Government of Finland on Methodology for Chemical Identification of CW Agents and Related Compounds - Progress of a Finnish Research Project	2.7.76
CCD/502 + Corr.1	United Kingdom	Working Paper on the Feasibility of Extra-territorial Surveillance of Chemical Weapon Tests by Air Monitoring at the Border	2.7.76
CCD/503	Yugoslavia	Medical protection against nerve gases poisoning (Present situation and future possibilities)	5.7.76
CCD/504	Yugoslavia	A method of categorization of chemical compounds regarding binary technology	5.7.76
CCD/505	Yugoslavia	Working Paper on the definition of chemical warfare agents (CWA)	5.7.76
CCD/506	German Democratic Republic	The catalytic detoxification of organo-phosphorus CW agents	6.7.76
CCD/508	Czechoslovakia	Some medical aspects of the CW problem and its perspectives	8.7.76
CCD/512	United Kingdom	Draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction	6.8.76
CCD/515	Japan	Working Paper: Draft of one form of LD50 spectrum	16.8.76
CCD/529	Japan	Some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons	22.3.77
CCD/531	United States	Working paper concerning incapacitating chemical warfare agents	28.3.77
CCD/533	Netherlands	Working paper concerning the verification of the presence of nerve agents, their decomposition products or starting materials downstream of chemical production plants	22.4.77
CCD/537/ Rev.1	Hungary	A possible method of defining toxic chemical agents	4.8.77
CCD/538	USSR	Some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons	3.8.77

CCD/539	USSR	Verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons	5.8.77
CCD/541	United Kingdom	Prophylaxis against nerve agent poisoning	5.8.77
CCD/544	Finland	Letter dated 19 August 1977 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning chemical and instrumental verification of organophosphorus warfare agents	19.8.77
CCD/569	Sweden	Working paper on a methodological investigation for computerized scanning of chemical literature	24.4.78

III. Question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction

CCD/511	USSR	Draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	3.8.76
CCD/511/Rev.1	USSR	Draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	8.8.77
CCD/514	USSR	On definitions of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	10.8.76
CCD/564	USSR	Draft decision of the CCD on the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction	28.3.78

IV. Question of the prohibition of radiological weapons

CCD/291	Netherlands	Working paper concerning United Nations General Assembly resolution 2602 C (XXIV)	14.7.70

V. Question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

A. General

ENDC/2	USSR and USA	Draft Treaty	19.3.62
ENDC/2/Add.1	USSR	Draft Treaty	19.7.62
ENDC/2/Rev.1	USSR	Draft Treaty	26.11.62
ENDC/2/Rev.1/ Corr.1	USSR	Draft Treaty	20.12.62
ENDC/2/Rev.1/ Add.1	USSR	Additions and Amendments to Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament	4.2.64
ENDC/3	USSR	Memorandum on Negotiations	19.3.62
ENDC/4/Rev.1	USSR	Statement by Mr. Gromyko on 15.3.62	19.3.62
ENDC/5	USSR and USA	Joint Statement of agreed principles	19.3.62
ENDC/6	USA	Programme of Disarmament	19.3.62
ENDC/7	USA	Messages by President Kennedy	16.3.62
ENDC/8	USSR	Messages by Mr. Khrushev	19.3.62
ENDC/15	USSR	Address by World Council of Peace	24.3.62
ENDC/18	USA	Part I of Draft Treaty: Objectives and Principles	4.4.62
ENDC/19/Rev.1	Canada	Comparison between USSR and USA proposals	6.4.62
ENDC/21	USSR	Appeal by World Congress of Women	6.4.62
ENDC/22	USSR	Appeal from Women of 10 countries	6.4.62
ENDC/26	USSR	Messages from the West German Women's Movement for Peace	13.4.62
ENDC/30 & Corr.1	USA	Basic provisions of a Treaty	14.4.62
ENDC/30/Add.1		Basic provisions of a Treaty	6.8.62
ENDC/30/Add.2		Basic provisions of a Treaty	8.8.62
ENDC/30/Add.3		Amendments to Basic Provisions of Treaty	14.8.63
ENDC/33	USSR	Appeal by Young Workers of Germany	24.4.62
ENDC/34	USSR	Report of Mr. Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR	5.4.62
ENDC/36	Canada	Comparison between USSR and USA proposals	4.5.62
ENDC/36/Rev.1	Canada	Comparison of US/USSR Disarmament proposals	20.8.63
ENDC/40/Rev.1	USSR and USA	Working Draft of Part I	31.5.62
ENDC/44	USA	Statement by President Kennedy	16.7.62
ENDC/47	USSR	Speech by Mr. Krushchev at World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow on 10.7.62	16.7.62

ENDC/55	USSR & USA	Working Draft of Article 4	
ENDC/69	USA	Draft Article 5 (Part II, Stage I)	10.12.62
ENDC/53	UK	Preliminary Study on elimination of rockets	1.8.62
ENDC/54	UK	Preliminary Study on verification of destruction of rockets	1.8.62
ENDC/60 & Corr.1	UK	Preliminary Study on technical possibility of international control of fissile material production	31.8.62
ENDC/64	G.A.	Resolution 1767 (XVII)	26.11.62
ENDC/79	Canada	Comparison of Developments in US/ USSR Disarmament Plans (1960-63)	3.4.63
ENDC/L.1	Sweden	Observations on preamble	30.3.62
ENDC/L.2	UK	Amendments on USSR preamble	31.3.62
ENDC/L.3	USA	Draft preamble	2.4.62
ENDC/L.4	Canada	Draft preamble	2.4.62
ENDC/L.5	India	Draft preamble	2.4.62
ENDC/L.6	Italy	Memorandum of preamble	2.4.62
ENDC/L.7	USSR & USA	Working draft preamble	6.4.62
ENDC/L.8	Brazil	Comments on ENDC/L.7	12.4.62
ENDC/L.9	Italy	Memorandum on Part I of Draft Treaty (articles 1,2,3)	16.4.62
ENDC/L.10	UK	Comments on Part I	16.4.62
ENDC/L.11	USSR & USA	Working draft preamble	16.4.62
ENDC/L.11/ Rev.1		" " "	17.4.62
ENDC/L.12	UK	Further comments on Part I	27.4.62
ENDC/L.13	Sweden	Amendments to USSR Draft of Part I	27.4.62
ENDC/L.14	Sweden	Amendments to USA Draft of Part I	27.4.62
ENDC/L.15	Canada	Comments on Part I	27.4.62
ENDC/L.16	India	Observations on Part I	27.4.62
ENDC/L.17	Bulgaria	Working Paper on Draft Article 4 (Part II, Stage I)	25.7.62
ENDC/L.17/ Rev.1	Bulgaria	" " "	31.7.62
ENDC/L.18	USA	Working Draft of Article 4	30.7.62
ENDC/81	USSR	Letter containing a Proposal of GDR on Disarmament and European Security	5.4.63
ENDC/84	USSR	Note of 8 April to US Government on NATO, W. Germany and M.L.F.	17.4.63
ENDC/86	USSR and USA	Statement from Women for Peace Pilgrimage to Rome	3.5.63
ENDC/88	Czechoslovakia	Statement on Nato, W. Germany and M.L.F.	22.5.63

ENDC/89	UK	Note of 18 May in reply to USSR note of 8 April (ENDC/84)	24.5.63
ENDC/90	USA	Note of 18 May in reply to USSR note of 8 April (ENDC/84)	24.5.63
ENDC/91	USSR	Note of 20 May to the USA	27.5.63
ENDC/92	Brazil	Manifesto by Special Assembly on Man's Right to Freedom from Hunger (Rome, 17 March)	27.5.63
ENDC/93/ Rev.1	Ethiopia, Nigeria and the U.A.R.	Resolution adopted by the Conference of Heads of African States on 25 May	18.6.63
ENDC/95	USA	Excerpts from President Kennedy's address on Peace, (Washington, 10 June)	11.6.63
ENDC/109	USA	Draft Articles VI to XII of Treaty	14.8.63
ENDC/136	Nigeria	Working document on Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	14.7.63
ENDC/143 and ENDC/144	Brazil, Burma Ehtiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, UAR	Memoranda on suggestions and proposals made during 1964	14.9.63
ENDC/118	USSR	Statements by Mr. Krushchev on peaceful co-existence on 31 December 1963	21.1.63
ENDC/125	USSR	Representations to FRG for production of missiles	6.2. 63
ENDC/127	USSR	Statements by Mr. Gromyko on ENDC, disarmament and collateral measures	4.3.63
ENDC/128	USA	Statement by State Department on Mr. Gromyko's statements	5.3.63
ENDC/147	USA	Message of President Johnson to ENDC	17.8.63
ENDC/163	His Holiness Pope Paul VI	Transmittal of the text of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by His Holiness Pope Paul VI	26.1.66
ENDC/165	USA	Message dated 27 January 1966 from President Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.	27.1.66
ENDC/166	UK	Message dated 27 January 1966 from Prime Minister Wilson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	28.1.66
ENDC/167	USSR	Message dated 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	3.2.66

ENDC/171	Ethiopia	Message from His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	1.3.66
ENDC/187	USA	Message of the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	21.2.67
ENDC/188	UK	Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson	21.2.67
ENDC/209/ Rev.1 ENDC/209		Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile presented on 29 November 1967 to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	15.12.67
ENDC/221	Italy	Working Paper	6.3.68
ENDC/227	USSR	Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament	16.7.68
ENDC/245	Italy	Working Paper setting forth suggestions for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme	21.4.69
ENDC/263	Italy	Statement by Ambassador R. Caracciolo at the Informal Meeting of the ENDC on 20 August 1969	20.8.69
CCD/287	Sweden	Working paper presenting the ways in which verification has been dealt with in various arms control and disarmament treaties and proposals	30.4.70
CCD/307	USA	Working paper on Conventional Arms Limitation	12.8.70
CCD/319	USA	Message from Mr. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America, to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	23.2.71
CCD/321	Mexico, Sweden Yugoslavia	Letter dated 10 March 1971 to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General from the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia	11.3.71
CCD/326	USSR	Letter dated 6 April 1971 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	6.4.71

CCD/350	USSR	Letter dated 7 September 1971 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	7.9.71 (For technical reasons reissued as CCD/350/Rev.1 in Russian only)
CCD/362	USSR	Letter dated 6 April 1972 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations	6.4.72
CCD/394	Mexico	Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	20.2.73
CCD/396	Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco Nigeria, Sweden, Yugoslavia	Memorandum (on the CCD)	14.3.73
CCD/398	Sweden	Working Paper presenting the ways in which verification has been dealt with in various arms control and disarmament treaties and proposals	24.4.73
CCD/426	Canada	Text of a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, on 22 May 1974	23.5.74
CCD/429	Nigeria	Letter dated 5 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the CCD	11.7.74
CCD/439	Mexico	Letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the CCD	6.8.74
CCD/447	USA	Message from the President of the United States of America	4.3.75

V. B. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

ENDC/5	USSR & USA	Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations	19.3.62
ENDC/245	Italy	Working Paper setting forth suggestions for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme	21.4.69
CCD/276	Netherlands	Working Paper Containing Some Introductory Remarks on Steps Toward a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme	24.2.70
CCD/309	Italy	Working Paper on a comprehensive programme programme of disarmament	19.8.70
CCD/313	Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia	Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	27.8.70
CCD/449	Romania	Steps to be taken within a Disarmament Programme	13.3.75
CCD/510	Nigeria	Working Paper on Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade	3.8.76
CCD/522	USSR	Memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament	15.2.77
CCD/545	Mexico	Working Paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Containing a preliminary draft of comprehensive programme of disarmament	23.8.77
CCD/548	Italy	Working Paper on the question of the drafting of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	31.1.78
CCD/549 + Corr.1	Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom	Working Paper on a draft programme of action	2.2.78
CCD/550 + Corr.1	Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia, Zäire	Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Non-Aligned Working Document Containing the Draft Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery for Implementation (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)	16.2.78
CCD/552	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR	Working Paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament	21.2.78
CCD/553	Romania	Working Paper on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament	21.2.78
CCD/554	Sweden	Elements for inclusion in the programme of action of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament and in its documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations (A/AC.187/95)	21.2.78

CCD/555	Nigeria	Suggestions for inclusion in a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	24.2.78
CCD/560	Mexico	Some fundamental principles and norms for inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977 (A/AC.187/56)	10.3.78
CCD/561	Mexico	Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.187/89)	10.3.78
CCD/561/ Add.1	Mexico	Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.187/89/Add.1): Addendum to the working paper in document CCD/561	10.3.78
CCD/566	Secretariat	Compilation of the documents and proposals submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	4.4.78
CCD/567	Secretariat	Tabulation of working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament	18.4.78

VI. Question of further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed

CCD/543	Final document of the Review Conference of the parties to the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof	17.8.77

VII. CCD Organization and Procedures

ENDC/1		Procedural arrangements	14.3.62
ENDC/1/Add.1			28.3.62
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ENDC/14	USSR	Memorandum of 26.9.61	24.3.62
ENDC/C1/2	USSR & USA	Agreed recommendation by Co-Chairmen	2.4.62
ENDC/C1/12	USSR	Recommendation	25.4.62
ENDC/C1/14	USA	Recommendation	26.4.62
ENDC/C1/17) ENDC/C1/19)	USSR & USA	Agreed recommendation by Co-Chairmen	24.5.62
ENDC/50		UK proposals	17.7.62
CCD/272	Mexico	Statements made by the Representative of Mexico concerning the enlargement of the ENDC and the change of its name	30.10.69
CCD/277	Mexico	Working Paper containing some comments and suggestions for making the Committee on Disarmament more effective	5.3.70
CCD/385	Mexico	Working Paper containing a subject index of opinions expressed on the question of the re-organization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1972 session (545th to 574th meetings)	8.8.72
CCD/389	Italy	Working Paper on the problem of re-organization of the negotiating structures in the disarmament field	28.8.72
CCD/390	Mexico	Working Paper reproducing statements dealing with re-organization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which were made at formal meetings of the Conference between 29 February and 24 August 1972 (545th to 580th meetings)	28.8.72
CCD/415	Mexico	Working Paper containing a compilation of statements made on the stagnation of the Committee's work, the absence of effective negotiations, and other related matters, at the formal meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held from 20 February to 16 August 1973 (585th to 622nd meetings)	23.8.73
CCD/450	Romania	Proposal regarding some adjustments in the organization of the work of the CCD	25.3.75

CCD/500		Decision on certain procedural aspects of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for 1976 and on organization of work for 1977 (Adopted at the 708th Meeting of the Conference on 1 July 1976)	1.7.76
CCD/527		Schedule of CCD meetings for spring session	1.3.77
CCD/530 + Add.1	Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zäire and Morocco	Working paper on CCD procedures	23.3.77
CCD/532		Decision on certain procedural aspects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	21.4.77
CCD/535		Schedule of CCD meetings for summer session	21.7.77
CCD/551		Schedule of CCD meetings for spring session	16.2.78
CCD/563		Working paper on organization and procedures of the CCD submitted by the members of its Group of 15	17.3.78
CCD/565	Netherlands	Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency	30.3.78
CCD/568	Italy	Working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament	24.4.78

CCD/573/Corr.1(VOL.II)
22 May 1978

Original: ENGLISH

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

CORRIGENDUM

page 97, para. 239

Delete last sentence of paragraph beginning "The delegation also held that..." placing reference "(CCD/PV.771)" after "...was a good basis for further intensive discussion."

page 99, para. 244

Add the following as new last sentence

"The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also held that it should be possible to elaborate a convention that would save mankind from developing new types of mass destruction weapons in that sphere (CCD/PV.771)."

CCD/574
27 July 1978
Original: ENGLISH

SCHEDULE OF CCD MEETINGS FOR 1978 SUMMER SESSION
(Adopted at the 795th Plenary Meeting on 27 July 1978)

Plenary Meetings

Plenary meetings will continue to be held on Tuesday and Thursday at 10.30 a.m., unless decided otherwise. The agenda for the plenary meetings, adopted on 15 August 1968, reads as follows:

> "1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
>
> "Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.
>
> "2. Non-nuclear measures.
>
> "Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.
>
> "3. Other collateral measures.
>
> "Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the seabed, etc.
>
> "4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
>
> "The Co-Chairmen note the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any meeting of the Committee."

INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE CCD

11-27 July */	- Informal meetings of the CCD, as required, to discuss the CCD Summer Session schedule of work.
31 July - 4 August	- Informal meetings of the CCD to consider the progress in the 24-28 July deliberations of the Group of Scientific Experts.
7-11 August	- Informal meetings of the CCD on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is understood that there will be a statement on the status of the trilateral negotiations on the subject.

14-18 August - Informal meetings of the CCD, with participation of experts, on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

21-25 August - Informal meetings of the CCD on CW. It is understood that there will be a statement on the status of the bilateral negotiations.

Week Prior to Adjournment **/ - Informal meetings of the CCD to consider the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly.

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*/ During the period 24-28 July, the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet to study the scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental test of a possible global network of seismological stations for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests, and a protocol, which would be an integral part of the treaty, covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

**/ On 10 April 1975, the Committee decided, *inter alia*, that the report of the Conference on its activities shall be transmitted to the United Nations General Assembly on the last Thursday in August unless decided otherwise. Also, the Committee is free to convene at any time during the remainder of the year upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen after full consultations with Committee members, in order to conduct negotiations on the priority items on its agenda.

CCD/575
14 August 1978
ENGLISH
Original : RUSSIAN

HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Working paper on infrasound weapons

1. Introduction

The development of technical military equipment has accelerated considerably over the past few decades. On the basis of the results of development obtained in various sectors of science and technology, new and more up-to-date military equipment and armaments are appearing and proliferating, and this quite rapidly. The emergence of a large number of new types of military equipment inevitably leads to the intensification of the arms race, since every army is anxious not to lag behind the others.

The intensive development of science and technology may lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction which differ qualitatively from the preceding ones, while their mass destruction effect may be identical with or greater than that of existing types of weapons of mass destruction.

The emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction would considerably intensify the arms race and would require vast material expenditure, since a qualitatively new type of weapon would upset the balance of power and would cast doubt on all the results achieved earlier at disarmament conferences.

These considerations, and awareness of the possibilities of scientific and technological progress, justify alarm concerning the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. This was realized by the Soviet Union, which drew up and submitted to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft agreement on the "Prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" (CCD/511).

The United Nations General Assembly considered that the question deserved attention and transmitted the draft agreement to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, in which negotiations were begun in 1976 with the participation of experts. During these negotiations the first questions to be clarified were as follows:

The extent to which there is a real possibility of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction;

The scientific and technological areas in which a development in that direction may be expected;

The particular new types of weapons of mass destruction that may be foreseen;

The list to be annexed to the above-mentioned draft agreement.

Several of these questions have so far been discussed at unofficial meetings of experts. At the most recent meetings, agreement began to crystallize on the need for including four categories of new types of weapons of mass destruction in the aforesaid list.

Of these four categories, that of infrasound weapons deserves special attention, since, on the basis of progress made in accoustics, the development of such equipment already seems possible in the foreseeable future.

2. Infrasound

Infrasound denotes elastic waves which are similar to sound waves, but have frequencies below the range of those audible to human beings. The upper limit of the infrasound range is generally accepted to be that of frequencies 16 - 25 hertz. The lower limit of the infrasound range has not been determined. Oscillations of tenths and even hundredths of a hertz, i.e. with periods of some ten seconds, may be of practical interest.

Infrasounds occur in the noise of the atmosphere, forests and seas; their source is atmospheric turbulence and wind (for example, the "voice of the sea", that is to say, infrasound oscillations caused by wind eddying on the crests of waves). Other sources of infrasound oscillations are atmospheric discharges (thunder), and also explosions and artillery fire.

Tremors and vibrations of infrasound frequencies in the earth's crust are caused by a wide variety of sources - explosions, clouds and other exciters.

A characteristic of infrasound is low absorption in various media, as a result of which infrasound waves in the air, water and earth's crust can propagate over very long distances without noticeable attenuation. It is easy to prove on the basis of accoustics that the propagation distance of infrasound waves is in inverse proportion to their frequency. For example, infrasounds at frequencies of up to 10 - 15 hertz will propagate over several hundred kilometres. Another peculiarity of infrasound waves is that it is practically impossible to set up any obstacles to their propagation path, since even large and solid installations have absolutely no effect.

The reception and measurement of infrasound oscillations is effected by microphones, hydrophones and geophones, "electro-accoustic" transformers or vibrometers.

3. Harmful effects of infrasound on the human organism

The human being does not hear infrasounds, although some of them are received. Yet infrasounds are received not by the organs of hearing, but by the organism as a whole. The effects of infrasound oscillations on the human organism are generally harmful.

Even slight infrasound radiations at certain frequencies induce headaches, giddiness, nausea, disorders of vision, throat spasms, breathing disorders and "psychotropic" effects, causing a feeling of fear and loss of consciousness. In some cases even a single exposure to low-power infrasound radiation can lead to epilepsy.

Certain researchers have discovered that the above-mentioned psychotropic effect is caused by infrasound at a frequency of 7 hertz. It has been determined that this frequency can be particularly harmful because it corresponds to the alpha-rhythm frequencies of the brain.

On the basis of the above-mentioned phenomena, it has been determined that a low-power infrasound affects the biocurrents of the brain and the nervous system as a whole, that is to say, a person's psychic condition, and may lead to the loss of military and defensive capacity.

Exposure to powerful infrasound radiations may lead to lethal discharges through injury to human internal organs.

Radiation of human beings by powerful infrasound leads to strong vibration of their internal organs, and that, in turn, can lead to the rupture of these organs, and to overloading of the cardiovascular system.

Research has shown that the harmful effect of infrasound on the human organism is most dangerous at frequency 7 - 8 hertz, because this corresponds to the resonance frequency of the human internal organs. In these cases, the "resonance" phenomenon occurs and the human internal organs are ruptured.

These effects of infrasound on human beings - feelings of acute pain, pathological changes in the human organism and fatal outcome - first began to be known after the Second World War, for it was at that time in connexion with the appearance of powerful jet-engine rockets and supersonic aircraft, that research was started on the effects of powerful sound radiation on the human being.

It was found that irreversible changes in the human organism will occur in the event of infrasound radiations even with an intensity below 100 decibels.

4. Possible types of infrasound weapons

Specific military systems of infrasound weapons of mass destruction of human life based on the harmful effects of infrasound radiations on the human organism have now become possible. The potential varieties of this new type of weapon of mass destruction are:

Psychotropic **types** of infrasound weapons;

Types of infrasound weapons for injuring human internal organs.

Examples of these types of weapons can even be found in world scientific and technological literature.

In order to manufacture an infrasound weapon, it is possible, for example, to use a simple aircraft jet engine, operating at a low frequency, to one end of which a long open tube is attached.

According to engineering calculations, infrasound oscillations might also be generated by a screw several metres in diameter placed in a tube and actuated by a gas-turbine aircraft engine.

The size of these structures is of course too large and their mobility is limited, but as science and technology develop, the size and weight parameters of the structures can be considerably reduced.

Research has shown that certain characteristic properties of infrasound can be used as a weapon of mass destruction. The most important of these is the great propagation distance and also the fact that this propagation cannot be hindered, that is to say, that there are practically no methods of defence against the effects of infrasound.

This means that the use of infrasound weapons can cause the mass destruction of people in shelters and in armoured military equipment.

The results of technological and economic analyses of the destructive effects of infrasound also serve as arguments for its military use.

On the basis of these analyses, it has been discovered that the specific indices of the destructive effect of this new weapon are fully acceptable. Calculations have shown that the destruction of human beings would theoretically require considerably less expenditure by infrasound weapons than by any existing type of weapons of mass destruction.

5. Conclusions

It is clear from the foregoing that infrasound can in future become the basis of one of the dangerous types of new weapons of mass destruction. On the basis of scientific and technological developments, the appearance of these new types of weapons of mass destruction can already be expected in the foreseeable future.

All this leads to the unequivocal conclusion that the scope of the agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction must also be extended to the military use of infrasound weapons of mass destruction, that is to say, infrasound weapons of mass destruction must also be included in the list annexed to the draft agreement.

Finally, it should be noted that the Soviet Union's initiative and draft agreement of 1975 in no way hamper scientific and technological research or the freedom of scientific and technological advancement, but are directed only towards limiting the use of scientific and technological achievements for military purposes; accordingly, where infrasound is concerned, it is proposed only to prohibit its use as a weapon of mass destruction.

This prohibition would in no way serve as an obstacle to the development of accoustics for peaceful purposes. The prohibition of types of infrasound weapons of mass destruction would not restrict scientific and technological progress, but would simply protect mankind from the emergence of one of the new and very dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction.

CCD/576
15 August 1978
Original: ENGLISH

SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. In pursuance of the decision taken by the CCD on 4 May 1978 (CCD/570) that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events conduct additional work, the Group held its sixth plenary session from 24 to 28 July 1978 in Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden.

2. Scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the CCD participated in the session: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.

3. By its decision of 18 July 1978, the CCD had invited Austria to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group. Thus scientific experts and representatives of the following States not Members of the CCD also participated in the sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group: Austria, Australia, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.

4. The Group agreed, inter alia, on a provisional table of contents for its second report, with main headings as follows:

Chapter 1. Summary of the report

Chapter 2. Background and mandate

Chapter 3. Instructions and specification for data to be routinely produced at participating stations (Level I data)

Chapter 4. Instructions and specifications for data format and procedure for Level I data transmission through the WMO communications network

Chapter 5. Instructions and specifications for procedures to be used for data analysis at data centers

Chapter 6. Instructions and specifications for format and procedures for the exchange of wave form data (Level II data)

Chapter 7. Recommendations.

5. After thorough discussion, the Group agreed on guidelines for working groups to produce drafts on Chapters three, four, five and six of its second report and established the corresponding working groups headed by the following convenors:

Dr. Kárník (Czechoslovakia), Dr. Suyehiro (Japan), Dr. Dahlman (Sweden) and Dr. Thirlaway (United Kingdom). The Ad Hoc Group also agreed on a tentative schedule for the further work of the working groups, including meetings on 27 and 28 July 1978.

6. The Ad Hoc Group suggested that a representative of the WMO be invited by the CCD to participate informally in the work of the Group in relation to the transmission of data through the WMO communication network.

7. The Group also established a draft agenda for its seventh and eighth sessions, tentatively to be convened at the end of February and the end of April 1979, respectively. In particular, the Group agreed, subject to decision by the CCD, to hold its next session in the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 19 February to 2 March 1979.

8. However, as a result of the discussions of the Ad Hoc Group, it became clear that the time originally allotted by the CCD for the final report would be insufficient to provide as detailed and comprehensive results as the CCD might wish. Therefore, the Ad Hoc Group asked its Chairman to consult with the CCD about the possibility to further continue its work to prepare its final report.

CCD/577*
22 August 1978

ENGLISH ONLY

LETTER DATED 14 AUGUST 1978 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA ADDRESSED TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT CONCERNING AN ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE FOR THE VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT - TRACE ANALYSIS BY GLASS CAPILLARY GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY WITH SPECIFIC DETECTORS

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a study entitled 'An Analytical Technique for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament - Trace Analysis by Glass Capillary Gas Chromatography with Specific Detectors', prepared for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland by the Advisory Board for Disarmament. I would very much appreciate it if the paper could be distributed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an official document.

Additional copies of the study may be obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki.

(Signed) Garth Castrén
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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* A limited distribution of this document has been made to the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UN 47

CCD/578/Add.1/Vol.II
31 August 1978

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Addendum

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Texts of Working Papers

CCD/INF.1/Rev.32
31 January 1978

Original: ENGLISH

BASIC INFORMATION FOR DELEGATIONS ON CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND DOCUMENTATION

1. Conference Room

The meetings of the Conference will be held in Salle XII. Delegations will have at their disposal a room with facilities for informal meetings. Should a delegation or a group of delegations wish to hold an informal meeting, the Conference Officer should be notified in advance in order that the necessary arrangements may be made.

2. Conference Secretariat

		Office No.	Tel No.
Mr. Risto Hyvärinen	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	A.644	3026
Ms. A. Segarra	Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General	A.650	3029
Mrs. L. Waldheim-Natural	Chief, Geneva Unit Centre for Disarmament	A.646	3038/3036
Mr. S. Buo	Political Affairs Officer	A.637	3010
Mr. G. Efimov	Political Affairs Officer	A.635	3009
Mr. K. Lin	Political Affairs Officer	A.639	3011
Mrs. F. Ertan	Research Assistant	A.648	3027/3036
Mrs. S. Thompson-Micuta	Documents Submitting and Conference Officer	A.642	3036/3027

* * *

Mr. V.K. Lobatchev	Director, Conference and General Services	276	3476
Mr. A.R. Courtois	Chief, Conference Division	B.532	3650
Mr. J. Halpérin	Chief, Languages Division	E.5086	5306
Mr. B. Yakovlev	Chief, Interpretation Division	C.524	3074
Mr. G. de Warlincourt	Chief, Documents Division	E.68	4736
Mr. A.E. Schutte	Chief, Documents and Editorial Control Section	B.534	3660
Miss J.L. Day	Chief, Meetings Co-ordination and Servicing Section	B.540	3665
Mr. C.E. Bourbonnière	Director, United Nations Information Service	C.304	2300

3. Passes

Passes will be required for entry into meetings. They will be issued as soon as the list of members of delegations is received from each delegation.

4. Final Records

The record of each meeting will consist of the texts of prepared statements made at the meeting, the definite versions of which will be provided by the delegations concerned. Each statement will be translated from the original language into the other three working languages after the meeting. The sole and final record, in each of the four working languages, will consist of a cover sheet, the attendance list, the "Communiqué of the meeting" and the statements, including announcements by the Chairman and any decisions taken by the Conference.

Delegations making statements are accordingly requested to transmit their texts, including any changes made before or during delivery, in five clearly typewritten copies, with any changes legibly made by hand, as soon as possible after delivery, to the Documents Submitting Officer in the meeting room and in any case not later than 2p.m. on the day of the meeting to Office A.642.

5. Preparation of Documents other than Statements

All documents which a delegation wishes to have translated and reproduced should be submitted to the Documents Submitting Officer in a minimum of five copies for the purposes of translation and reproduction.

The Conference Officer will be at the disposal of delegations to arrange distribution of prepared statements to other delegations during a meeting.

6. Interpretation

For the interpretation of statements in the meetings, the customary interpretation service will be provided.

Delegations are invited to provide five copies of prepared statements and documents for the simultaneous interpreters to the Conference Officer as soon as possible before the meeting begins.

7. Distribution of Documents

In the case of morning meetings, if the statements do not exceed a total of 15 pages, the record will normally be ready for distribution on the following day. They can be collected from documents pick-up boxes located next to Salle III, near the Documents Office, Room C.111, telephone extension 2609.

/...

8. Reference Documentation

A Research and Reference Collection of CCD documents and records as well as of other disarmament-related documents and publications has now been established by the Secretariat. Queries from delegates should be channeled to the Documents Officer when related to current documents of the CCD. Such queries relating to older CCD documents and to all other disarmament-related documents and publications including those from New York should be referred to the Research Assistant(A.648, telephone 3027/3036).

9. Non-Governmental Communications

All relevant communications addressed to the Conference or to the Secretariat will be retained, as in the past, by the Secretariat and will be available for consultation by delegations. A list of all communications retained by the Secretariat will be circulated to delegations periodically.

CCD/INF.1/Rev.32/Corr.1
5 April 1978

Original: ENGLISH

BASIC INFORMATION FOR DELEGATIONS ON CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND DOCUMENTATION

The telephone extension and office number of the following secretariat staff remains valid from the present date until the end of the spring session of the CCD.

2. Conference Secretariat

		Office No.	Tel. No.
Ms. A. Segarra	Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General	A.650	3029/3020
Mr. E. Stanger	Senior Political Affairs Officer	A.641	3023

* * *

CCD/INF.1/Rev.33
11 July 1978

Original: ENGLISH

BASIC INFORMATION FOR DELEGATIONS ON CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS AND DOCUMENTATION

1. Conference Room

The meetings of the Conference will be held in Salle XII. Delegations will have at their disposal a room with facilities for informal meetings. Should a delegation or a group of delegations wish to hold an informal meeting, the Conference Officer should be notified in advance in order that the necessary arrangements may be made.

2. Conference Secretariat

		Office No.	Tel No.
Mr. Risto Hyvärinen	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	A.644	3026
Mr. A. Corradini	Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General	A.650	3029
Mr. Liviu Bota	Senior Political Affairs Officer	A.635	3009
Mrs. L. Waldheim-Natural	Chief, Geneva Unit Centre for Disarmament	A.646	3038/3021
Mr. S. Kheradi	Political Affairs Officer	A.637	3010
Mrs. S. Thompson-Micuta	Documents Submitting and Conference Officer	A.642	3036/3021
Mrs. F. Ertan	Research Assistant	A.648	3027/3021

* * *

		Office No.	Tel No.
Mr. V.K. Lobatchev	Director, Conference and General Services	276	3476
Mr. A.R. Courtois	Chief, Conference Division	B.532	3650
Mr. J. Halpérin	Chief, Languages Division	E.5086	5306
Mr. B. Yakovlev	Chief, Interpretation Division	C.524	3074
Mr. G. de Warlincourt	Chief, Documents Division	E.68	4736
Mr. A.E. Schutte	Chief, Documents and Editorial Control Section	B.534	3660
Miss J.L. Day	Chief, Meetings Co-ordination and Servicing Section	B.540	3665
Mr. A. Curnow	Director, United Nations Information Service	C.304	2300

3. Passes

Passes will be required for entry into meetings. Those issued during the session of the Conference which commenced on 31 January 1978 will remain valid. Passes will be issued to new members as soon as the list of members of delegations is received from each delegation.

4. Final Records

The record of each meeting will consist of the texts of prepared statements made at the meeting, the definite versions of which will be provided by the delegations concerned. Each statement will be translated from the original language into the other three working languages after the meeting. The sole and final record, in each of the four working languages, will consist of a cover sheet, the attendance list, the "Communiqué of the meeting" and the statements, including announcements by the Chairman and any decisions taken by the Conference.

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Delegations are invited to provide five copies of prepared statements and documents for the simultaneous interpreters to the Conference Officer as soon as possible before the meeting begins.

7. Distribution of Documents

In the case of morning meetings, if the statements do not exceed a total of 15 pages, the record will normally be ready for distribution on the following day. They can be collected from documents pick-up boxes located next to Salle III. Additional copies of CCD documents can be obtained from the Documents Distribution counter, Room C.111, telephone extension 2609 (near Salle III).

8. Reference Documentation

A Research and Reference Collection of CCD documents and records as well as of other disarmament-related documents and publications has now been established by the Secretariat. Queries from delegates should be channeled to the Documents Officer when related to current documents of the CCD. Such queries relating to older CCD documents and to all other disarmament-related documents and publications including those from New York should be referred to the Research Assistant (A.648, telephone 3027/3036).

9. Non-Governmental Communications

All relevant communications addressed to the Conference or to the Secretariat will be retained, as in the past, by the Secretariat and will be available for consultation by delegations. A list of all communications retained by the Secretariat will be circulated to delegations periodically.

CCD/INF.2/Rev.63
9 February 1978

Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. Delegation of Argentina
Address: 93 rue de la Servette, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.18.00

Mr. D. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Fernando Jimenez Dávila	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Mr. D. Atilio N. Molteni	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative

2. Delegation of Brazil
Address: 33 rue Antoine-Carteret, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.31.50

Mr. George Maciel	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Mr. Aderbal Costa	Minister-Counsellor Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Italo Mastrogiovanni	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Guilherme Raymundo B. Arroio	Secretary Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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* Wife present

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3. Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Address: 16 chemin des Crêts-de-Pregny, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 33.91.39

Dr. Petar Voutov	Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Mr. Geri Gavrilov	Counsellor Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sofia
Mr. Ilia Petrov	First Secretary Permanent Representation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Ivan Sotirov	Second Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sofia

4. Delegation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma

Address: Embassy of the Socialist Republic of
the Union of Burma
Giacomettistrasse 3
3006 Berne
Tel. No: (031) 43.30.24

U Tha Tun	Chargé d'Affaires a.i. Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern
U Thaung Htun	Second Secretary Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern

5. Delegation of Canada

Address: 10A avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No. 34.19.50

*Mr. R. Harry Jay	Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. J.T. Simard	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
*Mr. C. Sirois	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva

6. Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Address: 9 Ancienne Route, 1218 Grande Saconnex, Geneva
Tel.No: 34.95.56, 34.95.57, Ext. 52

Dr. Miloslav Růžek	Ambassador, Permament Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Dr. Evžen Zápotocký	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative
Mr. Jan Jirůšek	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Vladimír Rohal-Ilkiv	Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Prague

---

* Wife present

7. Delegation of Egypt
Address: 72 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 31.65.30

Mr. Omran El-Shafei	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of the Delegation
Mr. Fawzi El Ibrashi	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Ahmed Aboul Kheir	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Moustapha Omar	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Taher Dinana	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

8. Delegation of Ethiopia
Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel.No: 34.40.80

Mr. Tadesse Terrefe	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office in Geneva Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Gebrekidan Alula	Deputy Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office at Geneva

9. Delegation of the German Democratic Republic
Address: 49 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.67.50

*Dr. Gerhard Herder	Ambassador Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of Delegation
Mr. Manfred Graczynski	Captain of the Navy Ministry of National Defence Military Adviser
Mr. Max Rakau	Third Secratary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10. Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany
Address: 28D chemin due Petit-Saconnex, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 31.97.70

*Dr. Gerhard Pfeiffer	Ambassador Head of Delegation
Dr. Jürgen Pöhlmann	Counsellor Deputy Representative
Colonel Dr. K. Hannesschläger	Military Adviser

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* Wife present

11. Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic

Address: 20 rue Crespin, 1206 Geneva
Tel.No: 46.03.23

*Mr. Mátyás Domokos	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of the Delegation
*Mr. Istvân Körmendy	Second Secretary
Mr. András Lakatos	Third Secretary

12. Delegation of India

Address: 9 rue de Valais, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 32.08.59

*Mr. C.R. Gharekhan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. S.T. Devare	Counsellor Alternate Representative
*Mr. B. Balakrishnan	Second Secretary Adviser

---

* Wife present

13. Delegation of Iran

Address: 28 chemin due Petit-Saconnex, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.30.04

*Mr. M. Fartash	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva. Leader of the Delegation
Mr. H. Ameri	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Miss Chirine Tahmasseb	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. D. Chilaty	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva

14. Delegation of Italy

Address: 10 chemin de l'Impératrice, 1292 Pregny, Geneva
Tel. No: 33.47.50

Ambassador's Office: 34.69.46

*Mr. Nicolo Di Bernardo	Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Maurizio Moreno	Counsellor Alternate Representative
*Mr. Giuseppe Valdevit	First Secretary
*Gen. Carlo Frateschi	Military Adviser

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* Wife present

15. Delegation of Japan

Address: 10 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 34.84.00

*Mr. Motoo Ogiso	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Teruyuki Sawai	Minister Deputy Leader of the Delegation Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. Yoshihiro Nakamura	First Secretary Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. Takashi Hirokawa	Second Secretary Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

16. Delegation of Mexico

Address: 13 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 34.57.40, 34.57.49

Mr. Alfonso García Robles	Ambassador Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Miguel Marín	Minister Counsellor Alternate Representative
Miss Alicia Cabrera	First Secretary Alternate Representative

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* Wife present

17. Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic

Address: 4 chemin des Mollies, 1293 Bellevue, Geneva
Tel.No: 74.19.74, 74.19.75

*Dr. Dugersurengiin Erdembileg	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva

18. Delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco

Address: 22 chemin François Lehmann, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Geneva
Tel.No: 98.15.35, 98.15.36

*Mr. Ali Skalli	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Sidi Mohammed Rahhali	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mohammed Chraïbi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva

19. Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel.No: 33.73.50

*Mr. Richard H. Fein	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Arend J. Meerburg	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation

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* Wife present

20. Delegation of Nigeria
Address: 44 rue de Lausanne, 1201 Geneva
Tel. No: 31.91.49, 31.91.40

*Mr. Olu Adeniji	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. G.A. Falase	Minister Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. K. Ahmed	Senior Counsellor Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. S.T. Adamu	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Dr. B.C.M. Ihekuna	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. R.A. Fatunase	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva

21. Delegation of Pakistan
Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.77.60

*Mr. Mohammed Yunus	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Dr. Humayun Khan	Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Khalid Saleem	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. A.A. Hashmi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

---

* Wife present

22. Delegation of Peru
Address: 1 rue d'Italie, 1204 Geneva
Tel. No: 28.67.02, 28.62.58, 28.80.47

*Mr. Alfonso Arias-Schreiber	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Gilbert Chauny	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Juan Aurich-Montero	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

23. Delegation of the Polish People's Republic
Address: 15 chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 98.11.61

*Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office in Geneva Head of the Delegation
*Mr. Andrzej Olszówka	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office in Geneva
*Mr. Henryk Pać	First Secretary Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Stanisław Konik	Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Warsaw
Col. Mirosław Kruczyk	Ministry of Defence Warsaw
Mr. Bogdan Russin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw

24. Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Address: 6 chemin de la Perrière, 1223 Cologny, Geneva
Tel No: 52.10.90

*Mr. Constantin Ene	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Dr. Valeriu Tudor	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. O. Ionescu	Counsellor Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gheorghe Tinca	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Constantin Ivascu	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva

25. Delegation of Sweden

Address: 9-11 rue de Varembé, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.36.00

Mrs. Inga Thorsson, M.P.	Under Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs Leader of the Delegation
*Baron Gustaf Hamilton	Ambassador Deputy Leader of the Delegation
Dr. Hans Blix	Under Secretary of State Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Lars Norberg	First Secretary of Embassy
*Captain (R.S.N.) Ulf Reinius	Military Adviser
Mr. Georg Andersson	Member of Parliament
Mr. Sture Ericsson	Member of Parliament
Mrs. Gunnel Jonäng	Member of Parliament
Mrs. Ingrid Sundberg	Member of Parliament
Mr. Rune Angström	Member of Parliament
Dr. Ulf Ericsson	Scientific Adviser Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Johan Lundin	Scientific Adviser, National Defence Research Institute
Dr. Jan Prawitz	Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence
Mrs. Désirée Edmar	Head of Section Ministry for Foreign Affairs

---

* Wife present

26. Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Address: 5 avenue de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 20
Tel. No: 33.18.70

*Mr. V.I. Likhatchev	Ambassador Representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament Head of Delegation
*Mr. B.P. Krassulin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr. N.V. Pesterev	Major General Adviser Ministry of Defence
Mr. P.F. Shakhov	Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Mr. I.P. Glazkov	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. L.A. Naoumov	Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. E.D. Zaïtsev	Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Y.V. Kostenko	Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Mr. A.I. Tiourenkov	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. G.A. Shevchenko	Attaché Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Delegation

27. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Address: 37-39 rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.38.00, 33.23.85

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Goronwy-Roberts of Caernarvon and Ogwen	Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. D.R. Ashe, CMG	Ambassador Alternate Leader of the Delegation
Mr. J.G. Taylor	Counsellor
*Mr. C.K. Curwen	Counsellor
*Mr. I.R. Kenyon	First Secretary
Mr. J.L. Jones	First Secretary and Private Secretary to the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

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* Wife present

28. Delegation of the United States of America
Address: 80 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 32.70.20, Ext. 306/321

*The Honorable Adrian S. Fisher	Ambassador of the United States of America Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Archelaus R. Turrentine	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Alternate Representative
*Mr. Alexander Akalovsky	Department of State Washington, D.C. Adviser
Major Roger N. Fritzel	Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. Adviser
**Mrs. Barbara Killian	Department of Energy Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico Adviser
Dr. Robert Mikulak	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Adviser
Miss Blair Murray	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Adviser

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* Wife present

** Husband present (Mr. Lawrence Germain)

29. Delegation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Address: 5 chemin Thury, 1206 Geneva
Tel.No.: 46.44.33

*Mr. Milos Lalović	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Dragomir Djokić	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr. Miodrag Mihajlović	Chief, Disarmament Section Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs Belgrade

30. Delegation of the Republic of Zaïre
Address: 32 rue de l'Athénée, 1206 Geneva
Tel. No: 47.83.22

Mr. Bintu'a-Tshiabola	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Lukabu K'Habouji	Second Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mulongandusu Esuk	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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* Wife present

CCD/INF.2/Rev.63/Add.1
16 February 1978

Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

page 11

22. Delegation of Peru

Add

Mr. Antonio Belaunde	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Replace Mr. Gilbert Chauny by:

Mr. Luis Chávez-Godoy	Minister-Counsellor Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

GE.78-82198

CCD/INF.2/Rev.63/Add.2
28 February 1978

Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS
OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

page 2

3. Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria

Amend:

*Dr. Petar Voutov	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation

4. Delegation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma

Add

U Tint So	Second Secretary Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, Bern

page 9

17. Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic

Insert before Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart:

Mr. Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ulan Bator

page 14

28. Delegation of the United States of America

Add

Dr. John Filsson	Department of Defence Adviser
Mr. Roger L. Hagengruber	Department of Energy Washington D.C. Adviser
Mr. Lawrence Turnbull	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington D.C. Adviser

CCD/INF.2/Rev.63/Add.3
13 March 1978
Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

page 8

16. Delegation of Mexico

Amend:

*Dr. Alfonso García Robles	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Leader of the Delegation

CCD/INF.2/Rev.63/Add.4
24 April 1978

Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

page 5

10. Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany

Replace Colonel Dr. K. Hannesschläger by:

*Captain (Navy) Helmut Müller	Military Adviser

page 13

27. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Replace Mr. J.G. Taylor by

Mr. Noel Marshall	Counsellor

page 14

28. Delegation of the United States of America

Delete

Dr. John Filsson and Mr. Lawrence Turnbull

Add

Ms. Margaret Finarelli	Bureau of Multilateral Affairs Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Mr. David R. Carlson	Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Department of State

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* Wife present

CCD/INF.2/Rev.64
25 July 1978
Original: ENGLISH

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. Delegation of Argentina

Address: 93 rue de la Servette, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.18.00

Mr. D. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Fernando Jimenez Dávila	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
Mr. D. Atilio N. Molteni	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative

2. Delegation of Brazil

Address: 35 rue Antoine-Carteret, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.31.50

Mr. George Maciel	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Mr. Aderbal Costa	Minister-Counsellor Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Italo Mastrogiovanni	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Guilherme Raymundo B. Arroio	Secretary Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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* Wife present

3. Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
Address: 16 chemin des Crêts-de-Pregny, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 98.03.00

Dr. Petar Voutov	Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Mr. Ilia Petrov	First Secretary Permanent Representation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Ivan Sotiroff	Second Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia

4. Delegation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
Address: Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
Giacomettistrasse 3
3006 Bern
Tel. No: (031) 43.30.24

U Saw Hlaing	Ambassador Designate to France and Switzerland Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern Leader of the Delegation
U Thein Aung	Chargé d'Affaires Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern
U Thaung Htun	Second Secretary Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern
U Kyee Myint	Second Secretary Embassy of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma Bern

5. Delegation of Canada
Address: 10A avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.19.50

*Mr. R. Harry Jay	Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. J.T. Simard	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative
*Mr. C. Sirois	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva

6. Delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
Address: 9 Ancienne Route, 1218 Grande Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 98.91.82

Dr. Miloslav Růžek	Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Dr. Evžen Zápotocký	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative
Mr. Jan Jirůšek	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Vladimír Rohal-Ilkiv	Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Prague

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* Wife present

7. Delegation of Egypt

Address: 72 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 31.65.30

Mr. Omran El-Shafei	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Mr. Fawzi M.L. El Ibrashi	Minister Plenipotentairy Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mohamed El-Baradei	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Taher Dinana	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Office at Geneva

8. Delegation of Ethiopia

Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.40.80

Mr. Tadesse Terrefe	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office in Geneva Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Gebrekidan Alula	Deputy Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Office in Geneva

9. Delegation of the German Democratic Republic
Address: 49 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.67.50

*Dr. Gerhard Herder	Ambassador Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of Delegation
Mr. Manfred Graczynski	Captain of the Navy Ministry of National Defence Military Adviser
Mr. Roland Eggert	Political Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10. Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany
Address: 28c chemin du Petit-Saconnex, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 31.97.70

*Dr. Gerhard Pfeiffer	Ambassador Head of Delegation
* Dr. Jürgen Pöhlmann	Counsellor Deputy Representative
* Capt. (Navy) Helmut Müller	Military Adviser

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* Wife present

11. Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic
Address: 20 rue Crespin, 1206 Geneva
Tel. No: 46.03.23

*Mr. Mátyás Domokos	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Istvân Körmendy	Second Secretary
Mr. András Lakatos	Third Secretary

12. Delegation of India
Address: 9 rue de Valais, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 32.08.59

*Mr. C.R. Gharekhan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. S.T. Devare	Counsellor Alternate Representative
*Mr. B. Balakrishnan	Second Secretary Adivser
Mr. Sharat Sobharwal	Third Secretary Adviser

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* Wife present

13. Delegation of Iran

Address: 28 chemin due Petit-Saconnex, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.30.04

*Mr. Manoutchehr Fartash	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
Miss Chirine Tahmasseb	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Dariush Chilaty	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Djahangir Ameri	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva

14. Delegation of Italy

Address: 10 chemin de l'Impératrice, 1292 Pregny, Geneva
Tel. No: 33.47.50

*Mr. Nicolo Di Bernardo	Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Mario Alessi	Minister Plenipotentiary Alternate Representative
Mr. Maurizio Moreno	Counsellor Alternate Representative
*Gen. Carlo Frateschi	Military Adviser
*Mr. Giuseppe Valdevit	First Secretary

---

* Wife present

15. Delegation of Japan

Address: 10 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.84.00

*Mr. Motoo Ogiso	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Teruyuki Sawai	Minister Deputy Leader of the Delegation Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. Yoshihiro Nakamura	First Secretary Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
*Mr. Takashi Hirokawa	Second Secretary Permanent Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

16. Delegation of Mexico

Address: 13 avenue de Budé, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.57.40

Mr. Alfonso García Robles	Ambassador Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Miguel Marín	Minister Counsellor Alternate Representative
Miss Alicia Cabrera	First Secretary Alternate Representative

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* Wife present

17. Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic

Address: 4 chemin des Mollies, 1293 Bellevue, Geneva
Tel. No: 74.19.74 74.19.75

*Dr. Dugersurengiin Erdembileg	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva

18. Delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco

Address: 22 chemin François Lehmann, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 98.15.35 98.15.36

*Mr. Ali Skalli	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mohammed Chraïbi	Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mohammed Maoulainine	Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Ali Boggi	Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations Office at Geneva

19. Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 33.73.50

*Mr. Richard H. Fein	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Arend J. Meerburg	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation

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* Wife present

20. Delegation of Nigeria

Address: 44 rue de Lausanne, 1201 Geneva
Tel. No: 31.91.49 31.91.40

*Mr. Olu Adeniji	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. K. Ahmed	Senior Counsellor Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Dr. B.C.M. Ihekuna	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. T.S.O. Olumoko	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. R.A. Fatunase	Third Secretary Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva

21. Delegation of Pakistan

Address: 56 rue de Moillebeau, 1209 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.77.60

*Mr. Mohammed Yunus	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Khalid Saleem	Counsellor Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. A.A. Hashmi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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* Wife present

22. Delegation of Peru

Address: 1 rue d'Italie, 1204 Geneva
Tel. No: 28.67.02 28.62.58 28.80.47

Mr. Alfonso Arias-Schreiber	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Alvaro de Soto	Counsellor Alternate Representative of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Juan Aurich Montero	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office at Geneva

23. Delegation of the Polish People's Republic

Address: 15 chemin de l'Ancienne Route, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, Geneva
Tel. No: 98.11.61

*Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of the Delegation
*Mr. Andrzej Olszówka	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Bogdan Russin	Counsellor Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Henryk Pać	First Secretary Permanent Representation of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Stanisław Przygodzki	Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Warsaw
Col. Mirosław Kruczyk	Ministry of Defence Warsaw

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* Wife present

24. Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Address: 6 chemin de la Perrière, 1223 Cologny, Geneva
Tel. No: 52.10.90

*Mr. Constantin Ene	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva Leader of the Delegation
*Dr. Valeriu Tudor	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Gheorghe Tinca	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva
*Mr. Constantin Ivascu	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva

25. Delegation of Sweden
Address: 9-11 rue de Varembé, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.36.00

Mrs. Inga Thorsson, M.P.	Under Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Curt Lidgard	Ambassador Deputy Leader of the Delegation
Dr. Hans Blix	Under Secretary of State Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Lars Norberg	First Secretary of Embassy
*Captain (R.S.N.) Ulf Reinius	Military Adviser
Mr. Georg Andersson	Member of Parliament
Mr. Sture Ericsson	Member of Parliament
Mrs. Gunnel Jonäng	Member of Parliament
Mrs. Ingrid Sundberg	Member of Parliament
Mr. Rune Angström	Member of Parliament
Dr. Ulf Ericsson	Scientific Adviser Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Johan Lundin	Scientific Adviser, National Defence Research Institute
Dr. Jan Prawitz	Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence
Mrs. Désirée Edmar	Head of Section Ministry for Foreign Affairs

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* Wife present

26. Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Address: 5 avenue de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 20
Tel. No: 33.18.70

*Mr. V.I. Likhatchev	Ambassador Representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament Head of Delegation
Mr. U.K. Nazarkin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr. N.V. Pesterev	Major General Adviser Ministry of Defence
Mr. P.F. Shakhov	Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. V. Ustinov	Adviser Ministry of Foreign Affairs
*Mr. A.I. Tiourenkov	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Y.V. Kostenko	Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. E.D. Zaïtzev	Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. E.K. Potiarkin	Attaché Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Delegation

27. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Address: 37-39 rue de Vermont, 1202 Geneva
Tel. No: 34.38.00 33.23.85

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Goronwy-Roberts of Caernarvon and Ogwen	Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Leader of the Delegation
*Sir Derek Ashe, KCMG	Ambassador Alternate Leader of the Delegation
Mr. Noel Marshall	Counsellor
*Mr. C.K. Curwen	Counsellor
*Mr. I.R. Kenyon	First Secretary
Mr. J.L. Jones	First Secretary and Private Secretary to the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

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* Wife present

28. Delegation of the United States of America

Address: 80 rue de Lausanne, 1202 Geneva
Tel.No: 32.70.20, Ext. 306/321

*The Honourable Adrian S. Fisher	Ambassador of the United States of America Leader of the Delegation
*Mr. Alexander Akalovsky	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Alternate Representative
Mr. Charles Flowerree	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Alternate Representative
Mr. Matthew Daley	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Adviser
Mr. Roger L. Hagengruber	Department of Energy Washington, D.C. Adviser
Ms. Blair L. Murray	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C. Adviser
Mr. Jospeh Taylor	Department of Energy Washington, D.C. Adviser

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* Wife present

29. Delegation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Address: 5 chemin Thury, 1206 Geneva
Tel. No: 46.44.33

*Mr. Milos Lalović	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of Delegation
*Mr. Dragomir Djokić	Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy Head of Delegation

30. Delegation of the Republic of Zaïre

Address: 32 rue de l'Athénée, 1206 Geneva
Tel. No: 47.83.22

Mr. Bintu'a-Tshiabola	Ambassador Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Lukabu K'Habouji	Second Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Mulongandusu Esuk	First Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaïre to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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* Wife present

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22 August 1978

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LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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11. Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic

Replace Mr. István Körmendy by:

*Mr. Csaba Györffy	Second Secretary

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17. Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic

Add:

Mr. Kh. Olzvoy	Attaché Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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28. Delegation of the United States of America

Add:

Dr. John Filson	Adviser, Department of Defence Washington, D.C.
Mr. Lawrence Turnbull	Adviser, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, D.C.
Mr. Robert Strand	Adviser, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.

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* Wife present

CCD/INF.3
9 March 1978

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INFORMATION FOR DELEGATIONS
RESEARCH AND REFERENCE COLLECTION

In view of the need expressed by various delegations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, members of the Secretariat and scholars for a comprehensive collection of United Nations documents dealing with disarmament negotiations as well as of publications and literature on armament and disarmament issues, a Research and Reference Collection has been established in Geneva in January 1978 by the Centre for Disarmament.

The Collection consists of UN documents (Geneva, New York) on disarmament issues, books, press clippings (Geneva, New York) periodicals (a list of which is attached), pamphlets, etc. The Collection also contains relevant UN documents as of 1946 including the UN Treaties Series on microfiche. A reader-printer machine is at the disposal of delegations for research which might involve the use of the microfiche. The Collection is open to delegations for consultation, and the Research Assistant is at their disposal to make available or prepare the required material.

The Research and Reference Collection of the Geneva Unit of the Centre for Disarmament maintains close co-operation with the UN Library and Mrs. Filiz Ertan (Research Assistant, A.648, ext 3027) acts as Liaison Officer to the Library. Delegations are invited to channel their book requests through her.[1/]

To finance the establishment of the Research Collection, a Trust Fund was opened in January 1978 within the framework of the Geneva Unit of the Centre for Disarmament. The scope of the Collection will be in proportion to the voluntary contributions in cash and kind (books, publications, etc. in all languages) received by the Trust Fund.

[1/] With regard to current CCD documents, delegations should address themselves, as in the past, to Mrs. S. Thompson-Micuta (A.642, ext. 3036).

PERIODICALS AVAILABLE THROUGH THE RESEARCH AND REFERENCE COLLECTION

The following periodicals are made available to the Research and Reference Collection by the UN Library. Each periodical will be at its disposal for a week following which it will have to be returned to the Library.

International Security
Nato's 15 Nations
Peace and the Sciences
Arms Control Today
Instant Research on Peace and Violence
Foreign Affairs
Peace Research
Pugwash Newsletter
International Peace Research Newsletter
NGO Bulletin
Orbis
Atom
Scientific American
Foreign Policy

Since these periodicals (monthly, weekly, quarterly) do not always reach the Research Collection on specific dates, delegations are invited to check with Mrs. Ertan at regular intervals regarding their availability. Articles on armament and disarmament issues contained in them are photocopied and kept on file for reference once the periodicals are returned to the UN Library.

INFORMATION FOR DELEGATIONS

Research and Reference Collection: Monthly List of Disarmament Related Articles

In accordance with the recommendation adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session that the research and information functions of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be extended, the Research and Reference Collection of the Centre for Disarmament Unit in Geneva will issue a monthly list of articles on disarmament and related issues, as published in various periodicals. The full text of these articles is available for consultation in the Reference Collection room A.648.

The attached first list covers issues of various periodicals which appeared between January and June 1978. Monthly addenda to this list will be issued regularly. The articles are grouped under the titles of the periodicals regularly examined by the Centre. Should delegations wish other publications to be added to this list, they are invited to inform the Research Assistant, Mrs. Ertan, on ext. 3027.

MONTHLY LIST OF SELECTED ARTICLES

I. ARMS CONTROL TODAY

a) BRAUCH, GUNTHER HANS: The Enhanced Radiation Warhead; A West German Perspective. Volume 8, No. 6, June 1978.

b) COLLINS, ARTHUR S., JR.: The Enhanced Radiation Warhead; A Military Perspective. Volume 8, No. 6, June 1978.

c) SCHERR, JACOB S. & CUBIE, JAMES M.: President Carter's "Plutonium Pause". Volume 8, No. 3, March 1978.

d) RHINELANDER, JOHN B.: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a Prelude to Salt II. Volume 8, No. 4, April 1978.

e) SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. III: The Outlook for the UN Special Session on Disarmament. Volume 8, No. 5, May 1978.

II. ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

a) BREWER, THOMAS L. (Eastern Michigan University): The International Atomic Energy Agency. Volume 4, No. 2, February 1978.

b) CANBY, STEVEN L. (Potamac, Maryland): European Mobilization, US and NATO Reserves. Volume 4, No. 2, February 1978.

c) LIPPERT, EKKEHARD, SCHNEIDER, PAUL AND ZOLL, RALF (Sozial wissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr) [Translated by Robert Shirer]: The Influence of Military Service on Political and Social Attitudes. Volume 4, No. 2, February 1978.

d) QUESTER, GEORGE H. (Cornell University): The Impact of Strategic Air Warfare. Volume 4, No. 2, February 1978.

e) WOLPIN, MILES D. (State University College): Marx and Radical Militarism in the Developing Nations. Volume 4, No. 2, February 1978.

III. DÉFENSE NATIONALE

a) BRÉHAT, VICTOR: Le genie de l'air - Armement Sovietique: Le Missile SS20. Mai 1978.

b) GAHERY, JEAN-LOUIS: La Strategie Sovietique en 1978; Cohérence et Continuité. Mai 1978.

c) GUILLEREZ, BERNARD: La défense a travers la presse. Mai 1978.

d) LALDY, JEAN: Coexistence Pacifique au Paix? Une vue perspective sur les rapports Est-Ouest. Mai 1978.

e) TILHERE, JACQUES: Etats-Unis: La capacité d'intervention Americaine. Mai 1978.

f) VERNANT, JACQUES: Une Nouvelle Strategie Americaine? Mai 1978.

IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

a) HEAD, RICHARD G., COLONEL: Technology and the Military Balance. April 1978.

b) NYE, JOSEPH S.: Non Proliferation: A Long-Term Strategy. April 1978.

V. FOREIGN POLICY

a) KAISER, KARL: The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements. No. 30, 1978.

VI. INSTANT RESEARCH ON PEACE AND VIOLENCE

a) SMITH, DAN (Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, London): Rivalry and Realignment in NATO. Volume 1, No. 1, 1978.

b) VESA, UNTO (Tompere Peace Research Institute): The Special Session on Disarmament: A Turning Point? Volume 1, No. 1, 1978.

VII. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

a) CHNOUPEK, B.: Détente and Czechoslovakia's Foreign Policy. No. 3, March 1978.

b) LEBSHKANOV, V.: The Arms Race and the NATO Eurogroup. No 3, March 1978.

c) MATVEYEV, V.: The Final Act: A guide for Decades to Come. No. 2, February 1978.

d) Nuclear Physicists Oppose the Neutron Bomb. No. 5, May 1978.

e) PODOLSKY, N.: Disarmament - Road to Lasting Peace. No. 2, February 1978.

f) SERGEYEV, Y.: The Arms Business. No. 3, March 1978.

g) STOLESHNIKOV, A.: The Neutron Weapon: A threat to Peace. No 5, May 1978.

h) TOMILIN, Y.: Eliminating the Nuclear Menace - An Urgent Task. No. 1, January 1978.

i) VICTOROV, V.: The Neutron Bomb: Weapon of Aggression. No. 4, April 1978.

j) VORONTSOV, G.: The US and Western Europe: Rivalry and Partnership. No. 3, March 1978.

k) YEMELYANOV, V.: Nuclear Energy and National Security. No. 4, April 1978.

l) YURYEV, G.: NATO's Rising Arms Bill. No. 4, April 1978.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

a) HOPMANN, TERRENCE P.: A symmetrical bargaining in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Volume 32, No. 1, Winter 1978.

b) SULLIVAN, MICHAEL J. III: Conference at the crossroads: Future prospects for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Volume 31, No. 4, Fall 1977.

IX. INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH NEWSLETTER

a) EIDE, ASBJØRN AND JOXE, ALAIN: COMMISSION I: Arms Production, Arms Transfers and the World Military Order. COMMISSION II: Military Rule and Fascism in the Third World. Volume XV, No. 1, 1978.

b) Research Institutions in the UN Special Session. Volume XVI, No. 2, 1978.

X. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

a) CANBY, STEVEN: Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective. Volume 2, No. 3, Winter 1978.

b) WOLF, CHARLES JR. AND LEEBAERT, DEREK: Trade Liberalization as a Path to Weapons Standardization in NATO. Volume 2, No. 3, Winter 1978.

c) YOUNG, WAYLAND: Disarmament: Thirty Years of Failure. Volume 2, No. 3, Winter 1978.

XI. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

a) Franco-German Collaboration ... The Political Context. No. 3, 1978.

b) The Republic of China; Facts and Figures on National Defense. No. 3, 1978.

c) 1977 - Year of Decision for the Armaments of the Bundeswehr. No. 3, 1978.

XII. NATO'S 15 NATIONS

a) APPLEYEARD, JAMES; GOODWIN, JACOB B., DEEN, THALIF AND KELLY, BRIDGET: US Arms Transfers to NATO - Past, Present, Future ... December 1977 - January 1978.

b) BAILEY-COWELL, G.M.: Strategically Your's. December 1977 - January 1978.

c) BAILEY-COWELL, G.M.: Focus on American Armament (1 and 2). December 1977-January 1978. February - March 1978.

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XII. NATO'S 15 NATIONS (Continued)

d) CARR, BOB (Member of Congress): The Neutron Bomb: Proceed, but with Caution. December 1977 - January 1978.

e) DAVIS, JACQUELYN K.: SALT and the Balance of Superpower Strategic Forces. February-March 1978.

f) GRAY, COLIN S.: Nuclear Weapons in NATO Strategy. February-March 1978.

g) GESSERT, ROBERT A.: United States Arms Export Policy and Weapons Co-operation. December 1977 - January 1978.

h) The Maritime Posture of Communist China. February-March 1978.

XIII. ORBIS

a) BRAUN, AUREL: Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

b) BROWN, THOMAS A.: Number Mysticism, Rationality and the Strategic Balance. Fall 1977.

c) CANE, JOHN W.: The Technology of Modern Weapons for Limited Military Use. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1977.

d) COPSON, RAYMOND W.: African International Politics: Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Seventies. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

e) CROMWELL, WILLIAM C.: Europe and the "Structure of Peace". Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

f) GRAY, COLIN S.: Who's Afraid of the Cruise Missile? Fall 1977.

g) REDICK, JOHN R.: Regional Restraint: US Nuclear Policy and Latin America. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

h) Reflections on the Quarter; The North Atlantic Commitment. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

i) RUBINSTEIN, ALVIN Z.: Israel in NATO: Basis for a Middle East Settlement? Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

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XIII. ORBIS (Continued)

j) SABROSKY, ALAN N.: Societal Values, Military Institutions and the Western Dilemma. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

k) SERFATY, SIMON: Conciliation and Confrontation: A strategy for North-South Negotiations. Volume 22, No. 1, Spring 1978.

XIV. PEACE AND THE SCIENCES

a) BRODA, ENGELBERT: Armaments and Global Problems. No. 4, December 1977.

b) KHOZIN, GREGORY S.: Ecological Imperatives for Disarmament. No. 4, December 1977.

XV. PEACE RESEARCH

a) HOWLETT, CHARLES F.: John Dewey's Views on Peace Education in America. Volume 10, No. 2, April 1978.

XVI. POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÉRE

a) KAISER, KARL: A la recherche d'un ordre nucléaire mondial. No. 2, 1978.

b) MATTEI, ANDRÉ: A propos des "Stratégies Nucléaires". No. 2, 1978.

XVII. PROJET

a) KLEIN, JEAN: La France et le Désarmement. No. 125, 1978.

XVIII. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

a) CERNY, JOSEPH AND POSKANZER, ARTHUR M.: Exotic Light Nuclei. 1978.

b) DICKINSON, DALE F.: Cosmic Masers. 1978.

c) ROSE, DAVID J., AND LESTER, RICHARD K.: Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons and International Stability. Volume 238, No. 4, April 1978.

d) KAPLAN, FRED M.: Enhanced Radiation Weapons. Volume 238, No. 5, May 1978.

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1 September 1978

ENGLISH ONLY

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Research and Reference Collection: Monthly List of Disarmament Related Articles

I. ARMS CONTROL TODAY

a) KANTER, Herschel: The U.S. Navy: Fleet of the Future or the Past? Volume 8, No.7, July 1978.

II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

a) BURT, Richard: The Scope and Limits of SALT. July 1978.

III. FOREIGN POLICY:

a) FRYE, Alton: Slow Fuse on the Neutron Bomb. No.31, Summer 1978.

b) COHEN, Eliot: NATO Standardization: The Perils of Common Sense. No.31, Summer 1978.

IV. INDIA QUARTERLY

a) JAISHANKAR, S.: The Israeli Nuclear Option: Volume XXXIV, No.1, January-March 1978.

V. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

a) BLOOMFIELD, Lincoln P. and CLEVELAND Harlan: A Strategy for the United States. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

b) BRODIE, Bernard: The Development of Nuclear Strategy. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

c) ELLSWORTH, Robert: New Imperatives for the Old Alliance. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

d) HART, Gary: The U.S. Senate and the Future of the Navy. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

e) HYDER, Osman Tariq: Inchoate Aspirations for World Order Change. /United Nations General Assembly Special Session Devoted to Disarmament/ Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

f) SIENKIEWICZ, Stanley: SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

g) SOHN, Louis B.: Disarmament and the Crossroads. Volume 2, No.4, Spring 1978.

VI. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

a) BREZARIĆ, J. Dr.: The United Nations and Nuclear Energy. Volume XXIX, July 5-20, 1978.

VII. THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

a) A convention for the Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons. Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

b) BAKER, Philip Noel: A Message for All Nations. Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

c) BARNABY, Frank: World Arsenals in 1977; A Report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

d) BAUER, Etienne and RIPKA, Georges: Is this Peace? Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

e) KINCADE, William H.: A Strategy for all Seasons; Targeting doctrine and strategic arms control. Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

f) KAWAKAMI, Koichi: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Japan. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

g) KENNAN, George F.: America's Relations with the Soviet Union. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

h) PATTERSON, Walter C.: The Windscale Report - A Nuclear Apologia. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

i) REPPY, Judith and LONG, F.A.: U.S. Military Research and Development: A Set of Questions. Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

j) ROTBLAT, J.: Nuclear Energy and Independence. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978

k) SALAFF, Stephen: The Lucky Dragon. /The Bikini Atoll/ Volume 34, No.5, May 1978.

l) SHARP, June M.O.: Isaiah Revisited, United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, Part II. Feasible initiatives for the United States. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

m) SWEET, William: The U.S. - India Safeguards Dispute. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

n) WARNKE, Paul C.: Arms Control: A Global Imperative. Volume 34, No.6, June 1978.

BOOK REVIEWS

a) ENERGY AND CONFLICT:

The Life and Times of Edward Teller, by
Stanley Blumberg and Gwinn Owens.

Putnam's, 1977, $12.95

Reviewed by: Barton J. Bernstein

b) STRATEGIC DISARMAMENT.

VERIFICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A Sipri Publication, by
Andrzej Karkazka

Taylor and Francis Limited (London), 1977

174 Pages, $16.50 (U.S.)

Reviewed by L. Sartori

Miscellaneous publications received

(a) White Paper on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
by Command of Her Majesty, July 1978.
Published by: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London

(b) Further Documents on Disarmament: The Disarmament Negotiations, 1976/1977
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
by Command of Her Majesty, July 1978.

(c) Abrustung und Rüstungskontrolle
Dokumente zur Haltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, May 1978.

(d) World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:

(e) Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:
Disarmament, Security and Development
26-31 August 1976.

(f) Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:
Peace and Security in a Changing World
24-29 August 1977

(g) 1977 Edition, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements:
Texts and History of Negotiations
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(h) The Annual Report for 1977:
International Atomic Energy Agency

(i) The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material:
International Atomic Energy Agency, June 1977

(j) The SALT Process:
Department of State Publication, June 1978
General Foreign Policy Series

(k) Power Reactors in Member States:
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1978

(l) International Red Cross Handbook
Conventions - Statutes and Regulations, Eleventh edition, 1971.

(m) Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary Suffering or have Indiscriminate Effects:
Report on the Work of Experts
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1973.

(n) The Red Cross and Biological and Chemical Weapons:
Extract from the "international review of the Red Cross", June 1970.

(o) Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977

(p) Working Paper on Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects:
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, June 1978.

(q) Swedish Arguments in the International Discussions on Extremely Inhumane Weapons:
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, May 1978.

(r) Balancing Non-Proliferation and Energy Security by Joseph Nye:
Uranium Institute London, July 12, 1978.